Microeconomics MSc. preference relations. Todd R. Kaplan. October University of Haifa. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October / 42

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Microeconomics MSc preference relations Todd R. Kaplan University of Haifa October 2015 Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 1 / 42

Guessing Game Guess a number 0 to 100. The guess closest to 2/3 the average number wins a prize. Ties will be broken randomly. Please write your name and your guess on the piece of paper and turn it in to me. Don t let others see your guess! Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 2 / 42

Guessing Game 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 10 10 20 20 30 30 40 40 50 50 60 60 70 70 80 80 90 90 100 Figure: Graph of guesses (Exeter UGs). Average was 36.7 (winning guess 24.5). Six guesses were above 66.66 Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 3 / 42

Guessing Game Guess a number 0 to 100. The guess closest to 2/3 the average number wins a prize. Your average was... Wharton average 40 Caltech UG average was 30 (10% at 0) Economics Phds 25 CEO average also 40. What would we expect if everyone is rational and thinks everyone else is rational? Now repeat this! Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 4 / 42

Guessing Game 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 0 10 10 20 20 30 30 40 40 50 50 60 60 70 70 80 80 90 90 100 Figure: Exeter UG 2nd round guesses. Average was 12.4 (winning guess 8.3). One guess was above 66.66 Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 5 / 42

Moral of the Story Sometimes markets aren t always rational or in equilibrium. This Guessing game is like a market bubble. Sometimes theory based on rationality doesn t predict perfectly. You shouldn t ignore theory (even when it is wrong). Otherwise, it may catch you unexpectedly. Star Trek: Kirk had several advisors with di erent views of the world. Spock used logic. Bones emotions. Scotty practicality. Here you will learn mostly the rational view. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 6 / 42

What is Microeconomics? The study choices made by rational beings and the interaction of these choices. The goal is to build simple models that can be tested either empirically or experimentally (science). Rationality assumption: people make the best choices they can given their circumstances. Equilibrium: when everyone is making their best choices (both given their circumstances and what others are doing). We will use mathematical tools to predict behavior. Pool players do not make calculations (Friedman). Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 7 / 42

Goals of the course: 1 To build a solid foundation of microeconomics (tools of the trade). 2 To understand where microeconomic analysis could be useful. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 8 / 42

Rationality in Economics Behavioral Postulate: A decisionmaker always chooses its most preferred alternative from the set of available alternatives. So to model choice we must model decisionmakers preferences. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 9 / 42

Preference Relations Comparing two di erent consumption bundles, x and y from the possibility set X R n +: weak preference: x is as at least as preferred as is y. strict preference: x is more preferred than is y. indi erence: x is exactly as preferred as is y. These are all preference relations. They are ordinal relations; i.e. they state only the order in which bundles are preferred. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 10 / 42

Preference Relations denotes strict preference so x y means that bundle x is preferred strictly to bundle y. s denotes indi erence; x s y means x and y are equally preferred denotes weak preference; x y means x is preferred at least as much as is y denotes not x % y, etc. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 11 / 42

Preference Relations: Implications Each is connected Can you nd these? x s y () x % y and y % x. x % y () x s y xor x y. x y () x % y and y x. x y ()? x y ()? x y ()? Note that s and are de ned solely by %. Hence, we refer to a preference relationship by %. Show that x s y =) y s x. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 12 / 42

Preference Relations: Implications Each is connected. Can you nd these? x s y () x % y and y % x. x % y () x s y xor x y. x y () x % y and y x. x y () x y or y x. x y () x y and x y. x y () x y or y % x. Note that s and are de ned solely by %. Hence, we refer to a preference relationship by %. Show that x s y =) y s x. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 13 / 42

Properties of Preference Relations De nition Completeness -For any two bundles x and y in X, it is always possible to make the statement that either x % y or y % x (or both). De nition Re exivity - Any bundle x is always at least as preferred as itself; i.e. x % x. Does Completeness imply Re exivity? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 14 / 42

Applying Completeness Completeness allows us to reduce some of our implications. Completeness implies x y =) y % x x y () x % y and y x reduces to x y () y x x y () x y or y % x reduces to x y () y % x. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 15 / 42

Properties of Preference Relations De nition (weak) Transitivity: If x is at least as preferred as y, and y is at least as preferred as z, then x is at least as preferred as z; i.e., x % y and y % z =) x % z. De nition Strong transitivity x y and y z =) x z De nition Indi erence transitivity x s y and y s z =) x s z Does weak transitivity implies indi erence transitivity (you can use the implications)? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 16 / 42

Rationality De nition A preference relationship % is rational if it satis es completeness and transitivity. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 17 / 42

When Transitivity may not apply Natural cycles:condorcet Example of violation: Rock, Paper, Scissors game. Voting: Condorcet (1743-94) paradox. There are 3 candidates: A, B, C Jim s preferences are A B C Sean s preferences are B C A Doug s preferences are C A B Who wins against who? With preferences, this is just an aggregation of considerations. Tournaments: USA, England, Israel, and Malta. Design one where USA/Israel/England wins. Dave wants to make money o his brother s Dean s intransitive preferences. How can he do it? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 18 / 42

Dave versus Dean Dave wants to make money o his brother Dean s intransitive preferences. How can he do it? Dean prefers card A to B, B to C and C to A. Dean has a pile of other cards of type X. Dave starts out with A and Dean with B, C and a lot of X s Dave trades A to Dean for B & X. Dave then has a B and an X. Dave then trades B for a C and another X. Dave has now C and 2 Xs. Dave now trades the C for an A and another X. Dave now has A and 3 Xs. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 19 / 42

Homework (week 1). 1 If there is completeness and weak transitivity holds, does x y and y z imply x z? 2 Show that weak transitivity implies strong transitivity. (Hint. First show that it implies x % z. Next, show that if z s x, then there is a contradition in that z % y. ) 3 Show that if weak transitivity holds, x y and y s z =) x z. 4 Give an example in real life where transitivity doesn t apply. 5 There are 4 contestants for Pop Idol (Chohav Nolad): A,B,C,D. There are 3 voters: Jim, Sean and Doug. Jim s preferences are A B C D. Sean s preferences are B C D A. Doug s preferences are C D A B. Can you design a tournament where D wins? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 20 / 42

Dice I have 3 dice: Red, Blue, Green Red has sides 1, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 Blue has sides 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 6 Green has sides 2, 2, 2, 5, 5, 5 You choose, then me. Let us do a best of 10: highest number wins. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 21 / 42

When Transitivity may not apply Small di erences x s y if jx yj < ε. Does x s y and y s z imply x s z? No! Does this imply a violation of weak transitivity? Where does this apply? Think of prices. I don t care if the di erence of prices is a penny. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 22 / 42

Fasting on Yom Kippur Fasting between England and Israel In Israel the fast starts and ends 2 hours before the fast in England. Basically at the start of the fast it does not really matter whether or not you are fasting. Let x = 0 be not fasting or right before the fast. x = 25 be when the fast ends. x s y if jx yj < 3 and x, y < 25. So at no point before the fast ends in Israel is someone jealous of another between Israel and England. However y x if y = 25 and x = 23. When fast ends, those in England are jealous of those in Israel. Is it better to fast in Israel then? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 23 / 42

When Transitivity may not apply Changing preferences x: Not drinking. y: One cup of wine per day. z: Getting wasted. I don t drink at the moment, but I may prefer y x z. Once I drink one cup per day, I may then prefer z y x. We then have a violition of transitivity. Is this correct? I don t buy this argument. I think the X needs to be better de ned to include the consumption path. In behavioral economics, there is a two self model where I may take into account my later self. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 24 / 42

Properties of Preference Relations Monotonicity: More is better Remember x 2 X R n +. Denote x i as the quantity of the ith component. De nition Weak Monotonicity. If x i y i for all i, then x y. De nition Strong Monotonicity. If x i y i for all i and x i > y i for at least one i, then x y. De nition Local Nonsatiation. Given any x and any ɛ > 0, then there is some bundle y with jx yj < ɛ such that y x. Strong Monotonicity implies Local Nonsatiation. (Not the other way). Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 25 / 42

Monotonicity Does Strong Monotonicity imply Weak Monotonicity? Does Weak Monotonicity imply Strong Montonocity? Give a counter example. One can be indi erent to everything. What about x y () min i fx i g min i fy i g? Does this satisfy Weak Monotonicity? Does it satisfy Strong Monotonicity? Take bundles (2, 1) and (1, 1). Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 26 / 42

De nitions of preference sets B(y) = fx : x yg and B s (y) = fx : x yg W (y) = fx : y xg and W s (y) = fx : y xg I (y) = fx : x yg = B(y) \ W (y) These sets are quite general: they don t need to be closed, convex, etc. I (y) is an indi erence curve (set). Prove under weak transitivity indi erence curves can t cross (or even touch): x y =) I (x) \ I (y) =?. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 27 / 42

Satiation Points A bundle strictly preferred to any other is a satiation point or a bliss point. What do indi erence curves look like for preferences exhibiting satiation? What do indi erence curves look like if there is a bad instead of a good? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 28 / 42

Continuity De nitions Continuity: For all y, the sets B(y) = fx : x yg and W (y) = fx : x yg are closed sets. Closed set: A set X is closed if for any sequence x i 2 X, the lim i! x i 2 X. Lemma The intersection of two closed sets is closed. Complement of a closed set is open. Corollary Under continuity, I (z) is closed, B s (z) and W s (z) are open. Continuity also implies there is an indi erence curve I (z) between both sets. Why? Continuity implies if y z and x is close enough to y, then x z. Why? Hint: converge to y. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 29 / 42

Homework (week 2). 1 The amount of candy that Joel gets is j, the amount of candy that Anaelle gets is a. Joel prefers more candy to less for himself and less candy to more for Anaelle, that is, (j 1, a 1 ) % (j 2, a 2 ) () j 1 j 2 and a 1 a 2. 1 Are these preferences complete? Why or why not? 2 Now say that if there is no strict ranking, Joel is indi erent. Draw the sets B((4, 4)), W ((4, 4)), I ((4, 4)). 3 Does Joel satisfy transitivity? 4 Is the set I ((4, 4)) closed? 5 Does Joel satisfy monotonicity or local non-satiation? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 30 / 42

Convexity De nition Convexity: if x % z and y % z, then t x + (1 0 < t < 1. (For two goods it is (t x 1 + (1 t) y 1, t x 2 + (1 t) y 2 ) % z.) t) y % z for all For example, x and y are on the same indi erence curve. The 50-50 mixture of the bundles x and y, is (0.5)x + (0.5)y. This is preferred to x or y. Warning. It does not imply.5x +.5y % y when x and y are not on the same indi erence curve. Remark: There is weak and strong convexity. Can you graph convex vs. non-convex indi erence curves? Can a satiation point have convex indi erence curves around it? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 31 / 42

Utility De nition A utility function u(x) represents a preference relation % if and only if u(x) u(y) () x y. Example Consider the bundles (4, 1), (2, 3) and (2, 2). Suppose (2, 3) (4, 1) s (2, 2). Assign to these bundles any numbers that preserve the preference ordering. Call these numbers utility levels. Note: All bundles in an indi erence curve have the same utility level. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 32 / 42

Utility Theorem Theorem Existence Theorem. (Debreu 1960) A preference relation that is complete, transitive and continuous can be represented by a utility function Fact There is no unique utility function representation of a preference relation. Fact With a discrete possibility set of goods, continuity is satis ed. Suppose U(x 1, x 2 ) = x 1 x 2 represents a preference relation. Does it represent (2, 3) (4, 1) (2, 2)? Does V (x 1, x 2 ) = U 2 = x 2 1 x 2 2 also represent the same preferences? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 33 / 42

Utility U(x 1, x 2 ) = x 1 x 2 =) (2, 3) (4, 1) (2, 2). How about W = 2U + 10? W preserves the same order as U and V and so represents the same preferences. Theorem If U is a utility function that represents a preference relation and f is a strictly increasing function, then V = f (U) is also a utility function representing those same preferences! WARNING: Only preserves ordinal ranking not cardinal. Hence, does not preserve risk aversion Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 34 / 42

Utility Theorem Easy Existence Theorem. A preference relation that is complete, transitive, strongly monotonic, and continuous can be represented by a utility function Proof. 1 Let 1 be a vector of ones i.e.(1, 1, 1,..., 1) 2 Let B t (x) = ft in R : t1 xg and W t (x) = ft in R : t1 xg 3 W t (x) is non-empty (has 0). B t (x) is non-empty (weak monotonicity). 4 Thanks to continuity, there exists t x in both B t (x) and W t (x). Hence, t x 1 x. 5 De ne u(x) = t x. Show t x t y () x % y. Proof of t x t y =) x % y : t x t y =) t x 1 % t y 1 =) x t x 1 % t y 1 y =) x % y Proof of x % y =) t x t y : x % y =) t x 1 x % y t y 1 =) t x 1 % t y 1 =) t x t y This last step is by strong monotonicity: Say instead, t y > t x. If so, by strong monotoniciy t y 1 t x 1. This contradicts t x 1 % t y 1, hence we must have t x t y. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 35 / 42

Lexicographic preferences Look rst at good x 1 and then look at x 2. For instance, Tall Tom likes to date tall, smart women. His rst choice in a partner is by height. If two women are of the same height, he chooses the one with the highest IQ. Does such preferences satisfy transitivity? Can one represent one by a utility function? Does Tom s preferences satisfy all of the necessary assumptions for existence? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 36 / 42

Utility w/o Continuity? Take the following preferences over age. Tank Carter is sent to prison for 5 years for driving with a revoked license (and not showing up to his earlier 6 month sentence to see his brother win the SuperBowl). When he is in prison, he prefers to be older since it is closer to his release. When he is outside, he prefers to be younger. (He prefers to be released as well). An example of the preference is t a t b if and only if t a, t b 5 and t a > t b (or) t a, t b > 5 and t a < t b (or) t a > 5 and t b 5. Is this continuous? (Are B & W closed?) Does the implication hold? Is there a utility function that represents it? Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 37 / 42

Necessary? Are all conditions necessary? Transitivity is necessary. (Real numbers follow transitivity.) Completeness and re exivity we want anyway. Monotonic (we know is not necessary). Nor is continuity. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 38 / 42

Are People Rational? We thus far have de nited rationality as completeness and transitivity. This with continuity allows us to use a utility function to represent preferences. Let us take a step back to see if this is actually how people behave. In theory, there is no di erence between theory and practice. In practice there is. -Yogi Berra Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 39 / 42

Yogi Berra Who is Yogi Berra? 1 An Indian spiritual Leader. B. A cartoon character. C. A baseball player. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 40 / 42

Relativity Yogi Berra is in a restaurant. He is about to order a steak when the waitress tells him the special of the day is spaghetti bolognese. He says In that case, I ll have the Lasaña. If anyone can nd the correct quote let me know. This is a common problem Dan Ariely s book. Subscription to the economist. 1 Internet only $59. 2 Print only $125. 3 Print and Internet $125. Two solutions: 1 Preferences depend upon the choice set. 2 Choice set contains information. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 41 / 42

Homework (week 3). 1 Let us de ne one-component convexity: if x % z, y % z and there exists an i such that x j = y j for all j 6= i, then t x + (1 t) y % z for all 0 < t < 1. 1 Show that convexity implies one-component convexity. 2 Give an example where one-component convexity holds but where convexity doesn t. 3 Give an example that does not satisfy one-component convexity. 2 Brad is indi erent frequently. For him x y if either x 1 y 1 and x 2 y 2 or if x 1 y 1 and x 2 y 2. (Otherwise, he prefers more of both goods) Can his preferences be represented by a utility function? If not, which assumption is violated? 3 Tata is never indi erent. She strictly prefers x to y if x 1 x 2 > y 1 y 2. If x 1 x 2 = y 1 y 2, she strictly prefers the bundle with more of good 1. Can her preferences be represented by a utility function? If not, which assumption is violated. 4 Using the notation of the proof of the easy existence theorem, show that t x > t y () x y. Kaplan (Haifa) micro October 2015 42 / 42