Multivariate Stress Testing for Solvency

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Multivariate Stress Testing for Solvency Alexander J. McNeil 1 1 Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh Vienna April 2012 a.j.mcneil@hw.ac.uk AJM Stress Testing 1 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors 1 Introduction Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors 2 3 AJM Stress Testing 2 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors 1 Introduction Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors AJM Stress Testing 3 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors Limitations of Stress Testing in Crisis... weaknesses in infrastructure limited the ability of banks to identify and aggregate exposures across the bank. This weakness limits the effectiveness of risk management tools - including stress testing.... Prior to the crisis most banks did not perform stress tests that took a comprehensive firm-wide perspective across risks and different books Methodological shortcomings Shocking single parameters/risk factors. Limited! Shocking many risk factors simultaneously. How? Using historical events. Not able to capture risks in new products; not severe enough Using hypthetical stress tests. Guessing! Prior to crisis difficult to obtain senior management buy-in for more extreme scenarios. AJM Stress Testing 4 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors FSA Proposes Reverse Stress Test We are proposing to introduce a reverse-stress test requirement which would apply to banks building societies CRD investment firms and insurers and would require firms to consider the scenarios most likely to cause their current business model to become unviable. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp08_24_newsletter.pdf How exactly is a reverse stress test to be constructed. And how does it differ from a standard (forward) stress test? AJM Stress Testing 5 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors Aims of Presentation 1 To define a stress test and relate stress tests to the theory of risk measures. 2 To define a reverse stress test. 3 To discuss the construction of multivariate scenario sets for stress testing. 4 To give an overview of the elegant theory of stress testing for linear portfolios (which underlies a lot of standard procedures). This section draws on work by [McNeil and Smith 2010] and unpublished material in second edition of [McNeil et al. 2005]. AJM Stress Testing 6 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors 1 Introduction Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors AJM Stress Testing 7 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors Set-up We fix a probability space (Ω F P) and a set of financial risks M defined on this space. These risks are interpreted as portfolio or position losses over some fixed time horizon. We assume that M is a linear space containing constants so that if L 1 L 2 M m R and k > 0 then L 1 + L 2 L 1 + m kl 1 M. A risk measure is a mapping ϱ : M R with the interpretation that ϱ(l) gives the amount of equity capital that is needed to back a position with loss L. A stress test is considered as an example of a risk measure. AJM Stress Testing 8 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors General Definition For a particular portfolio loss L M a stress test is carried out by computing ϱ(l) = sup {L(ω) : ω S} for some subset S Ω. We consider a set of possible scenarios S that could take place over the time horizon and work out what the worst loss could be under these scenarios. This might be used to set capital. We also want to identify a ω 0 such that L(ω 0 ) = ϱ(l). (The sup will usually be a max.) The scenario ω 0 is sometimes called the least solvent likely event (LSLE). Probabilistic considerations enter in the choice of S. AJM Stress Testing 9 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors Scenarios Based on Risk Factors Typically losses will be related to a d-dimensional random vector of risk factors X (equity interest-rate FX spread movements etc.) by L = l(x). Let Ω = R d and let each x Ω represent a scenario for changes in these risk factors over the time period. The stress test is then ϱ(l) = sup {l(x) : x S} for some subset of scenarios S R d. Possibilities include A set of point scenarios S = {x 1... x m }. An ellipsoidal scenario set S = {x : (x µ) Σ 1 (x µ) k} for some parameters µ Σ and k. The latter corresponds to Studer s maximum loss concept. [Studer 1997 Studer 1999 Breuer et al. 2009 Breuer et al. 2010] AJM Stress Testing 10 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors Stress Tests as Risk Measures Stress tests are special cases of a class of risk measures known as generalized scenarios. These risk measures take the form ϱ(l) = sup {E Q (L) : Q Q} where Q is a set of probability measures. In the stress test Q is a set of Dirac measures {δ x : x S} which place all the probability on each scenario in S in turn. Generalized scenarios are coherent measures of risk. (Under some technical conditions all coherent measures of risk can be shown to be generalized scenarios.) In particular situations we can represent well known coherent risk measures as stress tests as will later be seen. AJM Stress Testing 11 / 50

Linear Portfolios Introduction Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors In reality the losses are likely to be non-linear functions of risk factors due to the presence of derivative-like assets (and liabilities) in a typical bank or insurance portfolio. But it is useful to consider portfolios with a linear dependence on risk factors for a number of reasons. Linear (delta) approximations are commonly applied in bank risk management. Some standard approaches are justified only under linear assumptions. We will often consider linear portfolio losses in the set } M = {L : L = m + λ X m R λ R d. (1) AJM Stress Testing 12 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors 1 Introduction Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors AJM Stress Testing 13 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors How to Aggregate Single Factor Stresses? It is common practice to stress risk factors one at a time. For example one might consider the impact in isolation of an equity market shock of x% or a shift of y basis points in the yield curve or a z% spike in the default rate of loans. How can we aggregate the resulting losses to take into account dependencies in these scenarios? Should we simply add them up? Should we overlay correlation assumptions? (Solvency II standard formula.) AJM Stress Testing 14 / 50

A Possible Aggregation Formula Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors 1 The d risk factors are stressed one at a time in isolation by pre-determined amounts k 1... k d R. 2 Let L = l(x). The corresponding losses relative to baseline L i = l(k i e i ) l(0) i = 1... d are computed where e i are unit vectors and we assume L i > 0. 3 The overall stress test is computed using the formula ϱ(l) = l(0) + d i=1 j=1 d ρ ij L i L j where the ρ ij are a set of correlation parameters forming elements of a symmetric matrix. Summation is a special case when the ρ ij = 1 for all i and j. AJM Stress Testing 15 / 50

When Is This Principles Based? Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors When does this coincide with a proper stress test ϱ(l) = sup{l(x) : x C} for some appropriate set of multivariate scenarios C? Theorem Let M be the linear portfolio space in (1) and let L = l(x) = m + λ X M. Let ϱ(l) be given by the aggregation procedure described on previous slide. Provided the matrix P = (ρ ij sgn(k i )sign(k j )) is positive-definite we can write ϱ(l) = sup{l(x) : x C} where C is the ellipsoidal set C = { x : x Σ 1 x 1 } specified by Σ = diag(σ 1... σ d )Pdiag(σ 1... σ d ) where σ i = k i. AJM Stress Testing 16 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors What Justifies Ellipsoidal Scenario Sets? We can interpret the correlation-adjusted summation rule as a computational recipe for a stress test when portfolios are linear and the scenario set is ellipsoidal. An ellipsoidal scenario set can be justified by the assumption of a multivariate normal distribution or an elliptical distribution for the risk factors. For elliptical distributions the contours of equal density are ellipsoids. The depth sets are also ellipsoidal as we will see in the next section. Both the elliptical and linear assumptions are strong assumptions which are unlikely to hold in practice. The summation rule which appears conservative can actually understate the risk in the presence of non-linearities. AJM Stress Testing 17 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors 1 Introduction Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors AJM Stress Testing 18 / 50

Regulation General Definition of Stress Test Stressing Single Risk Factors Recall that in a standard forward stress test we want to compute ϱ(l) = sup {l(x) : x S} for some subset of scenarios S R d and we want to identify the scenario that is responsible for the worst case loss. If S is closed this means x LSLE = arg max {l(x) : x S} In a reverse stress test we restrict attention to ruin scenarios R = { x R d : l(x) > 0 }. We want to know the most plausible ways of being ruined that is the scenarios in R that are most probable or likely. For continuous distributions on R d this could be measured in terms of density or another concept known as depth. AJM Stress Testing 19 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions 1 Introduction 2 What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions 3 AJM Stress Testing 20 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions 2 What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions AJM Stress Testing 21 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions In One Dimension For a single risk factor X we can use an inter-quantile range to define a set of plausible scenarios particularly when X has a well-behaved unimodal distribution. For 0 < θ < 1 let q θ (X) denote the θ-quantile of X. Assume that X has a continuous and strictly increasing distribution function so that q θ (X) is always unambiguously defined. For any α satisfying 1 > α > 0.5 the inter-quantile interval I = [q 1 α (X) q α (X)] forms a set satisfying P(I) = 2α 1. For large α it is very likely that X will fall in this range. This is not the only interval with probability 2α 1. Can also create sets which maximise the minimum density. AJM Stress Testing 22 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions An Example Sets with 95% probability density(x) 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 quantile based density based 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 x AJM Stress Testing 23 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions 2 What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions AJM Stress Testing 24 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions Notation for Higher-Dimensional Case For any point y R d and any directional vector u R d \ {0} consider the closed half space H yu = { x R d : u x u y } bounded by the hyperplane through y with normal vector u. The probability of the half-space is written P X (H yu ) = P(u X u y). We define an α-quantile function on R d \ {0} by writing q α (u) for the α-quantile of the random variable u X. AJM Stress Testing 25 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions The Scenario Set Let α > 0.5 be fixed. We write our scenario set in two ways: 1 Q α = {H yu : P X (H yu ) α} 2 the intersection of all closed half spaces with probability at least α; Q α = {x : u x q α (u) u} (2) the set of points for which linear combinations are no larger than the quantile function. The set Q α is sometime referred to as a depth set consisting of points that are at least 1 α deep into the distribution. AJM Stress Testing 26 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions Two Independent Exponentials Q 0.95 x2 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 x1 AJM Stress Testing 27 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions Two Independent Exponentials Q 0.75 x2 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 x1 AJM Stress Testing 28 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions A bivariate Student distribution Q 0.95 x2 4 2 0 2 4 4 2 0 2 4 x1 ν = 4 ρ = 0.7 AJM Stress Testing 29 / 50

What are Plausible/Likely Scenarios? Quantiles in Higher Dimensions Commentary on examples Note how the depth set in the exponential case has a smooth boundary for α = 0.95. (Supporting hyperplanes in every direction.) Note how the depth set in the exponential case has a sharp corners for α = 0.75. (No supporting hyperplanes in some directions.) The depth set for an elliptical distribution is an ellipsoid. For elliptical distributions both the contours of equal depth and the contours of equal density are ellipsoidal. AJM Stress Testing 30 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall 1 Introduction 2 3 Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall AJM Stress Testing 31 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall 3 Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall AJM Stress Testing 32 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall Coherent Risk Measures as Scenarios Recall the definition of the linear portfolio set } M = {L : L = m + λ X m R λ R d and recall that a risk measure ϱ is coherent if it satisfies the following axioms: Monotonicity. L 1 L 2 ϱ(l 1 ) ϱ(l 2 ). Translation invariance. For m R ϱ(l + m) = ϱ(l) + m. Subadditivity. For L 1 L 2 M ϱ(l 1 + L 2 ) ϱ(l 1 ) + ϱ(l 2 ). Positive homogeneity. For λ 0 ϱ(λx) = λϱ(x). AJM Stress Testing 33 / 50

Duality Result Introduction Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall Theorem A risk measure ϱ on the linear portfolio set M is coherent if and only if it has the stress test representation ϱ(l) = ϱ(m + λ X) = sup{m + λ x : x S ϱ } where S ϱ is the scenario set S ϱ = {x R d : u x ϱ(u X) u R d }. The scenario set is a closed convex set and we may conclude that ϱ(l) = ϱ(m + λ X) = m + λ x LSLE. (3) AJM Stress Testing 34 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall 3 Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall AJM Stress Testing 35 / 50

The Case of VaR Introduction Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall Let us suppose the risk measure ϱ = VaR α for some value α > 0.5. Then the scenario set S ϱ is as given in (2) i.e. {x R d : u x q α (u) u R d } = Q α. But when is VaR α a coherent risk measure? Theorem Suppose that X E d (µ Σ ψ) (an elliptical distribution centred at µ with dispersion matrix Σ and type ψ) and let M be the space of linear portfolios. Then VaR α is coherent on M for α > 0.5. AJM Stress Testing 36 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall The Case of VaR for Elliptical Distributions In the elliptical case the scenario set is Q α = {x : (x µ) Σ 1 (x µ) k 2 α} where k α = VaR α (Y ) and Y E 1 (0 1 ψ). Moreover the LSLE can be calculated by the method of Lagrange multipliers and is x LSLE = µ + Σλ λ Σλ k α. The corresponding stress loss is VaR α (m + λ X) = m + λ x LSLE = m + λ µ + λ Σλk α. AJM Stress Testing 37 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall The Case of VaR for Non-Elliptical Distributions In the non-elliptical case it may happen that VaR α is not coherent on M for some value of α. In such situations we may find portfolio weights λ such that VaR α (L) = VaR α (m + λ X) > sup { m + λ x : x Q α }. Such a situation was shown earlier. It occurs when some lines bounding half-spaces with probablity α are not supporting hyperplanes for the set Q α i.e. they do not touch it. In such situations we can construct explicit examples to show that VaR α violates the property of subadditivity. AJM Stress Testing 38 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall Two Independent Exponentials Q 0.65 x2 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 x1 AJM Stress Testing 39 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall Demonstration of Super-Additivity In previous slide we set α = 0.65 and consider loss L = X 1 + X 2. Diagonal line is x 1 + x 2 = q α (X 1 + X 2 ) which obviously intersects axes at (0 q α (X 1 + X 2 )) and (q α (X 1 + X 2 ) 0). Horizontal (vertical) lines are at 0 q α (X 1 ) and 2q α (X 1 ). We infer 1 x 1 + x 2 < q α(x 1 + X 2 ) in the depth set; 2 sup {x 1 + x 2 : x Q α} is a poor lower bound 3 q α(x 1 + X 2 ) > q α(x 1 ) + q α(x 2 ) (non-subadditivity of quantile risk measure) AJM Stress Testing 40 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall 3 Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall AJM Stress Testing 41 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall The Case of Expected Shortfall Consider the expected shortfall risk measure ϱ = ES α which is known to be a coherent risk measure given by 1 α ES α (L) = VaR θ(l)dθ α (0.5 1) 1 α and write e α (u) := ES α (u X). Since expected shortfall is a coherent risk measure (irrespective of X) it must have the stress test representation ES α (L) = ϱ(m + λ X) = sup{m + λ x : x E α } where E α := {x : u x e α (u) u}. AJM Stress Testing 42 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall The Case of ES for Elliptical Distributions If X E d (µ Σ ψ) is elliptically distributed then the scenario set is simply the ellipsoidal set E α = {x : (x µ) Σ 1 (x µ) l 2 α} where l α = ES α (Y ) and Y E 1 (0 1 ψ). The LSLE is given by x LSLE = µ + Σλ λ Σλ l α. AJM Stress Testing 43 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall The Case of ES for Non-Elliptical Distributions x2 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 The set E 0.65. Recall that Q 0.65 did not have smooth boundary. x1 AJM Stress Testing 44 / 50

Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall 3 Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall AJM Stress Testing 45 / 50

Most likely ruin event Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall We use depth as a measure of plausibility and define it to be depth(x) = sup {θ : x Q 1 θ } the largest θ for which x is in the depth set Q 1 θ. The most likely ruin event (MLRE) for linear portfolios will be x MLRE = arg max { depth(x) : m + λ x 0 }. AJM Stress Testing 46 / 50

Elliptical Case Introduction Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall We have a simple optimization to solve: x MLRE = arg min{(x µ) Σ 1 (x µ) : m + λ x 0}. This has the solution: x MLRE = µ Σλ ( m + λ λ µ ). Σλ AJM Stress Testing 47 / 50

Non-Elliptical Case: Two Exponentials In the example we set l(x) = 3x 1 + 5x 2 25. Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall x2 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 x2 AJM Stress Testing 48 / 50

References Introduction Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall Artzner P. Delbaen F. Eber J. and Heath D. (1999). Coherent measures of risk. Math. Finance 9:203 228. Breuer T. Jandačka M. Mencia J. and Summer M. (2010). A systematic approach to multi-period stress testing of portfolio credit risk. Technical Report Working Paper 1018 Banco de España. Breuer T. Jandačka M. Rheinberger K. and Summer M. (2009). How to find plausible severe and useful stress scenarios. Technical Report Working Paper 150 Österreichische Nationalbank. AJM Stress Testing 49 / 50

References (cont.) Introduction Stress Test Representations for Standard Risk Measures Value-at-Risk Expected Shortfall McNeil A. and Smith A. (2010). Multiariate stress scenarios and solvency. working paper. Studer G. (1997). Maximum loss for measurement of market risk. PhD thesis ETH Zürich. Studer G. (1999). Market risk computation for nonlinear portfolios. Journal of Risk 1(4):33 53. AJM Stress Testing 50 / 50