Disaster and Science Post-Tohoku research actions in France March 6, 2013
Question for the "Disaster and Science" session "HOW SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY OF HIS/HER COUNTRY HAS REACTED AFTER MARCH 11, 2011 EARTHQUAKE"?
Outline Introduction Background and surveyed institutions Individuals Research institutions Institutions Funding agencies Administration in charge of natural & technological risks Conclusions
Introduction French background moderate seismicity country Except French West Indies (Carribean area) Many nuclear reactors (58 on about 20 NPP sites + research reactors) The research landscape : institutions and funding Surveyed institutions Research : INSU, IPGP, IFREMER Nuclear industry : IRSN, EDF, CEA National administration : DGPR (Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Develpment and Energy) Warning : Neither exhaustive nor fully objective! (my own bias )
Euro-Mediterranean Tectonic framework < 1 mm/year 1 cm/year HCTISN, Paris, 24/10/2011
The Carribean tectonic framework 2 cm/year M6-7 M7-8 -?9 OPECST, Audition publique, 7 juillet 2010 (documents IPGP et GEOTER)
Instrumental and Historical Seismicity ( 700 years) M : 6+ to 7 Paleoseismicity? Up to M7 in Rhône Valley OPECST, Audition publique, 7 juillet 2010
Seismic Hazard in France Design levels (475 year Return Period) Z2 : 0.7 m/s2 Z3 : 1.1 m/s2 Z4 : 1.6 m/s2 Z5 : 3.0 m/s2 (rock sites) Design levels for "ICPE" (Sevesotype, about 5000 year Return Period) a 5000 = a 475 x 2.2 Up to 3.4 m/s2 in metropolitan France, 6.6 in West Indies 8
Seimic Hazard and nuclear reactors in France ( + the deterministic / probabilistic issue) 9
Perception and Attitude of individuals General Humility Impressed by both the much limited shaking damage and the amount, quality and public availability of recorded data Need for interdisciplinary research for complex accidents Tighter links between "hard" and "soft" sciences Questions about the actual involvement of scientists in critical decisions Arguments for stronger positions and statements on hazard and design levels (whenever scientifically grounded) More topical Motivation for investigations about subduction areas (especially French West Indies), search for evidence of extreme events, science and technology for warning systems, dispersion of contaminants, Behavior beyond design : identifying the origin of margins and quantifying them Dealing with uncertainties 10
Research institutions 1 CNRS Motivating the research teams for specific proposals on the Tohoku event (ANR-JST Flash call) and improved hazard assessments Specific call for "SHS" research projects : "NEEDS", Fukushima, one year later Nuclear, Energy, Environment, Waste and Society Interdisciplinarity : Life, Material, Engineering, and Social Sciences 5-year program First call (2012) Consequences of the nuclear accident on the population (lodging, displacing, familial issues, environment and health, ) Social unrest and mobilization on nuclear issues (community organization, social networks, information technology, public policy, governance, ) Knowledge transfer, intergeneration or very long term responsibility (democracy and transparency, controversies, debates, public choices, )
Research institutions 2 IPGP (Institute of Earth Physics, Paris) (in charge of observational systems in the French West Indies among other things ) Several post Sumatra 2004 actions confirmed by Tohoku Participation to the construction of a tsunami warning system in the Caribbean area Update of seismological and geodetical monitoring systems (still very modest compared to Japan.) Paleo-seismicity (coral reefs, tectonics) Imaging the subduction interface with marine seismics Tsunami warning with ionospheric signals New post-tohoku initiatives Strengthening the opinion of several scientists about the possibility of M>8.5 events off-shore Guadeloupe and Martinique islands Proposals to the ANR-JST Flash call Proposal for sea bottom instrumentation (not funded) Proposal for seismic imagery of the deep subduction interface (under way)
Research institutions 3 IFREMER (Sea related research) Submission of short-term projects to the ANR-JST Flash call (not funded) Using their expertise in coastal oceanography for modelling the dispersion of radioactive plumes in a marine environment (joint project with IRSN) Constructing numerical models and testing them Using them for the live prediction of contamination immediately after an accident (i.e., within a few hours) Proposals for long-term projects (ANR-RSNR call) : coupling marine and aerial models for dispersion of radioactive material
Nuclear energy domain Control Authority (ASN) : ECS "Complementary Safety Evaluations"? Margins for events beyond design? Research : IRSN (Support research / technival expertise for ASN) Boost on internal research programs + partnership with other institutes Need for extra funding : 10 ANR-RSNR proposals on 3 main topics Safety in case of severe accidents, failure of cooling systems,mitigation of consequences, human factor external hazards (earthquakes, floods), radioprotection (humans, environment): effects of iodine on population, radioactive transfers in the environment with special focus on the marine environment Not really new topics, but need to deepen and enlarge the investigations with new partners and extra money
Nuclear energy domain : Operators (EDF, AREVA, CEA, ) Boosting some already existing R&D programs (SIGMA, Seismic hazard, probabilistic vs deterministic, identifying the origin of uncertainties, quantifying and reducing them) Participation to ANR-RSNR proposals CEA : Fukushima learnings : supporting long term R&D Dynamic Behavior of structures Reactor behavior in case of major accident Radioprotection (human kind, environment) New "SEISM" Research group (EDF-CEA-ECP-ENSC) (Seismology & Earthquake Engineering for Risk Assessment Paris-Saclay Research Institute) Gathering existing facilities and expertise in the same place (Paris-Saclay) "From fault to structure", tackling all issues to be dealt with for "Probabilistic Safety Studies"
Funding agencies : ANR Specific calls Flash call (joint JST / ANR) 9 projects funded out of proposals, 0.9 M Main results this afternoon RSNR 2012 (Research in Nuclear safety and radioprotection) What were the conditions leading to major nuclear accidents such as Fukushima 2011, and lessons from the "Complementary Safety Evaluations" ordered by ASN? How were managed those major accidents by both the operators and the public authorities? Investigating the impact of those accidents in terms of radioactive emissions, their effects on health and environment and the way to "reconquer" the contaminated areas Drawing the lessons for application on the presently existing French nuclear installations, and for the design of future ones, in view of improving their operating safety, the resistance and the efficiency of all safety procedures and devices in cse of extreme events "Open", regular calls No specific priority to Tohoku event related project
Results of the RSNR call To come! Expected 28/02/2013, postponed to mid March Long awaited by the whole community! The main source of extra research money for institutions and operators involved in nuclear energy 41 proposals, probably about half will be funded (amounts reduced wrt original requests) 50 M
National administration: MEDDE/DGPR Focus on "NaTech" issues Coupling between Natural hazards and Technological Risks Feedback from the Tohoku event : Industrial accidents linked to the earthquake and tsunami (overview report to be posted on line soon) No real impact on other already existing earthquake mitigation plans ("Plan séisme Antilles", ongoing for about 6 years)
Conclusions Hazard Issues Mainly raising the awareness of individual scientists and engineers New bottom-up proposals, not necessarily funded No real visible short term consequences on risk management policy at the State level for "our" subduction area No extra priorities on extreme events Technological Issues Clearly the main concern (due to the deep involvement of French society and companies in nuclear energy) Most visible investments at the State level through ANR and CGI (announced total funding: 50 M ) Extension to critical, non nuclear facilities Mostly bottom-up Mostly top-down