Lecture 1- The constrained optimization problem

Similar documents
Nonlinear Programming (NLP)

Macroeconomics IV Problem Set I

z = f (x; y) = x 3 3x 2 y x 2 3

Lecture 8: Basic convex analysis

Econ Spring Review Set 1 - Answers ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT. SET THE-

Functional Analysis: Assignment Set # 3 Spring 2009 Professor: Fengbo Hang February 25, 2009

ECON2285: Mathematical Economics

Lecture Notes on Game Theory

November 27 Lecturer Dmitri Zaitsev Michaelmas Term Course S h e e t 2. Due: after the lecture. + O(4)) (z 3! + O(5)) = c z3 + O(4),

BEE1024 Mathematics for Economists

a = (a 1; :::a i )

Advanced Economic Growth: Lecture 21: Stochastic Dynamic Programming and Applications

Some Notes on Adverse Selection

Advanced Microeconomics Problem Set 1

Notes on the Mussa-Rosen duopoly model

Advanced Microeconomics Fall Lecture Note 1 Choice-Based Approach: Price e ects, Wealth e ects and the WARP

COMPARISON OF INFORMATION STRUCTURES IN ZERO-SUM GAMES. 1. Introduction

EconS Microeconomic Theory I Recitation #5 - Production Theory-I 1

Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto Research School of Economics, Australian National University. ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics # 587

Topics in Mathematical Economics. Atsushi Kajii Kyoto University

Econ Review Set 2 - Answers

Lecture Notes on Bargaining

Business Cycles: The Classical Approach

The main purpose of this chapter is to prove the rst and second fundamental theorem of asset pricing in a so called nite market model.

Solving Extensive Form Games

Implicit Function Theorem: One Equation

Microeconomics, Block I Part 1

; p. p y p y p y. Production Set: We have 2 constraints on production - demand for each factor of production must be less than its endowment

5.5 Deeper Properties of Continuous Functions

Advanced Microeconomics

4. Duality and Sensitivity

Walker Ray Econ 204 Problem Set 3 Suggested Solutions August 6, 2015

Econ Slides from Lecture 1

MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING I

Economics 205 Exercises

2.2 Some Consequences of the Completeness Axiom

1 The Well Ordering Principle, Induction, and Equivalence Relations

Consequences of the Completeness Property

Lecture # 1 - Introduction

Lecture 6: Contraction mapping, inverse and implicit function theorems

where u is the decision-maker s payoff function over her actions and S is the set of her feasible actions.

Solutions to Problem Set 4 Macro II (14.452)

1 Selected Homework Solutions

Ordered Value Restriction

Game Theory. Bargaining Theory. ordi Massó. International Doctorate in Economic Analysis (IDEA) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)

Fall Final Examination Solutions Thursday 10 January 2012

MATH 722, COMPLEX ANALYSIS, SPRING 2009 PART 5

Topics in Mathematical Economics. Atsushi Kajii Kyoto University

6.2 Deeper Properties of Continuous Functions

Limit pricing models and PBE 1

Chapter 4. Maximum Theorem, Implicit Function Theorem and Envelope Theorem

ECON607 Fall 2010 University of Hawaii Professor Hui He TA: Xiaodong Sun Assignment 2

Week 5 Lectures 13-15

Upstream capacity constraint and the preservation of monopoly power in private bilateral contracting

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

ECON0702: Mathematical Methods in Economics

Microeconomics CHAPTER 2. THE FIRM

Non-convex Aggregate Technology and Optimal Economic Growth

Time is discrete and indexed by t =0; 1;:::;T,whereT<1. An individual is interested in maximizing an objective function given by. tu(x t ;a t ); (0.

1 Objective. 2 Constrained optimization. 2.1 Utility maximization. Dieter Balkenborg Department of Economics

Intro to Economic analysis

FROM BILATERAL TWO-WAY TO UNILATERAL ONE-WAY FLOW LINK-FORMATION

Discrete-Time Market Models

Final Exam (Solution) Economics 501b Microeconomic Theory

Lecture 7: General Equilibrium - Existence, Uniqueness, Stability

Essential Mathematics for Economists

z = f (x; y) f (x ; y ) f (x; y) f (x; y )

Verifying Payo Security in the Mixed Extension of Discontinuous Games

Near convexity, metric convexity, and convexity

EconS Microeconomic Theory II Midterm Exam #2 - Answer Key

Renormalization of the fermion self energy

Aggregate Supply. Econ 208. April 3, Lecture 16. Econ 208 (Lecture 16) Aggregate Supply April 3, / 12

Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods

NAME: Mathematics 205A, Fall 2008, Final Examination. Answer Key

Some Notes on Costless Signaling Games

Simultaneous Choice Models: The Sandwich Approach to Nonparametric Analysis

CAE Working Paper # Equivalence of Utilitarian Maximal and Weakly Maximal Programs. Kuntal Banerjee and Tapan Mitra.

Framing Competition. March 30, Abstract

Week 2: Sequences and Series

Lecture 3, November 30: The Basic New Keynesian Model (Galí, Chapter 3)

Optimal taxation with monopolistic competition

Problem Set 2: Solutions Math 201A: Fall 2016

POL502: Foundations. Kosuke Imai Department of Politics, Princeton University. October 10, 2005

3 Lecture Separation

Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information

Stochastic Dynamic Programming. Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde University of Pennsylvania

Consumer Constrained Imitation

Not Only What But also When A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp Introduction. 2. The preliminaries

Choosing the Two Finalists

Coordinate Systems. S. F. Ellermeyer. July 10, 2009

1 Which sets have volume 0?

8 Periodic Linear Di erential Equations - Floquet Theory

MATH 1190 Exam 4 (Version 2) Solutions December 1, 2006 S. F. Ellermeyer Name

Assignment 3. Section 10.3: 6, 7ab, 8, 9, : 2, 3

Microeconomic Theory-I Washington State University Midterm Exam #1 - Answer key. Fall 2016

Labor Economics, Lecture 11: Partial Equilibrium Sequential Search

LECTURE 12 UNIT ROOT, WEAK CONVERGENCE, FUNCTIONAL CLT

Solow Growth Model. Michael Bar. February 28, Introduction Some facts about modern growth Questions... 4

BEEM103 UNIVERSITY OF EXETER. BUSINESS School. January 2009 Mock Exam, Part A. OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES FOR ECONOMISTS solutions

Transcription:

Lecture 1- The constrained optimization problem The role of optimization in economic theory is important because we assume that individuals are rational. Why constrained optimization? the problem of scarcity. Example: ABC is a perfectly competitive, pro t maximizing rm, producing y from input z according to y = z :5 : The price of output is 2; and of input is 1. Negative levels of z are impossible. Also, the rm cannot buy more than k units of input. Consider the following general problem: (COP) max g(z) s.t. h(z) k z 2 Z where g : Z! R; Z is a subset of R n, h : Z! R m and k is a xed vector in R m. Let us denote this problem by COP: Definition: z solves COP if z 2 Z; h(z ) k; and for any other z 2 Z satisfying h(z) k; we have that g(z ) g(z): Definition: The feasible set is the set of vectors in R n satisfying z 2 Z and h(z) k: Some constraint maximization problems may have no solution. For example, consider: maximize ln z subject to z 1 and z 2: maximize ln z subject to z 1: maximize ln z subject to 1 z < 2: 1

Theorem If the feasible set is non empty, closed and bounded (compact), and the objective function g is continuous on the feasible set then the COP has a solution. Continuous functions map compact sets onto compact sets. If Z is closed and the constraint function h(z) is continuous, the feasible set is closed. This is because it is an intersection of two closed sets. The conditions are su cient and not necessary. minimum on R 2 even if it is not bounded. For example x 2 has a 2

Maximum value functions Consider the COP, and then consider the set C : C = f(k; v) : k = h(z); v = g(z) for some z 2 Zg: What is the interpretation of the set C? A graphical approach, using the example: The formal COP is: (COP) max g(z) = 2z :5 z s.t. h(z) = z k z 2 Z where Z = fz : z 2 R; z 0g is a Subset of R and k is a xed scalar. The set C is therefore C = f(k; v) : k = z; v = 2z :5 z for some z 0g: This set if actually the graph of the function g; for non negative z: It is strictly increasing on z < 1 and reaches a maximum at z = 1 and then decreases. If the constraint k varies, we can use it to realize how the maximum pro ts change. If k = :25; z :25;and in this interval the maximum is achieved by :25: The point (:25; :75) is indeed in the set C: In fact, for all k < 1; the problem is solved by setting k = z; giving rise to points (k; 2k :5 k): All these points are in C; so maybe C can tell us the maximum value v attainable with constraint k: Now suppose that k = 4; so z is constrained by z 4: From the gure, pro ts are maximized using z = 1: Thus, with k = 4;we have (k; v) = (k; 1): But a part of (1; 1); none of these points is in C: This implies that the set C may sometimes not show the maximum value v attainable with k: 3

Let us try a di erent approach. De ne: B = f(k; v) : k h(z); v g(z) for some z 2 Zg: Why do we need the set B? De ne the possible constraint set as the subset K of R m for which the feasible set is non empty. Let s(k) = supfg(z); z 2 Z; h(z) kg Lemma For any k 2 K; (i) for all v < s(k); (k; v) 2 B (ii) for all v > s(k); (k; v) =2 B: Proof: If v < s(k) he de nition of sup implies that there is a z 2 Z with v > g(z) and h(z) k which implies that (k; v) 2 B: If v > s(k) then for all z 2 Z with h(z) k; g(z) < s(k) < v; which implies that (k; v) =2 B: Thus, the set B has an upper boundary. We do not know if the boundary itself is in B; this depends on whether the objective function does or does not attain a maximum. Note that s(k) is a well de ned function on the possible constraint set K; although it may take in nite values. Lemma If k 1 2 K and k 1 k 2 then k 2 2 K and s(k 1 ) s(k 2 ): Proof: If k 1 2 K there exists a z 2 Z such that h(z) k 1 k 2 so k 2 K: Now consider any v < s(k 1 ): From the de nition there exists a z 2 Z such that v < g(z) and h(z) k 1 k 2 ; which implies that s(k 2 ) = supfg(z); z 2 Z; h(z) k 2 g > v: Since this is true for all v < s(k 1 ) it implies that s(k 2 ) s(k 1 ): The boundary de nes a non decreasing function, and if the set B is closed, that is, it includes its boundary, this is the maximum value function, that is, for each value of k it shows the maximum attainable value of the objective function. 4

We can con ne ourselves to maximum rather than supremum. This is possible if the COP has a solution. To ensure a solution, we can either nd it, or show that the objective function is continuous and the feasible set is compact. Definition (the maximum value function) If z(k) solves the COP with constraint k, the maximum value function is v(k) = g(z(k)): The maximum value function, if exists, has all the properties of s(k): In particular, it is non decreasing. So we have reached the conclusion that z is a solution to COP if and only if (k; g(z )) lies on the upper boundary of B: 5