Stakeholder Consultations on Neutron Beam Shutter Options

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Stakeholder Consultations on Neutron Beam Shutter Options 16 January 2013 Name Affiliation Authors Phil Bentley ESS Reviewers Approver Distribution: Internal ESS stakeholders.

Table of Contents 1.Executive summary...3 2.List of consulted stakeholders & contributors...4 2.1Science Division...4 2.2Target Division...4 2.3Programme...4 2.4Radioprotection...4 2.5Accelerator Division...4 3.initial Use Case Analysis...5 3.1With Light Shutter Reference Scenario...5 3.1.1Assumptions...5 3.1.2Use Cases...5 3.1.3Other Factors...6 3.2With Primary Shutter...7 3.2.1Assumptions...7 3.2.2Use Cases...7 3.2.3Other Factors...7 3.3With Primary Shutter Outside Monolith...8 3.3.1Assumptions...8 3.3.2Use Cases...8 3.3.3Other Factors...8 3.4With No Shutter Whatsoever...9 3.4.1Assumptions...9 3.4.2Use Cases...9 3.4.3Other Factors...9

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY There has been recent interest in the specifications of the neutron beam shutters within the target monolith, and whether those specifications will best serve the stakeholders during the construction and operation of the ESS facility. The Cross Functional Working Group on Beam Extraction was tasked by the ESS management in the summer of 2012 to address the feasibility and design of the baseline target monolith. Some differences of opinion were discovered during this process in the matter of primary shutters. As a result, a stakeholder consultation was held to establish use cases of shutters and to identify a number of scenarios and the viewpoints held by the various parties concerned, to try to evaluate some of the options. This document summarises this endeavour. Four options were considered. In descending order of functionality and scope of changes to the baseline target design, these are: A primary shutter located inside the monolith A primary shutter located outside the monolith but within the common shielding bunker A service shutter (i.e. the current baseline) No shutter From an operational viewpoint, the primary shutter inside the monolith was the option providing the greatest functionality, but from a project viewpoint this would have the greatest consequences in terms of change to the baseline and impact on the project planning. Conversely, the option without a shutter would make the construction project the easiest to realise but with an adverse affect on the utility and operations of the facility during the latter operational phase.

2. LIST OF CONSULTED STAKEHOLDERS & CONTRIBUTORS 2.1 Science Division Phil Bentley Iain Sutton Ken Andersen Markus Strobl Oliver Kirstein Pascale Deen 2.2 Target Division Ferenc Mezei François Plewinski Magnus Göhran Rikard Linander Stephen Gallimore 2.3 Programme Robert Connatser 2.4 Radioprotection Peter Jacobsson 2.5 Accelerator Division Steve Peggs Garry Trahern

3. INITIAL USE CASE ANALYSIS 3.1 With Light Shutter Reference Scenario This scenario represents the current design of the monolith as described in the TDR. 3.1.1 Assumptions Access to beam plugs from the side of the monolith. 3.1.2 Use Cases Instrument installation. a light shutter would allow access during neutron production (3 weeks shutdown, involves vertical access to the shutter in the monolith). Waste is increased because the dummy primary shutter creates a larger space in the unused beam lines that needs to be filled with shielding. It allows visual access to the beam axis a light shutter would not allow access close to the monolith, within line of sight, during neutron production. This is the waste reference point against which the other two options are being compared Heavy duty shielding (insert and / or temporary walls / blocks) would be required with proton beam on. Instrument installation in and near the monolith requires approx 2 mo shutdown. No installation in first 10 m of beam from moderator except during shutdown Long term maintenance/repair, outside cross-talk zone, e.g. realignment, chopper replacement within line of sight only during proton beam shutdown. Obsolescence, e.g. changing instruments in 2030, access for removal of equipment within line of sight only during proton beam shutdown Target maintenance (inspections) of neutron beam window area only possible during proton beam shutdown. During Beamline or Instrument Hot Commissioning or Operations Changing Instrument/beamline configurations (e.g. sample env, changing sample, beam testing) cannot be done freely irrespective of beam geometry, this will only be possible for regions out of line of sight with a secondary shutter closed. PPS personnel protection system (in high activity alarms go off) then we have to shut down the proton beamcan shut one beam line rather than whole system IPS instrument protection system (e.g. one instrument beam gets damaged, the whole system would need to be shut off)

3.1.3 Other Factors Engineering complexity of the monolith: this is the reference scenario against which the others are measured. Experiment Hall Crane: This calls for the capability to install a (current proposal) 20 ton cask at each beam port for insert removal. This has significant cost implications to the crane or cranes that have access to the face of the monolith in the experiment hall. Licensing: this is the reference scenario against which the others are measured, so no relative issues are flagged. Consequences: this is the reference scenario against which the others are measured, so no relative consequences are flagged.

3.2 With Primary Shutter 3.2.1 Assumptions This is a primary shutter similar to the SNS, i.e. in performance and placement is in the monolith structure. 3.2.2 Use Cases Instrument installation. We will be starting to build instruments during 2018, which means that the use cases are: a primary shutter would allow access during neutron production (3 weeks shutdown, involves vertical access to the shutter in the monolith). Waste is increased because the dummy primary shutter creates a larger space in the unused beam lines that needs to be filled with shielding. It allows visual access to the beam axis with the proton beam on. Long term maintenance/repair, outside cross-talk zone, e.g. realignment, chopper replacement some 10s of metres away, during neutron production. Obsolescence, e.g. changing instruments in 2030, access for removal of equipment Target maintenance (inspections) of neutron beam window area possible during operations on a sector by sector basis (but in any case would be done during shutdown). During Beamline or Instrument Hot Commissioning or Operations Changing Instrument/beamline configurations (e.g. sample env, changing sample, beam testing) can be done freely irrespective of beam geometry PPS personnel protection system (in high activity alarms go off) then we can shut one beam line rather than whole system IPS instrument protection system (e.g. one instrument beam gets damaged, shut the beam and not the whole system) 3.2.3 Other Factors Engineering complexity of the monolith: is increased. Licensing: the shutter is a large mass close to the safety barrier and this presents a licensing issue for the monolith. Consequences: no consequences recorded during the meeting.

3.3 With Primary Shutter Outside Monolith 3.3.1 Assumptions This is a primary shutter outside the monolith, with no shutter in the monolith. 3.3.2 Use Cases Instrument installation. We will be starting to build instruments during 2018, which means that the use case is that a primary shutter would allow access during neutron production to beam axis downstream of the shutter. Waste is increased because the total quantity of irradiated material now includes the shutter mechanisms outside the monolith It allows visual access to the beam axis with the proton beam on, downstream of the shutter. Long term maintenance/repair, outside cross-talk zone, e.g. realignment, chopper replacement some 10s of metres away, during neutron production, downstream of the shutter. Obsolescence, e.g. changing instruments in 2030, access for removal of equipment downstream of the shutter. Target maintenance (inspections) of neutron beam window area possible during operations on a sector by sector basis (but in any case would be done during shutdown). During Beamline or Instrument Hot Commissioning or Operations Changing Instrument/beamline configurations (e.g. sample env, changing sample, beam testing) can be done freely irrespective of beam geometry PPS personnel protection system (in high activity alarms go off) then we can shut one beam line rather than whole system, provided the event is downstream of the shutter. IPS instrument protection system (e.g. one instrument beam gets damaged, shut the beam and not the whole system, provided the problem is downstream of the shutter) 3.3.3 Other Factors Engineering complexity of the monolith: is reduced. Licensing: the shutter requires significant shielding inside the neutron guide hall. Consequences: no additional consequences were recorded at the meeting.

3.4 With No Shutter Whatsoever 3.4.1 Assumptions Access to the port hole is from outside the monolith. Dosimetry near the monolith wall (either the actual monolith or the installed shielding around it) allows a person to access the wall safely during operations. 3.4.2 Use Cases Instrument installation. We will be starting to build instruments during 2018 Heavy duty shielding (insert and / or temporary walls / blocks) would be required. Instrument installation in and near the monolith requires approx 2 mo shutdown. No installation in first 10 m of beam from moderator except during shutdown Reduced waste because the dummy beam plugs are single piece of narrow steel. No Long term maintenance/repair, outside cross-talk zone, e.g. realignment, chopper replacement some 10s of metres away, during neutron production. Obsolescence, e.g. changing instruments in 2030, access for removal of equipment Target maintenance (inspections) of neutron beam window area not possible during operations. During Beamline or Instrument Hot Commissioning or Operations Changing Instrument/beamline configurations (e.g. sample env, changing sample, beam testing) cannot be done within line of sight of the source. PPS personnel protection system (in high activity alarms go off) then we can shut down the whole facility. IPS instrument protection system (e.g. one instrument beam gets damaged), shut down the whole facility. 3.4.3 Other Factors Engineering complexity of the monolith: is reduced. Licensing: the licensing of the monolith may be simplified in this scenario but the licensing downstream is likely to be more complex. Consequences: no additional consequences recorded at the meeting.

4. Evaluation Matrices 4.1 Introduction For each of the different options above, an evaluation matrix was constructed to facilitate the selection of recommendations for the ESS management. Each of the core stakeholder groups was asked to independently evaluate a number of key criteria for each of the options. The arithmetic mean of these numbers was then computed as a badness score for each criterion for each option, on a scale of 1-5, where 5 represents the worst possible scenario, and 1 represents the lowest score of badness. If a criterion was irrelevant for that stakeholder, then the badness score was zero. There were four core groups placing scores for the criteria. The table was grouped roughly into two common themes. The upper theme focusses on a range of different scenarios during operations. The lower theme focusses more on construction project factors. The next stage of the evaluation was to allocate a weighting factor for the evaluation criteria, in other words how important each criterion is for the stakeholder. Each group was given two votes to cast. If the criterion is not important, then zero votes were placed on that criterion. If it was moderately important, then one vote could be cast. If it was extremely important, then two votes could be cast. As such, the importance scale runs from 0-8, depending on how many people vote for each cirterion, which was normalised to a scale of 0-1. During this activity, a number of additional criteria were identified that supplemented those listed above. 4.2 List of Voting Core Groups The core groups were: Instrument Scientists Target Division Chief Instrument Engineer Neutron Optics Group 4.3 Most Important Criteria The three most highly weighted criteria, in order of weight, were: Ease of beamport activation operation (8 votes out of a possible 8) Normal operations with proton beam on (7 votes out of a possible 8)

Monolith engineering complexity (7 votes out of a possible 8) 4.4 Option 1: Primary Shutter in Monolith Zones and Scenarios US / Shutter In LOS Beyond LOS Sample Pos Straight Sample Pos Curved Weight Weight Score Installation Protons on 1 1 1 1 6 0.75 3 Protons off 5 1 1 1 1 5 0.625 5.625 Normal Operations Protons on 1 1 1 1 7 0.875 3.5 Protons off 5 1 1 1 1 3 0.375 3.375 Planned Maintenance Protons on 1 1 1 1 2 0.25 1 Protons off 5 1 1 1 1 2 0.25 2.25 Unplanned Interventions Protons on 1 1 1 1 6 0.75 3 Protons off 5 1 1 1 1 2 0.25 2.25 Obsolescence Protons on 1 1 1 1 6 0.75 3 Protons off 5 1 1 1 1 3 0.375 3.375 Hot Commissioning Protons on 1 1 1 1 6 0.75 3 Protons off 1 0.125 0 Target External Surface Maintenance Protons on 1 2 0.25 0.25 Protons off 5 1 2 0.25 1.5 35.125 Other Evaluation Factors Monolith engineering complexity 5 7 0.875 4.375 Licensing complexity 4.25 3 0.375 1.59375 Monolith cost 4.75 4 0.5 2.375 Guide hall crane cost 2 4 0.5 1 Waste quantity 4.75 3 0.375 1.78125 Shielding costs on guides/bunker 1 6 0.75 0.75 Structural impact, transfer of loads 3 4 0.5 1.5 Ease of beam port activation operation 3 8 1 3 Total thickness of beam window material 5 5 0.625 3.125 Number of beam ports available 5 4 0.5 2.5 22 4.5 Option 2: Primary Shutter Outside Monolith Zones and Scenarios US / Shutter In LOS Beyond LOS Sample Pos SSample Pos Curved Weight Weight Score Installation Protons on 4.5 1 1 1 1 6 0.75 6.375 Protons off 4 1 1 1 1 5 0.625 5 Normal Operations Protons on 2.75 1 1 1 1 7 0.875 5.90625 Protons off 2.75 1 1 1 1 3 0.375 2.53125 Planned Maintenance Protons on 7.5 1 1 1 1 2 0.25 2.875 Protons off 3.25 1 1 1 1 2 0.25 1.8125 Unplanned Interventions Protons on 5 1 1 1 1 6 0.75 6.75 Protons off 4.75 1 1 1 1 2 0.25 2.1875 Obsolescence Protons on 4.5 1 1 1 1 6 0.75 6.375 Protons off 3.25 1 1 1 1 3 0.375 2.71875 Hot Commissioning Protons on 3 1 1 1 1 6 0.75 5.25 Protons off 1 0.125 0 Target External Surface Maintenance Protons on 3.75 2 0.25 0.9375 Protons off 3 2 0.25 0.75 49.46875 Other Evaluation Factors Monolith engineering complexity 1.25 7 0.875 1.09375 Licensing complexity 3 3 0.375 1.125 Monolith cost 1.25 4 0.5 0.625 Guide hall crane cost 2.5 4 0.5 1.25 Waste quantity 2.75 3 0.375 1.03125 Shielding costs on guides/bunker 3.25 6 0.75 2.4375 Structural impact, transfer of loads 2 4 0.5 1 Ease of beam port activation operation 2 8 1 2 Total thickness of beam window material 3.5 5 0.625 2.1875 Number of beam ports available 3.5 4 0.5 1.75 14.5

4.6 Option 3: Service Shutter (Baseline) Zones and Scenarios US / Shutter In LOS Beyond LOS Sample Pos Straight Sample Pos Curved Weight Weight Score Installation Protons on 5 3 5 1 6 0.75 10.5 Protons off 1 1 1 1 5 0.625 2.5 Normal Operations Protons on 4.5 3 5 1 7 0.875 11.8125 Protons off 1 1 1 1 3 0.375 1.5 Planned Maintenance Protons on 4.5 3 5 1 2 0.25 3.375 Protons off 1 1 1 1 2 0.25 1 Unplanned Interventions Protons on 5 3 5 1 6 0.75 10.5 Protons off 1 1 1 1 2 0.25 1 Obsolescence Protons on 5 3.5 5 1 6 0.75 10.875 Protons off 1 1 1 1 3 0.375 1.5 Hot Commissioning Protons on 4.5 3.5 5 1 6 0.75 10.5 Protons off 1 0.125 0 Target External Surface Maintenance Protons on 5 2 0.25 1.25 Protons off 1 2 0.25 0.25 66.5625 Other Evaluation Factors Monolith engineering complexity 2.5 7 0.875 2.1875 Licensing complexity 1 3 0.375 0.375 Monolith cost 2 4 0.5 1 Guide hall crane cost 5 4 0.5 2.5 Waste quantity 2 3 0.375 0.75 Shielding costs on guides/bunker 1 6 0.75 0.75 Structural impact, transfer of loads 2 4 0.5 1 Ease of beam port activation operation 2 8 1 2 Total thickness of beam window material 1.75 5 0.625 1.09375 Number of beam ports available 1 4 0.5 0.5 12.15625 4.7 No Shutter Zones and Scenarios US / Shutter In LOS Beyond LOS Sample Pos SSample Pos Curved Weight Weight Score Installation Protons on 5 5 5 1 6 0.75 12 Protons off 2.5 1 2 1 5 0.625 4.0625 Normal Operations Protons on 5 4.75 5 1 7 0.875 13.78125 Protons off 2.5 1 2 1 3 0.375 2.4375 Planned Maintenance Protons on 5 4.75 5 1 2 0.25 3.9375 Protons off 2.5 1 2 1 2 0.25 1.625 Unplanned Interventions Protons on 5 5 5 1 6 0.75 12 Protons off 2.5 1 2 1 2 0.25 1.625 Obsolescence Protons on 5 5 5 1 6 0.75 12 Protons off 2.5 1 2 1 3 0.375 2.4375 Hot Commissioning Protons on 5 5 5 1 6 0.75 12 Protons off 1 0.125 0 Target External Surface Maintenance Protons on 5 2 0.25 1.25 Protons off 2.5 2 0.25 0.625 79.78125 Other Evaluation Factors Monolith engineering complexity 1 7 0.875 0.875 Licensing complexity 3 3 0.375 1.125 Monolith cost 1 4 0.5 0.5 Guide hall crane cost 3 4 0.5 1.5 Waste quantity 1.5 3 0.375 0.5625 Shielding costs on guides/bunker 1 6 0.75 0.75 Structural impact, transfer of loads 1 4 0.5 0.5 Ease of beam port activation operation 2.5 8 1 2.5 Total thickness of beam window material 1 5 0.625 0.625 Number of beam ports available 1 4 0.5 0.5 9.4375

4.8 Analysis of Options The badness from an operational standpoint for each of the options is shown in figure. "Badness" Scores for Each Option Operational Aspects Lower scores are better Badness 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Primary In Primary Out Service (Baseline) No Shutter Upper (Ops) The badness from a project standpoint for each of the options is shown in figure.

"Badness" Scores for Each Option Project Aspects Lower scores are better Badness 25 20 15 10 5 Lower (Proj) 0 Primary In Primary Out Service (Baseline) No Shutter 5. Conclusions It is satisfying that our expectations from the consultation were met, namely that the most complex and costly options offer the most flexibility during the operation phase, but these are on the other hand the most complex and challenging to implement during the construction phase.