Lecture 10 The Extended Model

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Lecture 10 The Extended Model Dr. Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003

The Extended Model The Extended Model Recall that the standard model assumes that the user cost on each link is a function solely of the flow on that link. A more general model is the extended model in which the cost on a link can depend upon the entire vector of link flows. This feature enables us to model more complex interactions on the transportation network.

Real-World Illustrations

Real-World Illustrations

The Extended Model Hence, in the extended model, we have that the user link cost functions are of the form: c a = c a (f ), a L, where f denotes the vector of link flows such that f = (f a, f b,..., f n ). The user travel cost on path p is, thus, C p = C p (f ) = a L c a (f )δ ap.

The Extended Model The Simplest Link Cost Structure (Congested) The user link travel costs are linear: c a (f ) = b L g ab f b + h a, a L. We expect that the main effect is from g aa f a. The total link cost can then be expressed as: ĉ a (f ) = g ab f b f a + h a f a. b L In particular, a cost on a link, c a, may be independent of some of the link flows.

The Extended Model An Example Two way street: a = (x, y), ā = (y, x), with user link costs and total link costs: c a (f ) = g aa f a + g aā fā + h a, ĉ a (f ) = g aa f 2 a + g aā fāf a + h a f a, cā(f ) = gāā fā + gāa f a + hā, ĉā(f ) = gāā f 2 ā + gāa f a fā + hāfā.

The Extended Model The U-O / Equilibrium Conditions Statement is the same as for the standard model, but user costs on links and paths require now more computation. For every O/D pair w, there exists an ordering of the paths connecting w, such that: C p1 (f ) =... = C ps (f ) = λ w C ps+1 (f )... C pnw (f ) F p r > 0; r = 1,..., s; F p r = 0; r = s + 1,..., n w, where C p (f ) = a L c a (f )δ ap.

The Extended Model The Associated Network We pose the problem: Given a transportation network T = (G, d, c), where G: graph of nodes and links, d: demands, c: cost structure, is it possible to construct an associated network T = (G, d, c ), with c : total link costs, so that C p (f ) = Ĉ p (f ) - marginal total costs, for all paths p?

The Extended Model This is true if the Jacobian matrix of the user link cost functions, Λ, given by: Λ = c a f a. c n f a c a c f b... a f n... c n c f b... n f n is symmetric.

Hence, there exists an optimization reformulation of the user-optimized conditions if the Jacobian of the user link travel cost functions is symmetric.

Interpretation of the Symmetry Condition The symmetry condition means that c a f b = c b f a, a, b. In other words, the cost on a particular link is affected by the flow on another link in the same way that the cost on the other link is affected by the flow on the particular link.

A Numerical Example Consider the following network: The O/D pair is: w 1 = (x 1, x 3 ) with d w1 = 100. The paths are: p 1 = (a, b) and p 2 = (a, c). The user link cost functions are: c a (f ) = 10f a +20, c b (f ) = 8f b +4f c +36, c c (f ) = 5f c +4f b +56. Is there an optimization reformulation of the U-O conditions?

In other words, is there an optimization problem that, when solved, will give us the U-O flow pattern? The answer is: Yes. We construct the Jacobian of the user link cost functions, Λ, which is: Λ = 10 0 0 0 8 4 0 4 5. Clearly, Λ is symmetric.

Condition for Uniqueness of the U-O Link Flow Pattern Moreover, if the Jacobian matrix of the link travel cost functions is positive definite, we are guaranteed a unique U-O link flow pattern. How to verify if the Jacobian matrix is positive definite?

We know that if the Jacobian matrix of the user link cost functions is strictly diagonally dominant, then it is positive definite, and the U-O (equilibrium) link flow pattern is unique. Strict diagonal dominance of a square matrix with component {a ij } means that a ii > j i a ij for each row of the matrix A = a 11 a 12 a 1n.... a n1 a n2 a nn.

Recall that an n n (square) matrix is positive-definite if all of its eigenvalues are positive. A matrix may still be positive-definite even if it is not strictly diagonally dominant; however, that is an easy condition to check.

Is the U-O link flow pattern for the previous example unique? Indeed, it is, since its Jacobian matrix: Λ = 10 0 0 0 8 4 0 4 5 is strictly diagonally dominant. Note that each diagonal element in this matrix is strictly greater than the sum of the off-diagonal elements in its corresponding row.

The Extended Model S-O Conditions The S-O Conditions Correspond to the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions of Nonlinear Programming/Optimization For every w W : Ĉ p 1 (f ) = = Ĉ p s (f ) = λ w Ĉ p s +1 (f ) Ĉ p nw (f ) F pr > 0; r = 1,, s ; F pr = 0; r = s + 1,, n w,

The Extended Model where b L Ĉ p(f ) = S F p by the Chain Rule = b L S f b f b F p = S δ bp = ( ĉ a (f )) a L δ bp = ĉ a δ bp. f b f b f b b L a L b L

Equilibration Algorithms for the Extended Model General equilibration algorithms have been developed to determine the S-O and the U-O (under the symmetry condition) flow patterns for the extended model. In the case of asymmetric user link cost functions, in order to formulate and solve for the user-optimized flow patterns, one must apply the more advanced theory of variational inequalities (cf. Nagurney (1999) and the references therein).

Some Novel Applications of System-Optimization In this course, we are providing the foundations for the formulation, analysis, and solution of complex network problems, operating under different behavioral principles. Such principles can be applied to a spectrum of different applications. Now, for illustration purposes, we highlight some recent applications of system-optimization.

Current Merger & Acquisition (M&A) Activity M&As totaled over $2 trillion in 2009, down 32% from full-year 2008 and down 53% from the record high in 2007, according to data from Thomson Reuters. Mergers announced in October 2010 include Bain Capital / Gymboree, at $1.789 billion and Dynamex / Greenbriar Equity Group ($207 million). Some of the most visible recent mergers have occurred in the airline industry with Delta and Northwest completing their merger in October 2008 and United and Continental closing on the formation of United Continental Holdings Oct. 1, 2010.

Global 2010 M&A activity is estimated to have risen as much as 35% from 2009 figures. Successful mergers can add tremendous value; however, the failure rate is estimated to be between 74% and 83%. It is worthwhile to develop tools to better predict the associated strategic gains, which include, among others, cost savings.

Mergers and Acquisitions and Network Synergies A successful merger depends on the ability to measure the anticipated synergy of the proposed merger. A. Nagurney (2009) A System-Optimization Perspective for Supply Chain Network Integration: The Horizontal Merger Case, Transportation Research E 45, 1-15.

M A 1 D A 1,1 Firm A Firm B A B M A n M B M 1 M B nm D A nd A,1 D1,1 B D B nd B,1 D A 1,2 D A nd A,2 D B 1,2 D B nd B,2 R1 A R A nr A R1 B R B nr B Figure: Case 0: Firms A and B Prior to Horizontal Merger

M A 1 D A 1,1 0 Firm A Firm B A B M A n A M B M 1 M B nm B D A nd A,1 D1,1 B D B nd B,1 D A 1,2 R A 1 D A nd A,2 D B 1,2 D B nd B,2 R A nr A R1 B R B nr B Figure: Case 1: Firms A and B Merge

M A 1 D A 1,1 0 Firm A Firm B A B M A n A M B M 1 M B nm B D A nd A,1 D1,1 B D B nd B,1 D A 1,2 R A 1 D A nd A,2 D B 1,2 D B nd B,2 R A nr A R1 B R B nr B Figure: Case 2: Firms A and B Merge

M A 1 D A 1,1 0 Firm A Firm B A B M A n A M B M 1 M B nm B D A nd A,1 D1,1 B D B nd B,1 D A 1,2 R A 1 D A nd A,2 D B 1,2 D B nd B,2 R A nr A R1 B R B nr B Figure: Case 3: Firms A and B Merge

Synergy Measure The measure that we utilized in Nagurney (2009) to capture the gains, if any, associated with a horizontal merger Case i; i = 1, 2, 3 is as follows: [ ] TC S i 0 TC i = 100%, TC 0 where TC i is the total cost associated with the value of the objective function a L i ĉ a (f a ) for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 evaluated at the optimal solution for Case i. Note that S i ; i = 1, 2, 3 may also be interpreted as synergy.

This system-optimization model can also be applied to the teaming of organizations in the case of humanitarian operations.

Bellagio Conference on Humanitarian Logistics See: http://hlogistics.som.umass.edu/

References S. C. Dafermos (1971) An extended traffic assignment model with applications to two-way traffic, Transportation Science, 5, pp. 366-389. S. C. Dafermos and F. T. Sparrow (1969) The traffic assignment problem for a general network, Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards, 73B, pp. 91-118. A. Nagurney (1999) Network Economics: A Variational Inequality Approach, second and revised edition, Kluwer Academic Publishers. A. Nagurney and Q. Qiang (2009) Fragile Networks: Identifying Vulnerabilities and Synergies in an Uncertain World, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey.