Prof. Erhan Bayraktar (University of Michigan)

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September 17, 2012 KAP 414 2:15 PM- 3:15 PM Prof. (University of Michigan) Abstract: We consider a zero-sum stochastic differential controller-and-stopper game in which the state process is a controlled diffusion evolving in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space. In this game, the controller affects both the drift and the volatility terms of the state process. Under appropriate conditions, we show that the game has a value and the value function is the unique viscosity solution to an obstacle problem for a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1009.0932. Joint work with Yu-Jui Huang.

On the Multi-Dimensional Controller and Stopper Games Joint work with Yu-Jui Huang University of Michigan, Ann Arbor September 17, USC Math Finance Colloquium

Outline Introduction. The setup. The sub-solution property of the of the upper value function. The super-solution property of the lower value function. Comparison.

Introduction Consider a zero-sum controller-and-stopper game: Two players: the controller and the stopper. A state process X α : can be manipulated by the controller through the selection of α. Given a time horizon T > 0. The stopper has the right to choose the duration of the game, in the form of a stopping time τ in [0, T ] a.s. the obligation to pay the controller the running reward f (s, X α s, α s ) at every moment 0 s < τ, and the terminal reward g(x α τ ) at time τ. Instantaneous discount rate: c(s, X α s ), 0 s T.

Lower value of the game We consider the robust (worst-case) optimal stopping problem: [ τ V (t, x) := sup inf E e s t,x,α t c(u,xu )du f (s, X α A t τ Tt,T t s t,x,α, α s )ds t + e τ t ] c(u,xu t,x,α )du g(xτ t,x,α ), where A t : set of controls, Tt,T t : set of stopping times. f (s, Xs α, α s ): running cost at time s. g(x α τ ): terminal cost at time τ. c(s, X α s ): discount rate at time s. X α : a controlled state process. Think of this as a controller-stopper game between us (stopper) and nature (controller)!

Lower value of the game We consider the robust (worst-case) optimal stopping problem: [ τ V (t, x) := sup inf E e s t,x,α t c(u,xu )du f (s, X α A t τ Tt,T t s t,x,α, α s )ds t + e τ t ] c(u,xu t,x,α )du g(xτ t,x,α ), where A t : set of controls, Tt,T t : set of stopping times. f (s, Xs α, α s ): running cost at time s. g(x α τ ): terminal cost at time τ. c(s, X α s ): discount rate at time s. X α : a controlled state process. Think of this as a controller-stopper game between us (stopper) and nature (controller)!

Upper value of the game If Stopper acts first: Instead of choosing one single stopping time, he would like to employ a strategy π : A t T t t,t. U(t, x) := inf π Π t t,t [ π[α] sup E α A t t e s t + e π[α] t c(u,x t,x,α u where Π is the set of strategies π : A t T t t,t. )du f (s, X t,x,α, α s )ds c(u,xu t,x,α )du g(x t,x,α π[α] ], ) s

Non-anticipative Strategies for the stopper Fix t [0, T ]. For any function π : A t T t t,t, π Πt t,t if For any α, β A t and s [t, T ], 1 {π[α] s} = 1 {π[β] s} for P-a.e. ω {α = [t,s) β}, (1) where {α = [t,s) β} := {ω Ω α r (ω) = β r (ω) for s [t, s)}.

Non-anticipative Strategies for the stopper Fix t [0, T ]. For any function π : A t T t t,t, π Πt t,t if For any α, β A t and s [t, T ], 1 {π[α] s} = 1 {π[β] s} for P-a.e. ω {α = [t,s) β}, (1) where {α = [t,s) β} := {ω Ω α r (ω) = β r (ω) for s [t, s)}.

Non-anticipative strategies for the controller Fix t [0, T ]. Let γ : T A t satisfy the following non-anticipativity condition: for any τ 1, τ 2 T and s [t, T ], it holds for P-a.e. ω Ω that if min{τ 1 (ω), τ 2 (ω)} > s, then (γ[τ 1 ]) r (ω) = (γ[τ 2 ]) r (ω) for r [t, s). Then, observe that γ[τ](ω) = γ[t ](ω) on [t, τ(ω)) P-a.s. for any τ T. This implies that employing the strategy γ has the same effect as employing the control γ[t ]. In other words, the controller would not benefit from using non-anticipating strategies.

Non-anticipative strategies for the controller Fix t [0, T ]. Let γ : T A t satisfy the following non-anticipativity condition: for any τ 1, τ 2 T and s [t, T ], it holds for P-a.e. ω Ω that if min{τ 1 (ω), τ 2 (ω)} > s, then (γ[τ 1 ]) r (ω) = (γ[τ 2 ]) r (ω) for r [t, s). Then, observe that γ[τ](ω) = γ[t ](ω) on [t, τ(ω)) P-a.s. for any τ T. This implies that employing the strategy γ has the same effect as employing the control γ[t ]. In other words, the controller would not benefit from using non-anticipating strategies.

First comparison between value functions If Controller acts first: nature does NOT use strategies. V (t, x) = sup inf E[ ]. α A t τ Tt,T t Now it follows that V U. We say the game has a value if U = V. (Not at all clear for the the players both use controls.)

First comparison between value functions If Controller acts first: nature does NOT use strategies. V (t, x) = sup inf E[ ]. α A t τ Tt,T t Now it follows that V U. We say the game has a value if U = V. (Not at all clear for the the players both use controls.)

First comparison between value functions If Controller acts first: nature does NOT use strategies. V (t, x) = sup inf E[ ]. α A t τ Tt,T t Now it follows that V U. We say the game has a value if U = V. (Not at all clear for the the players both use controls.)

Related Work The controller-stopper game is closely related to some common problems in mathematical finance: pricing American contingent claims, see e.g. Karatzas & Kou [1998], and Karatzas & Zamfirescu [2005]. minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin, see Bayraktar & Young [2011]. But, the game itself has been studied to a great extent only in some special cases.

Related Work One-dimensional case: Karatzas and Sudderth [2001] study the case where X α moves along an interval on R. they show that the game has a value; they construct a saddle-point of optimal strategies (α, τ ). Difficult to extend their results to higher dimensions (their techniques rely heavily on optimal stopping theorems for one-dimensional diffusions). Multi-dimensional case: Karatzas and Zamfirescu [2008] develop a martingale approach to deal with this. But, require some strong assumptions: the diffusion term of X α has to be non-degenerate, and it cannot be controlled!

Related Work One-dimensional case: Karatzas and Sudderth [2001] study the case where X α moves along an interval on R. they show that the game has a value; they construct a saddle-point of optimal strategies (α, τ ). Difficult to extend their results to higher dimensions (their techniques rely heavily on optimal stopping theorems for one-dimensional diffusions). Multi-dimensional case: Karatzas and Zamfirescu [2008] develop a martingale approach to deal with this. But, require some strong assumptions: the diffusion term of X α has to be non-degenerate, and it cannot be controlled!

Related Work One-dimensional case: Karatzas and Sudderth [2001] study the case where X α moves along an interval on R. they show that the game has a value; they construct a saddle-point of optimal strategies (α, τ ). Difficult to extend their results to higher dimensions (their techniques rely heavily on optimal stopping theorems for one-dimensional diffusions). Multi-dimensional case: Karatzas and Zamfirescu [2008] develop a martingale approach to deal with this. But, require some strong assumptions: the diffusion term of X α has to be non-degenerate, and it cannot be controlled!

Our Goal We intend to investigate a much more general multi-dimensional controller-stopper game in which both the drift and the diffusion terms of X α can be controlled; the diffusion term can be degenerate. Main Result: Under appropriate conditions, the game has a value (i.e. U = V ); the value function is the unique viscosity solution to an obstacle problem of an HJB equation.

Our Goal We intend to investigate a much more general multi-dimensional controller-stopper game in which both the drift and the diffusion terms of X α can be controlled; the diffusion term can be degenerate. Main Result: Under appropriate conditions, the game has a value (i.e. U = V ); the value function is the unique viscosity solution to an obstacle problem of an HJB equation.

Methodology U U V V 1. Weak DPP for U subsolution property of U 2. Weak DPP for V supersolution property of V 3. A comparison result V U (supersol. subsol.) U = V U = V, i.e. the game has a value.

Methodology U U V V 1. Weak DPP for U subsolution property of U 2. Weak DPP for V supersolution property of V 3. A comparison result V U (supersol. subsol.) U = V U = V, i.e. the game has a value.

The Set-up Consider a fixed time horizon T > 0. Ω := C([0, T ]; R d ). W = {W t } t [0,T ] : the canonical process, i.e. W t (ω) = ω t. P: the Wiener measure defined on Ω. F = {F t } t [0,T ] : the P-augmentation of σ(w s, s [0, T ]). For each t [0, T ], consider F t : the P-augmentation of σ(w t s W t, s [0, T ]). T t :={F t -stopping times valued in [0, T ] P-a.s.}. A t :={F t -progressively measurable M-valued processes}, where M is a separable metric space. Given F-stopping times τ 1, τ 2 with τ 1 τ 2 P-a.s., define T t τ 1,τ 2 :={τ T t valued in [τ 1, τ 2 ] P-a.s.}.

The Set-up Consider a fixed time horizon T > 0. Ω := C([0, T ]; R d ). W = {W t } t [0,T ] : the canonical process, i.e. W t (ω) = ω t. P: the Wiener measure defined on Ω. F = {F t } t [0,T ] : the P-augmentation of σ(w s, s [0, T ]). For each t [0, T ], consider F t : the P-augmentation of σ(w t s W t, s [0, T ]). T t :={F t -stopping times valued in [0, T ] P-a.s.}. A t :={F t -progressively measurable M-valued processes}, where M is a separable metric space. Given F-stopping times τ 1, τ 2 with τ 1 τ 2 P-a.s., define T t τ 1,τ 2 :={τ T t valued in [τ 1, τ 2 ] P-a.s.}.

Concatenation Given ω, ω Ω and θ T, we define the concatenation of ω and ω at time θ as (ω θ ω ) s := ω r 1 [0,θ(ω)] (s)+(ω s ω θ(ω) +ω θ(ω))1 (θ(ω),t ] (s), s [0, T ]. For each α A and τ T, we define the shifted versions: α θ,ω (ω ) := α(ω θ ω ) τ θ,ω (ω ) := τ(ω θ ω ).

Assumptions on b and σ Given τ T, ξ L p d which is F τ -measurable, and α A, let X τ,ξ,α denote a R d -valued process satisfying the SDE: dx τ,ξ,α t with the initial condition X τ,ξ,α τ = b(t, Xt τ,ξ,α, α t )dt + σ(t, Xt τ,ξ,α, α t )dw t, (2) = ξ a.s. Assume: b(t, x, u) and σ(t, x, u) are deterministic Borel functions, and continuous in (x, u); moreover, K > 0 s.t. for t [0, T ], x, y R d, and u M b(t, x, u) b(t, y, u) + σ(t, x, u) σ(t, y, u) K x y, b(t, x, u) + σ(t, x, u) K(1 + x ), (3) This implies for any (t, x) [0, T ] R d and α A, (2) admits a unique strong solution X t,x,α.

Assumptions on b and σ Given τ T, ξ L p d which is F τ -measurable, and α A, let X τ,ξ,α denote a R d -valued process satisfying the SDE: dx τ,ξ,α t with the initial condition X τ,ξ,α τ = b(t, Xt τ,ξ,α, α t )dt + σ(t, Xt τ,ξ,α, α t )dw t, (2) = ξ a.s. Assume: b(t, x, u) and σ(t, x, u) are deterministic Borel functions, and continuous in (x, u); moreover, K > 0 s.t. for t [0, T ], x, y R d, and u M b(t, x, u) b(t, y, u) + σ(t, x, u) σ(t, y, u) K x y, b(t, x, u) + σ(t, x, u) K(1 + x ), (3) This implies for any (t, x) [0, T ] R d and α A, (2) admits a unique strong solution X t,x,α.

Assumptions on f, g, and c f and g are rewards, c is the discount rate assume f, g, c 0. In addition, Assume: f : [0, T ] R d M R is Borel measurable, and f (t, x, u) continuous in (x, u), and continuous in x uniformly in u M. g : R d R is continuous, c : [0, T ] R d R is continuous and bounded above by some real number c > 0. f and g satisfy a polynomial growth condition f (t, x, u) + g(x) K(1 + x p ) for some p 1. (4)

Reduction to the Mayer form Set F (x, y, z) := z + yg(x). Observe that V (t, x) = sup α A t where X t,x,y,z,α τ inf E [ Z t,x,1,0,α τ Tt,T t τ = sup inf E [ F (X t,x,1,0,α α A t τ Tt,T t τ ) ], := (X t,x,α τ U(t, x) =, Y t,x,y,α τ inf π Π t t,t sup E α A t, Z t,x,y,z,α τ + Yτ t,x,1,α g(xτ t,x,α ) ] ). Similarly, ]. [ F (X t,x,1,0,α π[α] ) More generally, for any (x, y, z) S := R d R 2 +, define V (t, x, y, z) := sup α A t Ū(t, x, y, z) := inf π Π t t,t inf E [ F (X t,x,y,z,α τ Tt,T t τ ) ]. sup E α A t [ ] F (X t,x,y,z,α π[α] ).

Reduction to the Mayer form Set F (x, y, z) := z + yg(x). Observe that V (t, x) = sup α A t where X t,x,y,z,α τ inf E [ Z t,x,1,0,α τ Tt,T t τ = sup inf E [ F (X t,x,1,0,α α A t τ Tt,T t τ ) ], := (X t,x,α τ U(t, x) =, Y t,x,y,α τ inf π Π t t,t sup E α A t, Z t,x,y,z,α τ + Yτ t,x,1,α g(xτ t,x,α ) ] ). Similarly, ]. [ F (X t,x,1,0,α π[α] ) More generally, for any (x, y, z) S := R d R 2 +, define V (t, x, y, z) := sup α A t Ū(t, x, y, z) := inf π Π t t,t inf E [ F (X t,x,y,z,α τ Tt,T t τ ) ]. sup E α A t [ ] F (X t,x,y,z,α π[α] ).

Conditional expectation Lemma Fix (t, x) [0, T ] S and α A. For any θ T t,t and τ T θ,t, ( E[F (Xτ t,x,α ) F θ ](ω) = J θ(ω), X t,x,α θ (ω); α θ,ω, τ θ,ω) P-a.s. ( [ ( )]) = E F X θ(ω),xt,x,α θ (ω),α θ,ω τ θ,ω

Subsolution Property of U For (t, x, p, A) [0, T ] R d R d M d, define H a (t, x, p, A) := b(t, x, a) 1 2 Tr[σσ (t, x, a)a] f (t, x, a), and set H(t, x, p, A) := inf a M Ha (t, x, p, A). Proposition The function U is a viscosity subsolution on [0, T ) R d to the obstacle problem of an HJB equation { max c(t, x)w w } t + H (t, x, D x w, Dx 2 w), w g(x) 0.

Subsolution Property of U For (t, x, p, A) [0, T ] R d R d M d, define H a (t, x, p, A) := b(t, x, a) 1 2 Tr[σσ (t, x, a)a] f (t, x, a), and set H(t, x, p, A) := inf a M Ha (t, x, p, A). Proposition The function U is a viscosity subsolution on [0, T ) R d to the obstacle problem of an HJB equation { max c(t, x)w w } t + H (t, x, D x w, Dx 2 w), w g(x) 0.

Subsolution Property of U Sketch of proof: Assume the contrary, i.e. h C 1,2 ([0, T ) R d ) and (t 0, x 0 ) [0, T ) R d s.t. 0 = (U h)(t 0, x 0 ) > (U h)(t, x), (t, x) [0, T ) R d \(t 0, x 0 ), and max { c(t 0, x 0 )h h } t + H (t 0, x 0, D x h, Dx 2 h), h g(x 0 ) (t 0, x 0 ) > 0. (5)

Proof (continued) Since by definition U g, the USC of g implies h(t 0, x 0 ) = U (t 0, x 0 ) g(x 0 ). Then, we see from (5) that c(t 0, x 0 )h(t 0, x 0 ) h t (t 0, x 0 ) + H (, D x h, D 2 x h)(t 0, x 0 ) > 0. Define the function h(t, x) := h(t, x) + ε( t t 0 2 + x x 0 ) 4. Note that ( h, t h, D x h, D 2 x h)(t 0, x 0 ) = (h, t h, D x h, D 2 x h)(t 0, x 0 ). Then, by LSC of H, r > 0, ε > 0 such that t 0 + r < T and c(t, x) h(t, x) h t (t, x) + Ha (, D x h, D 2 x h)(t, x) > 0, (6) for all a M and (t, x) B r (t 0, x 0 ).

Proof (continued) Define η > 0 by ηe ct := min Br (t 0,x 0 )( h h) > 0. Take (ˆt, ˆx) B r (t 0, x 0 ) s.t. (U h)(ˆt, ˆx) < η/2. For α Aˆt, set { } θ α := inf s ˆt (s, X ˆt,ˆx,α s ) / B r (t 0, x 0 ) T ˆt. ˆt,T Applying the product rule to Ys ˆt,ˆx,1,α [ h(ˆt, ˆx) = E Y ˆt,ˆx,1,α θ α θ α + Y ˆt,ˆx,1,α s ˆt [ > E h(θ α, X ˆt,ˆx,α Y ˆt,ˆx,1,α θ h(θ α, X ˆt,ˆx,α α θ ) + α θ α ) h(s, X ˆt,ˆx,α s ), we get ( ) c h h t + Hα (, D x h, Dx 2 h) + f θ α ˆt Y ˆt,ˆx,1,α s ] (s, X ˆt,ˆx,α s )ds ] f (s, X ˆt,ˆx,α s, α s )ds + η

Proof (continued) By our choice of (ˆt, ˆx), U(ˆt, ˆx) + η/2 > h(ˆt, ˆx). Thus, [ U(ˆt, ˆx) > E Y ˆt,ˆx,1,α θ h(θ α, X ˆt,ˆx,α α θ ) + α for any α Aˆt. How to get a contradiction to this?? θ α ˆt Y ˆt,ˆx,1,α s ] f (s, X ˆt,ˆx,α s, α s )ds + η 2,

Subsolution Property of U By the definition of U, U(ˆt, ˆx) sup α Aˆt E [ E F [ E [ ( )] F Xˆt,ˆx,1,0,α π [α] ( Xˆt,ˆx,1,0,ˆα π [ˆα] Y ˆt,ˆx,1,ˆα θ ˆα )] + η, for some ˆα Aˆt. 4 ] h(θ, X ˆt,ˆx,ˆα ) + Z ˆt,ˆx,1,0,ˆα + η θ ˆα θ ˆα 4 + η 4. The BLUE PART is the WEAK DPP we want to prove!

Subsolution Property of U By the definition of U, U(ˆt, ˆx) sup α Aˆt E [ E F [ E [ ( )] F Xˆt,ˆx,1,0,α π [α] ( Xˆt,ˆx,1,0,ˆα π [ˆα] Y ˆt,ˆx,1,ˆα θ ˆα )] + η, for some ˆα Aˆt. 4 ] h(θ, X ˆt,ˆx,ˆα ) + Z ˆt,ˆx,1,0,ˆα + η θ ˆα θ ˆα 4 + η 4. The BLUE PART is the WEAK DPP we want to prove!

Weak DPP for U Proposition (Weak DPP for U) Fix (t, x) [0, T ] S and ε > 0. For any π Π t t,t and ϕ LSC([0, T ] R d ) with ϕ U, π Π t t,t s.t. α A t, [ ] [ E F (X t,x,α π [α] ) E Y t,x,y,α π[α] ( ϕ π[α], X t,x,α π[α] ) ] + Z t,x,y,z,α π[α] + 4ε.

An important Lemma To prove this weak DPP, we need the very technical lemma Lemma Fix t [0, T ]. For any π Π t t,t, Lπ : [0, t] S R defined by [ ] L π (s, x) := sup α As E F (X s,x,α π[α] ) is continuous. Idea of Proof: Generalize the arguments in Krylov[1980] for control problems with fixed horizon to our case with random horizon. This lemma is why we need the stopper to use strategies.

An important Lemma To prove this weak DPP, we need the very technical lemma Lemma Fix t [0, T ]. For any π Π t t,t, Lπ : [0, t] S R defined by [ ] L π (s, x) := sup α As E F (X s,x,α π[α] ) is continuous. Idea of Proof: Generalize the arguments in Krylov[1980] for control problems with fixed horizon to our case with random horizon. This lemma is why we need the stopper to use strategies.

Weak DPP for U Sketch of proof for Weak DPP for U : 1. Separate [0, T ] S into small pieces. Since [0, T ] S is Lindelöf, take {(t i, x i )} i N s.t. i N B(t i, x i ; r (t i,x i ) ) = (0, T ] S, with B(t i, x i ; r (t i,x i ) ) := (t i r (t i,x i ), t i ] B r (t i,x i )(x i ). Take a disjoint subcovering {A i } i N s.t. (t i, x i ) A i. 2. Pick ε-optimal strategy π (t i,x i ) in each A i. For each (t i, x i ), by def. of Ū, π (t i,x i ) Π t i t i,t s.t. [ ] sup E F (X t i,x i,α ) Ū(t π α A (t i,x i ) [α] i, x i ) + ε. ti Set ϕ(t, x, y, z) := yϕ(t, x) + z. For any (t, x ) A i, L π(t i,x i ) (t, x ) L π(ti,xi ) (t i, x i ) + ε Ū(t i, x i ) + 2ε usc ϕ(t i, x i ) + 2ε lsc ϕ(t, x ) + 3ε. (7)

Weak DPP for U Sketch of proof for Weak DPP for U : 1. Separate [0, T ] S into small pieces. Since [0, T ] S is Lindelöf, take {(t i, x i )} i N s.t. i N B(t i, x i ; r (t i,x i ) ) = (0, T ] S, with B(t i, x i ; r (t i,x i ) ) := (t i r (t i,x i ), t i ] B r (t i,x i )(x i ). Take a disjoint subcovering {A i } i N s.t. (t i, x i ) A i. 2. Pick ε-optimal strategy π (t i,x i ) in each A i. For each (t i, x i ), by def. of Ū, π (t i,x i ) Π t i t i,t s.t. [ ] sup E F (X t i,x i,α ) Ū(t π α A (t i,x i ) [α] i, x i ) + ε. ti Set ϕ(t, x, y, z) := yϕ(t, x) + z. For any (t, x ) A i, L π(t i,x i ) (t, x ) L π(ti,xi ) (t i, x i ) + ε Ū(t i, x i ) + 2ε usc ϕ(t i, x i ) + 2ε lsc ϕ(t, x ) + 3ε. (7)

Weak DPP for U Sketch of proof for Weak DPP for U : 1. Separate [0, T ] S into small pieces. Since [0, T ] S is Lindelöf, take {(t i, x i )} i N s.t. i N B(t i, x i ; r (t i,x i ) ) = (0, T ] S, with B(t i, x i ; r (t i,x i ) ) := (t i r (t i,x i ), t i ] B r (t i,x i )(x i ). Take a disjoint subcovering {A i } i N s.t. (t i, x i ) A i. 2. Pick ε-optimal strategy π (t i,x i ) in each A i. For each (t i, x i ), by def. of Ū, π (t i,x i ) Π t i t i,t s.t. [ ] sup E F (X t i,x i,α ) Ū(t π α A (t i,x i ) [α] i, x i ) + ε. ti Set ϕ(t, x, y, z) := yϕ(t, x) + z. For any (t, x ) A i, L π(t i,x i ) (t, x ) L π(ti,xi ) (t i, x i ) + ε Ū(t i, x i ) + 2ε usc ϕ(t i, x i ) + 2ε lsc ϕ(t, x ) + 3ε. (7)

Weak DPP for U 3. Paste π (t i,x i ) together. For any n N, set B n := 1 i n A i and define π n Π t t,t by π n [α] := T 1 (B n ) c (π[α], Xt,x,α 4. Estimations. π[α] ) + n i=1 E[F (X t,x,α π n [α] [ )] ] [ = E F (X t,x,α π n [α] )1 Bn(π[α], Xt,x,α π[α] ) + E E[ ϕ(π[α], X t,x,α π[α] )] + 3ε + ε, π (t i,x i ) [α]1 Ai (π[α], X t,x,α π[α] ). F (X t,x,α T ] )1 (B n ) c (π[α], Xt,x,α π[α] ) where RED PART follows from (7) and BLUE PART holds for n n (α).

Weak DPP for U 3. Paste π (t i,x i ) together. For any n N, set B n := 1 i n A i and define π n Π t t,t by π n [α] := T 1 (B n ) c (π[α], Xt,x,α 4. Estimations. π[α] ) + n i=1 E[F (X t,x,α π n [α] [ )] ] [ = E F (X t,x,α π n [α] )1 Bn(π[α], Xt,x,α π[α] ) + E E[ ϕ(π[α], X t,x,α π[α] )] + 3ε + ε, π (t i,x i ) [α]1 Ai (π[α], X t,x,α π[α] ). F (X t,x,α T ] )1 (B n ) c (π[α], Xt,x,α π[α] ) where RED PART follows from (7) and BLUE PART holds for n n (α).

Weak DPP for U 5. Construct the desired strategy π. Define π Π t t,t by Then we get π [α] := π n (α) [α]. E[F (X t,x,α π [α])] E[ ϕ(π[α], Xt,x,α π[α] )] + 4ε = E[Y t,x,y,α π[α] ϕ(θ, X t,x,α π[α] ) + Z t,x,y,z,α π[α] ] + 4ε. Done with the proof of Weak DPP for U! Done with the proof of the subsolution property of U!

Weak DPP for U 5. Construct the desired strategy π. Define π Π t t,t by Then we get π [α] := π n (α) [α]. E[F (X t,x,α π [α])] E[ ϕ(π[α], Xt,x,α π[α] )] + 4ε = E[Y t,x,y,α π[α] ϕ(θ, X t,x,α π[α] ) + Z t,x,y,z,α π[α] ] + 4ε. Done with the proof of Weak DPP for U! Done with the proof of the subsolution property of U!

Supersolution Property of V Proposition (Weak DPP for V ) Fix (t, x) [0, T ] S and ε > 0. For any α A t, θ Tt,T t and ϕ USC([0, T ] R d ) with ϕ V, (i) E[ ϕ + (θ, X t,x,α θ )] < ; (ii) If, moreover, E[ ϕ (θ, X t,x,α θ )] <, then there exists α A t with αs = α s for s [t, θ] s.t. for any τ T t E[F (X t,x,α τ Proposition )] E[Y t,x,y,α τ θ t,t, ϕ(τ θ, X t,x,α τ θ ) + Z t,x,y,z,α τ θ ] 4ε. The function V is a viscosity supersolution on [0, T ) R d to the obstacle problem of an HJB equation { max c(t, x)w w } t + H(t, x, D xw, Dx 2 w), w g(x) 0.

Comparison To state an appropriate comparison result, we assume A. for any t, s [0, T ], x, y R d, and u M, b(t, x, u) b(s, y, u) + σ(t, x, u) σ(s, y, u) K( t s + x y ). B. f (t, x, u) is uniformly continuous in (t, x), uniformly in u M. The conditions A and B, together with the linear growth condition on b and σ, imply that the function H is continuous, and thus H = H. Proposition (Comparison) Assume A and B. Let u (resp. v) be an USC viscosity subsolution (resp. a LSC viscosity supersolution) with polynomial growth condition to (30), such that u(t, x) v(t, x) for all x R d. Then u v on [0, T ) R d.

Comparison To state an appropriate comparison result, we assume A. for any t, s [0, T ], x, y R d, and u M, b(t, x, u) b(s, y, u) + σ(t, x, u) σ(s, y, u) K( t s + x y ). B. f (t, x, u) is uniformly continuous in (t, x), uniformly in u M. The conditions A and B, together with the linear growth condition on b and σ, imply that the function H is continuous, and thus H = H. Proposition (Comparison) Assume A and B. Let u (resp. v) be an USC viscosity subsolution (resp. a LSC viscosity supersolution) with polynomial growth condition to (30), such that u(t, x) v(t, x) for all x R d. Then u v on [0, T ) R d.

Main Result Lemma For all x R d, V (T, x) g(x). Theorem Assume A and B. Then U = V on [0, T ] R d. In particular, U = V on [0, T ] R d, i.e. the game has a value, which is the unique viscosity solution to (30) with terminal condition w(t, x) = g(x) for x R d.

Summary U U V V 1. Weak DPP for U subsolution property of U 2. Weak DPP for V supersolution property of V 3. A comparison result V U (supersol. subsol.) U = V U = V, i.e. the game has a value. No a priori regularity needed! (U and V don t even need to be measurable!) No measurable selection needed!

Summary U U V V 1. Weak DPP for U subsolution property of U 2. Weak DPP for V supersolution property of V 3. A comparison result V U (supersol. subsol.) U = V U = V, i.e. the game has a value. No a priori regularity needed! (U and V don t even need to be measurable!) No measurable selection needed!

References I E. Bayraktar and V.R. Young, Proving Regularity of the Minimal Probability of Ruin via a Game of Stopping and Control, Finance and Stochastics, 15 No.4 (2011), pp. 785 818. B. Bouchard, and N. Touzi, Weak Dynamic Programming Principle for Viscosity Solutions, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 49 No.3 (2011), pp. 948 962. I. Karatzas and S.G. Kou, Hedging American Contingent Claims with Constrained Portfolios, Finance & Stochastics, 2 (1998), pp. 215 258. I. Karatzas and W.D. Sudderth, The Controller-and-stopper Game for a Linear Diffusion, The Annals of Probability, 29 No.3 (2001), pp. 1111 1127.

References II I. Karatzas and H. Wang, A Barrier Option of American Type, Applied Mathematics and Optimization, 42 (2000), pp. 259 280. I. Karatzas and I.-M. Zamfirescu, Game Approach to the Optimal Stopping Problem, Stochastics, 8 (2005), pp. 401 435. I. Karatzas and I.-M. Zamfirescu, Martingale Approach to Stochastic Differential Games of Control and Stopping, The Annals of Probability, 36 No.4 (2008), pp. 1495 1527. N.V. Krylov, Controlled Diffusion Processes, Springer-Verlag, New York (1980).

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