An information encryption system based on Boolean functions

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Computer Science Journal of Moldova, vol.18, no.3(54), 2010 Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions Aureliu Zgureanu Abstract An information encryption system based on Boolean functions is proposed. Information processing is done using multidimensional matrices, performing logical operations with these matrices. At the basis of ensuring high level security of the system the complexity of solving the problem of building systems of Boolean functions that depend on many variables (tens and hundreds) is set. Such systems represent the private key. It varies both during the encryption and decryption of information, and during the transition from one message to another. Keywords: Boolean functions, multidimensional matrices, private keys, security of the system, the complexity of the problem. 1 Introduction The most popular information encryption systems (IES), based on prime numbers, are shown in [1, 2]. In [3], using ideas from [1], there is proposed a new encryption algorithm, which considerably increases resistance to breakage, keeping the speed encryption and decryption. In [4] there has been proposed another encryption system with a cryptographic power not smaller than those two shown in [1,3], but, at the same time, with an encrypting-decrypting time much smaller. Together with the improving of computing means, the requirements towards IES also increase. Public keys and those private become bigger and bigger, and arithmetic operations with very big numbers become more difficult. As a result, the productivity of the systems decreases considerably. The c 2010 by A. Zgureanu 319

A. Zgureanu situation may be changed if we replace these arithmetic operations with logical operations on systems of Boolean functions, represented by multidimensional matrices [4]. Such a solution to the problem is proposed in this paper. 2 Sets of relations and multidimensional matrixes In accordance with [11], a system A of N A = n 1 n 2 n 3... n p elements a i1 i 2 i 3...i p (i α = 1, 2, 3,..., n α ; α = 1, 2, 3,..., p) that belong to the set Ω and are placed in the points of p-dimensional space of coordinates i 1, i 2,..., i p is called a multidimensional matrix over the set Ω. The number p is called the size of the matrix and shows the number of indexes in the notation of the matrix elements. Size N A shows the total number of elements in this matrix. Size n α of the index i α shows how many values (from 1 to n α ) this index runs. So in this paper, a multidimensional matrix is a direct generalization of the usual twodimensional matrix. Consider a family of sets X = {X 1, X 2,..., X n }, where X i = {x i1, x i2,..., x iλi }, i = 1, n and the set Ω = {ω 1,..., ω r } with arbitrary elements (in our case integer numbers). There are k relations R j = R Xj1...X jdj (2 d j n, j = 1, k, j 1, j 2,..., j dj {1, 2,..., n}) defined on this family as subsets of Cartesian products X j1 X j2... X jdj. The matrixes of these relations are d j -dimensional with elements from Ω. Let s mark by R the vector with components R j, that is R = (R 1,..., R j,..., R k ). Let s correlate the following n-dimensional matrix to this vector: A R = Φ( R). (1) The elements of this matrix are denoted by a s1...s τ...s n. Let s explain how these elements are obtained. We build the Cartesian product X 1 X 2... X n = {x 11,..., x 1λ1 }... {x n1,..., x nλn }, which obviously contains u = λ 1... λ n elements. 320

Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions With these elements compose a two-dimensional matrix with u rows and n columns (Figure 1, left side). Figure 1. Compose another two-dimensional matrix r ij with u rows and k columns (Figure 1, right side), where r ij = r sj1...s jd with elements s j1,..., s jd selected from line i at the places j 1,..., j d, that indicate the sets X j1,..., X jd where relation R j is defined. For simplicity replace the element x τsτ with its second index as it is shown in Figure 2. The lines of the matrix in the left side of Figure 2 represent indices of the matrix A R elements. The lines of the matrix in the right side of Figure 2 form the elements of matrix A R : a s1...s τ...s n = (r i1,..., r ij,..., r ik ), (2) To the vector (2) there is associated a number c i in the base y which satisfies the condition y > max ω h, h = 1, r: c i = r i1 y k 1 +... + r ij y k j +... + r ik = So, we obtain the vector k r ij y k j, i = 1, u. (3) c = (c 1,..., c i,..., c u ). (4) 321

A. Zgureanu Figure 2. Thus, using the transformation (1), the vector c (3), (4) is put into correspondence to the vector R. The reverse transformation R = Φ 1 ( c), (5) generally is much more complicated [5], [7], [8]. In some particular cases we can find vector R coordinates by vector c coordinates. This was achieved when investigating of the distribution of prime numbers in the range of integer numbers. As the result an algorithm for prime numbers generating has been elaborated [9], [10]. If the transformation (5) is difficult we can use this when elaborating the IES. 3 Information encryption systems We consider a particular case of the exposed above, i.e. X 1 = X 2 =... = X n = Ω = {0, 1}. We denote the relations defined on these sets by M j = M Xj1...X jdj (2 d j n, j = 1, k, j 1, j 2,..., j dj {1, 2,..., n}), thus obtaining the vector M = (M 1,..., M j,..., M k ). Let s correlate an n-dimensional matrix A M = Φ( M), i = 0, u, j = 1, k [5], presented at Figure 3, to this vector. In this matrix M j = M Xτ...X n and 322

Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions m ij = m στ...σ n {0, 1}. Therefore, this matrix represents a system of k Boolean functions with variables x 1,..., x n. We correlate the following vector to this matrix: k m = (m 0,..., m i,..., m t ), t u, where m i = m ij 2 k j, i = 0, t, (6) n = log 2 t, k = log 2 max m i (7) Figure 3. By analogy (Figure 4) we create another matrix A D to which we correlate a vector d = (d 0,..., d i,..., d t ), t u, where d i = k d ij 2 k j, i = 0, t. (8) We may perform logical operations with these matrixes: A M A D, A M A D, A M A D and other, as the result we obtain other matrixes. Let s analyze the operation (sum modulo 2). Suppose that A M A D = A C. In this case c ij = m ij d ij. Taking into account properties of this operation, we obtain: 323

A. Zgureanu Figure 4. Thus (A M A D ) A D = A M (A D A D ) = A M. A M A D = A C, A C A D = A M. (9) From (9) it results that the matrix A D may serve as private key for encryption and decryption of vector m which is the ASCII encoding (or any other encoding) of the plaintext M through vector c (ciphertext) c = (c0,..., c i..., c t ), t u, k where c i = c ij 2 k j, i = 0, t, c ij = m ij d ij. (10) Let s see how we may create the private key. Suppose that the function is defined by veracity table (see Table 1), where ε 0,..., ε u {0, 1}. Let s create the partition { X 1, X 2 } = {{x 1,..., x τ }, {x τ+1,..., x n }} on set x = {x 1,..., x n }. We create two sets: - Y = {y 0, y 1,..., y p,..., y 2 τ 1} (formed of binary states that correspond to variables from X 1 ); 324

Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions 0. i. u Table 1. x 1 x τ x n F (x 1,..., x n ) 0 0 0 ε 0... σ 1 σ τ σ n... 1 1 1. ε i. ε u and Z = {z 0,..., z q,..., z 2 n τ 1} (formed of binary states that correspond to variables from X 2 ). Then, the Boolean function F (x 1,..., x n ) may be considered as a binary relation R Y Z between the sets Y and Z with the matrix R Y Z = y 0. y i. y h z 0 z j z s a 00 a 0j a 0s... a i0 a ij a is... a h0 a hj a hs, h = 2 τ 1, s = 2 n τ 1, i, ja ij = { 1, if F (yi, z j ) = 1, 0, if F (y i, z j ) = 0. According to [6], the subset S z j F of the set Y is called subset of ε column of the function F (x 1,..., x n ) for the column z j and is composed of the elements y i for which a ij = ε, ε {0, 1}. The Boolean function may be defined by the table of subsets of column (see Table 2): It is obvious that S z j = Y \S z j. Because of this, the subsets S z j F 0 F 1 F 0 are not indicated in the Table 2. We create partitions π x1,..., π xτ on the set Y [6]. 325

A. Zgureanu Table 2. z 0... z j... z s F 1 S z 0 F 1... S z j F 1... S z s F 1 Let s consider a specific case: n=5, τ = 3 (see Table 3). In this case X 1 = {x 1, x 2, x 3 }, X 2 = {x 4, x 5 } and Y = {y 0, y 1, y 2, y 3, y 4, y 5, y 6, y 7 } = {000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111}, Z = {z 0, z 1, z 2, z 3 } = {00, 01, 10, 11}. We create the Table 3 (ε 0,..., ε 31 {0, 1}) and the partitions π xi = { m 0 i ; m1 i }, i = 1, 3 according to the following conditions: y j m σ i i, if x i = σ i (11) π x1 = {y 0, y 1, y 2, y 3 0 1 ; y 4, y 5, y 6, y 7 1 1 }, π x2 = {y 0, y 1, y 4, y 5 0 2 ; y 2, y 3, y 6, y 7 1 2 }, π x3 = {y 0, y 2, y 4, y 6 0 3 ; y 1, y 3, y 5, y 7 1 3 }. Table 3. y 0 y 1 y 2 y 3 y 4 y 5 y 6 y 7 x 4 x 5 z 0 z 1 z 2 z 3 x 1 x 2 x 3 00 01 10 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 ε 0 ε 4 ε 8 ε 12 ε 16 ε 20 ε 24 ε 28 ε 1 ε 5 ε 9 ε 13 ε 17 ε 21 ε 25 ε 29 ε 2 ε 6 ε 10 ε 14 ε 18 ε 22 ε 26 ε 30 ε 3 ε 7 ε 11 ε 15 ε 19 ε 23 ε 27 ε 31 326

Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions To simplify this, we replace elements y i by their indexes i. Thus, such partitions are obtained: π x1 = {0, 1, 2, 3 0 1; 4, 5, 6, 7 1 1}, π x2 = {0, 1, 4, 5 0 2; 2, 3, 6, 7 1 2}, π x3 = {0, 2, 4, 6 0 3; 1, 3, 5, 7 1 3}. Let s mark by m σ i,..., σ j,..., σ p i,..., j,..., p the bloc of product of partitions π xi,..., π xj,..., π xp, where σ j = 0 (1) if the elements of this bloc belong to the bloc m 0 j ( m1 j ) for j = i, p. We also mark the indicated partitions product by π xi,..., x j,..., x p. For partitions above we get the following products: π x1,x 2 = {0, 1 0,0 1,2; 2, 3 0,1 1,2; 4, 5 1,0 1,2; 6, 7 1,1 1,2}, π x1,x 3 = {0, 2 0,0 1,3; 1, 3 0,1 1,3; 4, 6 1,0 1,3; 5, 7 1,1 1,3}, π x2,x 3 = {0, 4 0,0 2,3; 1, 5 0,1 2,3; 2, 6 1,0 2,3; 3, 7 1,1 2,3}, π x1, x 2, x 3 = {0 0,0,0 1,2,3; 1 0,0,1 1,2,3; 2 0,1,0 1,2,3; 3 0,1,1 1,2,3; 4 1,0,0 1,2,3; 5 1,0,1 1,2,3; 6 1,1,0 1,2,3; 7 1,1,1 1,2,3}. The Table 2 is obtained when the function is given by veracity table. This table may be also obtained in the case when the function is given in analytical form, for instance in disjunctive normal form: where u i = x σ i 1 i 1 F (x 1,..., x n ) = u 1... u i... u e,... x σ ia i a, i 1, i 2,..., i a {1,..., n}, σ i1,..., σ ia {0, 1}, i = 1, e. There may be distinguished the following 3 cases: 327

A. Zgureanu a) x i1,..., x ia X 1 In this case u i doesn t depend on variables x τ+1,..., x n and, therefore, the subsets of column are equal and are formed of the elements of the bloc m σ i 1... σ iα i 1... i α [6]: S z 0 u 1 i =... = S z s u 1 i = m σ i 1... σ i α i 1... i α b) x i1,..., x ia X 2 Taking into account the property { 1, if xit {x u i = i1,..., x ia }, x it = σ it, 0, if x it {x i1,..., x ia }, x it σ it and the definition of the subset of column we get: S z j u 1 i = { Y, if for xit {x i1,..., x ia }, x it = σ it,, if x it {x i1,..., x ia }, x it σ it ; c) x i1,..., x ib X 1, x ib+1,..., x ia X 2 In this case S z j u 1 i { σ i1... σ is m = i 1... i s if for x it {x is+1,..., x ib }, x it = σ it, if x it {x is+1,..., x ib }, for which x it σ it holds. Considering every conjunction as a Boolean function, we get their subsets of column according to the cases mentioned above. These subsets are given in Table 4. The subsets of column of the given function are obtained in last line. They represent the union of the subsets from every column. As any analytical form of Boolean function may be reduced to the form (11), then any function given in analytical form may be represented by the table of subsets of column. 328

Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions The representation of Boolean function by subsets of column gives us the possibility to create the private key in a compact form. Suppose that functions F 1,..., F j,..., F k with values from the respective columns from the Figure 4 correspond to relations D 1,..., D j,..., D k. Table 4. u 1 1 S z 0 u 1 1 u 1 2 S z 0 u 1 2 z 0... z j... z s... S z j u 1 1... S z s u 1 1.. u 1 e S z 0 u 1 e S z 0 = e F 1 i=1 Sz 0 u 1 i... S z j u 1 2..... S z j u 1 e... S z j = e F 1 i=1 Sz j u 1 i... S z s u 1 2..... S zs u 1 e... S zs = e F 1 i=1 Szs u 1 i Consider functions F j achieved: for which the following conditions are S z 0 F 1 j = S z 1 F 1 j =... = S zs F 1 j = S j, j = 1, k. For all the values of j we ll get the vector S = (S 1,..., S j,..., S k ) private key. Suppose that the values of the first τ variables in the index i of d i form the binary state σ 1...σ τ = y q (Figure 4). Thereby, according to the definition of the subset of column, the values of d ij are obtained from the relation { 1, if yq S d ij = j (12) 0, if y q / S j Thus, the vector S determines univocally the matrix A D. subsets S j are chosen on condition that The k S j = Y (13) 329

A. Zgureanu This condition assures changing the components of the vector m through vector d. Relation (12) assures a rapid calculation of function value on binary state i = σ 1...σ τ...σ n. As Y = 2 τ, then for a single function we may create 2 2τ subsets of column, and for k functions we have λ = 2 k 2τ different keys. As a result, the security of the private key may be chosen by parameter τ and subsets S j. According to those mentioned, in the computational software program Mathematica 6, there has been elaborated an IES composed of: key generator, which generates vector S = (S 1,..., S j,..., S k ). The components S j are selected randomly as subsets of the set Y and on condition (13). Using (12) and (8) we create vector d = (d 0,..., d t ); codifier, which creates vector c = (c 0,..., c t ) (on the basis of vectors m and d using (10)), codifies vector S = (S 1,..., S j,..., S k ) with the help of the system from [4] or other secure system, and, concatenating it with vector c, creates vector g [4]; decoder, which restores the vector S = (S 1,..., S j,..., S k ) from the vector g, creates vector d using (8) and (12), creates vector m on the basis of the vectors c = (c 0,..., c t ) and d = (d 0,..., d t ) using (9). The initial text is printed on the basis of the vector m. Some data concerning functioning of this system (Cripto 3) in comparison with the system are brought in the Table 5. We notice that for both the encrypting and decrypting time grow almost linearly. Beginning with t = 100000 the system already meets some difficulties in creating vector c because of its too big components. This fact is marked in the Table 5 by symbol. The data correspond to the public key of 2057 bits. The time grows much slowly for the system Cripto 3 and as a result it manages handling messages that contain millions of symbols, and, in the same time, has a very high security. 330

Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions Encrypting systems Table 5. Number Encrypting of symbols time (sec.) 100 0.34 0.31 500 0.48 0.36 1000 0.93. 0.46 10000 9.60 1.01 100000 14.67 500000 76.23 1000000 82.62 2000000 192.06 4000000 582.75 Decrypting time (sec.) 5.34 0.07 26.90. 0.08 53.66 0.10 533.40 0.51 5.46 34.37 67.20 193.23 431.90 For instance, if t = 1000000, then k = 14. Consider τ = 4 and, therefore, λ = 2 224. This number is bigger than the number of atoms in the galaxy. More than that, the key is the variable one. It changes both from one message to another and during the information encrypting. It changed 334 times in the case mentioned above. The data from Table 5 were got using Athlon (tm) Processor3500. This system may be generalized for the case when the functions F 1,..., F j,..., F k are from q-valent logics. In such a case, both variables x 1,..., x n and functions F j admit values from the set Ω = {0, 1,..., q 1}. 331

A. Zgureanu In the Table 1 we have u = q n 1 for these functions and the last state has the form q 1...q 1...q 1. In Figure 3 m ij Ω and in Figure 4 d ij Ω. These matrices represent systems of q-valent functions. The formulas (14), (15) and (16) correspond respectively to the formulas (6), (7) and (8): m = (m 0,..., m i,..., m t ), t u, k where m i = m ij q k j, i = 0, t, (14) n = log q t, k = log q max m i, (15) d = (d 0,..., d i,..., d t ), t u, where d i = k d ij q k j, i = 0, t. (16) Let s create a new matrix A C = A M + A D (mod q), where c ij = m ij + d ij (mod q). Since for q matrices A D the following relation holds: q times {}}{ A D + A D +... + A D (mod q) = 0 (zero matrix), then the equalities (17) and (18) correspond respectively to equalities (9) and (10): A M + A D (mod q) = A C, A C + (q 1)A D (mod q) = A M, (17) c = (c0,..., c i..., c t ), t u, k where c i = c ij q k j, i = 0, t, c ij = m ij + d ij (mod q). (18) 332

Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions From (18) it results that if for encrypting the vector m we apply the matrix A D, then for decrypting this vector we apply the matrix (q 1)A D. From (16) it results that components d h of the vector d belong to the set {1,..., q k 1} (0 is not included in this set because the state 0...0 doesn t change the components of the vector m). In order to create this vector we take the last τ variables from the set {x 1,..., x n τ,..., x n }, choose randomly q τ numbers from the set {1,..., q k 1} and create the following vector with these numbers: d = (d 0,..., d h,..., d q τ 1), q τ 1 t, which represents the private key. Components d h may be repeated an arbitrary number of times. Thereby, the number of different private keys is λ = (q k 1) qτ. Using (14) and (18) we create the vector c. It results from (17) that m i = k (c ij + (q 1)d ij )(mod q)q k j, i = 0, t. For the examined case, in the computation software Mathematica 6, there was also elaborated an encryption system with a higher speed, depending on q and τ values. For example, the encrypting and decrypting time for t = 2000000, q = 3, τ = 4 is equal to 130.62 sec and 127.45 sec respectively in comparison with 192.06 and 193.23 (see Table 5). Generally, a deeper investigation is needed to determine the optimal values for parameters q, τ and t. For q > 2 the private key may be also represented by subsets of column. For this case, in the vector S = (S 1,..., S j,..., S k ), every component S j represents sets of form {{Sj 1}, {S2 j },..., {Sq 1 j }}, where Sj ε is a subset of the set {0, 1,..., q τ 1}, for ε {1,..., q 1}, and Sj k S s j = occurs for k, s {1,..., q 1}. But, together with the growth of q, there appear difficulties concerning the representation and transmitting of private key. Additional investigations are needed here. 333

A. Zgureanu 4 Conclusions 1. The elaborated system has information processing speed much higher and also a capacity of solving the problems of much bigger dimensions in comparison with existent encryption systems. The priorities of the system have been highlighted during its testing with vectors that contain hundreds, thousands and millions of components. 2. Due to the fact that the system can operate with small numbers, it may be easily created using different programming languages. 3. The system may be improved using functions with q-valent logics. Deeper investigations are needed in order to achieve this. References [1] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. CACM, 21(2), February 1978, pp. 120 126. [2] El Gamal, A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms. IEEE TRANS. On inform. Theory, vol. IT- 31. pp. 469 472, July 1985. [3] Bulat M., Zgureanu A., Ciobanu I., Bivol L, Encryption systems with vector keys. International scientific conference Mathematical modeling, optimization and information technologies, Chişinău, 9-21 martie, 2008. ATIC. pp. 281 285. [4] Bulat M.S., Zgureanu A.F., Chobanu Ya.I., Bivol L.G., Encryption systems based on n-ary relations. Systems of management, control and measuring (UKI-08), Russian Conference with international participation, Moscow IPU RAN, 2008. pp. 66 67. [5] M. Bulat, Some applications of multidimensional matrices. Annals of ATIC-2002, v.i (II), pp. 75 82. 334

Information encryption systems based on Boolean functions [6] M. Bulat, About one method of Boolean functions differentiation. Annals of ATIC-2001, v.i (I), pp. 40 47. [7] M. Bulat M, Isomorfismo de grandes sistemas. Acta Academia 2001, Evrica, Chiinu, pp. 161 170. [8] M. Bulat, A. Zgureanu, I. Ciobanu, L. Bivol, The inverse transformations of multidimensional matrices. ASADE Moldova, August 21, 2007, p. 34. [9] M. Bulat, D. Leon, A. Zgureanu, I. Ciobanu, L. Bivol, Generadores de numeros primos y factorizadores de numeros compuestos. Revista de Matematica: Teoria y Aplicaciones, 2006, 13(1) CIMPA- UCR-CCSS: pp.1 15. [10] M. Bulat, A. Zgureanu, I. Ciobanu, L. Bivol, Generating of prime numbers based on the multidimensional matrices. Intern. Algebraic Conf. dedic. to the 100th an-ry of D. K. Fadeev. St P-rg, Russia, 2007, pp. 98 99. [11] N. P. Sokolov, Spatial matrices and their application. Moscow, 1960. Aureliu Zgureanu, Received November 10, 2010 Aureliu Zgureanu The Academy of Transport, Computer Science and Communication Munceşti, 121-a, Chişinău MD-2002 Moldova E mail: aurelzgureanu@gmail.com Phone: +373 79 234829, +373 22 473056 335