Lecture 12 The Spatial Price Equilibrium Problem

Similar documents
Topic 4: Spatial Price Equilibrium

Lecture 3 Cost Structure

A Dynamic Network Oligopoly Model with Transportation Costs, Product Differentiation, and Quality Competition

Multicriteria Spatial Price Networks: Statics and Dynamics

Lecture 10 The Extended Model

Tradable Permits for System-Optimized Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Dynamic Electric Power Supply Chains and Transportation Networks: an Evolutionary Variational Inequality Formulation

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 6: Equilibration Algorithms for a General Network

Sustainable Fashion Supply Chain Management Under Oligopolistic Competition and Brand Differentiation

Variational Inequalities. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Emission Paradoxes in Transportation Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Topic 6: Projected Dynamical Systems

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 5: The System-Optimized (S-O) Problem

Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Computations

Topic 2: Algorithms. Professor Anna Nagurney

Handbook of Computational Econometrics David Belsley and Erricos Kontoghiorghes, Editors, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK, 2009, pp

A Network Economic Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Choices and Quality Competition

Dynamics and Equilibria of Ecological Predator-Prey Networks as Nature s Supply Chains

Topic 5: Oligopolies and Game Theory

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 7: Basic Sensitivity Analysis and the Braess Paradox

Viable and Sustainable Transportation Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Technology and Network Design Issues. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Modeling of Supply Chain Risk under Disruptions with Performance Measurement and Robustness Analysis

A Game Theory Model for a Differentiated. Service-Oriented Internet with Contract Duration. Contracts

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 3: Cost Structure

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 8: Tolls

Advanced Microeconomics

A Supply Chain Network Game Theory Model with Product Differentiation, Outsourcing of Production and Distribution, and Quality and Price Competition

Management of Knowledge Intensive Systems as Supernetworks: Modeling, Analysis, Computations, and Applications

A Network Equilibrium Framework for Internet Advertising: Models, Qualitative Analysis, and Algorithms Abstract:

Kai Wu Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003

Dynamic Electric Power Supply Chains and Transportation Networks: An Evolutionary Variational Inequality Formulation

Firms and returns to scale -1- Firms and returns to scale

Supply Chain Supernetworks with Random Demands

4 Lecture Applications

Firms and returns to scale -1- John Riley

Network Equilibrium. Professor Anna Nagurney

The negation of the Braess paradox as demand increases: The wisdom of crowds in transportation networks

The DC Optimal Power Flow

Static and Dynamic Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Known Demands Anna Nagurney

October 2007; revised April 2008 International Transactions in Operational Research (2009) 16, pp

Competition for Blood Donations: A Nash Equilibrium Network Framework

Migration Equilibrium. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Computational procedure for a time-dependent Walrasian price equilibrium problem

Cybersecurity Investments with Nonlinear Budget Constraints: Analysis of the Marginal Expected Utilities

NETWORK ECONOMICS: A VARIATIONAL INEQUALITY APPROACH

Competitive Equilibrium

Collaborative Network Formation in Spatial Oligopolies

Modeling of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Fuel Suppliers via Variational Inequalities

Projected Dynamical Systems and Evolutionary Variational Inequalities. via Hilbert Spaces with Applications 1

Returns to Scale in Networks. Marvin Kraus * June Keywords: Networks, congestion, returns to scale, congestion pricing

Routing Games 1. Sandip Chakraborty. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY KHARAGPUR.

Environmental and Cost Synergy in Supply Chain Network Integration in Mergers and Acquisitions

Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics

Supply Chain Network Design for Critical Needs with Outsourcing

Dynamics of Global Supply Chain and Electric Power Networks: Models, Pricing Analysis, and Computations

An Integrated Electric Power Supply Chain and Fuel Market Network Framework: Theoretical Modeling with Empirical Analysis for New England

Transportation Science and the Dynamics of Critical Infrastructure Networks with Applications to Performance Measurement and Vulnerability Analysis

Problem Set 1: Tariffs and Quotas (Solutions) Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Economics of European Integration TA: Victor Troster Fall 2012

PhD Qualifier Examination

EC487 Advanced Microeconomics, Part I: Lecture 5

Market Outcomes: Efficient or Fair?

First-Best Dynamic Assignment of Commuters with Endogenous Heterogeneities in a Corridor Network

Efficiency and Braess Paradox under Pricing

Welfare Economics: Lecture 12

International Financial Networks with Intermediation: Modeling, Analysis, and Computations

Supply Chain Network Sustainability. Competition and Frequencies of Activities from Production to Distribution

Supply Chain Network Design for Critical Needs with Outsourcing

A VARIATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM FORMULATION FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS UNDER COMPETITION. Patrizia DANIELE

A Reversal of Rybczynski s Comparative Statics via Anything Goes *

Nonlinear Programming (Hillier, Lieberman Chapter 13) CHEM-E7155 Production Planning and Control

Microeconomic Theory -1- Introduction

Elements of Economic Analysis II Lecture VII: Equilibrium in a Competitive Market

External Economies of Scale and International Trade: Further Analysis

Department of Agricultural Economics. PhD Qualifier Examination. May 2009

(ii) An input requirement set for this technology is clearly not convex as it

Notes on General Equilibrium

VALUATION USING HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION LECTURE PLAN 15: APRIL 14, 2011 Hunt Allcott

Advanced Microeconomics

Estimating the Loss of Efficiency due to Competition in Mobility on Demand Markets

Walrasian Equilibrium in an exchange economy

Introduction to General Equilibrium: Framework.

Mathematical Foundations -1- Constrained Optimization. Constrained Optimization. An intuitive approach 2. First Order Conditions (FOC) 7

In the Name of God. Sharif University of Technology. Microeconomics 1. Graduate School of Management and Economics. Dr. S.

Using Markov Chains To Model Human Migration in a Network Equilibrium Framework

A Network Economic Game Theory Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Price and Quality Competition in Both Content and Network Provision

International Trade Lecture 9: Factor Proportion Theory (II)

Lecture 9: Game Theory and Disaster Relief

Lagrangian road pricing

An Integrated Electric Power Supply Chain and Fuel Market Network Framework: Theoretical Modeling with Empirical Analysis for New England

DYNAMICS OF ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS UNDER RISK AND UNCERTAINTY

Dornbusch, Fischer, Samuelson (DFS) Model

General Equilibrium and Welfare

Lecture 10: Critical Needs Supply Chains Under Disruptions

Dual decomposition approach for dynamic spatial equilibrium models

The TransPacific agreement A good thing for VietNam?

Tutorial letter 201/2/2018

Ramsey Cass Koopmans Model (1): Setup of the Model and Competitive Equilibrium Path

COMPUTATIONAL INEFFICIENCY OF NONPARAMETRIC TESTS FOR CONSISTENCY OF DATA WITH HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION. 1. Introduction

Supply Chain Network Competition in Price and Quality with Multiple Manufacturers and Freight Service Providers

Transcription:

Lecture 12 The Spatial Price Equilibrium Problem Dr. Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 c 2009

Parallel to the study of the traffic network equilibrium problem, researchers have studied the spatial price equilibrium problem. This problem dates to Samuelson (1952), and Takayama and Judge (1971) and is considered the basic framework for a variety of applications in energy, agriculture, and interregional/international trade. New applications have also been proposed in finance.

The problem has a structure similar to the TNEP with elastic demands. In fact, it has been shown by Dafermos & Nagurney (1985), that given any SPE problem, one can construct a TNEP, which is isomorphic and, hence, any SPE problem can be solved as a TNEP.

The Samuelson, Takayama & Judge Model There are m supply markets and n demand markets involved in the production of a homogeneous commodity. Let s i denote the supply of the commodity at supply market i. Let d j denote the demand for the commodity at demand market j. Let Q ij denote the commodity shipment form i to j.

Spatial Price Equilibrium A set of (s, Q, d) are said to constitute a spatial price equilibrium, if the demand price of the commodity at a demand market is equal to the supply price at the supply market plus the transportation cost and there is trade between this pair of supply and demand markets. If there is no trade between a pair of markets, then the supply price plus transportation cost exceed the demand price.

Associated with each supply market i is a supply price function π i = π i (s i ) which is assumed to be increasing.

Associated with each demand market j is a demand price function ρ j = ρ j (d j ) which is assumed to be decreasing.

Associated with each pair of supply and demand markets (i, j) there is a unit cost of shipping c ij = c ij (Q ij ) which is assumed to be increasing.

Mathematically, this equilibrium state is represented as follows: For each pair (i, j): π i (s i ) + c ij (Q ij ) { = ρj (d j ), if Q ij > 0 ρ j (d j ), if Q ij = 0 subject to the feasibility conditions: s i = j Q ij, for all supply markets i d j = i Q ij, for all demand markets j Q ij 0, for all pairs (i, j).

These equilibrium conditions have an equivalent optimization formulation given by: Minimize i si 0 π i (x)dx + ij Qij 0 c ij (y)dy j dj 0 ρ j (z)dz subject to the previous feasibility conditions.

Incorporating the feasibility conditions directly into the above objective function, we obtain: Minimize j Q ij π i (x)dx + ij Qij i 0 0 Q ij j i 0 ρ j (z)dz c ij (y)dy subject to: Q ij 0, for all (i, j).

Cargo loading i.pbase.com

Relationship of the SPEP to TNEP Obvious network for the SPEP is the bipartite graph where the nodes represent the spatial location of the markets:

Indeed, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this optimization problem are equivalent to the spatial equilibrium conditions. This objective function has been interpreted as a Social Welfare Function by many economists. In the case where the Jacobians of the supply price, demand price, and transportation cost functions [ π i s j ] [ ρ j d i ] [ c ij Q kl ] are symmetric, one also has in optimization reformulation of the SPE conditions.

Construction of the isomorphic traffic network equilibrium problem

The O/D pairs are: w 1 = (0, 1),..., w n = (0, n). The travel disutilities are: λ w1 = ρ 1 (d 1 ),..., λ wn = ρ n (d n ). The flow on a path = Q ij.

References Samuelson P.A. (1952), Spatial Price Equilibrium and Linear Programming, The American Economic Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jun. 1952), pp. 283-303 Takayama T. and Judge G.G. (1971), Spatial and Temporal Price and Equilibrium Models, North Holland, Amsterdam. Dafermos S. and Nagurney A. (1985), Isomorphism between spatial price and traffic equilibrium models. Lefschetz Center for Dynamical Systems Report No. 85-17, Division of Applied Mathematics, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island

Acknowledgment Professor Anna Nagurney acknowledges the support and assistance of Mr. Amir Masoumi, a doctoral student at the Isenberg School of Management at UMass Amherst, who served as a TA for this course.