Math for Liberal Studies

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Transcription:

Math for Liberal Studies

We want to measure the influence each voter has As we have seen, the number of votes you have doesn t always reflect how much influence you have

In order to measure the power of each voter, we will determine the number of times each voter is pivotal For example, consider the system [8: 5, 4, 3, 2] A has 5 votes B has 4 votes C has 3 votes D has 2 votes

Start off with each voter voting no Then we go down the line, switching each vote from no to yes until the motion passes

First we switch A s vote But there are still only 5 votes in favor, so the motion still fails

Now we switch A s vote The quota is 8, so the motion passes We say that B is the pivotal voter

If we had arranged the voters differently, then the pivotal voter would have been different For the Shapley-Shubik power index, we need to consider all of the different ways the voters can be arranged All of these arrangements are called permutations

Let s examine another permutation Again, start with all votes being no and switch them one at a time until the motion passes

Switch C s vote The motion still fails, so keep going

Switch B s vote The motion still fails, so keep going

Switch A s vote The motion passes, so A is the pivotal voter

We consider every possible permutation and find the pivotal voter for each one The Shapley-Shubik power index is the fraction of times each voter was pivotal Each power index is a fraction: the numerator is the number of times the voter was pivotal, and the denominator is the total number of permutations

For 3 voters, there are 3 2 1 = 6 permutations For 4 voters, there are 4 3 2 1 = 24 permutations For 5 voters, there are 5 4 3 2 1 = 120 permutations For 51 voters (the US Electoral College, for example), there are 51 50 49 3 2 1 permutations. This number is 67 digits long!

Our example was [8: 5, 4, 3, 2] There are 24 permutations: ABCD BACD CABD DABC ABDC BADC CADB DACB ACBD BCAD CBAD DBAC ACDB BCDA CBDA DBCA ADBC BDAC CDAB DCAB ADCB BDCA CDBA DCBA

Our example was [8: 5, 4, 3, 2] For each permutation, determine the pivotal voter just like the earlier examples: ABCD BACD CABD DABC ABDC BADC CADB DACB ACBD BCAD CBAD DBAC ACDB BCDA CBDA DBCA ADBC BDAC CDAB DCAB ADCB BDCA CDBA DCBA

We see that A was pivotal 10 times B was pivotal 6 times C was pivotal 6 times D was pivotal 2 times So the Shapley-Shubik power indices are: Power of A = 10/24 Power of B = 6/24 Power of C = 6/24 Power of D = 2/24

[10: 6, 4, 3] ABC BAC CAB ACB BCA CBA

[10: 6, 4, 3] ABC BAC CAB ACB BCA CBA

[10: 6, 4, 3] Power of A = 3/6 Power of B = 3/6 Power of C = 0/6 C is a dummy voter ABC BAC CAB ACB BCA CBA

When we considered the Shapley-Shubik power index, we examined all possible permutations of voters Now we will look at all possible coalitions of voters

A coalition is a set of voters who are prepared to vote together for or against a motion A winning coalition has enough votes to pass a motion A blocking coalition has collective veto power: enough votes to defeat a motion

Consider the system [10: 8, 5, 3, 1] with the voters named A, B, C, and D {A, B} is a winning coalition since they have 13 votes; this is also a blocking coalition {B, C, D} is not a winning coalition since they only have 9 votes; however, this is a blocking coalition

If the total number of votes is T and the quota is Q A coalition with at least Q votes is a winning coalition A coalition with at least T Q + 1 votes is a blocking coalition

With 3 voters, there are 2 2 2 = 8 coalitions With 4 voters, there are 2 2 2 2 = 16 coalitions With 5 voters, there are 2 2 2 2 2 = 32 coalitions With 51 voters (like the US Electoral College), there are 2 2 2 2 = 2 51 coalitions. This is a 16 digit number!

In a winning coalition, a voter is critical to the coalition if removing the voter makes the coalition no longer winning In a blocking coalition, a voter is critical to the coalition if removing the voter makes the coalition no longer blocking

Our example was [10: 8, 5, 3, 1] {A, B} is a winning coalition, and removing either A or B makes the coalition no longer winning, so A and B are both critical {A, B} is also a blocking coalition, but if we remove B, the coalition is still blocking (A has veto power by itself). So only A is critical to this coalition

[10: 8, 5, 3, 1] {B, C, D} is a blocking coalition, and B and C are the critical voters {A, B, C, D} is a winning coalition, but only A is critical {A, B, C, D} is a blocking coalition, and none of the voters are critical (we can remove any single voter and the coalition is still blocking)

The Banzhaf power index is the fraction of times each voter is critical in either a winning or blocking coalition Just like the Shapley-Shubik index, this index will measure the portion of the total power each voter has

Step 1: List All Coalitions We will list all of the possible coalitions and determine which coalitions are winning and/or blocking Step 2: Find the Critical Voters In each coalition, we will determine which voters are critical Step 3: Add It Up We will add up the number of times each voter is critical and use this to compute the power index

Our example is [10: 8, 5, 3, 1] There are 4 voters, so there are 16 coalitions Start with the smallest coalitions and work up to the biggest ones Next, determine which coalitions are winning and which are blocking { } 0 votes { A } 8 votes { B } 5 votes { C } 3 votes { D } 1 vote { A, B } 13 votes { A, C } 11 votes { A, D } 9 votes { B, C } 8 votes { B, D } 6 votes { C, D } 4 votes { A, B, C } 16 votes { A, B, D } 14 votes { A, C, D } 12 votes { B, C, D } 9 votes { A, B, C, D } 17 votes

For the example [10: 8, 5, 3, 1], a coalition needs 10 votes to win and 17 10 + 1 = 8 votes to block Winning Coalitions { A, B } { A, C } { A, B, C } Blocking Coalitions { A } { A, B } { A, C } { A, B, D } { A, D } { A, C, D } { B, C } { A, B, C, D } { A, B, C } { A, B, D } { A, C, D } { B, C, D } { A, B, C, D }

Now in each coalition, determine the critical voters (if any) Winning Coalitions { A, B } A, B { A, C } A, C { A, B, C } A Blocking Coalitions { A } A { A, B } A { A, C } A { A, B, D } A, B { A, D } A { A, C, D } A, C { B, C } B, C { A, B, C, D } A { A, B, C } none { A, B, D } A { A, C, D } A { B, C, D } B, C { A, B, C, D } none

Next, just count how many times each voter was critical (in either way) Winning Coalitions { A, B } A, B { A, C } A, C { A, B, C } A Blocking Coalitions { A } A { A, B } A { A, C } A { A, B, D } A, B { A, D } A { A, C, D } A, C { B, C } B, C { A, B, C, D } A { A, B, C } none { A, B, D } A { A, C, D } A { B, C, D } B, C { A, B, C, D } none

We see that A was a critical voter 12 times, B was critical 4 times, and C was critical 4 times Add these all up and we get 12 + 4 + 4 = 20 The power of each voter is the number of times the voter is critical divided by this total

We see that A was a critical voter 12 times, B was critical 4 times, and C was critical 4 times Power of A = 12/20 Power of B = 4/20 Power of C = 4/20 Power of D = 0/20 D is a dummy voter

[15: 12, 8, 4] 15 votes needed to win 24 15 + 1 = 10 votes needed to block Coalition # of Votes Blocking? Critical Voters Winning? Critical Voters { } 0 votes no --- no --- { A } 12 votes yes A no --- { B } 8 votes no --- no --- { C } 4 votes no --- no --- { A, B } 20 votes yes A yes A, B { A, C } 16 votes yes A yes A, C { B, C } 12 votes yes B, C no --- { A, B, C } 24 votes yes none yes A

Our results for [15: 12, 8, 4] are Power of A = 6/10 Power of B = 2/10 Power of C = 2/10 Even though B has twice as many points as C, they have the same power!