A Strategic Epistemic Logic for Bounded Memory Agents

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CNRS, Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France Workshop on Resource Bounded Agents Barcelona 12 August, 2015

Contents 1 Introduction 2 3 4 5

Combining Strategic and Epistemic Reasoning The goal is to develop a strategic epistemic logic for agents with arbitrary memory abilities. Much work has already been done on epistemic ATL, but it is mostly either perfect recall or memoryless situations. We allow each agent to have an arbitrary equivalence relation on histories. Agents strategies and knowledge are based on these equivalence relations, so we consider their abilities to act, their knowledge, and the relationship between them.

Combining Strategic and Epistemic Reasoning The goal is to develop a strategic epistemic logic for agents with arbitrary memory abilities. Much work has already been done on epistemic ATL, but it is mostly either perfect recall or memoryless situations. We allow each agent to have an arbitrary equivalence relation on histories. Agents strategies and knowledge are based on these equivalence relations, so we consider their abilities to act, their knowledge, and the relationship between them.

Combining Strategic and Epistemic Reasoning The goal is to develop a strategic epistemic logic for agents with arbitrary memory abilities. Much work has already been done on epistemic ATL, but it is mostly either perfect recall or memoryless situations. We allow each agent to have an arbitrary equivalence relation on histories. Agents strategies and knowledge are based on these equivalence relations, so we consider their abilities to act, their knowledge, and the relationship between them.

Combining Strategic and Epistemic Reasoning The goal is to develop a strategic epistemic logic for agents with arbitrary memory abilities. Much work has already been done on epistemic ATL, but it is mostly either perfect recall or memoryless situations. We allow each agent to have an arbitrary equivalence relation on histories. Agents strategies and knowledge are based on these equivalence relations, so we consider their abilities to act, their knowledge, and the relationship between them.

Our contributions We develop a strategic, epistemic logic based on uniform strategies. We allow agents to have arbitrary equivalence relations on histories, Our logic allows different agents to have different memory abilities, We present a new version of perfect recall for agents, allowing agents to reason about their own actions.

Contents 1 Introduction 2 3 4 5

Epistemic Concurrent Game Structures Q, Π, Σ, B,, π, Av, δ Q: states, Π: propositions, Σ: finite set of agents, {a 1,..., a n }, B: finite set of actions, : Σ P(Q Q): equivalence relation on states for each agent, π : Q Π: valuation, Av : Q Σ P(B): the available actions for an agent at a state, δ : Q Σ B P(Q): transition function.

Epistemic Concurrent Game Structures Q, Π, Σ, B,, π, Av, δ Requirements: Indistinguishable states. If q 1 i, then Av(q 1, a i ) = Av(, a i ): if two states are indistinguishable for a i, then the same actions are available to a i. Action availability. Av(q, a i ) : every agent has at least one action available at every state. Determinacy: when every agent chooses an available action, this leads to exactly one next state.

Histories and Strategies A history is a sequence q 0.b1.q 1.b2...q k 1.bk.q k where each q j Q, b j B n, such that q j is the bj successor of q j 1 (technically, {q j } = n i=1 δ(q j 1, a i, b i )) Given an arbitrary equivalence relation i on histories, a uniform strategy for a i is a function f : Hist B satisfying the following requirements: for all h Hist, f i (h) is an available action for a i in h, and if h 1 i h 2 then f (h 1 ) = f (h 2 ).

Contents 1 Introduction 2 3 4 5

Equivalence relations on histories Most work on epistemic ATL considers two possibilities for memory: either perfect recall or memoryless. Furthermore, all agents in a system are assumed to have the same memory capabilities. We generalize the notion of memory in several ways. Allow arbitrary equivalence relations on histories. Allow different agents to have different memory capabilities. New notion of perfect recall, taking actions into account.

Arbitrary equivalence relations In other work, agents equivalence relations on histories are derivable from their equivalence relations on states usually, memoryless or remembering all past states. We allow a more general definition: each agent can have any equivalence relation on histories. This means we consider more general systems. Examples: Agent remembers all past states except a certain state that is invisible to him, An agent who remembers half the states the system has been in, Agent remembers entire history until the system enters s 0, which wipes out his memory. This generalization is similar to allowing agents in traditional, static Kripke models to have arbitrary equivalence relations on the set of states.

Different agents with different memory abilities In other work, all agents are assumed to have the same memory capabilities- e.g. all memoryless or all with perfect recall. Since we allow arbitrary equivalence relations, each agent can have a different type of memory. Practical examples: A system where some simple agents with limited memory interact with sophisticated agents who remember everything, or A system with friendly agents of known memory ability and adversarial agents of unknown ability. Taking adversaries as perfect recall agents models a worst-case scenario, e.g. to check security properties.

Example I: Agents with different memory abilities Two agents: a 1 controls a lightswitch, is memoryless and blind. a 2 can turn over card: red on one side, green on other. Perfect recall. Propositions: r: red g: green l: light on q 0 r, l (n,t) 1 (s,t) q 1 g, l Actions: s: flip lightswitch t: turn card over n: do nothing (s,n) 1 r, l 1,2 (n,t) 1 q 3 g, l (s,n)

Example I: Agents with different memory abilities Formulas: = {a2 } g = {a2 } {a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } {a 1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g (s,n) q 0 r, l 1 r, l (n,t) 1 (s,t) 1,2 (n,t) 1 q 1 g, l q 3 g, l (s,n)

Example I: Agents with different memory abilities Formulas: = {a2 } g = {a2 } {a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } {a 1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g (s,n) q 0 r, l 1 r, l (n,t) 1 (s,t) 1,2 (n,t) 1 q 1 g, l q 3 g, l (s,n)

Example I: Agents with different memory abilities Formulas: = {a2 } g = {a2 } {a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } {a 1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g (s,n) q 0 r, l 1 r, l (n,t) 1 (s,t) 1,2 (n,t) 1 q 1 g, l q 3 g, l (s,n)

Example I: Agents with different memory abilities Formulas: = {a2 } g = {a2 } {a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } {a 1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g (s,n) q 0 r, l 1 r, l (n,t) 1 (s,t) 1,2 (n,t) 1 q 1 g, l q 3 g, l (s,n)

Example I: Agents with different memory abilities Formulas: = {a2 } g = {a2 } {a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } {a 1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g (s,n) q 0 r, l 1 r, l (n,t) 1 (s,t) 1,2 (n,t) 1 q 1 g, l q 3 g, l (s,n)

Example I: Agents with different memory abilities Formulas: = {a2 } g = {a2 } {a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } {a 1, a 2 } g = {a1, a 2 } g (s,n) q 0 r, l 1 r, l (n,t) 1 (s,t) 1,2 (n,t) 1 q 1 g, l q 3 g, l (s,n)

New definition of perfect recall Traditional definition: q 0.a 1.q 1.a 2...q k i r 0.b 1.r 1.b 2.r 3...r k iff q j i r j for j {0,..., k}. Only looks at states. New definition: two histories are equivalent for a i if all past states are equivalent and a i took the same action in both histories at every step in the past. Definition (Perfect recall equivalence) h 1 i h 2, iff either h 1 = q 1 and h 2 = and q 1 i, or h 1 = q 0.b 1.q 1...q j 1.b j.q j and h 2 = r 0.c 1.r 1...r j 1.c j.r j and: 1 q 0.b 1.q 1...q j 1 i r 0.c 1.r 1...r j 1, and 2 q j i r j, and 3 b i = c i where b j = b 1,..., b n and c j = c 1,..., c n.

New definition of perfect recall Traditional definition: q 0.a 1.q 1.a 2...q k i r 0.b 1.r 1.b 2.r 3...r k iff q j i r j for j {0,..., k}. Only looks at states. New definition: two histories are equivalent for a i if all past states are equivalent and a i took the same action in both histories at every step in the past. Definition (Perfect recall equivalence) h 1 i h 2, iff either h 1 = q 1 and h 2 = and q 1 i, or h 1 = q 0.b 1.q 1...q j 1.b j.q j and h 2 = r 0.c 1.r 1...r j 1.c j.r j and: 1 q 0.b 1.q 1...q j 1 i r 0.c 1.r 1...r j 1, and 2 q j i r j, and 3 b i = c i where b j = b 1,..., b n and c j = c 1,..., c n.

Example II: Recalling actions A robot is in a simple maze shaped like this: Robot has a position and an orientation. Robot perceives only the walls around him.

Example II: equivalence relation So, these two states are indistinguishable for the robot: s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 (s 3, e) (s 5, s)

Introduction Example II: equivalence relation But these two states are distinguishable: s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 (s 2, n) (s 4, n)

Introduction Example II: equivalence relation And these two states are distinguishable: s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 (s 1, e) (s 1, w)

Introduction Example II: actions The robot s actions are go left, right, forward, and back, l, r, f, b. The actions l, r, and b change the orientation as you would expect, but f does not change the orientation. Every action changes the position if the space in that direction is free; otherwise, the position stays the same. E.g. right action: s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 r s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 (s 2, e) (s 4, s)

Introduction Example II: actions The robot s actions are go left, right, forward, and back, l, r, f, b. The actions l, r, and b change the orientation as you would expect, but f does not change the orientation. Every action changes the position if the space in that direction is free; otherwise, the position stays the same. E.g. left action: s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 l s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 (s 2, e) (s 2, n)

Introduction Example II: histories So, which histories can the robot distinguish If the robot is memoryless this is obvious. If the robot has perfect recall, we will say that it can remember its actions, not just the past states. Consider the following pair of histories: h 1 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).l.(s 1, w) h 2 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).r. (s 3, e) s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 h 1 h 2

Introduction Example II: histories So, which histories can the robot distinguish If the robot is memoryless this is obvious. If the robot has perfect recall, we will say that it can remember its actions, not just the past states. Consider the following pair of histories: h 1 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).l.(s 1, w) h 2 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).r. (s 3, e) s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 h 1 h 2

Introduction Example II: histories So, which histories can the robot distinguish If the robot is memoryless this is obvious. If the robot has perfect recall, we will say that it can remember its actions, not just the past states. Consider the following pair of histories: h 1 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).l.(s 1, w) h 2 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).r. (s 3, e) = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 = = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 h 1 h 2

Introduction Example II: histories So, which histories can the robot distinguish If the robot is memoryless this is obvious. If the robot has perfect recall, we will say that it can remember its actions, not just the past states. Consider the following pair of histories: h 1 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).l.(s 1, w) h 2 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).r. (s 3, e) = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 = = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 h 1 h 2

Introduction Example II: histories h 1 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).l.(s 1, w) h 2 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).r. (s 3, e) = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 = = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 h 1 h 2 Traditional definition of perfect recall: h 1 h 2 Our definition of perfect recall: h 1 h 2 because l r.

Introduction Example II: histories h 1 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).l.(s 1, w) h 2 =(s 5, n).f.(s 4, n).f.(s 2, n).r. (s 3, e) = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 = = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 5 h 1 h 2 Traditional definition of perfect recall: h 1 h 2 Our definition of perfect recall: h 1 h 2 because l r.

Contents 1 Introduction 2 3 4 5

Syntax The syntax of uatel: φ ::= p φ φ φ K i φ C A φ A φ A φ A φuφ where p Π, i Σ, and A Σ. K i : knowledge C A : common knowledge

Semantics In order to express knowledge, we must define our semantics over (finite) histories. L, h = p iff p π(last(h)) Semantics for φ, φ 1 φ 2, K i φ, and C A φ are standard. L, h = A φ iff group strategy F A for A such that h A h, λ out(h, F A ), L, λ[0, h + 1] = φ, L, h = A φ iff group strategy F A for A such that h A h, λ out(h, F A ), L, λ[0, h + n] = φ for all n 0 L, h = A φ 1 Uφ 2 iff group strategy F A for A s.t. h A h, λ out(h, F A ), m N s.t. L, λ[0, h + m] = φ 2 and n {0,..., m 1}, L, λ[0, h + n] = φ 1

Next operator L, h = A φ iff group strategy F A for A such that h A h, λ out(h, F A ), L, λ[0, h + 1] = φ, This means that there is a successful group strategy (a set of strategies, one for each agent in the group), and it is common knowledge for the group that the strategy will succeed from the current history. This corresponds to the intuitive notion of a group of agents being able to achieve a goal.

Validities L, h = A φ iff group strategy F A for A such that h A h, λ out(h, F A ), L, λ[0, h + 1] = φ, This means that there is a successful group strategy (a set of strategies, one for each agent in the group), and it is common knowledge for the group that the strategy will succeed from the current history. This corresponds to the intuitive notion of a group of agents being able to achieve a goal.

Validities For perfect recall agents: Γ φ (C Γ φ Γ Γ φ). Γ φ Γ C Γ φ C Γ Γ φ, Γ φ Γ C Γ φ C Γ Γ φ, and but NOT Γ φ 1 Uφ 2 C Γ Γ φ 1 Uφ 2. Γ a φ 1 Uφ 2 Γ a C Γ φ 1 UC Γ φ 2.

Validities For perfect recall agents: Γ φ (C Γ φ Γ Γ φ). Γ φ Γ C Γ φ C Γ Γ φ, Γ φ Γ C Γ φ C Γ Γ φ, and but NOT Γ φ 1 Uφ 2 C Γ Γ φ 1 Uφ 2. Γ a φ 1 Uφ 2 Γ a C Γ φ 1 UC Γ φ 2.

Validities For perfect recall agents: Γ φ (C Γ φ Γ Γ φ). Γ φ Γ C Γ φ C Γ Γ φ, Γ φ Γ C Γ φ C Γ Γ φ, and but NOT Γ φ 1 Uφ 2 C Γ Γ φ 1 Uφ 2. Γ a φ 1 Uφ 2 Γ a C Γ φ 1 UC Γ φ 2.

Contents 1 Introduction 2 3 4 5

Future Work Study the decidability of model checking for the logic, Complexity if decidable, Axiomatization Abilities of subgroups of agents, Include memory abilities in the logical language: be able to express properties like a 1 is memoryless Use strategy logic to discuss strategies explicitly within formulas.

Thank you Thank you.

Related Work van der Hoek & Wooldridge 03 (ATEL); Jamroga & van der Hoek 04 (ATOL); Schobbens 04; Jamroga & Ågotnes 07 (CSL); Ågotnes & Alechina 12 (ECL), Bulling & Jamroga 14, others. Main differences: Uniform vs. non-uniform strategies. Non-uniform: ATEL. De re or de dicto strategies. De dicto: ECL. De re: Sch04, ATOL, us. Both: CSL and BJ14. Different coalitional operators. ATOL can express ours and more for memoryless systems. abilities: we allow arbitrary equivalence on histories, different memory abilities for different agents and introduce action-based definition of perfect recall. These are new.