The Quantum Threat to Cybersecurity (for CxOs)

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Transcription:

The Quantum Threat to Cybersecurity (for CxOs) Michele Mosca 5 th ETSI-IQC Workshop on Quantum-Safe Cryptography 13 September 2017

What is quantum?? E. Lucero, D. Mariantoni, and M. Mariantoni 2017 M. Mosca

A new paradigm for information and computation: quantum computation By Carsten Ullrich E. Lucero, D. Mariantoni, and M. Mariantoni Harald Ritsch Y. Colombe/NIST

What is a quantum computer? What is a classical computer? A device that encodes information in an array of bits, and can manipulate those bits according to simple rules. 0 1

What is a quantum computer? What is a quantum computer? A device that encodes information in an array of bits, and can manipulate those bits according to simple quantum rules. 0 1

Quantum paradigm brings new possibilities Designing new materials, drugs, etc. Optimizing Sensing and measuring Secure communication What else??? 2017 M. Mosca

But while in the old paradigm Encrypting is easy. Codebreaking is hard.

in the quantum paradigm Encrypting is easy. Codebreaking is easy!

How secure will our current crypto algorithms be? Algorithm Key Length Security level (Conventional Computer) RSA-1024 1024 bits 80 bits 0 bits RSA-2048 2048 bits 112 bits 0 bits ECC-256 256 bits 128 bits 0 bits ECC-384 384 bits 192 bits 0 bits Security level (Quantum Computer) AES-128 128 bits 128 bits 64 bits AES-256 256 bits 256 bits 128 bits

What will be affected? Products, services, business functions that rely on security products will either stop functioning or not provide the expected levels of security. Clouding computing Payment systems Internet IoT etc. Secure Web Browsing - TLS/SSL Auto-Updates Digital Signatures VPN - IPSec Secure email -S/MIME PKI Blockchain etc RSA, DSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, AES, 3-DES, SHA,

What will be affected? Products, services, business functions that rely on security products will either stop functioning or not provide the expected levels of security.

Depends on*: Do we need to worry now? How long do you need your cryptographic keys to be secure? security shelf life (x years) How much time will it take to re tool the existing infrastructure with large scale quantum safe solution? (y years) migration time How long will it take for a large scale quantum computer to be built (or for any other relevant advance)? (z years) collapse time Theorem : If x + y > z, then worry. *M. Mosca: e Proceedings of 1 st ETSI Quantum Safe Cryptography Workshop, 2013. Also http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1075 y z x

Business bottom line Fact: If x+y>z, then you will not be able to provide the required x years of security. Fact: If y>z then cyber systems will collapse in z years with no quick fix. Fact: Rushing y will be expensive, disruptive, and lead to vulnerable implementations. Prediction: In the next 6 18 months, organizations will be differentiated by whether or not they have a well articulated quantum risk management plan.

How large of a quantum computer is needed? 2017 M. Mosca

Physical qubits and gates versus logical qubits and gates Logical layer Physical layer CNOT fault-tolerant CNOT

Our AES analysis, e.g. 192 bit AES: 5.9x10 6 qubits, 2 121 surface code cycles, 2 137.5 total cost

How close are we to having sufficient quantum resources? 2017 M. Mosca

Non-fault-tolerant quantum devices Not a known threat to cryptography Can they capture some of the power of quantum computation? Can they simulate themselves or similar systems faster/cheaper than conventional computers? Can they solve useful problems better than conventional devices? 2017 M. Mosca Similarly, although there is no proof today that imperfect quantum machines can compute fast enough to solve practical problems, that may change.

Scalable fault-tolerant quantum computer Known to solve many problems previously thought to be intractable 2017 M. Mosca

What is z? Mosca: [Oxford] 1996: 20 qubits in 20 years [NIST April 2015, ISACA September 2015]: 1/7 chance of breaking RSA 2048 by 2026, ½ chance by 2031 Today: 1/6 chance within 10 years Microsoft Research [October 2015]: Recent improvements in control of quantum systems make it seem feasible to finally build a quantum computer within a decade. Use of a quantum computer enables much larger and more accurate simulations than with any known classical algorithm, and will allow many open questions in quantum materials to be resolved once a small quantum computer with around one hundred logical qubits becomes available.

Quantum safe cryptographic tool chest conventional quantum safe cryptography a.k.a. Quantum Resistant Algorithms or Post Quantum Cryptography + quantum cryptography Deployable without quantum technologies Believed/hoped to be secure against quantum computer attacks of the future Requires some quantum technologies (less than a large scale quantum computer) Typically no computational assumptions and thus known to be cryptographically secure against quantum attacks Both sets of cryptographic tools can work very well together in quantum-safe cryptographic ecosystem

Quantum cryptography For this talk, focus on key establishment Quantum key distribution (QKD): Over time, QKD evolves from: Point to Point Trusted Repeater Networks Untrusted Repeater Networks Quantum physics guarantees the cryptographic security of the key

Quantum Internet the Long Term Vision Qubit distribution with moving systems: satellites, aircraft, vehicles, ships, handheld Satellites Aircraft QL A Final Key Service Providers Agencies Distant Network WLAN Computers Buildings in a City Centre ATM Vehicles Handheld (Thanks to Thomas Jennewein)

Protocol stack for QKD Host Layer Key Mgmt. Service Layer (KMS) QKD Network Layer (QNL) Can design QKD into systems today as a key establishment alternative. QKD Link Layer (QLL)

Ongoing work to develop standards and certifications for these tools. Are these algorithms actually secure against quantum attacks? Will these systems interoperate? Are the protocols implemented correctly? How can we be sure the quantum apparatus is behaving correctly? e.g.

But we re risk averse! Hybrid deployment of quantum safe with currently deployed crypto provides strictly better security

Quantum Risk Fundamentals Identify: Your organization s reliance on cryptography The sources and types of technology in use Track: The state of quantum technology development Advances in the development of quantum safe technologies and algorithms Manage: IT procurement to communicate the issue to vendors Technology upgrades and lifecycles to facilitate the incorporation of quantumsafe algorithms. https://globalriskinstitute.org/publications/3423 2/

Security is a choice Problematic choices: Do nothing: my vendors will take care of this for me Do nothing until NIST standardization is done Get it over with

Security is a choice Does your organization have plan? Who is responsible for it? Do your vendors have a plan? Does your industry have plan? Are these plans coordinated?

Historic opportunity 2017 M. Mosca

Thank you! Comments, questions and feedback are very welcome. Michele Mosca University Research Chair, Faculty of Mathematics Co Founder, Institute for Quantum Computing www.iqc.ca/~mmosca Director, CryptoWorks21 www.cryptoworks21.com University of Waterloo mmosca@uwaterloo.ca CEO, evolutionq Inc. michele.mosca@evolutionq.com