Convex Sets Strict Separation. in the Minimax Theorem

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Applied Mathematical Sciences, Vol. 8, 2014, no. 36, 1781-1787 HIKARI Ltd, www.m-hikari.com http://dx.doi.org/10.12988/ams.2014.4271 Convex Sets Strict Separation in the Minimax Theorem M. A. M. Ferreira 1 Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE IUL), BRU - IUL, Lisboa, Portugal M. C. P. Matos Instituto Politécnico de Viseu (IPV), ESTV, Viseu, Portugal Copyright 2014 M. A. M. Ferreira and M. C. P. Matos. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Abstract The convex sets strict separation is very useful to obtain mathematical optimization results. The minimax theorem, a key result in Game Theory is an example. It will be outlined in this work. Keywords: Minimax theorem, game theory, convex sets 1 Introduction Be a zero-sum two players game. Call W the winner player and L the loser player. The payoff table when W chooses the strategy and L chooses the strategy is [ ] 1 Corresponding author

1782 M. A. M. Ferreira and M. C. P. Matos reading the player W the values as earnings and the player L as losses. Evidently, a negative earning is a loss and vice-versa. In terms of von Neumann s minimax theorem [ ], the problem may be solved as a linear programming problem, see for instance [ ]: For player W the target is to maximize, the value of the game, subject to the constraints being the frequency at which the player chooses its i strategy,. For player L the target is to minimize, the value of the game, subject to the constraints being the frequency at which the player chooses its j strategy,. Whenever there is a solution. If the common value is the game value and the mathematical programs 2 presented above are not useful. Note that in this kind of problems there is a maximization of minimums and a minimization of maximums. In order to present a mathematical basis for this tool, it will be seen how the convex sets strict separation allows obtaining this key result in game theory. Consider then the zero-sum two players games formulation: -Be ( ) a real function of two real variables (real Hilbert space). -Be A and B two convex sets in H. -One of the players chooses strategies (points) in A, in order to maximize ( ) (or to minimize ( ) ( )): it is the maximizing player. - The other player chooses strategies (points) in B, in order to minimize ( ) (or to maximize ( ) ( )): it is the minimizing player. - ( ) is the payoff function. ( ) represents, simultaneously, the maximizing player earning and the minimizing player loss in a move at which they chose, respectively, the strategies and. This game has value G if ( ) ( ) ( ) If for any ( ), ( ), ( ) is a pair of optimal strategies. It is also a saddle point if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 Note that these two programs are duals of each other.

Convex sets strict separation in the minimax theorem 1783 2 Strict Separation The Banach-Sachs theorem, see for instance [ ] is very important for the sequence of this work: Theorem 2.1 (Banach-Saks) Suppose that converges weakly to x. So it is possible to determine a subsequence { }, such that the arithmetical means converge to x. Observation: -An alternative formulation of this theorem is: A closed convex subset is weakly closed. And also, see again [ ], the Theorem 2.2 (Convex functionals weak inferior semi continuity) Be ( ) a continuous convex functional in Hilbert space H. So if converges weakly to x, ( ) ( ). Theorem 2.3 Consider A and B closed convex sets in H, with A bounded. Be ( ) a real functional defined for x in A and y in B such that: - ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for x in A and in B, 0, - (( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for y in B and in A, 0, - ( ) is continuous in x for each y,

1784 M. A. M. Ferreira and M. C. P. Matos then (1.1) is fulfilled, that is : the game has a value. Proof: Obviously ( ) ( ) ( ) and so ( ) ( ). Then as ( ) is concave and continuous in, A convex, closed and bounded, it follows that ( ). Suppose now that there is such that ( ) for each y in B. If this is the case, ( ) or ( ) as it is convenient. So, in the sequence it will be demonstrated the existence of such a. For each y in B, call { ( ) }. A is closed, bounded and convex. Suppose that, for a finite set { },. Consider the transformation from A to defined by ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ). Call F the ( ) set convex hull closure. Be the closed positive cone in. in fact, being ( ) concave in x, for any in ( ( ) ) ( ) and so the ( ) convex extension does not intersect. Consider now a sequence in A, such that ( ) converges to. As A is closed, bounded and convex, it is possible to find a subsequence, designated { }, convergent for an element of A (call it ). Moreover, for any, as ( ) is concave in x, ( ) ( ), that is ( ) ( ). So. Then F and may be strictly separated, and it is possible to find a vector in with components, fulfilling

Convex sets strict separation in the minimax theorem 1785 ( ( ) ), with the whole great or equal than zero. Obviously, the whole must be non-negative, not being possible to have the whole of them simultaneously null. So, dividing by, as ( ) is convex in y, an making the whole zero, ( ). And ( ), what is contradictory with the definition of G. So,. Now it will be shown that, in fact,, using that result and proceeding by absurd. Note that is closed and convex. So, by Theorem 2.1, is also weakly closed, and, as it is bounded, is compact in the weak topology such as A. Call the complementary. is open in the weak topology. So, if is empty,. But, being A compact, it is known that a finite number of is enough to cover A:,that is is contained in the complementary of A and it must be, leading to a contradiction. So suppose that, then satisfies ( ), as wished. 3 The Minimax Theorem The minimax theorem is obtained as a corollary of Theorem 2.3 strengthening its hypothesis. Now it is important to the sequence the following result:

1786 M. A. M. Ferreira and M. C. P. Matos Theorem 3.1 A continuous convex functional in a Hilbert space has minimum in any closed and bounded convex set. Proof: In a space with finite dimension, obviously the set convexity is not needed. In spaces with infinite dimension, note that if is a minimizing sequence, so, as the sequence is bounded, it is admissible to work with a weakly convergent sequence and, by Theorem 2.2, there is weak inferior semi continuity: ( ) ( ), designating ( ) the functional, where x is the weak limit, and so the minimum is ( ). As a closed convex set is weakly closed, x belongs to the closed convex set. Theorem 3.2 (Minimax) Suppose that the Theorem 2.3 functional ( ) is continuous in both variables, separately, and is also bounded. Then there is an optimal pair of strategies fulfilling the property of being a saddle point. Proof: It was seen that there is satisfying ( ) for each y. As ( ) is continuous in y and B is bounded, ( ) ( ), for some in B, by Theorem 3.1. But ( ) ( ) and so ( ). The saddle point property follows trivially from the above arguments. 4 Conclusions The separation concept, see [ ], is very important to establish rigorously the Mathematical Convex Programing results, as it was exemplified in this work with the minimax theorem. The Khun-Tucker theorem and the Nash equilibrium are other very interesting examples, see [ ] [ ]. Note finally the important role played by the weak convergence in Hilbert spaces concept in the demonstrations presented. References [1] A. V. Balakrishnan, Applied Functional Analysis, Springer-Verlag, New York Inc., New York, 1981.

Convex sets strict separation in the minimax theorem 1787 [2] J. von Neuman, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1967. [3] M. A. M. Ferreira, M. Andrade, Management optimization problems, International Journal of Academic Research, 3(2011), 2, Part III, 647-654. [4] M. A. M. Ferreira, M. Andrade, Separation of a vector space convex parts, International Journal of Academic Research, 4(2012), 2, 5-8. [5] M. A. M. Ferreira, M. Andrade, J. A. Filipe, The concept of weak convergence in Hilbert spaces, International Conference Aplimat, 12th, Bratislava: Slovak University of Technology, 2013. http://repositorio-iul.iscte.pt/handle/10071/5702 [6] M. C. Matos, M. A. M. Ferreira, Game representation-code form, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 567, 321-334, 2006. DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28727-2_22 Received: February 1, 2014