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http://www.imedea.uib.es/physdept Konstantin Klemm Victor M. Eguíluz Raúl Toral Maxi San Miguel Damon Centola Nonequilibrium transitions in complex networks: a model of social interaction, Phys. Rev. E 67, 262 (23) Global culture: A noise induced transition in finite systems, Phys Rev. E 67, 45 (23), Physica A 327, (23) Globalization, polarization and cultural drift, J. Economic Dynamics and Control 29, 32-334 (25) Cultural drift and Dynamical networks, unpublished

Axelrod s model of social influence (J. Conflict Res. 4, 23 (997)) Question: if people tend to become more alike in their beliefs, attitudes and behavior when they interact, why do not all differences eventually disappear? Proposal: Model to explore mechanisms of competition between globalization and persistence of cultural diversity ( polarization ) Definition of culture: Set of individual attributes subject to social influence Basic premise: The more similar an actor is to a neighbor, the more likely the actor will adopt one of neighbor s traits (communication most effective between similar people). Novelty in social modeling: it takes into account interaction between different cultural features. Physics paradigm: Cooperative behavior and order-disorder transition This work is about the mechanisms that translate individual unorganized behavior into collective results (T.Schelling, J. Math. Sociology (97))

Axelrod s agents based model: interaction agent i agent i s neighbors σ i σ i M σ 2 if F = # Features q = # Traits per feature σ if {,..., q-} F=3; q= 7 5 9 Prob to interact = 7 q F ( 3 ) equivalent cultural options. Mechanism of local convergence: Common features = F 3 5 5 7 9 7

Visualization of Axelrod s Dynamics Color code for F=3, q=2 f= R f= G f=2 B We can identify a cultural domain with a given colour. In general for q >2, q weights the basic colours (R,G,B): /( q ) F = 3, q = t = System freezes in an absorbing multicultural state σ if The model illustrates how local convergence can generate global polarization. Number of domains taken as a measure of cultural diversity Uniform state always prevails without similarity rule (Kennedy 998) http://www.imedea.uib.es/physdept/ research_topics/socio/culture.html

Statistical Physics: a nonequilibrium phase transition Order parameter: S max size of the largest homogeneous domain Control parameter: q measures initial degree of disorder. F = > 2 Castellano et al, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 3536 (2) Lewenstein et al (992) q < q c : Monocultural Global culture q c st order transition (d=2) well defined as N q > q c : Multicultural Cultural diversity Global polarization

Beyond Axelrod s original model Cultural drift: Perhaps the most interesting extension and at the same time, the most difficult one to analyze is cultural drift (modeled as spontaneous change in a trait). R. Axelrod, J. Conflict Res. (997) Questions:. Measure of heterogeneity. 2. Time scales of evolution. Role of noise? Beyond T= B. Latane et al., Behav. Science (994) Social cleavages: Electronic communication allow us to develop patterns of interaction which are chosen rather than imposed by geography... With random long distance interactions, the heterogeneity sustained by local interactions cannot be sustained. R. Axelrod, J. Conflict Res. (997) Network topology. Small-world networks 2. Scale-free networks Structured scale-free

Small-world networks Watts, Strogatz, Nature 393, 44 (998) Clustering SW Rewire with prob. p monocultural F= N=5 2 Regular net. Length Disorder (multicultural) Random net. Regular Random Order (monocultural) multicultural Small world connectivity favors cultural globalization

Scale-free networks Albert & Barabasi, Rev. Mod. Phys.74, 47 (22) Power law for the degree distribution P(k) k - γ, γ=3 P(k) Importance of hubs k LINK UPDATE!: See voter model and conservation laws, KS,VME, MSM, Europhys. Lett. 69, 228 (25) monocultural F= <k>=4 scaling multicultural System size scaling: Global culture prevails for N

Social Networks and Cultural Globalization order-monoculture Klemm et al., Phys. Rev. E 67, 262 (23) N, <k> fixed S max /N Small World Scale free q c as N Disorder-multicultural q Regular network p = q c (p = ) q c (p = ) N Random network p = Scale free connectivity is more efficient than random connectivity in promoting global culture

Structured scale-free networks Klemm & Eguiluz, Phys. Rev. E 65, 3623 (22) Nonrandom scale free : High clustering, C~N monocultural N= F= Transition for N. Hubs create ordered clusters in disordered state N= multicultural Disordered multicultural states Structured scale-free N= F= q=5 Random scale-free q=2

Cultural drift Cultural drift: Perhaps the most interesting extension and at the same time, the most difficult one to analyze is cultural drift (modeled as spontaneous change in a trait). R. Axelrod, J. Conflict Res. (997) t = System freezes in an absorbing multicultural state

Metastable states? Perturbationrelaxation cycles:. Perform single feature perturbation 2. Let the system relax to an absorbing state. 3. Return to. Initial multicultural configuration System driven by noise towards a state of global culture d=: Lyapunov potential exists

Lyapunov potential in -d network L = -Σ i l(i,i+) L(t) L(t+) STABILITY j - j j + l(i,j)= overlap: number of shared features Homogeneous configurations are equivalent global minima of L (L min =-(N-)F). They are metastable states. All other absorbing states are NOT minima of L. There are always neighboring configurations with the same or lower value of L. Marginally stable or unstable states. DYNAMICS Klemm et al. J. Economic Dynamics and Control 29, 32 (25) Change of L from initial random configuration to an absorbing state is NOT small. L min is not reached because of proximity in the value of L: Genuine nonequilibrium dynamics. Not an optimization dynamics

Lyapunov description: Attractors Random initial condition, F=3, q=, N= L = ( N ) F / q st attractor reached by dynamics: Marginally stable Single perturbation: L unchanged Next attractor reached by dynamics: Unstable Single perturbation: L diminishes Next attractor reached by dynamics: Smaller value of L and smallernumberofdomains

Lyapunov description: Transition q>q c L saturates to a (L min -L)/L min F= N= 4 t -.5 q<q c finite value for q<q c L decays to L min as a powerlawforq>q C t (L min -L)/L min F= F= F=2 F=3 q Normalized difference between initial L and value of L at absorbing state is large Transition in d= for F ~ q Vilone et al. Eur. Phys. J. B 3, 399 (22)

Transition to global culture controlled by noise rate d=2 F=, N=25 Cultural drift: Single feature random perturbation acting continuously at rate r r = r(-/q) States of global culture for any q as r : Cultural drift destroys the transition controlled by q that occurs at r=. Transition from multicultural to global culture states controlled by noise rate r with universal scaling properties with respect to q. /q: Probability of configuration unchanged in a perturbation

Why does the noise rate cause a transition? Competition between noise time scale (/r) and relaxation time of perturbations T: Small noise rate: There is time to relax and system decays to monocultural state Large noise rate: Perturbations accumulate and multicultural disorder is built up Transition expected for rt What is the relaxation time T? Exit time in random walks (mean field) 23 N Damage x()= reaches x= or x=n in a mean exit time T N ln N (d=, T N 2 )

System size dependence monocultural scaling F= q= multicultural r R=rN ln N Fixed system size: Universal transition for rt rn ln N <S max (r,q,n)> = <S max (α)>, α= r (-/q) N lnn Large systems: For N multicultural states prevail at any finite noise rate. Global polarization persists, but as a noise sustained state instead of a frozen configuration.

Decoupled model Motivation: Correct estimates independent of sites overlap Decoupled Model: a site always adopts the trait of the chosen neighboring site independently of the number of shared features. Original In the presence of cultural drift our main results are insensitive to Axelrod s basic premise: Cultural overlap is not essential for local convergence

http://www.imedea.uib.es/physdept/research_topics/socio/culture.html Cultural Drift: Summary Phys Rev. E 67, 45 R (23) Relevance of time scales: Noise induced order-disorder transition for r T - (N). Scaling properties with respect to q and N. Stability: Multicultural frozen configurations are not stable and for small noise rate (r < T - (N)) a state of global culture is induced by noise independently of the number of traits (q). Size dependence: For large systems and arbitrarily small noise rate (r > T - (N) ) the multicultural state prevails: Axelrod s global polarization in spite of local convergence is recovered. Dynamical nature of states: Ordered state: Jumps among monocultural configurations (Metastable states). Multicultural state: Noise sustained dynamics. Cultural drift is a crucial ingredient which drastically modifies the dynamics of Axelrod s model.. In particular the basic premise on cultural overlap becomes irrelevant

Revisiting Axelrod s question and conclusion Principle of Homophily: Promotes interaction between similar. like attracts like Principle of Social Influence: Promotes cultural similarity. The more two interact the more similar they become. But they become more unlike that someone else: Cleavages. Axelrod: Combination of homophily and social influence produces and sustains polarization (cultural diversity) Cultural drift: Destroys diversity for N finite and small noise rate r<< Question: Can stable cultural diversity emerge from local processes of homophily and social influence in an imperfect world (cultural drift)? Answer: YES! With a proper specification of homophily: Social network is not fixed. Principle of CO-EVOLUTION of agents and network: Social structure evolves in tandem with the collective action that makes it possible. Dynamic and adaptive networks Zimmermann et al, Phys. Rev. E. 69, 652-6 (24)

Example of co-evolution: Process of social differentiation V. Eguíluz et al. Am. J. Soc. (25) Spatial Prisoner s Dilemma Game: Cooperation maintained by local interactions (M. A. Nowak and R. M. May, Nature 359, 826 (992)) Network Dynamics (Choosing partners): Unsatisfied Defectors break any link with neighbouring Defector and establishes a new link in the network Social differentiation: Emergence of Leaders Conformists Exploiters Imitation network of Cooperators Absolute leader L : Largest pay-off in the network and largest number of links

Axelrod s model in a Dynamic Network Step : Choose randomly a link connecting two agents and calculate the overlap (number of shared features). Probability of interaction is proportional to the overlap (if overlap is not maximum) Step 2: Social influence dynamics: interaction results in one more common trait Step 3: NETWORK DYNAMICS: New homophily specification A link with zero overlap (cleavage-link) is dropped + new link established t t+ Step 4: Cultural drift: Single feature perturbation with probability r

Cultural drift in a Dynamic Network Fixed Network w/noise Fixed Network w/noise Fixed Network Fixed Network d=2, k=4, F=3, q= 2 > q c, N= (r c = -2 ), r= -3 Dynamical network maintains polarization in spite of cultural drift of slow rate: Insensitive to noise Noise is not efficient to produce globalization in a dynamical network during large time scales: WHY?

Physical groups in a Dynamic Network: Cleavages vs. Noise t= t=75 k=4 t=5 t=25 t=75 Dynamics of the network leads to static physical groups Each group evolves independently becoming a cultural group Cultural drift only efficient within a group

Summary Basics: Interaction of several cultural features based on homophily and social influence produces a transition between global culture and polarization. Fixed networks: Long range links and degree heterogeneity favor globalization. High clustering restores polarization in scale free networks. Cultural drift in fixed networks: Essential Qualitative changes. q-independent, N-dependent noise induced transition between metastable global culture and noise dominated polarized state. Dynamic networks: Stable polarization due to formation of physical groups. Cultural drift of slow rate becomes inefficient. Some open questions: *Hierarchy of features *Mass media effects *System size in dynamic networks *Competition of degree heterogeneity with cultural drift