Lecture 1: Introduction to IO Tom Holden

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Transcription:

Lecture 1: Introduction to IO Tom Holden http://io.tholden.org/

Email: t.holden@surrey.ac.uk Standard office hours: Thursday, 12-1PM + 3-4PM, 29AD00 However, during term: CLASSES will be run in the first hour. Thursday, 12-1, in room 40AD00 If anyone turns up. For private problems: Come to my office between 3-4PM. Ideally, e-mail first so I know to wait for you. Other times are possible by e-mail appointment.

Course website is: http://io.tholden.org/ Going to SurreyLearn will just send you to this site. Has the last two years slides up already. This year will have almost identical content to last year, so feel free to read ahead. Please use the comment facility on the site to ask about things you don t understand. This year, I will be videoing all lectures, and placing them on YouTube.

Main text: Oz Shy: Industrial organization: Theory and applications 338.6 SHY Goldilocks level difficulty (I hope). Alternative texts: Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 338.6 TIR A little difficult in places. Jeffrey Church and Roger Ware, Industrial Organisation: A strategic Approach Not quite right for our course, but it is available for free at: http://is.gd/xhblz4 Plus, as ever, Google & Wikipedia are your friends.

Midterm test (10%): Very short answer section. One hour. Week 6. Will provide mock. End of term test (20%): Longer maths questions. Up to two hours. Week 10. Again, there ll be a mock. Final exam (70%): Very short answer section. Rest is multi-part questions requiring both maths and discussion. Again, there ll be a mock

Oz Shy s book contains exercises. Do them! The answers are online at: http://ozshy.50webs.com/bkman24.pdf He has additional problems online at: http://ozshy.50webs.com/io-exercises.pdf With solutions at http://links.ozshy.com/iosolutions I ll set a few other questions.

What is IO? Aim of the course Some revision : Demand curves Consumer surplus Cost functions Profits Welfare Monopoly Note: There will be a lot of work on the board today. It is important everyone get these basic bits of maths. If you missed this lecture, ask a friend for notes, and study the readings.

IO is no the economics of manufacturing industries (as opposed to agriculture etc.). IO is the economics of: the firm and its behaviour, the structure of markets, the regulation of markets. IO is the field of most economic consultants.

Firm s decisions: Entry, exit, mergers R&D Advertising Capital investment Pricing Market structure: How do firms interact? Why are some firms large? Why are some industries highly concentrated? Competition policy: Cartels and collusion When should we regulate firms?

IO is a big subject. Our aim will be cover enough theory that you could go on to think independently about practical questions. The theory is fun on its own though. It s basically applied game theory.

Two ways of thinking about aggregate demand curves. Homogeneous consumers, wanting multiple units. Heterogeneous consumers, wanting one unit each. Can you explain graphically how they emerge? We will usually denote demand curves by Q p. And inverse demand curves by p Q. Given Q p how do you derive p Q?

Two families of demand curves we will use a lot. Linear: Q p = q 0 q 1 p or p Q = p 0 p 1 Q. Iso-elastic (aka constant-elastic): Q p = cp α or p Q = kq β. How do we map from the parameters of the linear demand curve to the parameters of the linear inverse demand curve? How do we go the other way? How do we do the same for iso-elastic demand?

The elasticity of demand at a quantity level Q is Q p p defined by: η p Q p How do we find the elasticity of demand when we only have the inverse demand curve? Hint: The Inverse Function Theorem states that: df 1 x df x dx 1. Q. dx = Demand is elastic when η p Q > 1. Demand is inelastic when η p Q < 1. When is linear demand elastic? What is the elasticity of an iso-elastic demand curve?

A consumer has utility U Q = v Q + M, where: Q is the quantity of some good, M is money left over for other goods. What is this type of utility function called? Their income is Y, and the good costs p. So their budget constraint says Y = pq + M. Want to max: U Q = v Q + Y pq. FOC: v Q = p What is v? (Other than v s first derivative.)

p Q, p p Q Q

Consumer surplus at a quantity Q and a price p on the demand curve is defined as the blue shaded area. With our consumer from before, this is: Q p Q p dq = Q v Q p dq = Q v Q dq p Q 0 0 = v Q p Q By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (FTC). This says that if you integrate a derivative, you get back the original function. But v Q p Q = U Q Y. Consumer surplus is a measure of utility, when agents have quasi-linear preferences. With quasi-linear preferences, money is the unit of utility. So CS is also a measure of the value gained by consumers. Note that Y is the utility they would get when Q = 0. 0

The cost function, c Q producing Q units. c Q is marginal cost. c Q Q is average costs. gives the total cost of When do average costs equal marginal costs? Suppose output is produced using Q = f L where L is labour, which is paid W per unit. What is the cost function? Example: Q = L γ α where α 0,1 and γ > 0.

We can think of firms as either choosing prices or quantities. These give two different versions of the profit function: π p = pq p c Q p π Q = p Q Q c Q If p y = Q 1 y for all y then these will give the same result. The p Q Q term is total revenue. What is marginal revenue?

p MC Q = c Q Q, p p Q Q

The grey shaded area gives producer surplus at a quantity Q and a price p on the demand curve. This area is: Q p MC Q dq = Q p c Q dq 0 By the FTC again. 0 = p Q c Q c 0 But p Q c Q c 0 = π Q + c 0. Producer surplus measures profits. Or the value gained by producers. Note that c 0 is their profit when Q = 0.

The total value gained by all agents in the economy is consumer surplus plus producer surplus. We call this welfare. What quantity maximises welfare? W Q = CS Q + PS Q = v Q pq + pq c Q c 0 = v Q c Q + c 0 FOC: v Q = c Q or equivalently p Q = c Q. Perfect competition maximises welfare!

A monopolist has cost function c Q faces market demand curve p Q. Profits are π Q = p Q Q c Q. and First order condition: p Q Q + p Q c Q = 0 So: MR Q = p Q Q + p Q = c Q = MC Q

p Consumer surplus MC Q = c Q Deadweight loss Producer surplus MR Q = p Q Q + p Q p Q Q

Suppose p Q = p 0 p 1 Q and c Q = c 0 + c 1 Q. Show that under monopoly: Q = p 0 c 1 2p 1 And under perfect competition: Q = p 0 c 1 p 1 So quantity is halved. What are CS, PS and DWL? Suppose p Q = kq β and c Q = c 0 + c 1 Q. Show that under monopoly: p Q = 1 1 β c Q Mark-up pricing!

Redo the problems on the previous page assuming the monopolist chooses prices rather than quantities. (Using the demand curve rather than the inverse demand curve.) Show your answers are equivalent. OZ Ex 3.4 Questions 3, 4, 5 and 6. OZ Ex 5.7 Questions 1, 2 and 7. OZ Extra exercises: http://ozshy.50webs.com/io-exercises.pdf Set #4

CS is the value gained by consumers. PS is the value gained by producers. Monopoly is inefficient and results in DWL. Key skills: Be able to work with linear and iso-elastic demand functions. Calculate elasticities etc. Maximise profit, maximise welfare.