Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions

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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions Joan Feigenbaum Yale Scott Shenker ICSI Slides: http://www.cs.yale.edu/~jf/dialm02.{ppt,pdf} Paper: http://www.cs.yale.edu/~jf/fs.{ps,pdf} 1

CS Focus is on Computational & Communication Efficiency Agents are Obedient, Faulty, or Adversarial ECON Focus is on Incentives Agents are Strategic 2

Both incentives and computational and communication efficiency matter. Ownership, operation, and use by numerous independent self-interested parties give the Internet the characteristics of an economy as well as those of a computer. DAMD: Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design 3

DAMD definitions and notation Example: Multicast cost sharing Example: Interdomain routing General open questions 4

t 1 Agent 1 t n Agent n p 1 a 1 a n p n Mechanism O (Private) types: t 1,, t n Strategies: a 1,, a n Payments: p i = p i (a 1,, a n ) Output: O = O(a 1, a n ) Valuations: v i = v i (t i, O) Utilities: u i = v i + p i Agent i chooses a i to maximize u i. 5

For all i, t i, a i, and a i = (a 1,, a i-1, a i+i, a n ) v i (t i, O(a i, t i )) + p i (a i, t i ) v i (t i, O(a i, a i )) + p i (a i, a i ) Dominant-Strategy Solution Concept Said to be appropriate for Internet-based games; see, e.g., Nisan-Ronen 99, Friedman-Shenker 97 Truthfulness 6

N. Nisan and A. Ronen Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001), pp. 166--196 Introduced computational efficiency into mechanism-design framework. Polynomial-time computable functions O( ) and p i ( ) Centralized model of computation 7

Input: Tasks z 1,, z k i Agent i s type: t = (t 1,, t k ) i (t j is the minimum time in which i can complete z j.) Feasible outputs: Z = Z 1 Z 2 Z n (Z i is the set of tasks assigned to agent i.) Valuations: v i i (t, Z) = t j i i z j Z i i Goal: Minimize max t j Z i z j Z i i 8

O(a 1,, a n ): Assign z j to agent with smallest a j i p i (a 1,, a n ) = min a j i i i z j Z i Theorem: Strategyproof, n-approximation Open Questions: Average case(s)? Distributed algorithm for Min-Work? 9

Agents 1,, n Interconnection network T Numerical input {c 1, c m } O( T ) messages total O(1) messages per link Polynomial-time local computation Maximum message size is polylog(n, T ) and poly( c j ). j=1 Good network complexity m 10

Source Receiver Set 3 3 1,2 3,0 1 5 5 2 Which users receive the multicast? Cost Shares 10 Users types Link costs 6,7 1,2 How much does each receiver pay? 11

Marginal cost Strategyproof Efficient Good network complexity [FPS 00] Shapley value Group-strategyproof Budget-balanced Minimum worst-case efficiency loss Bad network complexity [FKSS 02] 12

Receiver set: R* = arg max NW(R) R Cost shares: NW(R) t i C(T(R)) i R p i = 0 if i R* t i [NW( R*( t ) ) NW( R*( t i 0) )] o.w. Computable with two (short) messages per link and two (simple) calculations per node. [FPS 00] 13

Cost shares: c(l) is shared equally by all receivers downstream of l. (Non-receivers pay 0.) Receiver set: Biggest R* such that t i p i, for all i R* Any distributed algorithm that computes it must send (n) bits over ( T ) links in the worst case. [FKSS 02] 14

Mechanism: Treat each node as a separate market. Choose clearing price for each market to maximize market revenue (approximately). Find profit-maximizing subtree of markets. Results: Strategyproofness O(1) messages per link Expected constant fraction of maximum profit if Maximum profit margin is large (> 300%), and There is real competition in each market. 15

WorldNet Qwest UUNET Sprint Agents: Transit ASs Inputs: Transit costs Outputs: Routes, Payments 16

Agents types: Per-packet costs {c k } (Unknown) global parameter: Traffic matrix [T ij ] Outputs: {route(i, j)} Payments: {p k } Objectives: Lowest-cost paths (LCPs) Strategyproofness BGP-based distributed algorithm 17

Nisan-Ronen [STOC 99] Polynomial-time centralized mechanism Strategic agents are the edges Single source-destination pair Hershberger-Suri [FOCS 01] Same formulation as in NR 99 Compute payments for all edges on the path in the same time it takes to compute payment for one edge Feigenbaum-Papadimitriou-Sami-Shenker [PODC 02] BGP-based, distributed algorithm Strategic agents are the nodes All source-destination pairs 18

LCPs described by an indicator function: I k (c; i,j) 1 if k is on the LCP from i to j, when cost vector is c 0 otherwise k cι (c 1, c 2,, c k-1,, c k+1,, c n ) 19

Theorem 1: For a biconnected network, if LCP routes are always chosen, there is a unique strategyproof mechanism that gives no payment to nodes that carry no transit traffic. The payments are of the form p k = T ij i,j k p ij, where k p ij k = c k I k (c; i, j) + [ I r (cι ; i, j ) c r - I r (c; i, j ) c r ] r r 20

Payments have a very simple dependence on traffic T ij : payment p k k is the sum of per-packet prices. k p ij Price is 0 if k is not on LCP between i, j. p ij Cost c k is independent of i and j, but price depends on i and j. k p ij k p ij Price is determined by cost of min-cost path from i to j not passing through k (min-cost k-avoiding path). 21

d = max i,j P(c; i, j) d = max i,j,k P -k ( c; i, j ) Theorem 2: Our algorithm computes the VCG prices correctly, uses routing tables of size O(nd) (a constant factor increase over BGP), and converges in at most (d +d ) stages (worst-case additive penalty of d stages over the BGP convergence time). 22

Per-packet c k is an unrealistic cost model. AS route preferences are influenced by reliability, customer-provider relationships, peering agreements, etc. General Policy Routing: For all i,j, AS i assigns a value v i (P ij ) to each potential route P ij. Mechanism Design Goals: Maximize V = v i (P ij ). i For each destination j, {P ij } forms a tree. Strategyproofness, good network complexity 23

NP-hard even to approximate V closely Approximation-preserving reduction from Maximum Independent Set Possible approaches: Restricted class of networks Restricted class of valuation functions v i ( ) 24

v i (P ij ) depends only on next-hop AS a. Captures preferences due to customer/provider/peer agreements. For each destination j, we need to find a Maximum-weight Directed Spanning Tree (MDST). Edge weight = v i ([i a j]) i a b c j 25

Notation: T*(S, j) = MDST on vertex set S, with destination j Payments: p j i p i = p i j, where j = Weight[T*(N, j)] v i (T*(N, j)) Weight[T*(N {i}, j)] Belongs to the family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) utilitarian mechanisms. 26

Centralized and distributed algorithms for MDST are known (e.g., [Humblet 83]). Need to compute VCG payments efficiently. Need to solve for all destinations simultaneously. Can we find a BGP-based algorithm? 27

Hard to solve on the Internet if No solution simultaneously achieves: Good network complexity Incentive compatibility Can achieve either requirement separately. GSP, BB multicast cost sharing is canonically hard. Open Question: Find other canonically hard problems. 28

Caching P2P file sharing Distributed Task Allocation Overlay Networks * Ad-hoc and/or Mobile Networks 29

Nodes make same incentive-sensitive decisions as in traditional networks, e.g.: Should I connect to the network? Should I transit traffic? Should I obey the protocol? These decisions are made more often and under faster-changing conditions than they are in traditional networks. Resources (e.g., bandwidth and power) are scarcer than in traditional networks. Hence: Global optimization is more important. Selfish behavior by individual nodes is potentially more rewarding. 30

Agent behavior: In each DAMD problem, which agents are Obedient, Strategic, [ Adversarial ], [ Faulty ]? Reconciling strategic and computational models: Strategyproofness Agents have no incentive to lie about their private inputs. But, output and payments may be computed by the strategic agents themselves (e.g., in interdomain routing). Quick fix : Digital Signatures [Mitchell, Sami, Talwar, Teague] Is there a way to do this without a PKI? 31

AMD approximation is subtle. One can easily destroy strategyproofness. Feasibly dominant strategies [NR 00] Strategically faithful approximation [AFKSS 02] Tolerable manipulability [AFKSS 02] 32

If there is a mechanism (O, p) that implements a design goal, then there is one that does so truthfully. Agent 1 Agent n p 1 t 1 t n p n FOR i 1 to n SIMULATE i to COMPUTE a i O O(a 1,, a n ); p p(a 1,, a n ) O Note: Loss of privacy Shift of computational load 33

Consider Lowest-Cost Routing: Mechanism is strategyproof, in the technical sense: Lying about its cost cannot improve an AS s welfare in this particular game. But truthtelling reveals to competitors information about an AS s internal network. This may be a disadvantage in the long run. Note that the goal of the mechanism is not acquisition of private inputs per se, but rather evaluation of a function of those inputs. 34

t n-1 t 3 t n t 2 t 1 O = O (t 1,, t n ) Each i learns O. No i can learn anything about t j (except what he can infer from t i and O). 35

Agents are either good or bad. Good is what s called obedient in DAMD. Bad could mean, e.g., Honest but curious Byzantine adversary Typical Results If at most r < n/2 agents are honest but curious, every function has an r-private protocol. If at most r < n/3 agents are byzantine, every function has an r-resilient protocol. ([BGW 88] uses threshold-r secret sharing and error-correcting codes.) 36

trusted party t 1 O t n O agent 1 agent n generic SMFE transformation SMFE Protocol Tempting to think: centralized mechanism trusted party DAM SMFE protocol 37

In general, cannot simply compose a DAM with a standard SMFE protocol. Strategic models may differ (e.g., there may be (n) obedient agents in an SMFE protocol but zero in a DAM). Unacceptable network complexity Agents don t know each other. Are SMFE results usable off-the-shelf at all? 38

New solution concepts Use of indirect mechanisms for goals other than privacy. Tradeoffs among - agent computation - mechanism computation - communication - privacy - approximation factors 39