Axioms as definitions: revisiting Hilbert

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Axioms as definitions: revisiting Hilbert Laura Fontanella Hebrew University of Jerusalem laura.fontanella@gmail.com 03/06/2016

What is an axiom in mathematics?

Self evidence, intrinsic motivations an axiom is a self-evident proposition requiring no formal demonstration to prove its truth, but received and assented as soon as mentioned (Oxford English Dictionary). Problems: self-evidence is subjective Axiom of Choice, Axiom of Infinity were not immediately received and assented even less controversial axioms of ZF are not strictly speaking obvious Ex: the Axiom of Foundation A / A vs. every set is well-founded no field of set theory or mathematics is in any general need of sets which are not well-founded (Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, Levy 1973 )

Self evidence, intrinsic motivations an axiom is a self-evident proposition requiring no formal demonstration to prove its truth, but received and assented as soon as mentioned (Oxford English Dictionary). Problems: self-evidence is subjective Axiom of Choice, Axiom of Infinity were not immediately received and assented even less controversial axioms of ZF are not strictly speaking obvious Ex: the Axiom of Foundation A / A vs. every set is well-founded no field of set theory or mathematics is in any general need of sets which are not well-founded (Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, Levy 1973 )

Self evidence, intrinsic motivations an axiom is a self-evident proposition requiring no formal demonstration to prove its truth, but received and assented as soon as mentioned (Oxford English Dictionary). Problems: self-evidence is subjective Axiom of Choice, Axiom of Infinity were not immediately received and assented even less controversial axioms of ZF are not strictly speaking obvious Ex: the Axiom of Foundation A / A vs. every set is well-founded no field of set theory or mathematics is in any general need of sets which are not well-founded (Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, Levy 1973 )

Self evidence, intrinsic motivations an axiom is a self-evident proposition requiring no formal demonstration to prove its truth, but received and assented as soon as mentioned (Oxford English Dictionary). Problems: self-evidence is subjective Axiom of Choice, Axiom of Infinity were not immediately received and assented even less controversial axioms of ZF are not strictly speaking obvious Ex: the Axiom of Foundation A / A vs. every set is well-founded no field of set theory or mathematics is in any general need of sets which are not well-founded (Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, Levy 1973 )

Extrinsic motivations Axioms can (also) be justified by their success, fruitfulness, or by "pragmatic or inter-theoretic motivations" (Maddy). Remark: different incompatible theories can be successful Ex: V=L vs. Axiom of measurable cardinals In general, in this approach, axioms are legitimated by their consequences, not the converse.

Extrinsic motivations Axioms can (also) be justified by their success, fruitfulness, or by "pragmatic or inter-theoretic motivations" (Maddy). Remark: different incompatible theories can be successful Ex: V=L vs. Axiom of measurable cardinals In general, in this approach, axioms are legitimated by their consequences, not the converse.

Extrinsic motivations Axioms can (also) be justified by their success, fruitfulness, or by "pragmatic or inter-theoretic motivations" (Maddy). Remark: different incompatible theories can be successful Ex: V=L vs. Axiom of measurable cardinals In general, in this approach, axioms are legitimated by their consequences, not the converse.

A different approach: Axioms as definitions of a concept. In my opinion, a concept can be fixed logically only by its relations to other concepts. These relations formulated in certain statements, I call axioms, thus arriving at the view that axioms (perhaps together with propositions assigning names to concepts) are the definitions of the concepts. (Hilbert, letter to Frege 22 Sept. 1900)

The Frege-Hilbert controversy [...] it is surely obvious that every theory is only a scaffolding or schema of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the basic elements can be thought in any way one likes. If in speaking of my points I think of some system of things, e.g. the system: love, law, chimney-sweep... and then assume all my axioms as relations between these things, then my propositions, e.g. Pythagoras theorem, are also valid for these things. (Hilbert 29 Dic. 1899)

Axioms as definitions: matters of truth and existence Hilbert: consistency is a sufficient condition for truth and existence Shapiro (Ante rem Structuralism): satisfaction rather than consistency, and also categoricity In rebus Structuralism: the structure exists only inasmuch as some concrete system of things instantiates the structure, but no system is the unique intended interpretation of the theory, all concrete systems would do equally well. The real meaning of a sentence ϕ in a theory T is: Every concrete system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. or, Any possible system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. Arealism: mathematics is not a body of truths.

Axioms as definitions: matters of truth and existence Hilbert: consistency is a sufficient condition for truth and existence Shapiro (Ante rem Structuralism): satisfaction rather than consistency, and also categoricity In rebus Structuralism: the structure exists only inasmuch as some concrete system of things instantiates the structure, but no system is the unique intended interpretation of the theory, all concrete systems would do equally well. The real meaning of a sentence ϕ in a theory T is: Every concrete system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. or, Any possible system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. Arealism: mathematics is not a body of truths.

Axioms as definitions: matters of truth and existence Hilbert: consistency is a sufficient condition for truth and existence Shapiro (Ante rem Structuralism): satisfaction rather than consistency, and also categoricity In rebus Structuralism: the structure exists only inasmuch as some concrete system of things instantiates the structure, but no system is the unique intended interpretation of the theory, all concrete systems would do equally well. The real meaning of a sentence ϕ in a theory T is: Every concrete system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. or, Any possible system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. Arealism: mathematics is not a body of truths.

Axioms as definitions: matters of truth and existence Hilbert: consistency is a sufficient condition for truth and existence Shapiro (Ante rem Structuralism): satisfaction rather than consistency, and also categoricity In rebus Structuralism: the structure exists only inasmuch as some concrete system of things instantiates the structure, but no system is the unique intended interpretation of the theory, all concrete systems would do equally well. The real meaning of a sentence ϕ in a theory T is: Every concrete system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. or, Any possible system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. Arealism: mathematics is not a body of truths.

Axioms as definitions: matters of truth and existence Hilbert: consistency is a sufficient condition for truth and existence Shapiro (Ante rem Structuralism): satisfaction rather than consistency, and also categoricity In rebus Structuralism: the structure exists only inasmuch as some concrete system of things instantiates the structure, but no system is the unique intended interpretation of the theory, all concrete systems would do equally well. The real meaning of a sentence ϕ in a theory T is: Every concrete system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. or, Any possible system that satisfies T, also satisfies ϕ. Arealism: mathematics is not a body of truths.

Existential quantifiers in set theory ZF y x(x y Ord(x)) the class of ordinals does not exist (absent in the literature) the class of ordinals is not a set there is no set that contains all the ordinals (and nothing more)

Rephrasing the axioms of ZFC (Extensionality) Two sets are equal if they contain the same sets as elements. (Pairing) Given two sets a and b, the pair {a, b} (i.e. the collection containing exactly a and b as elements) is a set; (Separation) Given a formula ϕ(x, p) with sets parameters p, and given a set a, the collection of all x in a that satisfy ϕ(x, p) is a set; (Union) Given a set a, the union of a (i.e. the collection of all sets that belong to some element of a) is a set; (Power Set) Given a set a, the collection of all subsets of a is a set; (Replacement) Given a function f (x) (defined with set parameters) and a set a, the collection of all f (x) with x a is a set; (Foundation) A collection of sets that does not have an -minimal element is not a set; (Infinity) Consider all the collections of sets that contain the empty set and are closed by the operation x x {x}, at least one of such collections is a set; (Choice) For every family of nonempty sets which is itself a set, the image of the choice function is a set.

Existential quantifiers in set theory- continue The existential quantifiers in the axioms of ZFC do not establish the actual existence of something. Instead, they are ways of singling out collections which are already given. The existential quantifiers select among such collections, those that are worth the title of set. Set theory is concerned with a domain of individuals, which we shall call simply objects and among which are the sets. (Zermelo 1908)

Existential quantifiers in set theory- continue The existential quantifiers in the axioms of ZFC do not establish the actual existence of something. Instead, they are ways of singling out collections which are already given. The existential quantifiers select among such collections, those that are worth the title of set. Set theory is concerned with a domain of individuals, which we shall call simply objects and among which are the sets. (Zermelo 1908)

When we infer of a certain collection, we make the collection available for the operations definable from the other axioms. Thus being a set means being available for the other axioms. It follows that the meaning of set depends on the theory. In this sense, the whole theory ZF (or ZFC) is a definition of set through the membership relation (so, more precisely, it s a definition of the concepts of set and membership ). [...] to give a definition of a point in three lines is to my mind an impossibility, for only the whole structure of axioms yields a complete definition and hence every new axiom changes the concept. (Hilbert 29 Dic. 1899) The meaning of set changes if we change the theory. So being a set in the sense of ZF is different than in ZFC, or ZFC+V=L etc.

The foundational role of set theory If many theories of sets or concepts of sets are legitimate, then should we consider this multitude of set theories as the object of study of set theorists, just as we consider that the multitude of geometries are the object of study of geometers? The foundational role of set theory relies in the richness of the concept of set which already embraces all the standard mathematical notions, including groups, rings, numbers...

The foundational role of set theory If many theories of sets or concepts of sets are legitimate, then should we consider this multitude of set theories as the object of study of set theorists, just as we consider that the multitude of geometries are the object of study of geometers? The foundational role of set theory relies in the richness of the concept of set which already embraces all the standard mathematical notions, including groups, rings, numbers...

The foundational role of set theory A possible criterion: maximize the expressive power of the concept defined. Some concepts of sets may be more expressive than others: you can express set in the sense of V=L in the theory of large cardinals (by simply saying that the object in question is in L), the converse is not true. (Steel) The language of set theory as used by the believer in V = L can certainly be translated into the language of set theory as used by the believer in measurable cardinals, via the translation ϕ ϕ L. There is no translation in the other direction.

Thank you