From query complexity to computational complexity (for optimization of submodular functions)

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From query complexity to computational complexity (for optimization of submodular functions) Shahar Dobzinski 1 Jan Vondrák 2 1 Cornell University Ithaca, NY 2 IBM Almaden Research Center San Jose, CA Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 1 / 15

Submodular optimization Submodular functions: 1 A general framework capturing useful combinatorial structure 2 A natural property to be assumed in certain settings (utilities/valuations with diminishing returns) 3 A discrete variant of convexity / concavity Recent interest: primarily due to Ability to unify/generalize previously studied problems Reappearing approximation factors ( 1 2, 1 1 e,...) - where do they come from? Algorithmic game theory - submodular functions form an important class of valuations Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 2 / 15

Submodular Functions Definition A function f : 2 X R is submodular if for any S, T, f (S T ) + f (S T ) f (S) + f (T ). Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 3 / 15

Submodular Functions Definition A function f : 2 X R is submodular if for any S, T, f (S T ) + f (S T ) f (S) + f (T ). Coverage function: Given A 1,..., A n U, f (S) = j S A j. A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 3 / 15

Submodular Functions Definition A function f : 2 X R is submodular if for any S, T, f (S T ) + f (S T ) f (S) + f (T ). Coverage function: Given A 1,..., A n U, f (S) = j S A j. A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 Cut function: δ(t ) = e(t, T ) Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 3 / 15

Access models In general, there are too many submodular functions (2 2Ω(n) ) to describe them explicitly in poly(n) space. Oracle models: Value oracle: For a given set S, what is f (S) =? Demand oracle: For given prices p i, which set maximizes f (S) i S p i? Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 4 / 15

Access models In general, there are too many submodular functions (2 2Ω(n) ) to describe them explicitly in poly(n) space. Oracle models: Value oracle: For a given set S, what is f (S) =? Demand oracle: For given prices p i, which set maximizes f (S) i S p i? Succinct representation: A string a {0, 1} poly(n), encoding a function f a : 2 [n] R. The encoding should allow efficient evaluation: Given a and S, compute f a (S) in time poly(n). Example: cut functions have a natural succinct description. Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 4 / 15

Submodular maximization Unconstrained submodular maximization: given f : 2 X R +, maximize f (S) over all S X. NP-hard, generalizes Max Cut. Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 5 / 15

Submodular maximization Unconstrained submodular maximization: given f : 2 X R +, maximize f (S) over all S X. NP-hard, generalizes Max Cut. Recent result: [Buchbinder,Feldman,Naor,Schwartz 12] 1 2 -approximation for unconstrained submodular maximization (following a line of improvements: 0.4 0.41 0.42 0.45...) We already knew: [Feige,Mirrokni,V. 07] ( 1 2 + ɛ)-approximation for unconstrained submodular maximization in the value oracle model would need exponentially many queries Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 5 / 15

Submodular maximization Unconstrained submodular maximization: given f : 2 X R +, maximize f (S) over all S X. NP-hard, generalizes Max Cut. Recent result: [Buchbinder,Feldman,Naor,Schwartz 12] 1 2 -approximation for unconstrained submodular maximization (following a line of improvements: 0.4 0.41 0.42 0.45...) We already knew: [Feige,Mirrokni,V. 07] ( 1 2 + ɛ)-approximation for unconstrained submodular maximization in the value oracle model would need exponentially many queries Note: For Max Cut, 1 2 can be improved using SDP. Could there be 1 2 + ɛ for every succinctly represented special case? (UG-hardness of 0.7-approximation for a special case [Austrin 10] ) Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 5 / 15

Submodular welfare maximization Given: m items, n players with submodular valuations v i : 2 [m] R +. Goal: Find an allocation of disjoint sets S 1,..., S n to the n players, maximizing the social welfare n i=1 v i(s i ). Allocation (S 1, S 2,..., S n ) has value n i=1 v i(s i ). Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 6 / 15

Submodular welfare maximization Given: m items, n players with submodular valuations v i : 2 [m] R +. Goal: Find an allocation of disjoint sets S 1,..., S n to the n players, maximizing the social welfare n i=1 v i(s i ). Allocation (S 1, S 2,..., S n ) has value n i=1 v i(s i ). (1 1/e)-approximation [V. 08], optimal by [Khot,Lipton,Markakis,Mehta 05] (1 (1 1/n) n )-approximation for n players [Feldman,Naor,Schwartz 11], optimal for fixed n in the value oracle model [Mirrokni,Schapira,V. 08] What about succinctly represented valuations? Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 6 / 15

Our results Oracle hardness Computational hardness for submodular optimization problems: There are succinctly represented nonnegative submodular functions for which there is no ( 1 2 + ɛ)-approximation for the problem Max S X f (S), unless NP = RP. Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 7 / 15

Our results Oracle hardness Computational hardness for submodular optimization problems: There are succinctly represented nonnegative submodular functions for which there is no ( 1 2 + ɛ)-approximation for the problem Max S X f (S), unless NP = RP. There are succinctly represented monotone submodular functions for which there is no (1 (1 1 n )n + ɛ)-approximation for welfare maximization with n players, unless NP = RP. Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 7 / 15

Our results Oracle hardness Computational hardness for submodular optimization problems: There are succinctly represented nonnegative submodular functions for which there is no ( 1 2 + ɛ)-approximation for the problem Max S X f (S), unless NP = RP. There are succinctly represented monotone submodular functions for which there is no (1 (1 1 n )n + ɛ)-approximation for welfare maximization with n players, unless NP = RP. More generally, any hardness result proved by the symmetry gap technique [V. 09] can be converted into computational hardness. Symmetry gap γ Oracle hardness of better than γ-approximation Computational hardness of better than γ-approximation Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 7 / 15

Hardness from symmetry gap Intuitive statement: For any instance I where the gap between the best symmetric and best asymmetric solution is γ, there is no approximation better than γ for instances "similar to I". Applications: Monotone submodular maximization Constraint Approximation Hardness hardness ref. S k, matroid 1 1/e 1 1/e [Nemhauser,Wolsey 78] [Feige 98] n-players welfare 1 (1 1 n )n 1 (1 1 n )n [Mirrokni,Schapira,V. 08] Non-monotone submodular maximization Constraint Approximation Hardness hardness ref. unconstrained 1/2 1/2 [Feige,Mirrokni,V. 07] S k 1/e 0.49 [Oveis-Gharan,V. 11] matroid 1/e 0.48 [Oveis-Gharan,V. 11] 1 matroid base 2 (1 1 ν ) 1 1 ν [V. 09] Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 8 / 15

Our techniques How do we convert oracle hardness into computational hardness? We use objective functions of the same type that were used in the oracle hardness proofs. We do not use the PCP theorem or Unique Games Conjecture. We encode the optimal set implicitly as a solution to a computationally difficult problem. To evaluate the function efficiently, we use list decodable codes. Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 9 / 15

Hardness of unconstrained submodular maximization Oracle hardness proof [Feige,Mirrokni,V. 07] starts from the cut function of a complete bipartite graph: S f (A) f (B) A B f (S) f (S) = ψ(x, y) = x(1 y) + (1 x)y, where x = S A A, y = S B B f (A) = f (B) = 1 f (S) = 1 2 if S A = S B = 1 2 A = 1 2 B Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 10 / 15

The oracle hardness argument For a suitable perturbation of f (S), the partition (A, B) cannot be found using poly-many value queries only symmetric solutions can be found efficiently. 1.0 f (S) symmetric solution f (S) asymmetric solution 0.5 δ 0 δ max f (S) cannot be solved better than within 0.5. Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 11 / 15

How to represent the functions succinctly? What is the issue: imagine we want to present the function where x = S A A f (S) = ψ(x, y) = x(1 y) + (1 x)y, y = S B B, explicitly on the input. We can encode it by writing down the formula and specifying (A, B). However, then it s easy to determine the optimal solution A (or B)! Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 12 / 15

How to represent the functions succinctly? What is the issue: imagine we want to present the function where x = S A A f (S) = ψ(x, y) = x(1 y) + (1 x)y, y = S B B, explicitly on the input. We can encode it by writing down the formula and specifying (A, B). However, then it s easy to determine the optimal solution A (or B)! Our approach: (A, B) is determined by the solution of a computationally difficult problem (i.e. SAT). Rather than (A, B), the encoding contains a SAT instance φ. HOWEVER: this encoding must allow us to evaluate the function! Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 12 / 15

Encoding by list-decodable codes Encoding: We encode the objective function by specifying a Unique-SAT formula φ on t variables, and a list-decodable code C : {0, 1} t {0, 1} n. Unique-SAT instance φ Satisfying assignment x Codeword A = C(x ) Interpretation: (C, φ) encodes the perturbed function f (S) ( ) S A S B f (S) = ψ, A B where A = B = C(x ), and x = unique satisfying assignment to φ. LDCs from [Guruswami-Rudra 08], Unique-SAT hardness from [Valiant-Vazirani 86] Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 13 / 15

Evaluating f (S) using this representation A S B f (A) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 f (B) βn +βn Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 14 / 15

Evaluating f (S) using this representation A S B f (A) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 f (B) βn +βn Case 1: If S A S B > βn, we find x = C 1 (A) as one of the codewords obtained by list-decoding S. Evaluating φ(x ) confirms that A is the correct set. Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 14 / 15

Evaluating f (S) using this representation A S B f (A) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 f (B) βn +βn Case 1: If S A S B > βn, we find x = C 1 (A) as one of the codewords obtained by list-decoding S. Evaluating φ(x ) confirms that A is the correct set. Case 2: If S B S A > βn, we find x = C 1 (A) again by list-decoding S. Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 14 / 15

Evaluating f (S) using this representation A S B f (A) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 f (B) βn +βn Case 1: If S A S B > βn, we find x = C 1 (A) as one of the codewords obtained by list-decoding S. Evaluating φ(x ) confirms that A is the correct set. Case 2: If S B S A > βn, we find x = C 1 (A) again by list-decoding S. Case 3: If S A S B [ βn, +βn], we are not able to determine A and B. But f (S) in this case depends only on S, so we can still evaluate f (S). Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 14 / 15

Conclusions We match several inapproximability results in the oracle model with computational hardness results. Another application: Computational hardness result ruling out truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. [upcoming EC 12] Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 15 / 15

Conclusions We match several inapproximability results in the oracle model with computational hardness results. Another application: Computational hardness result ruling out truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. [upcoming EC 12] Future questions: Encoding is not very natural - is there a hardness result for more natural objective functions? Is there a matching hardness result for objective functions in "Max-CSP form"? (sum over small gadgets) Does this technique apply to problems other than submodular optimization? Dobzinski - Vondrák (Cornell / IBM) Query to computational complexity 15 / 15