CEMMAP Masterclass: Empirical Models of Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 1 Lecture 3: Gravity Models

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CEMMAP Masterclass: Empirical Models of Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 1 Lecture 3: Gravity Models Dave Donaldson (MIT) CEMMAP MC July 2018 1 All material based on earlier courses taught jointly with Arnaud Costinot (MIT). Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 1 / 34

Plan for this Lecture 1 The Simplest Gravity Model: Armington 2 Gravity Models and the Gains from Trade: ACR (2012) 3 Beyond ACR s (2012) Equivalence Result: CR (2013) Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 2 / 34

The Armington Model: Armington (1969) Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 3 / 34

The Armington Model: Equilibrium Labor endowments CES utility CES price index P 1 σ j L i for i = 1,...n = n i=1 (w i τ ij ) 1 σ Bilateral trade flows follow gravity equation: X ij = (w i τ ij ) 1 σ n l=1 (w l τ lj ) 1 σ w jl j In what follows ε d ln X ij /X jj d ln τ ij = σ 1 denotes the trade elasticity Trade balance X ji = w j L j i Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 4 / 34

The Armington Model: Welfare Analysis Question: Consider a foreign shock: L i L i for i = j and τ ij τ ij for i = j. How do foreign shocks affect real consumption, C j w j /P j? Shephard s Lemma implies d ln C j = d ln w j d ln P j = n i=1 λ ij (d ln c ij d ln c jj ) with c ij w i τ ij and λ ij X ij /w j L j. Gravity implies d ln λ ij d ln λ jj = ε (d ln c ij d ln c jj ). Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 5 / 34

The Armington Model: Welfare Analysis Combining these two equations yields d ln C j = n i=1 λ ij (d ln λ ij d ln λ jj ). ε Noting that i λ ij = 1 = i λ ij d ln λ ij = 0 then d ln C j = d ln λ jj. ε Integrating the previous expression yields (with ˆx x /x) ˆ C j = ˆλ 1/ε jj. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 6 / 34

The Armington Model: Welfare Analysis In general, predicting ˆλ jj requires (computer) work We can use exact hat algebra as in DEK (previous lecture) Requires data on initial levels of data {λ ij, Y j }, and ε Where to get ε? Gravity equation suggests natural (but not the only) way would be to estimate (via OLS): ln X ij = α i + α j ε ln t ij + ν ij With α i as fixed-effects and t ij some observable and exogenous component of trade costs (that satisfies τ ij = t ij ν ij ). But predicting how bad it would be to shut down all trade is easy... In autarky, λ jj = 1. So Cj A /C j = λ 1/ε jj Thus gains from trade can be computed as GT j 1 C A j /C j = 1 λ 1/ε jj Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 7 / 34

The Armington Model: Gains from Trade Suppose that we have estimated the trade elasticity using the gravity equation (as described above). Central estimate in the literature is ε = 5; see Head and Mayer (2013) Handbook chapter. Using World Input Output Database (2008) to get λ jj, we can then estimate gains from trade: λ jj % GT j Canada 0.82 3.8 Denmark 0.74 5.8 France 0.86 3.0 Portugal 0.80 4.4 Slovakia 0.66 7.6 U.S. 0.91 1.8 Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 8 / 34

Cheese, really? Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 9 / 34

Plan for this Lecture 1 The Simplest Gravity Model: Armington 2 Gravity Models and the Gains from Trade: ACR (2012) 3 Beyond ACR s (2012) Equivalence Result: CR (2013) Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 10 / 34

Motivation New Trade Models Micro-level data have lead to new questions in international trade: How many firms export? How large are exporters? How many products do they export? New models highlight new margins of adjustment: Old question: From inter-industry to intra-industry to intra-firm reallocations How large are the gains from trade (GT)? Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (AER, 2012) question: How do new trade models affect the magnitude of GT? Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 11 / 34

ACR s Main Equivalence Result ACR focus on gravity models Perfect comp.: Armington and Eaton & Kortum 02 Monopolistic comp.: Krugman 80 and many variations of Melitz 03 Within that class, welfare changes are ( ˆx = x /x) ˆ C = ˆλ 1/ε Two sufficient statistics for welfare analysis are: Share of domestic expenditure, λ; Trade elasticity, ε Two views on ACR s result: Optimistic: welfare predictions of Armington model are more robust than you might have thought Pessimistic: within that class of models, micro-level data do not matter Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 12 / 34

Primitive Assumptions Preferences and Endowments CES utility Consumer price index, Pi 1 σ = p i (ω) 1 σ dω, ω Ω One factor of production: labor L i labor endowment in country i w i wage in country i Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 13 / 34

Primitive Assumptions Technology Linear cost function: C ij (ω, t, q) = qw i τ ij α ij (ω) t 1 σ 1 }{{} variable cost + w 1 β i w β j ξ ijφ ij (ω) m ij (t), }{{} fixed cost q : quantity, τ ij : iceberg transportation cost, α ij (ω) : good-specific heterogeneity in variable costs, ξ ij : fixed cost parameter, φ ij (ω) : good-specific heterogeneity in fixed costs. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 14 / 34

Primitive Assumptions Technology Linear cost function: C ij (ω, t, q) = qw i τ ij α ij (ω) t 1 σ 1 1 β + w i w β j ξ ijφ ij (ω) m ij (t) m ij (t) : cost for endogenous destination specific technology choice, t, t [t, t], m ij > 0, m ij 0 Heterogeneity across goods G j (α 1,..., α n, φ 1,..., φ n ) {ω Ω α ij (ω) α i, φ ij (ω) φ i, i} Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 15 / 34

Primitive Assumptions Market Structure Perfect competition Firms can produce any good. No fixed exporting costs. Monopolistic competition Either firms in i can pay w i F i for monopoly power over a random good. Or exogenous measure of firms, N i < N, receive monopoly power. Let N i be the measure of goods that can be produced in i Perfect competition: N i = N Monopolistic competition: N i < N Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 16 / 34

Macro-Level Restrictions Trade is Balanced Bilateral trade flows are defined as: X ij ω Ω ij Ω x ij (ω) dω R1: For any country j, i =j X ij = i =j X ji Trivial if perfect competition or β = 0. Non trivial if β > 0. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 17 / 34

Macro-Level Restrictions Profit Share is Constant R2: For any country j, Π j / ( ) n i=1 X ji is constant where Π j : aggregate profits gross of entry costs, w j F j, (if any) Trivial under perfect competition. Direct from CES preferences in Krugman (1980) each firm has sales equal to σ 1 σ times costs. Non-trivial in more general environments. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 18 / 34

Macro-Level Restrictions CES Import Demand System Import demand system defined as: R3: (w, N, τ) X ε ii j ln (X ij /X jj ) / { ε < 0 i = i ln τ i j = = j 0 otherwise Note: symmetry and separability. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 19 / 34

Macro-Level Restrictions Comments on CES Import Demand System The trade elasticity ε is an upper-level elasticity: it combines x ij (ω) (intensive margin) Ω ij (extensive margin). R3 = complete specialization. R1-R3 are not necessarily independent E.g., if β = 0 then R3 = R2. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 20 / 34

Macro-Level Restrictions Strong CES Import Demand System (AKA Gravity) R3 : The IDS satisfies X ij = χ ij M i (w i τ ij ) ε Y j n i =1 χ i j M i (w i τ i j) ε where χ ij is independent of (w, M, τ). Same restriction on ε ii j as R3, but additional structural relationships (R3 R3 but converse not true) Most prominent models that satisfy R3 : PC: Armington with CES prefs and EK (2002) MC: Krugman (1980 AER), and Melitz (2003 ECMA) with Pareto-distributed firm-level productivity distribution Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 21 / 34

Welfare results State of the world economy: Z (L, τ, ξ) Foreign shocks: a change from Z to Z with no domestic change. Effects of a domestic change in L i would be different between PC and MC models (due to the home-market effect which is at work in the MC models but not in the PC models...more on this in Lecture 5). Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 22 / 34

Equivalence (I) Proposition 1: Suppose that R1-R3 hold. Then for any foreign shock it must be true that Ŵ j = λ 1/ε jj. Implication: λ jj acts as (along with elasticity ε) a sufficient statistic for the fully global (i.e. arbitrarily large changes) GE welfare analysis for any country j Note that it is still true that for any of these models we could estimate ε from OLS gravity regression: ln X ij = α i + α j ε ln t ij + ν ij New margins affect structural interpretation of ε...and composition of gains from trade (GT)...... but size of GT is the same. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 23 / 34

Gains from Trade Revisited Proposition 1 is an ex-post result (based on seeing λ jj ). A simple ex-ante result (for the case of going to autarky): Corollary 1: Suppose that R1-R3 hold. Then Ŵ A j = λ 1/ε jj. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 24 / 34

Equivalence (II) A stronger ex-ante result for variable trade costs (and things that act like variable trade costs, like productivity shocks; but not for other types of foreign shocks) under R1-R3 : Proposition 2: Suppose that R1-R3 hold. Then where and λ jj = ŵ i = n j=1 Ŵ j = λ 1/ε jj [ n i=1 λ ij (ŵ i ˆτ ij ) ε] 1, λ ij ŵ j Y j (ŵ i ˆτ ij ) ε Y i n i =1 λ i j (ŵ i ˆτ i j) ε. So: ε and {λ ij } are sufficient to predict Ŵ j (ex-ante) from ˆτ ij, i = j. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 25 / 34

Taking Stock ACR consider models featuring: (i) CES preferences; (ii) one factor of production; (iii) linear cost functions; and (iv) perfect or monopolistic competition; with three macro-level restrictions: (i) trade is balanced; (ii) aggregate profits are a constant share of aggregate revenues; and (iii) a CES import demand system. Equivalence for ex-post welfare changes and GT under R3 equivalence carries over to ex-ante welfare changes So if R3 is satisfied, then models in this ACR class agree on all implications of changes in variable trade costs Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 26 / 34

A note on methodology ACR set out to answer the question of whether different trade models predict different GT In some of these cases, tempting to think that it is easy to rank GT across these models. E.g., following Melitz and Redding (AER, 2015), note that since Krugman is a strictly nested special case of Melitz for which the firm productivity distribution is degenerate, the Melitz model is Krugman plus an additional margin of adjustment. And since both models are efficient (i.e. correspond to planner s problem, so equilibrium is maximizing something see Dhingra and Morrow, JPE 2017), an additional margin of adjustment guarantees that the damage done by a negative shock (e.g. move to autarky) is less bad in Melitz than in Krugman. But note that this is not the ACR thought experiment. ACR s thought experiment is to ask about GT (or any other counterfactual), conditional on the data {λ ij, Y j } and elasticity ε we have. Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 27 / 34

Plan for this Lecture 1 The Simplest Gravity Model: Armington 2 Gravity Models and the Gains from Trade: ACR (2012) 3 Beyond ACR s (2012) Equivalence Result: CR (2013) Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 28 / 34

Departing from ACR s (2012) Equivalence Result Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (Handbook of International Econ, 2013) has nice discussion of general cases. Other Gravity Models: Multiple Sectors Tradable Intermediate Goods Multiple Factors Variable Markups (ACDR 2012 more on this in Lecture 5) Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 29 / 34

Multiple sectors, GT Nested CES: Upper level EoS ρ and lower level EoS ε s Recall gains for Canada of 3.8%. Now gains can be much higher: ρ = 1 implies GT = 17.4% Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 30 / 34

Tradable intermediates, GT Set ρ = 1, add tradable intermediates with Input-Output structure Labor shares are 1 α j,s and input shares are α j,ks ( k α j,ks = α j,s ) Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 31 / 34

Tradable intermediates, GT % GT j % GT MS j % GT IO j Canada 3.8 17.4 30.2 Denmark 5.8 30.2 41.4 France 3.0 9.4 17.2 Portugal 4.4 23.8 35.9 U.S. 1.8 4.4 8.3 Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 32 / 34

Multiple sectors: a combination of micro and macro features In Krugman, free entry scale effects associated with total employment In Melitz, additional scale effects associated with sales in each market In both models, trade may affect entry and fixed costs All these effects do not play a role in the one sector model (since factor supply to that one sector is assumed to be fixed) With multiple sectors and traded intermediates, these effects come back (since inter-sectoral factor supply is now endogenous) Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 33 / 34

Gains from Trade MS = multiple sectors; IO = tradable intermediates... Canada China Germany Romania US Aggregate 3.8 0.8 4.5 4.5 1.8 MS, PC 17.4 4.0 12.7 17.7 4.4 MS, MC 15.3 4.0 17.6 12.7 3.8 MS, IO, PC 29.5 11.2 22.5 29.2 8.0 MS, IO, MC (Krugman) 33.0 28.0 41.4 20.8 8.6 MS, IO, MC (Melitz) 39.8 77.9 52.9 20.7 10.3 Dave Donaldson (MIT) Gravity Models CEMMAP MC July 2018 34 / 34