Implicit Function Theorem: One Equation

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Natalia Lazzati Mathematics for Economics (Part I) Note 3: The Implicit Function Theorem Note 3 is based on postol (975, h 3), de la Fuente (2, h5) and Simon and Blume (994, h 5) This note discusses the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) This result plays a key role in economics, particularly in constrained optimization problems and the analysis of comparative statics The rst section develops the IFT for the simplest model of one equation and one exogenous variable We then extend the analysis to multiple equations and exogenous variables Implicit Function Theorem: One Equation In general, we are accustom to work with functions of the form x = f () where the endogenous variable x is an explicit function of the exogenous variable : This ideal situation does not always occur in economic models The IFT in its simplest form deals with an equation of the form F (x; ) = () where we separate endogenous and exogenous variables by a semicolon The problem is to decide whether this equation determines x as a function of : If so, we have x = x () for some function x (:), and we say x (:) is de ned "implicitly" by () Formally, we are interested in two questions (a) Under which conditions on () is x determined as a function of?; and (b) How do changes in a ect the corresponding value of x? The IFT answers these two questions simultaneously! The idea behind this fundamental theorem is quite simple If F (x; ) is a linear function, then the answer to the previous questions is trivial we elaborate on this point below If F (x; ) is nonlinear, then the IFT states a set of conditions under which we can use derivatives to construct

a linear system that behaves closely to the nonlinear equation around some initial point We can then address the local behavior of the nonlinear system by studying the properties of the associated linear one So the results of Notes and 2 turn out to be important here! Before introducing the IFT let us develop a few examples that clarify the requirements of the theorem and its main implications Example Let us consider the function F (x; ) = ax b c Here the values that satisfy F (x; ) = form a linear equation ax b c = : Moreover, assuming a 6=, the values of x and that satisfy F (x; ) = can be expressed as x () = b a + c a : If a 6= ; then x () is a continuous function of and dx () =d = b=a Notice that the partial derivative of F (x; ) with respect to x is F (x; ) =x = a So in this simple case, x () exists and is di erentiable if and only if F (x; ) =x 6= : N In Example, assuming F (x; ) =x 6=, x () is de ned for every initial value of x and In the next example, x () exists only around some speci c values of these two variables Example 2 Let F (x; ) = x 2 + 2, so that the values of x and that satisfy F (x; ) = form a circle of radius and center (; ) in R 2 : In this case, for each 2 ( ; ) we have two possible values of x that satisfy F (x; ) = x 2 + 2 = : [Therefore, x () is not a function] Note, however, that if we restrict x to positive values, then we will have the upper half of the circle only, and that does constitute a function, namely, x () = + p 2 Similarly, if we restrict x to negative values, then we will have the lower half of the circle only, and that does constitute a function as well, namely, x () = p 2 Here for all x > we have that F (x; ) =x = 2x > ; and for all x < we have that F (x; ) =x = 2x < : Then the condition F (x; ) =x 6= plays again an important role in the existence and di erentiability of x () : N The last two examples suggest that F (x; ) =x 6= is a key ingredient for x () to exist, and that in some cases x () exists only around some initial values of x and/or : The next example 2

proceeds in a di erent way, it assumes x () exists and studies the behavior of this function with respects to : Example 3 onsider the cubic implicit function F (x; ) = x 3 + 2 3x 7 = (2) around the point x = 3 and = 4: Suppose that we could nd a function x = x () that solves (2) around the previous point Plugging this function in (2) we get [x ()] 3 + 2 3x () 7 = : (3) Di erentiating this expression with respect to (by using the hain Rule) we obtain 3 [x ()] 2 dx dx () + 2 3x () 3 () = : (4) d d Therefore dx d () = n o [3x () 2] : (5) 3 [x ()] 2 t x = 3 and = 4 we nd dx d () = 5 : (6) Notice that (5) exists if [x ()] 2 6= Since F (x; ) =x = 3 x 2, the required condition is again F (x; ) =x 6= at the point of interest: N Let us extend Example 3 to a general implicit function F (x; ) = around an initial point (x ; ) : To this end suppose there is a (continuously di erentiable) solution x = x () to the equation F (x; ) =, that is, F [x () ; ] = : (7) We can use the hain Rule to di erentiate (7) with respect to at to obtain Solving for dx=d we get F [x ( ) ; ] d d + F x [x ( ) ; ] dx d ( ) = : dx d ( ) = F [x ( ) ; ] = F x [x ( ) ; ] : (8) 3

The last expression shows that if the solution x () to F (x; ) = exists and is continuously di erentiable, then we need F (x; ) =x 6= at [x ( ) ; ] to recover dx=d at : The IFT states that this necessary condition is also a su cient condition! Theorem (Implicit Function Theorem) Let F (x; ) be a function on a ball about (x ; ) in R 2 : Suppose that F (x ; ) = and consider the expression F (x; ) = : If F (x ; ) =x 6=, then there exists a function x = x () de ned on an open interval I about the point such that: (a) F [x () ; ] = for all in I; (b) x ( ) = x ; and (c) dx d ( ) = F [x ( ) ; ] = F x [x ( ) ; ] : Proof See de la Fuente (2), pp 27-2 The next example applies the IFT to the standard model of rm behavior in microeconomics In EON 5 we will study a general version of this problem lthough in the next example the endogenous variable can in fact be explicitly solved in terms of the exogenous ones, we will use the IFT to state how changes in the latter a ect the former In this way we can corroborate the predictions of the IFT hold Example 4 (omparative Statics I) Let us consider a rm that produces a good y by using a single input x The rm sells the output and acquires the input in competitive markets: The market price of y is p, and the cost of each unit of x is just w Its technology is given by f : R +! R + ; where f (x) = x a and a 2 (; ) Its pro ts are given by (x; p; w) = px a wx: (9) The rm selects the input level, x; in order to maximize pro ts We would like to know how its choice of x is a ected by a change in w: 4

ssuming an interior solution, the rst-order condition of this optimization problem is x (x ; p; w) = pa (x ) a w = () for some x = x (heck that the second order condition holds) Notice that here F (x; p; w) = pa (x ) a w: () Since F (x ; p; w) =x = pa (a ) (x ) a 2 < ; we can use the IFT to get dx (p; w) = F dw w [x ; p; w] = F x [x ; p; w] = pa (a ) (x a 2 < : (2) ) We conclude that if the price of the input increases, then the rm will acquire less of it That is, the unconditional input demand is decreasing in the input price [on rm this result by nding an explicit expression for x in (9) and di erentiating it with respect to w:] N The next sub-section extends the previous ideas to a model that involves a systems of equations and many parameters Implicit Function Theorem: System of Equations The general problem involves a system of several equations and variables Some of the variables are endogenous, and the other ones are exogenous The question of interest is under what conditions we can solve these equations for the endogenous variables in terms of the remaining variables (or parameters) The IFT describes these conditions and some conclusions about the e ect of the exogenous variables on the endogenous ones To motivate the requirements of the theorem, we start again with a linear example Example 5 onsider a linear system of two equations ax + bx 2 = or a b x cx + dx 2 2 = c d x 2 = 2 : (3) In Note we showed that the linear system (3) has a unique solution for (x ; x 2 ) if the determinant of the coe cient matrix is di erent from, ie ad cb 6= If this condition holds, we can 5

use rammer s rule to state x = x ( ; 2 ) with x ( ; 2 ) = b 2 d x 2 = x 2 ( ; 2 ) with x 2 ( ; 2 ) = a c 2 = a c = a c b d b d = d 2 b ad cb = a 2 c ad cb : Then if ad cb 6= we can nd a pair of functions x ( ; 2 ) and x 2 ( ; 2 ) that simultaneously solve (3) for all possible values of the exogenous variables and 2 Moreover, these two functions are and we can di erentiate, for instance, x ( ; 2 ) with respect to 2 to obtain x ( ; 2 ) 2 = b ad cb : The Jacobian matrix of the left-hand side of system (3) with respect to (x ; x 2 ) is a b : (4) c d The determinant of (4) is ad cb: Therefore, we conclude that the system of equations (3) de nes x ( ; 2 ) and x 2 ( ; 2 ) as continuous functions of the exogenous variables if the determinant of its Jacobian matrix is di erent from zero In the general IFT, the nonvanishing condition of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix also plays a fundamental role This comes about by approximating a system of nonlinear equations by linear ones! N To extend Example 5 to a nonlinear system, let us write the basic system of equations as F (x ; ; x n ; ; ; m ) = (5) F n (x ; ; x n ; ; ; m ) = where (x ; ; x n ) is the vector of endogenous variables and ( ; ; m ) are the exogenous ones Suppose there are n functions in a neighborhood of (x ; ; x n; ; ; m) x = x ( ; ; m ) x n = x n ( ; ; m ) 6

that solve the system of equations (5) Then F [x ( ; ; m ) ; ; x n ( ; ; m ) ; ; ; m ] = (6) F n [x ( ; ; m ) ; ; x n ( ; ; m ) ; ; ; m ] = : We can use the hain Rule to di erentiate (6) with respect to h at ( ; ; m) to get F x x + + F + F = (7) F n x x + + F n + F n = where all the partial derivatives are evaluated at (x ; ; x n; ; ; m) This system of equations can be rewritten as B F F x F n x F n B x = where the n n matrix of the left-hand side is the Jacobian of (6) with respect to (x ; ; x n ) evaluated at (x ; ; x n; ; ; m) : Solving for (x = ; ; = ) we obtain B x = B F F x F n x F n B B F F n F F n (8) : (9) We see from (9) that if the solution [x ( ; ; m ) ; ; x n ( ; ; m )] to the system of equations (5) exists and is di erentiable, then (x = ; ; = ) exists if the determinant of the Jacobian of (5) is di erent from zero at (x ; ; x n; ; ; m) (Why?) The IFT shows again that this necessary condition is also a su cient condition! Theorem 2 (Implicit Function Theorem) Let F ; ; F n : R n+m! R be functions: 7

onsider the system of equations F (x ; ; x n ; ; ; m ) = (2) F n (x ; ; x n ; ; ; m ) = as possibly de ning x ; ; x n as implicit functions of ; ; m Suppose that (x ; ; x n; ; ; m) is a solution of (2) If the determinant of the n n Jacobian matrix D x F = B F F x F n x F n evaluated at (x ; ; x n; ; ; m) is non-zero, then there exist functions x = x ( ; ; m ) x n = x n ( ; ; m ) de ned on an open ball B around ( ; ; m) such that F [x ( ; ; m ) ; ; x n ( ; ; m ) ; ; ; m ] = (2) F n [x ( ; ; m ) ; ; x n ( ; ; m ) ; ; ; m ] = for all ( ; ; m ) in B and x = x ( ; ; m) x n = x n ( ; ; m) : Furthermore, we can calculate x ( ; ; m) ; ; xn ( ; ; m) as in (9), or solve for one particular element of this vector by using rammer s rule Proof See de la Fuente (2), pp 2-22 8

SB, pp 36-364, provide an interesting application We o er a simpler one that extends Example 4 to a rm problem with two inputs Example 6 (omparative Statics II) Let us consider again a rm that produces a good y; but now let us assume it uses two inputs x and x 2 The rm sells the output and acquires the inputs in competitive markets: The market price of y is p, and the cost of each unit of x and x 2 is just w and w 2 respectively Its technology is given by f : R 2 +! R +, where f (x ; x 2 ) = x a xb 2, a + b < Its pro ts take the form (x ; x 2 ; p; w ; w 2 ) = px a x b 2 w x w 2 x 2 : (22) The rm selects x and x 2 in order to maximize pro ts We aim to know how its choice of x is a ected by a change in w Notice that now w a ects the choice of x not only in a direct way (as in Example 4) but also indirectly through its e ect on the other variable of choice, x 2 : ssuming an interior solution, the rst-order conditions of this optimization problem are x (x ; x 2; p; w ; w 2 ) = pa (x ) a (x 2) b w = (23) x 2 (x ; x 2; p; w ; w 2 ) = pb (x ) a (x 2) b w 2 = for some (x ; x 2 ) = (x ; x 2 ) (s we will study later, the second order conditions hold here by the strict concavity of the production function) Let us de ne F (x ; x 2; p; w ; w 2 ) = pa (x ) a (x 2) b w (24) F 2 (x ; x 2; p; w ; w 2 ) = pb (x ) a (x 2) b w 2 : To achieve our goal we need to di erentiate the system of equations (24) with respect to w pa (a ) (x ) a 2 (x 2) b x w + pab (x ) a (x 2) b x 2 w = (25) pab (x ) a (x 2) b x w + pb (b ) (x ) a (x 2) b 2 x 2 w = : The Jacobian matrix of F = (F ; F 2 ) T with respect to x at x is D x F (x ; x 2) = pa (a ) (x )a 2 (x 2 )b pab (x )a (x 2 )b pab (x )a (x 2 )b pb (b ) (x )a (x 2 )b 2 : (26) 9

Notice that in this case D x F (x ; x 2 ; p; w ; w 2 ) = pdxf 2 (x ; x 2 ) That is, the Jacobian of F with respect to (x ; x 2 ) is the market price times the Hessian of the production function similar structure appears in many other models of microeconomics ombining (25) and (26), and rearranging terms, we get pa (a ) (x )a 2 (x 2 )b pab (x )a (x 2 )b pab (x )a (x 2 )b pb (b ) (x )a (x 2 )b 2 x w x 2 w = : (27) The requirement of the IFT is satis ed if the determinant of (26) is non-zero: (heck that this condition holds) By the IFT and rammer s rule we get pab (x )a (x 2 )b x pb (b ) (x (p; w ; w 2 ) = )a (x 2 )b 2 < : w pa (a ) (x )a 2 (x 2 )b pab (x )a (x 2 )b pab (x )a (x 2 )b pb (b ) (x )a (x 2 )b 2 We conclude that if the price of input increases, then the rm will acquire less of it [on rm this result by nding an explicit expression for x and x 2 x with respect to w :] N in (23) and di erentiating