Maximum Theorem, Implicit Function Theorem and Envelope Theorem

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Maximum Theorem, Implicit Function Theorem and Envelope Theorem Ping Yu Department of Economics University of Hong Kong Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 1 / 25

1 The Maximum Theorem 2 The Implicit Function Theorem 3 The Envelope Theorem Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 2 / 25

Overview of This Chapter The maximum theorem: the continuity of the optimizer and optimum with respect to (w.r.t.) a group of parameters. The implicit function theorem: the differentiablity of the optimizer w.r.t. a group of parameters. The envelope theorem: the differentiablity of the optimum w.r.t. a group of parameters. In the previous two chapters, we are "moving along a curve", that is, f and G are given (or the parameter value is given) and we are searching over x along f to find the optimal x. In this chapter, we are "shifting a curve", i.e., we change the parameter values to shift f and G, and check how the optimizer and optimum respond to such shifting. Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 2 / 25

The Maximum Theorem The Maximum Theorem Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 3 / 25

The Maximum Theorem History of the Maximum Theorem Claude J. Berge (1926-2002), French Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 4 / 25

The Maximum Theorem The Problem Problem: We want to know how x (or the maximized function) depends on the exogenous parameters a, rather than what x is for a particular a. - For example, in consumer s problem max u(x 1,x 2 ) s.t. p 1 x 1 + p 2 x 2 = y, how x 1,x 2 (x1,x 2 ) or (u(x 1,x 2 )) depends on (p 1,p 2,y) rather than what (x1,x 2 ) is when p 1 = 2, p 2 = 7, and y = 25, i.e., we are interested in what the demand function is. Mathematically, max f (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) x 1,,x n s.t. g 1 (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) = c 1,. g m (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) = c m. When is the "demand" function continuous? Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 5 / 25

The Maximum Theorem Continuous Correspondence Define the maximized value of f when the parameters are (a 1,,a k ) as v(a 1,:::,a k ) = f (x 1 (a 1,:::,a k ),:::,x n(a 1,:::,a k ),a 1,:::,a k ), which is uniquely defined even if x (a 1,:::,a k ) is not uniquely defined. Using the feasible set, the problem can be restated as max f (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) x 1,,x n s.t. (x 1,,x n ) 2 G(a 1,,a k ), where G(a 1,,a k ) f(x 1,,x n ) j g j (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) = c j, 8 jg is a set valued function or a correspondence. Two sets of vectors A and B are within ε of each other if for any vector x in one set there is a vector x 0 in the other set such that x 0 2 B ε (x). The correspondence G is continuous at (a 1,:::,a k ) if 8 ε > 0, 9 δ > 0 such that if (a1 0,,a0 k ) is within δ of (a 1,,a k ) then G(a1 0,,a0 k ) is within ε of G(a 1,,a k ). [Figure here] - If G is a function, then the continuity of G as a correspondence is equivalent to the continuity as a function. - The continuity of the functions g j does not necessarily imply the continuity of the feasible set. (Exercise) Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 6 / 25

The Maximum Theorem Figure: Continuous and Discontinuous Correspondence Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 7 / 25

The Maximum Theorem The Maximum Theorem Theorem Suppose that f (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) is continuous (in (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k )), that G(a 1,,a k ) is a continuous correspondence, and that for any (a 1,,a k ) the set G(a 1,,a k ) is compact. Then (i) v(a 1,,a k ) is continuous, and (ii) if (x 1 (a 1,,a k ),,x n(a 1,,a k )) are (single valued) functions then they are also continuous. Compactness of G(a 1,,a k ) and continuity of f w.r.t. x guarantees the existence of x for any a by the Weierstrass Theorem. Uniqueness of x is guaranteed by the uniqueness theorem in Chapter 3. Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 8 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem The Implicit Function Theorem Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 9 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem History of the IFT Augustin-Louis Cauchy (1789-1857), French Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 10 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem The Problem Problem: How to solve x 2 R n from n FOCs and how sensitive of x is to the parameter? Suppose that we have n endogenous variables x 1,:::,x n, m exogenous variables or parameters, b 1,:::,b m, and n equations or equilibrium conditions or, using vector notation, f 1 (x 1,,x n,b 1,,b m ) = 0, f 2 (x 1,,x n,b 1,,b m ) = 0,. f n (x 1,,x n,b 1,,b m ) = 0, f(x,b) = 0, where f : R n+m! R n, x 2 R n, b 2 R m, and 0 2 R n. When can we solve this system to obtain functions giving each x i as a function of b 1,:::,b m? Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 11 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem The Case of Linear Functions Suppose that our equations are a 11 x 1 + + a 1n x n + c 11 b 1 + c 1m b m = 0 a 21 x 1 + + a 2n x n + c 21 b 1 + c 2m b m = 0. a n1 x 1 + + a nn x n + c n1 b 1 + c nm b m = 0 We can write this, in matrix notation, as x [A j C] = 0 or Ax + Cb = 0, b where A is an n n matrix, C is an n m matrix, x is an n 1 (column) vector, and b is an m 1 vector. As long as A can be inverted or is of full rank, x = A 1 Cb or x b 0 = A 1 C. Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 12 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem The General Nonlinear Case If there are some values (x,b) for which f (x,b) = 0, then a parallel result holds in the neighborhood of (x,b) if we linearize f in that neighborhood. Theorem Suppose that f : R n+m! R n is a C 1 function on an open set A R n+m and that (x,b) in A is such that f (x,b) = 0. Suppose also that 0 1 f 1 (x,b) f 1 (x,b) f(x,b) x 1 x n x 0 = B. @...... C A f n (x,b) f n (x,b) x 1 x n is of full rank. Then there are open sets A 1 R n and A 2 R m with x 2 A 1, b 2 A 2 and A 1 A 2 A such that for each b in A 2 there is exactly one g(b) in A 1 such that f(g(b),b) = 0. Moreover, g : A 2! A 1 is a C 1 function and g(b) b 0 = nm f(g(b),b) 1 f(g(b),b) x 0 nn b 0. nm Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 13 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem Explanations of the IFT Intuition: For (x,b) in a neighborhood of (x,b) such that f(x,b) = 0 with x = g(b), we have f(g(b),b) g(b) x 0 b 0 + f(g(b),b) b 0 = 0 nm, so g(b) f(g(b),b) 1 f(g(b),b) b 0 = x 0 b 0 A 1 C in the linear case. This is a local result, rather than a global result. If b is not close to b we may not be able to solve the system, and that for a particular value of b there may be many values of x that solve the system, but there is only one close to x. [Figure here] For all values of b close to b we can find a unique value of x close to x such that f (x,b) = 0. However, (1) for each value of b there are other values of x far away from x that also satisfy f (x,b) = 0, and (2) there are values of b, such as b for which there are no values of x that satisfy f (x,b) = 0. That f ( x, b) x is of full rank means jg 0 ( x)j 6= 0 in this example. Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 14 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem Figure: Intuition for the IFT: f (x,b) = g(x) b, x,b 2 R Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 15 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem Comparative Statics The IFT does not provide conditions to guarantee the existence of (x,b) such that f (x,b) = 0; rather, it provides conditions such that if such an (x,b) exists, then we can also uniquely solve f (x,b) = 0 in its neighborhood. So the most important application of the IFT is to obtain g(b) rather than b 0 guarantee the existence or uniqueness of the solution. Suppose the equality-constrained problem under consideration is max f (x,c) x s.t. h(x,d) = 0, where x 2 R n, c 2 R L, d 2 R M, and h 2 R K. Form the Lagrangian then the FOCs are L (x,λ,c,d) = f (x,c) + λ h(x,d); L x (x,λ,c,d) = f x (x,c) + h(x,d) 0 λ = 0, x L λ (x,λ,c,d) = h(x,d) = 0. Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 16 / 25

The Implicit Function Theorem continue... Casting in the notation of the IFT, f(x,b) =! f h(x,d)0 (x,c) + λ x x, h(x, d) where x (x,λ ), b (c,d), n n + K, and m (L + M). Suppose f and h are C 2 ; then f(x,b) is C 1 as required by the IFT. Suppose that (x,λ ) satisfies! D x,λ L (x,λ,c,d) 0 f = x (x,c) + h(x,d) 0 λ x h(x = 0,,d) and Dx,λ 2 L (x,λ D 2,c,d) = x f (x,c) + Dx 2 (h(x,d) 0 λ ) (D x h(x,d)) 0 D x h(x,d) 0 K K is of full rank, where Dx 2 (h(x,d) 0 λ ) = K k=1 λ k Dxh 2 k (x,d). Then the assumptions of the IFT are satisfied, so we have x 0,λ 0 0 (c 0,d 0 ) = D 2 x,λ L (x,λ,c,d) 1 2 L (x,λ,c,d) x 0,λ 0 0 (c 0,d 0 ), where (x,λ ) are treated as functions of (c,d). Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 17 / 25

The Envelope Theorem The Envelope Theorem Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 18 / 25

The Envelope Theorem Intuition for The Envelope Theorem Problem: How is v(a 1,:::,a k ) sensitive to (a 1,:::,a k )? Suppose we are at a maximum (in an unconstrained problem) and we change the data of the problem by a very small amount. Now both the solution of the problem and the value at the maximum will change. However at a maximum the function is flat (the first derivative is zero). Thus when we want to know by how much the maximized value has changed it does not matter (very much) whether or not we take account of how the maximizer changes or not. In the figure in the next slide, f (x (a 0 ),a 0 ) f (x (a),a 0 ). Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 19 / 25

The Envelope Theorem Figure: Intuition for the Envelope Theorem Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 20 / 25

The Envelope Theorem SRAC and LRAC: A Motivating Example The short run average cost (SRAC) of producing Q units when the scale is k be given by SRAC(Q,k) and the long run average cost (LRAC) of producing Q units by LRAC(Q). Here, the scale of operation k, i.e., the size and number of plants and other fixed capital, is assumed not to be changed for some level of production Q in the short run, but will be selected to be the optimal scale for that level of production in the long run. In other words, LRAC(Q) = min k SRAC(Q,k). Let us denote, for a given value Q, the optimal level of k by k(q). Drawing one short run average cost curve for each of the (infinite) possible values of k. One way of thinking about the long run average cost curve is as the bottom or envelope of these short run average cost curves. [Figure here] This implies that d LRAC(Q) dq = SRAC(Q,k(Q)). Q Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 21 / 25

The Envelope Theorem Figure: The Relationship Between SRAC and LRAC Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 22 / 25

The Envelope Theorem The General Problem Consider again the maximization problem The Lagrangian max f (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) x 1,,x n s.t. g 1 (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) = c 1,. g m (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) = c m. L (x 1,,x n,λ 1,,λ m ;a 1,,a k ) = f (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k ) + m j=1 λ j (c j g j (x 1,,x n,a 1,,a k )). Suppose the optimal values of x i and λ j are x i (a 1,,a k ) and λ j (a 1,,a k ), i = 1,,n, j = 1,,k. Then v(a 1,:::,a k ) = f (x 1 (a 1,:::,a k ),:::,x n(a 1,:::,a k ),a 1,:::,a k ). The envelope theorem says that the derivative of v is equal to the derivative of L at the maximizing values of x and λ. Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 23 / 25

The Envelope Theorem The Envelope Theorem Theorem If all functions are defined as above and the problem is such that the functions x and λ are well defined, then v a h (a 1,,a k ) = L a h (x 1 (a 1,,a k ),,x n(a 1,,a k ), λ 1 (a 1,,a k ),,λ m(a 1,,a k );a 1,,a k ) = f a h (x 1 (a 1,,a k ),,x n(a 1,,a k ),a 1,,a k ) m λ j (a 1,,a k ) g h (x a 1 (a 1,,a k ),,xn(a 1,,a k ),a 1,,a k ) j=1 h for all h = 1,,k. In matrix and vector notation, v L (a) = a a (x (a),λ (a);a) = f g(x a (x (a),a) (a),a) 0 λ (a). a Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 24 / 25

The Envelope Theorem Interpretation of the Lagrange Multiplier In Chapter 2, we have interpreted the Lagrange multiplier as the penalty on violating the constraint. More rigorously, treating c j, j = 1,,m, also as parameters, then by the envelope theorem, v c j (a 1,,a k,c 1,,c m ) = λ j (a 1,,a k,c 1,,c m ). Intuition: Think of f as the profit function of a firm, the g j equation as the resource constraint, and c j as the amount of input j available to the firm. In this situation, v c j (a 1,,a k,c 1,,c m ) represents the change in the optimal profit resulting from availability of one more unit of input j. Alternatively, it tells the maximum amount the firm would be willing to pay to acquire another unit of input j. For this reason, λ j is often called the internal value, or more frequently, the shadow price of input j. It may be a more important index to the firm than the external market price of input j. Ping Yu (HKU) MIFE 25 / 25