DETERMINISTIC AND STOCHASTIC SELECTION DYNAMICS

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DETERMINISTIC AND STOCHASTIC SELECTION DYNAMICS Jörgen Weibull March 23, 2010

1 The multi-population replicator dynamic Domain of analysis: finite games in normal form, G =(N, S, π), with mixed-strategy extensions, G =(N, (S), π) Foreachplayerrolei N: a (continuum) population of individuals All individuals use pure strategies, but may shift from one pure strategy to another, depending how well they do A mixed-strategy profile x = (x 1,..., x n ) (S) interpreted as a population state With the time argument t suppressed: ẋ ih = h π i (e h i,x i) π i (x) i x ih i N, h S i,x

1.1 Results Proposition 1.1 (Samuelson and Zhang, 1992) If a pure strategy h S i is iteratively strictly dominated (by a pure or mixed strategy), then x 0 int ( ) lim t + ξ ³ ih t, x 0 =0 Proposition 1.2 (Nachbar, 1990) If an interior solution trajectory converges, then its limit point is a Nash equilibrium: x 0 int ( ) lim t + ξ ³ t, x 0 = x x NE Proposition 1.3 (Bomze, 1986) If x (S) is Lyapunov stable, then x NE. Proposition 1.4 (Ritzberger and Weibull, 1995) x (S) is asymptotically stable iff x is a strict NE.

2 General selection dynamics Consider n-population dynamics of the form where g is regular: ẋ ih = g ih (x)x ih i N, h S i,x Definition 2.1 g : (S) R m is a regular growth-rate function if it is locally Lipschitz continuous and g i (x) x i =0for all i N, x (S). Here m = S 1 +... + S n. This guarantees the existence and uniqueness of solutions, by the Picard-Lindelöf Theorem, and that (S) is invariant

2.1 Classes of growth-rate functions Payoff monotonicity (PM): π i (e h i,x i) > π i (e k i,x i) g ih (x) >g ik (x) Payoff positivity (PP): sign [g ih (x)] = sign h π i (e h i,x i) π i (x) i Weak payoff-positivity (WPP): let B i (x) = n h S i : π i (e h i,x i) > π i (x) o and require B i (x) 6= g ih (x) > 0forsomeh B i (x) Convex payoff monotonicty (CPM): π i (y i,x i ) > π i (e k i,x i) y i g i (x) >g ik (x)

2.2 Examples 1. The (Taylor, 1979) multi-population replicator dynamic: What classes does this belong to? g ih (x) = π i (e h i,x i) π i (x) 2. Random aspiration levels, rejection of current strategy if falls short, and then imitation of randomly drawn individual in own population 3. A well-behaved one-dimensional family of growth-rate functions: for some σ>0 g ih (x) = i exp h σ π ³ e h i,x i P k S i x ik exp h σ π ³ e k i,x i 1 i

Regular? What classes does it belong to? [Hint: For CM, use Jensen s inequality!] Approaches replicator orbits as σ 0: g ih (x) 1+σ π ³ e h i,x i [1 + σ π (x)] 1+σ π (x) σ h π ³ e h i,x i i π (x) Approaches best-reply dynamic as σ + : g ih (x) P i exp h σ π ³ e h i,x i k β i (x) x ik exp h σ π ³ e k i,x i 1 i ³ P k β i (x) x 1 ik 1 h βi (x) 1 h / β i (x)

2.3 Results Proposition 2.1 (Hofbauer and Weibull, 1996) If a pure strategy h S i is iteratively strictly dominated (by a pure or mixed strategy), then its population share converges to zero, from any interior initial state and in all CPM dynamics. Proof sketch: 1. Suppose k S i is strictly dominated by y i (S i ): π i (y i,x i ) > π i (e k i,x i) x (S) 2. Let V : int( ) R be defined by V (x) = X h S i y ih ln(x ih ) ln(x ik )

3. Then V increases along any CPM dynamic: = X V (x) = X V (x) ẋ ih = X h S x i ih h S y ih ẋ ih x ih ẋik x ik h S i y ih g ih (x) g ik (x) =y i g i (x) g ik (x) > 0 4. Indeed, one can show that δ >0s.t. V (x) >δ x 5. Hence V (x) + and thus x ik 0 We also show that the result is essentially sharp: if a dynamic is not CPM then game with a strictly dominated strategy that survives in an insignificant population share forever.

Proposition 2.2 (Weibull, 1995) If an interior solution trajectory converges in any WPP dynamic, then its limit point is a Nash equilibrium. Proposition 2.3 (Weibull, 1995) If x (S) is Lyapunov stable in any WPP dynamic, thenx NE.

2.4 Set-wise stability Foreachplayerrolei, lett i S i and consider the sub-polyhedron (T )= i N (T i ) Definition 2.2 X = (T ) contains its (pure weakly) better replies if for all x X: π i (e h i,x i) π i (x) h T i Definition 2.3 A closed invariant set X is asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and has a nbd from which all solution trajectories converge to the set. Proposition 2.4 (Ritzberger and Weibull, 1995) If a subpolyhedron (T ) contains its better replies, then it is asymptotically stable in all PP dynamics. If a subpolyhedron (T ) is asymptotically stable in some PP dynamic, then it contains its better replies.

Proposition 2.5 (Ritzberger and Weibull, 1995) If a subpolyhedron (T )= i N (T i ) contains its better replies, then it contains an essential NEcomponent and a (KM) strategically stable set, and a proper equilibrium. Remark 2.1 Sufficient for this result that (T )= i N (T i ) contains its best replies. Such as set is called a curb set (closed under rational behavior): β i [ (T )] T i i N

2.5 Examples Reconsider the battle-of-the sexes game where player 1 has an outside option (go to a café with a friend). (3,1) (0,0) (0,0) (1,3) a b a b 1 (2,v) A B 2 L R 1 Multiple SPE but unique forward-induction solution: s =(Ra, A)

What strategy profiles, or subpolyhedra, are asymptotically stable in PP dynamics? A B La 2,v 2,v Lb 2,v 2,v Ra 3, 1 0, 0 Rb 0, 0 1, 3

3 Stochastic selection dynamics [Benaïm and Weibull (2003) and (2009)] Finite n-player game G =(I,S,π) in normal form [Note change of notation: I instead of N] One population, of finite size N, for each player role All individuals play pure strategies Random draw of 1 individual for strategy review, attimest =0, 1/N, 2/N...

Equal probability for each of the nn individuals to be drawn Population state: vector X (t) =hx 1 (t),...,x n (t)i of populationshare vectors X i (t) =(X ih (t)) h Si where X ih (t) =N ih (t) /N DefineaMarkovchainX N = D X N (t) E on as follows: Θ N = {x (S) :Nx ih N i I,h S i } 1. i I and h, k S i a continuous function p hn ik x ik =0 p hn ik (x) =0 and x Θ N : Pr Xi N (t + 1 N )=x i + 1 ³ e h N i e k i X N (t) =x : (S) [0, 1] s.t. = p hn ik (x)

2. x Θ N,y R m (m = S 1 +... + S 1 ): Pr X N (t + 1 N )=x + 1 N y XN (t) =x = ( p hn ik (x) if y i = e h i ek i and y j =0 j 6= i 0 otherwise 3. Then the expected net increase in subpopulation (i, h), from t to t + 1/N, conditional upon the current state x, is F N ih (x) = X k6=h p hn ik (x) X p kn ih (x). k6=h 4. Assume that (a) F N bounded (b) compact set C common Lipschitz constant F N (c) F N F uniformly

5. Then also F is bounded and locally Lipschitz continuous 6. We are interested in deterministic continuous-time approximation of X N when N is large

3.1 Mean-field equations The system of mean-field equations: ẋ ih = F N ih (x) i, h, x, N Solution mapping ξ N : R (S) (S) The flow induced by F N Affine interpolation of the process X N : straight-line segments) ˆX N (connect the points by Deviation between the flow ξ N and ˆX N at any time t R: ˆX N (t) ξ N (t, x) = max ˆX ih N (t) i I,h S ξn ih (t, x) i

Given T<+, the maximal deviation in [0,T]: D N N (T,x)= max 0 t T ˆX N (t) ξ N (t, x) Consider also the limit flow ξ : R (S) (S) thatsolves ẋ ih = F ih (x) i, h, x Let D N (T,x)= max 0 t T ˆX N (t) ξ(t, x) Proposition 3.1 T >0 c>0 such that ε >0 and any N large enough: Pr h D N (T,x) ε X N (0) = x i 2Me ε2 cn x N (S). Here M = m n, the dimension of the tangent space of (S)

This result can be used, in combination with the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, to establish result that connect the behavior of X N for N large, with properties of its mean-field.

3.2 Exit times Definition 3.1 FirstexittimefromasetB (S): τ N (B) =inf n t 0: ˆX N (t) / B o. Consider the forward orbit γ + (x 0 )ofthemean-field solution ξ through x 0 (S) Proposition 3.2 Let B be an open nbd of the closure of γ + (x 0 ) and suppose that X N (0) x 0.Then Pr lim τ N (B) =+ N =1 In particular, if the mean-field growth-rate function is WPP, x 0 int [ (S)] and ξ ³ t, x 0 x, then we know from the above that

x NE (S), and then this proposition says that X N (t), for large enough N, will stay close to the trajectory of ξ andwillremainfora very long time near the Nash equilibrium. Definition 3.2 The basin of attraction of a closed asymptotically stable set A (S) is the set B(A) ={x (S) :ξ(t, x) t A} Proposition 3.3 Let A (S) be closed and asymptotically stable set in the mean-field flow ξ. EverynbdB 1 B(A) of A contains a nbd B 0 of A s.t. X N (0) B 0 N Pr lim inf τ N (B 0 )=+ N =1 In particular, if the mean-field growth-rate function is PP and A = (T ) is a subpolyhedron that contains its better replies, then we know

from the above that A is asymptotically stable, and thus, for all N large enough: if X N starts in A, ornearit,thenx N will stay in or near A, for a very long time. 3.3 Visitation rates Definition 3.3 Let x (S). A state y (S) belongs to the omega limit set ω(x) of x if lim tk + ξ(t k,x)=y for some sequence t k +. Definition 3.4 The Birkhoff center B C (ξ) of a flow ξ is the closure of set of states x ω(x). All stationary states and all points on periodic orbits belong the Birkhoff center.

Definition 3.5 The visitation rate in a set C (S) during a time interval [0,T] is V N (C, T )= 1 X 1 T(T ) {X N (t) C} t T(T ) where T (T ) is the set of times t =0, 1/n, 2/N,... T. Proposition 3.4 For any open nbd A of B C (ξ) : lim lim N inf V N (A, T ) T =1 a.s. In other words: almost all of the time the stochastic process will hang around the Birkhoff center of its mean-field.

Next lecture: stochastic models of noisy best-reply adaptation References: Young (1993), Hurkens (1995) and Young (1998) THE END