The Causal Inference Problem and the Rubin Causal Model

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The Causal Inference Problem and the Rubin Causal Model Lecture 2 Rebecca B. Morton NYU Exp Class Lectures R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 1 / 23

Variables in Modeling the E ects of a Cause The Treatment Variable De nition (Treatment Variable) The principal variable that we expect to have a causal impact. In general we can denote the two states of the world that a voter can be in as 1 and 0 where 1 refers to being informed and 0 refers to being uninformed or less informed. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 2 / 23

Variables in Modeling the E ects of a Cause The Treatment Variable De nition (Treatment Variable) The principal variable that we expect to have a causal impact. In general we can denote the two states of the world that a voter can be in as 1 and 0 where 1 refers to being informed and 0 refers to being uninformed or less informed. Let T i = 1 if an individual is in state 1 ; T i = 0 otherwise. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 2 / 23

Variables that A ect Treatments Useful to think of T i as an endogenous variable, R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 3 / 23

Variables that A ect Treatments Useful to think of T i as an endogenous variable, which is a function of a set of observable variables, Z i, R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 3 / 23

Variables that A ect Treatments Useful to think of T i as an endogenous variable, which is a function of a set of observable variables, Z i, a set of unobservable variables, V i, R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 3 / 23

Variables that A ect Treatments Useful to think of T i as an endogenous variable, which is a function of a set of observable variables, Z i, a set of unobservable variables, V i, as well as sometimes a manipulated variable, M i, which may be manipulated by a researcher or by nature. What is this?... R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 3 / 23

What is the Manipulated Variable? De nition (Manipulated Variable) A variable that has an impact on the treatment variable that can be manipulated either naturally or by an experimenter. De nition (Experimental Manipulation) When the manipulated variable is xed through the intervention of an experimentalist. De nition (Natural Manipulation) When the manipulated variable is part of nature without intervention of an experimentalist. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 4 / 23

The Dependent Variable If our target election is a U.S. presidential election with three candidates, then the voter has four choices: abstain, vote for the Republican candidate, vote for the Democratic candidate, or vote for the minor party or independent candidate. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 5 / 23

The Dependent Variable If our target election is a U.S. presidential election with three candidates, then the voter has four choices: abstain, vote for the Republican candidate, vote for the Democratic candidate, or vote for the minor party or independent candidate. Dependent variable is a random variable, Y i, that can take on four values {0, 1, 2, 3}, where 0 denotes individual i choosing abstention, 1 denotes individual i voting for the Republican, 2 denotes individual i voting for the Democrat, and 3 denotes the individual voting for the minor party or independent candidate. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 5 / 23

The Dependent Variable If our target election is a U.S. presidential election with three candidates, then the voter has four choices: abstain, vote for the Republican candidate, vote for the Democratic candidate, or vote for the minor party or independent candidate. Dependent variable is a random variable, Y i, that can take on four values {0, 1, 2, 3}, where 0 denotes individual i choosing abstention, 1 denotes individual i voting for the Republican, 2 denotes individual i voting for the Democrat, and 3 denotes the individual voting for the minor party or independent candidate. Denote Y i1 as the voting choice of i when informed and Y i0 as the voting choice of i when uninformed. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 5 / 23

The Dependent Variable De nition (Dependent Variable) A variable that represents the e ects that we wish to explain. In the case of political behavior, the dependent variable represents the political behavior that the treatment may in uence. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 6 / 23

Variables that A ect the Dependent Variable We hypothesize that Y ij is also a function of a set of observed variables, X i, R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 7 / 23

Variables that A ect the Dependent Variable We hypothesize that Y ij is also a function of a set of observed variables, X i, and a set of unobservable variables U i, as well as T i. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 7 / 23

Variables that A ect the Dependent Variable We hypothesize that Y ij is also a function of a set of observed variables, X i, and a set of unobservable variables U i, as well as T i. For example, Y ij might be a function of a voter s partisan a liation, an observable variable and it might be a function of a voter s value for performing citizen duty, an arguably unobservable variable. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 7 / 23

Variables that A ect the Dependent Variable We hypothesize that Y ij is also a function of a set of observed variables, X i, and a set of unobservable variables U i, as well as T i. For example, Y ij might be a function of a voter s partisan a liation, an observable variable and it might be a function of a voter s value for performing citizen duty, an arguably unobservable variable. Note that we assume that it is possible that Z i and X i overlap & could be the same and that U i and V i overlap & could be the same (although this raises problems with estimation as discussed in the following Chapters). R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 7 / 23

Other Variables Occasionally we will also discuss two other variables: R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 8 / 23

Other Variables Occasionally we will also discuss two other variables: W i, the set of all observable variables, R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 8 / 23

Other Variables Occasionally we will also discuss two other variables: W i, the set of all observable variables, and P i, the probability that Y i = 1. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 8 / 23

Other Variables Occasionally we will also discuss two other variables: W i, the set of all observable variables, and P i, the probability that Y i = 1. We de ne and use W i when the analysis makes no distinction between X & Z. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 8 / 23

Other Variables Occasionally we will also discuss two other variables: W i, the set of all observable variables, and P i, the probability that Y i = 1. We de ne and use W i when the analysis makes no distinction between X & Z. In some of the examples and sometimes for ease of exposition we will focus on the case where Y i is binary, can be either 0 or 1. When the choice is binary, the dependent variable is often assumed to be the probability that Y i equals 1, which we designate as P i. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 8 / 23

Other Variables Occasionally we will also discuss two other variables: W i, the set of all observable variables, and P i, the probability that Y i = 1. We de ne and use W i when the analysis makes no distinction between X & Z. In some of the examples and sometimes for ease of exposition we will focus on the case where Y i is binary, can be either 0 or 1. When the choice is binary, the dependent variable is often assumed to be the probability that Y i equals 1, which we designate as P i. Denote P i1 as the value of P i when i is informed and P i0 as the value of P i when i is uninformed. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 8 / 23

Other Variables Occasionally we will also discuss two other variables: W i, the set of all observable variables, and P i, the probability that Y i = 1. We de ne and use W i when the analysis makes no distinction between X & Z. In some of the examples and sometimes for ease of exposition we will focus on the case where Y i is binary, can be either 0 or 1. When the choice is binary, the dependent variable is often assumed to be the probability that Y i equals 1, which we designate as P i. Denote P i1 as the value of P i when i is informed and P i0 as the value of P i when i is uninformed. Table 3.1 presents a summary of this notation, which is used throughout Chapters 3-5. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 8 / 23

Manipulations versus Treatments Why are Manipulations Sometimes Called Treatment? R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 9 / 23

Manipulations versus Treatments Why are Manipulations Sometimes Called Treatment? Ideal manipulation is when M i = T i and Z i and V i have no e ect on T i. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 9 / 23

Manipulations versus Treatments Why are Manipulations Sometimes Called Treatment? Ideal manipulation is when M i = T i and Z i and V i have no e ect on T i. But rarely true, except perhaps in some simple lab experiments R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 9 / 23

Manipulations versus Treatments Why are Manipulations Sometimes Called Treatment? Ideal manipulation is when M i = T i and Z i and V i have no e ect on T i. But rarely true, except perhaps in some simple lab experiments So we make the distinction between the two. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 9 / 23

When Treatment Variables Cannot be Manipulated Suppose we want the "treatment" to be gender. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 10 / 23

When Treatment Variables Cannot be Manipulated Suppose we want the "treatment" to be gender. Can only manipulate with great di culty, so cannot really be a manipulated variable. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 10 / 23

When Treatment Variables Cannot be Manipulated Suppose we want the "treatment" to be gender. Can only manipulate with great di culty, so cannot really be a manipulated variable. But can manipulate whether the subject assigned to a manipulation is of a given gender, so can have an a ect on the treatment variable (gender) through the thing we can manipulate R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 10 / 23

When Treatment Variables Cannot be Manipulated Suppose we want the "treatment" to be gender. Can only manipulate with great di culty, so cannot really be a manipulated variable. But can manipulate whether the subject assigned to a manipulation is of a given gender, so can have an a ect on the treatment variable (gender) through the thing we can manipulate View that ethnicity or gender cannot be a treatment variable con ates the di culty in identifying causal e ects with de ning causal e ects. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 10 / 23

When Treatment Variables Cannot be Manipulated Suppose we want the "treatment" to be gender. Can only manipulate with great di culty, so cannot really be a manipulated variable. But can manipulate whether the subject assigned to a manipulation is of a given gender, so can have an a ect on the treatment variable (gender) through the thing we can manipulate View that ethnicity or gender cannot be a treatment variable con ates the di culty in identifying causal e ects with de ning causal e ects. It maybe that identifying the causal e ect of gender, race or ethnicity on something like earnings or, in political science voting, is di cult, but that does not mean it isn t an interesting question that we can imagine asking. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 10 / 23

When Manipulations A ect Treatments Only Indirectly Consider the Spezio, et al. 2008 Experiment in Chapter 3 Subjects are shown candidate images and their brain activations are measured. The comparison is between winning and losing candidates. Subjects brains appear to respond. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 11 / 23

When Manipulations A ect Treatments Only Indirectly Consider the Spezio, et al. 2008 Experiment in Chapter 3 Subjects are shown candidate images and their brain activations are measured. The comparison is between winning and losing candidates. Subjects brains appear to respond. Is this an experiment? No manipulation of the images. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 11 / 23

When Manipulations A ect Treatments Only Indirectly Consider the Spezio, et al. 2008 Experiment in Chapter 3 Subjects are shown candidate images and their brain activations are measured. The comparison is between winning and losing candidates. Subjects brains appear to respond. Is this an experiment? No manipulation of the images. But there is intervention in the DGP and considerable control over the choices of subjects. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 11 / 23

The Rubin Causal Model De ning Causal E ects In RCM, the causal e ect of the treatment for each individual is de ned as the di erence between the individual s choices in the two states of the world: δ i = Y i1 Y i0 R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 12 / 23

The Rubin Causal Model De ning Causal E ects In RCM, the causal e ect of the treatment for each individual is de ned as the di erence between the individual s choices in the two states of the world: δ i = Y i1 Y i0 The main issue in causal inference is guring out how to measure δ i. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 12 / 23

The Causal Inference Problem & Observational Data In observational data an individual can only be in one of the two states of the world at a given time. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 13 / 23

The Causal Inference Problem & Observational Data In observational data an individual can only be in one of the two states of the world at a given time. It is also possible that we have no observations at all for one state of the world if we are considering proposed treatments that have never been used. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 13 / 23

The Causal Inference Problem & Observational Data In observational data an individual can only be in one of the two states of the world at a given time. It is also possible that we have no observations at all for one state of the world if we are considering proposed treatments that have never been used. Thus, with observational data the observed voting choice of an individual, Y i at a given point in time is given by: Y i = T i Y i1 + (1 T i ) Y i0 R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 13 / 23

The Causal Inference Problem & Observational Data In observational data an individual can only be in one of the two states of the world at a given time. It is also possible that we have no observations at all for one state of the world if we are considering proposed treatments that have never been used. Thus, with observational data the observed voting choice of an individual, Y i at a given point in time is given by: Y i = T i Y i1 + (1 T i ) Y i0 As a result, we cannot observe directly the causal e ect of information on any given individual s voting choice since for each individual we only observe one value of Y i. How can we deal with this problem?... R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 13 / 23

The Causal Inference Problem & Observational Data RCM conceptualizes individual as having two potential choices under di erent information situations & the causal e ect is e ect of the treatment on di erence between two potential choices. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 14 / 23

The Causal Inference Problem & Observational Data RCM conceptualizes individual as having two potential choices under di erent information situations & the causal e ect is e ect of the treatment on di erence between two potential choices. Also called counterfactual approach to causality since assumes counterfactuals are theoretically possible; that individuals have potential choices in both states of the world even though we only have factual observations on one state. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 14 / 23

The Causal Inference Problem & Observational Data RCM conceptualizes individual as having two potential choices under di erent information situations & the causal e ect is e ect of the treatment on di erence between two potential choices. Also called counterfactual approach to causality since assumes counterfactuals are theoretically possible; that individuals have potential choices in both states of the world even though we only have factual observations on one state. Winship & Morgan (1999, page 664) summarize causal inference in a single question (using our notation): Given that δ i cannot be calculated for any individual and therefore that Y i1 and Y i0 can be observed on mutually exclusive subsets of the population, what can be inferred about the distribution of the δ i from an analysis of Y i and T i? R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 14 / 23

The Causal Inference Problem & Observational Data RCM conceptualizes individual as having two potential choices under di erent information situations & the causal e ect is e ect of the treatment on di erence between two potential choices. Also called counterfactual approach to causality since assumes counterfactuals are theoretically possible; that individuals have potential choices in both states of the world even though we only have factual observations on one state. Winship & Morgan (1999, page 664) summarize causal inference in a single question (using our notation): Given that δ i cannot be calculated for any individual and therefore that Y i1 and Y i0 can be observed on mutually exclusive subsets of the population, what can be inferred about the distribution of the δ i from an analysis of Y i and T i? At this point RCM requires thinking theoretically or hypothetically in order to measure causal e ects. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 14 / 23

Causal Inference Problem & Experimental Data Within versus Between Subjects Designs De nition (Between-Subjects Experimental Design) Subjects in an experiment make choices in only one state of the world. De nition (Within-Subjects Experimental Design) Subjects in an experiment make choices in multiple states of the world. De nition (Multiple-Choice Procedure) Subjects in a within subjects experimental design make choices in multiple states of the world simultaneously. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 15 / 23

Causal Inference Problem & Experimental Data Strategy versus Decision Method De nition (Strategy Method) A version of the multiple-choice procedure in which subjects choose a strategy to be implemented in an experiment testing a game theoretic situation. The strategy is a set of choices conditional on hypothetical information or previous choices that subjects may face when the choice situation occurs in the experiment. De nition (Decision Method) When subjects in an experiment evaluating a game theoretic model make choices when the decision situation for the choice occurs in the experiment given knowledge of the information available at that time and actual previous choices made by other subjects. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 16 / 23

Cross-Over Procedures & the Importance of Sequence De nition (Cross-Over Procedure) Subjects make choices in states of the world sequentially. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 17 / 23

Design versus Analysis Figure: Stages in Experimental Research R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 18 / 23

Design versus Analysis De nition (Design Stage) The period before an experimenter intervenes in the DGP in which he or she makes decisions about the design of the experiment such as the extent to use experimental control and/or random assignment. De nition (Analysis Stage) The period after data has been generated either by an experiment or without experimental intervention in which a researcher uses statistical tools to analyze the data such as statistical control and statistical methods that attempt to simulate random assignment. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 19 / 23

Measures of Causality Average Unconditional Treatment E ect, de ned as: ATE= E (δ i ) R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 20 / 23

Measures of Causality Average Unconditional Treatment E ect, de ned as: ATE= E (δ i ) Average Unconditional Treatment E ect on the Treated or ATT, which is de ned as follows: ATT= E (δ i jt i = 1) R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 20 / 23

Measures of Causality Average Unconditional Treatment E ect, de ned as: ATE= E (δ i ) Average Unconditional Treatment E ect on the Treated or ATT, which is de ned as follows: ATT= E (δ i jt i = 1) Average Conditional Treatment E ect, ATE(W ) = E (δ i jw i ) R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 20 / 23

Measures of Causality Average Unconditional Treatment E ect, de ned as: ATE= E (δ i ) Average Unconditional Treatment E ect on the Treated or ATT, which is de ned as follows: ATT= E (δ i jt i = 1) Average Conditional Treatment E ect, ATE(W ) = E (δ i jw i ) Average Conditional Treatment E ect on the Treated, ATT(W ) = E (δ i jw i, T i = 1) R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 20 / 23

Measures of Causality Average Unconditional Treatment E ect, de ned as: ATE= E (δ i ) Average Unconditional Treatment E ect on the Treated or ATT, which is de ned as follows: ATT= E (δ i jt i = 1) Average Conditional Treatment E ect, ATE(W ) = E (δ i jw i ) Average Conditional Treatment E ect on the Treated, ATT(W ) = E (δ i jw i, T i = 1) Other measures will discuss later... R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 20 / 23

The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Rubin (1980) highlights two implicit assumptions behind δ i = Y i1 Y i0 R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 21 / 23

The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Rubin (1980) highlights two implicit assumptions behind δ i = Y i1 Y i0 Treatment of unit i only a ects the outcome of unit i (thus it does not matter how many others have been treated or not treated) (Note this means it is a "local" e ect, can t be aggregated, something OFTEN ignored) R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 21 / 23

The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Rubin (1980) highlights two implicit assumptions behind δ i = Y i1 Y i0 Treatment of unit i only a ects the outcome of unit i (thus it does not matter how many others have been treated or not treated) (Note this means it is a "local" e ect, can t be aggregated, something OFTEN ignored) For ATE and ATT, the treatment is homogeneous across voters. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 21 / 23

The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Heckman (2005) points out 4 additional implicit assumptions behind δ i = Y i1 Y i0 R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 22 / 23

The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Heckman (2005) points out 4 additional implicit assumptions behind δ i = Y i1 Y i0 Treatment of unit i is invariant with respect to mechanism by which treatment is provided. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 22 / 23

The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Heckman (2005) points out 4 additional implicit assumptions behind δ i = Y i1 Y i0 Treatment of unit i is invariant with respect to mechanism by which treatment is provided. All possible states of the world are observed there exists both informed and uninformed units. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 22 / 23

The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Heckman (2005) points out 4 additional implicit assumptions behind δ i = Y i1 Y i0 Treatment of unit i is invariant with respect to mechanism by which treatment is provided. All possible states of the world are observed there exists both informed and uninformed units. Only causality question of interest is a historical one, that is, the evaluation of treatments that exist in reality on the population receiving the treatment, either observational or experimental. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 22 / 23

The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Heckman (2005) points out 4 additional implicit assumptions behind δ i = Y i1 Y i0 Treatment of unit i is invariant with respect to mechanism by which treatment is provided. All possible states of the world are observed there exists both informed and uninformed units. Only causality question of interest is a historical one, that is, the evaluation of treatments that exist in reality on the population receiving the treatment, either observational or experimental. Assumes a recursive model of causality. It cannot measure the causal e ects of outcomes that occur simultaneously. R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 22 / 23

Is RCM Good or Bad? What do you think? R B Morton (NYU) EPS Lecture 2 Exp Class Lectures 23 / 23