Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem

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Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem Alex Edmonds MAT 477 January 2014 Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 1 / 29

Incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic (Main Theorem): If the axioms of PA are true, then there is an L A -sentence G called the Gödel sentence of L A such that G is true and unprovable. In particular, PA G and PA G. Idea: Our proof constructs G explicitly. Loosely speaking, we want G to say, This sentence is unprovable. However, L A -formulas can t talk about L A -formulas. This motivates us to code L A -expressions into N using uniqe factorization into primes: Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 2 / 29

Gödel Numbers: We assign each L A -expression E a unique natural number E called the Gödel number (shortly g.n.) of E. To do this, assign each non-variable L A -symbol an odd code number; the code number of the variable symbol v k is 2k. For an L A -expression E given by the sequence of symbols {s 1,..., s k } with corresponding code numbers {c 1,..., c k }, the Gödel number of E is defined as E = π c 1 1 πc 2 2... πc k k where π i denotes the i th prime. e.g. Say code number of S is 7. Then, v 3 = 2 2 3 and Sv 3 = 2 7 3 2 3. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 3 / 29

Super Gödel Numbers: We may also code sequences of L A -expressions with N. Let P = {E 1,..., E k } be a sequence of L A -expressions with corresponding Gödel numbers {g 1,..., g k }. The super Gödel number (shortly sup. g.n.) of P is defined by [P] = π g 1 1 πg 2 2... πg k k. Diagonalization: Gödel numbers allow formulas to be self-referential. In particular, for a formula ϕ of one free variable, define its diagonalization ϕ d as ϕ( ϕ ). However, we want more: formulas need to be able to express properties of formulas via their Gödel numbers. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 4 / 29

Expressability: A relation R on N k is called expressible in L A if there exists an L A -formula ϕ(v 1,..., v k ) such that, for all n 1,..., n k N, if R(n 1,..., n k ), then ϕ( n 1,..., n k ) is true; if not R(n 1,..., n k ), then ϕ( n 1,..., n k ) is true. Say function f : N k N is expressible if the relation f(n 1,..., n k ) = n k+1 is expressible. e.g. The function x y is expressed by x = y + z. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 5 / 29

Main Claim: The following functions and relations are expressible: function diag(n): satisfies, for every L A -formula ϕ, diag( ϕ ) = ϕ d rel. P rf(m, n): holds when m = [P], n = ϕ for some proof P of ϕ rel. Gdl(m, n): holds when m = [P], n = ϕ for some proof P of ϕ d We ll return to a proof of this later on. First, the heart of it all: Main Claim Main Theorem Proof: By Claim, there exists an L A -formula Gdl(x, y) which expresses Gdl. Let T(y) be the formula x Gdl(x, y). Let G be the diagonalization Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 6 / 29

of T(y), namely x Gdl(x, T ). Then, G false There exists m N such that Gdl(m, T ) There exists m N such that, for some finite sequence P of L A -formulas, m = P and P is a proof of diag. of T, namely G G is provable (Compare to This sentence is unprovable. ) Now, by soundness, G provable G is true. Therefore, G is true and unprovable. By soundness again, G is also unprovable. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 7 / 29

Primitive recursive functions Def: f is defined from g and h by primitive recursion if: f( x, 0) = g( x) f( x, Sy) = h( x, y, f( x, y)) Def: The primivitive recursive (shortly p.r.) functions are: The initial functions, namely the successor function S, the zero functions Z k, and the co-ordinate functions Ii k; Any composition of p.r. functions; Any function defined by primitive recursion from p.r. functions. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 8 / 29

Proposition: {p.r. functions} {expressible functions} Proof: It suffices to show (1) L A expresses the initial functions; (2) L A expresses g and h L A expresses any composition of g and h; (3) L A expresses g and h L A expresses any function defined by primitive recursion from g and h. Proving (1) is trivial: S is expressed by Sx = y; Z k by y = 0; I k i by v i = y. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 9 / 29

(2): If functions g(x) and h(x) are expressed by G(x,y) and H(x,y), then their composition f(x) = h(g(x)) is expressed by z(g(x, z) H(z, y)). (3) is tricky and relies on a sort of Gödel numbering again. Suppose H(x, y) expresses h(x) = y. Let f (x) be defined primitive recursively by f(0) = a and f(sx) = h(f(x)). Note that f(x) = y iff (A) There is a sequence of numbers k 0, k 1,..., k x such that: k 0 = a; for u < x, k Su = h(k u ); and k x = y. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 10 / 29

For any such sequence k 0, k 1,..., k n, we wish to encode it by a pair of numbers c and d. We need a function β(c, d, i) = i th element of the sequence coded by c and d. A result from number theory (see Appendix) tells us that, for every sequence k 0,..., k n, there exists c, d s.th., for all i n, k i is the remainder of c divided by d(i + 1) + 1. Hence, taking β(c, d, i) to be said remainder, (A) may be reformulated as (B) There exists c, d such that: β(c, d, 0) = a; For u < x, β(c, d, Su) = h(β(c, d, u)); And β(c, d, x) = y Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 11 / 29

Easy fact: The remainder function is expressible. It follows β is expressible. Say B(c,d,i,k) expresses β(c, d, i) = k. Then, (B) may be translated into L A as (C) c d{b(c,d,0,ā) ( u x) [u x v w{b(c,d,u,v) B(c,d,Su,w) H(v,w)}] B(c,d,x,y)} We may conclude that f is expressible in L A. This argument generalizes easily to the multivariable case. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 12 / 29

Constructing our p.r. fucntions a sketch It remains to show that the functions and relations we need are p.r. This is a large but mostly mechanical task aided by the following. Four useful facts: (1) f( x) p.r. function f( x) = y is a p.r. relation (2) Truth-functional combinations (conjunction, implication etc.) of p.r. relations are p.r. (3) A relation defined from a p.r. relation by bounded quantification is p.r. (4) Functions defined by p.r. cases from p.r. functions are p.r. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 13 / 29

Claim: Relation T erm(n), which holds when n = τ for a term τ, is p.r. Our proof uses the following useful notion: Def: A term-sequence is a finite sequence of expressions such that each is either: a. 0; b. a variable symbol; c. Sτ where τ is an expression which appears earlier in the sequence; Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 14 / 29

d. (τ 1 + τ 2 ) where τ 1 and τ 2 are earlier expressions in the sequence; or e. (τ 1 τ 2 ) where τ 1 and τ 2 are earlier expressions in the sequence. Note that an expression is a term iff it is the last expression in some term sequence. Before proceeding with Claim, we need: Lemma 1: relation V ar(n), which holds iff n is g.n. of a variable, is p.r. Lemma 2: relation T ermseq(m, n), which holds iff m = [T] and n = τ for a term-sequence T ending in τ, is p.r. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 15 / 29

Basic Fact: The following functions are primitive recursive: prime(i), returns the i th prime len(n), returns the number of distinct prime factors of n. In particular, len( E ) is length of L A -expression E; len([t]) length of term-sequence T exp(n, i), returns degree of i th prime in factorization of n. Importantly, for sequence of expressions E, exp([e], i) returns g.n. of i th expression in E m n, which returns the g.n. of the concactenation of the expression with g.n. m and the expression with g.n. n. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 16 / 29

Proof of Lemma 1 (i.e. that V ar(n) is p.r.) The g.n. of the variable v k is 2 2k. Hence, V ar(n) k(n = 2 2k ). However, unbounded quantification is not necessarily p.r.-preserving. This is dealt with by noting that n = 2 2k k < n. Hence, V ar(n) ( k < n)(n = 2 2x ) which is constructed in p.r. preserving ways. Therefore, V ar(n) is p.r. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 17 / 29

Proof of Lemma 2 (i.e. that T ermseq(m, n) is p.r. easy but technical) T ermseq(m, n) is equivalent to the statement (1) exp(m, len(m)) = n; and (2) for 1 k len(m): a exp{m, k} = 0 ; or b V ar(exp(m, k)); or c ( j < k)(exp(m, k) = S exp(m, j)); or d ( i < k)( j < k)(exp(m, k) = ( exp(m, j) + exp(m, j) ) ) Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 18 / 29

or e ( i < k)( j < k)(exp(m, k) = ( exp(m, j) exp(m, j) ) ) Indeed, (1) guarantees that the sequence with super g.n. m ends with the expression with g.n. n. Also, (2) guarrantees that m is actually the g.n. of a term sequence. In particular, a, b, c, d, e correspond to a, b, c, d, e, resp. Since the relation above is constructed in p.r.-preserving ways from p.r. functions and relations, conclude T erm(m, n) is p.r. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 19 / 29

Proof of Claim: T erm(n) m T ermseq(m, n), but again we need quantification to be bounded. Suppose [T] = π d1 1... π d k k for a term-sequence T of τ. Length of T is bounded by length of τ, i.e. k len(n). Also, [T] π k max i d i k and max i d i n. Therefore, T erm(n) ( m prime(len(n)) n(len(n) ) T ermseq(m, n). Since the relation is constructed from p.r. relations in p.r. preserving ways, it is p.r. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 20 / 29

Using construction histories: Note that our definitions of term-sequence and term aren t very different from our definitions of proof an provability. Not suprisingly then, the proof that P rf(m, n) is p.r. is very close to the proof for T erm(m, n). Actually, most of the important proofs of primivitive recursiveness that we want (i.e. for formulas, sentences, axioms) follow the same structure. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 21 / 29

Sketch that Prf(m,n) is p.r. Fact: We ll omit a proof that following relations are p.r.: Sent(n), holds when n = ϕ for some sentence ϕ; Axiom P A (n), holds when n = ϕ for some axiom ϕ of PA; Ded(l, m, n), holds when l = ϕ, m = ψ, n = γ, where sentence γ follows by rule of deduction from sentences ϕ and ψ. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 22 / 29

Then, P rf(m, n) is equivalent to the statement: exp(m, len(m)) = n; and Sent(n); and k len(m){ Axiom P A (exp(m, k)), or ( i k)( j < k)[ded(exp(m, i), exp(m, j), exp(m, k)] } which is constructed from p.r. functions in p.r.-preserving ways. This result completes part of the proof of Main Claim. We ll omit the rest. Important Note: The only facts about PA we use in the proof of Main Theorem are to show that Axiom P A (n) is primitive recursive!! Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 23 / 29

Generalizing the incompleteness argument We have shown that PA is incomplete. The obvious question is whether PA is completable. That is to say, can we add axioms to PA so that, for every sentence ϕ, either ϕ or ϕ is provable? No! Since the only fact used about PA is that Axiom P A (n) is p.r., our argument holds for any theory T where Axiom T (n) is p.r. We call such a theory p.r. axiomatized. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 24 / 29

Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem (Semantic Version) Let T be a theory whose language includes L A. Suppose T is p.r. axiomatized and all L A axioms of T are true. Then, there exists an L A -sentence ϕ such that T ϕ and T ϕ. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 25 / 29

Appendix: Beta-function Def: Let rem(c, d) denote the remainder when c is divided by d. Def: For d = d 0,..., d n N n, c N, let Rm(c, d) = k 0,..., k n where k i = rem(c, d i ). β-theorem: For every sequence k N n, there exists c, d N such that Rm(c, d) = k, where d i = d(i + 1) + 1. In particular, i n β(c, d, i) := rem(c, d(i + 1) + 1) = k i. To prove this, we need: Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 26 / 29

Chinese Remainder Theorem: Let d = d 0,..., d n and suppose all d i are relatively prime. Then, for distinct c 1, c 2 < d := d 0... d n, Rm(c 1, d) Rm(c 2, d). Proof: By way of contradiction, assume Rm(c 1, d) = Rm(c 2, d). Let c = c 1 c 2, Then each d i divides c. Since d i are relatively prime, this implies d = d 0... d n divides c. Hence, d c max{c 1, c 2 }. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 27 / 29

Proof of β-theorem Step 1: Let s = max{n, k 1,..., k n } and let d = s!. For i n, the numbers d i := d(i + 1) + 1 are relatively prime. Indeed, suppose otherwise. Then, there exists distinct i, j n s.th. both d(i + 1) + 1 and d(j + 1) + 1 are divisible by p. In particular, p divides d i j. Also, since p divides d(i + 1) + 1, p does not divide d. Hence, p divides (i j) n s, i.e. p s. But, if p doesn t divide d = s!, then p > s. Contradiction. Conclude d i s are relatively prime. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 28 / 29

Step 2: Note that, for all c, Rm(c, d) S 1 S n where S i = {0, 1,..., d i 1}. Furthermore, S 1 S k = d 0... d n = d. The Chinese Remainder Theorem says each c < d is mapped to a distinct element, i.e. Rm(c, d) takes on d many values for c < d. Therefore, Rm(c, d) takes on each a S 1 S n for c < d. Since k S 1 S n, this completes the proof. Alex Edmonds (2014) Gödel s First Incompleteness Theorem January 2014 29 / 29