The Mother of All Paradoxes

Similar documents
03 Review of First-Order Logic

TRUTH TELLERS. Volker Halbach. Scandinavian Logic Symposium. Tampere

KRIPKE S THEORY OF TRUTH 1. INTRODUCTION

Syntax. Notation Throughout, and when not otherwise said, we assume a vocabulary V = C F P.

An Introduction to Modal Logic III

Final Exam (100 points)

Informal Statement Calculus

Classical First-Order Logic

TRUTH-THEORIES FOR FRAGMENTS OF PA

A simplified proof of arithmetical completeness theorem for provability logic GLP

CHAPTER 2. FIRST ORDER LOGIC

3. Only sequences that were formed by using finitely many applications of rules 1 and 2, are propositional formulas.

A Quantified Logic of Evidence

Introduction to first-order logic:

Formal Methods for Java

INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC. Propositional Logic. Examples of syntactic claims

Propositional and Predicate Logic - XIII

First-Order Logic. 1 Syntax. Domain of Discourse. FO Vocabulary. Terms

POSSIBLE-WORLDS SEMANTICS FOR MODAL NOTIONS CONCEIVED AS PREDICATES

Fuzzy Does Not Lie! Can BAŞKENT. 20 January 2006 Akçay, Göttingen, Amsterdam Student No:

An Introduction to Modal Logic V

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students. Optional Subject (i): Set Theory and Further Logic

Neighborhood Semantics for Modal Logic Lecture 3

Mathematics 114L Spring 2018 D.A. Martin. Mathematical Logic

TR : Binding Modalities

Notes on Satisfiability-Based Problem Solving. First Order Logic. David Mitchell October 23, 2013

Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground II Partial Ground and Typed Truth

Propositional and Predicate Logic - VII

Herbrand Theorem, Equality, and Compactness

Gödel s Completeness Theorem

Algebraizing Hybrid Logic. Evangelos Tzanis University of Amsterdam Institute of Logic, Language and Computation

CSE 1400 Applied Discrete Mathematics Definitions

HENNESSY MILNER THEOREM FOR INTERPRETABILITY LOGIC. Abstract

A generalization of modal definability

185.A09 Advanced Mathematical Logic

Predicate Logic: Sematics Part 1

First-Order Predicate Logic. Basics

Handout: Proof of the completeness theorem

5. Peano arithmetic and Gödel s incompleteness theorem

Logic: The Big Picture

Restricted truth predicates in first-order logic

Peano Arithmetic. CSC 438F/2404F Notes (S. Cook) Fall, Goals Now

Chapter 3. Formal Number Theory

Between proof theory and model theory Three traditions in logic: Syntactic (formal deduction)

INF3170 Logikk Spring Homework #8 For Friday, March 18

Classical First-Order Logic

Motivation. CS389L: Automated Logical Reasoning. Lecture 10: Overview of First-Order Theories. Signature and Axioms of First-Order Theory

Logic and Modelling. Introduction to Predicate Logic. Jörg Endrullis. VU University Amsterdam

Gödel s Incompleteness Theorems

Relations to first order logic

The logic of Σ formulas

First Order Logic (FOL) 1 znj/dm2017

Axiomatic Theories of Truth

Proseminar on Semantic Theory Fall 2013 Ling 720 First Order (Predicate) Logic: Syntax and Natural Deduction 1

Part II. Logic and Set Theory. Year

Automata, Logic and Games: Theory and Application

Lecture 7. Logic. Section1: Statement Logic.

Formal Epistemology: Lecture Notes. Horacio Arló-Costa Carnegie Mellon University

Predicate Logic. CSE 595 Semantic Web Instructor: Dr. Paul Fodor Stony Brook University

September 13, Cemela Summer School. Mathematics as language. Fact or Metaphor? John T. Baldwin. Framing the issues. structures and languages

VAUGHT S THEOREM: THE FINITE SPECTRUM OF COMPLETE THEORIES IN ℵ 0. Contents

Formal Methods for Java

Dual-Intuitionistic Logic and Some Other Logics

Gödel s Incompleteness Theorem. Overview. Computability and Logic

First-order logic Syntax and semantics

Axiomatisation of Hybrid Logic

Overview of Topics. Finite Model Theory. Finite Model Theory. Connections to Database Theory. Qing Wang

Notes for Math 601, Fall based on Introduction to Mathematical Logic by Elliott Mendelson Fifth edition, 2010, Chapman & Hall

Applied Logic. Lecture 1 - Propositional logic. Marcin Szczuka. Institute of Informatics, The University of Warsaw

An Introduction to Modal Logic. Ordinary logic studies the partition of sentences1 into two categories, true and false.

Interpretability Logic

NIP Summer School 2011 Truth and Paradox Lecture #1

Propositional Logic: Syntax

C. Modal Propositional Logic (MPL)

A MODEL-THEORETIC PROOF OF HILBERT S NULLSTELLENSATZ

Maximal Introspection of Agents

COMP 409: Logic Homework 5

MATH 770 : Foundations of Mathematics. Fall Itay Ben-Yaacov

On the Complexity of the Reflected Logic of Proofs

Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground I

Logic Michælmas 2003

the logic of provability

MODEL THEORY FOR ALGEBRAIC GEOMETRY

Part 2: First-Order Logic

A Tableau Calculus for Minimal Modal Model Generation

LINDSTRÖM S THEOREM SALMAN SIDDIQI

Predicate Calculus - Semantics 1/4

3. The Logic of Quantified Statements Summary. Aaron Tan August 2017

First-Order Logic First-Order Theories. Roopsha Samanta. Partly based on slides by Aaron Bradley and Isil Dillig

SOCRATES DID IT BEFORE GÖDEL

Gödel s Incompleteness Theorem. Overview. Computability and Logic

GS03/4023: Validation and Verification Predicate Logic Jonathan P. Bowen Anthony Hall

02 Propositional Logic

First Order Logic (FOL)

Peano Arithmetic. by replacing the schematic letter R with a formula, then prefixing universal quantifiers to bind

Přednáška 12. Důkazové kalkuly Kalkul Hilbertova typu. 11/29/2006 Hilbertův kalkul 1

From Logic Programming Semantics to the Consistency of Syntactical Treatments of Knowledge and Belief

12th Meeting on Mathematics of Language. 6, September, 2011

CS156: The Calculus of Computation

Transcription:

The Mother of All Paradoxes Volker Halbach Truth and Intensionality Amsterdam 3rd December 2016

A theory of expressions The symbols of L are: 1. infinitely many variable symbols v 0, v 1, v 2, v 3,... 2. predicate symbols = and, 3. function symbols q, and sub, 4. the connectives, and the quantifier symbol, 5. auxiliary symbols ( and ), 6. possibly finitely many further function and predicate symbols of arbitrary arity but at least the sentence letter p, and 7. for each string e of symbols there is exactly one constant in the language L. The constant for e is called the quotation constant of e. We write e for the quotation constant of e. I write x for v 0, y for v 1, and z for v 2 to make the notation less cluttered.

A theory of expressions I distinguish three kinds of nonlogical vocabulary (beyond the logical vocabulary): the syntactic (quotations constants, sub etc) and the contingent vocabulary (p etc), and.

A theory of expressions All instances of the following schemata and rules are axioms of the theory A: a.1. all axioms and rules of first-order predicate logic including the identity axioms. a.2. a b = ab, where a and b are arbitrary strings of symbols. a.3. q(a) = a a.4. sub(a, b, c) = d, where a and c are arbitrary strings of symbols, b is a symbol (or, equivalently, a string of symbols of length 1), and d is the string of symbols obtained from a by replacing all occurrences of the symbol b with c. a.5. x y z((x y) z) = (x (y z)) a.6. x y(x y = 0 x = 0 y = 0) a.7. x y(x y = x y = 0) x y(y x = x y = 0) a.8. v 3 v 4 y z(sub(v 3, y, z) sub(v 4, y, z)) = sub(v 3 v 4, y, z) a.9. a = b, if a and b are distinct expressions.

A theory of expressions A standard model for the language L without interprets the syntactic vocabulary in the intended way and assigns some interpretations to the other vocabulary, in particular to p. The domain of a standard model is always the set of all L-expressions (finite strings of symbols). Let S be a set of expressions. A sentence φ of L holds in E, S formally E, S φ if and only if φ holds when all nonlogical symbols of L except are interpreted according to the model E and is interpreted by S. S is called the extension of in the model E, S. We have: E, S e iff e S

A theory of expressions A standard model for the language L without interprets the syntactic vocabulary in the intended way and assigns some interpretations to the other vocabulary, in particular to p. The domain of a standard model is always the set of all L-expressions (finite strings of symbols). Let S be a set of expressions. A sentence φ of L holds in E, S formally E, S φ if and only if φ holds when all nonlogical symbols of L except are interpreted according to the model E and is interpreted by S. S is called the extension of in the model E, S. We have: E, S e iff e S

A theory of expressions A standard model for the language L without interprets the syntactic vocabulary in the intended way and assigns some interpretations to the other vocabulary, in particular to p. The domain of a standard model is always the set of all L-expressions (finite strings of symbols). Let S be a set of expressions. A sentence φ of L holds in E, S formally E, S φ if and only if φ holds when all nonlogical symbols of L except are interpreted according to the model E and is interpreted by S. S is called the extension of in the model E, S. We have: E, S e iff e S

A theory of expressions Definition dia(x) = sub(x, x, q(x))

A theory of expressions Lemma Assume φ(x) is a formula not containing bound occurrences of x. Then the following holds: A dia(φ(dia(x))) = φ(dia(φ(dia(x)))) dia(φ(dia(x))) = sub(φ(dia(x)), x, q(φ(dia(x)))) = sub(φ(dia(x)), x, φ(dia(x))) = φ(dia(φ(dia(x))))

A theory of expressions Lemma (strong diagonalization) If φ(x) is a formula of L with no bound occurrences of x, then one can find a term t such that the following holds: A t = φ(t) and therefore A φ(t) φ(φ(t))

Possible worlds semantics Definition A frame is an ordered pair W, R where W is nonempty and R is a binary relation on W.

Possible worlds semantics Definition A valuation V for a frame W, R is a function that assigns to every w W a standard model E. Definition A pw-model is a quadruple W, R, V, B such that W, R is a frame, V is a valuation for W, R and B is a -interpretation for W, R satisfying the following condition: B(w) = {φ L for all u W (if wru, then V(u), B(u) φ)} V(u), B(u) is always a standard model and V(u), B(u) φ means that φ is true in the standard model V(u), B(u) in the usual sense of first-order predicate logic.

Possible worlds semantics Definition A valuation V for a frame W, R is a function that assigns to every w W a standard model E. Definition A pw-model is a quadruple W, R, V, B such that W, R is a frame, V is a valuation for W, R and B is a -interpretation for W, R satisfying the following condition: B(w) = {φ L for all u W (if wru, then V(u), B(u) φ)} V(u), B(u) is always a standard model and V(u), B(u) φ means that φ is true in the standard model V(u), B(u) in the usual sense of first-order predicate logic.

Possible worlds semantics Definition A frame W, R admits a pw-model on every valuation iff for every valuation V on W, R there is a such that B such that W, R, V, B is a pw-model. Definition A frame admits a pw-model iff the frame admits a pw-model on some valuation, that is, iff there is a valuation V such that W, R, V, B is a pw-model model. Strong Characterization problem Which frames admit a pw-model on every valuation?

Possible worlds semantics Definition A frame W, R admits a pw-model on every valuation iff for every valuation V on W, R there is a such that B such that W, R, V, B is a pw-model. Definition A frame admits a pw-model iff the frame admits a pw-model on some valuation, that is, iff there is a valuation V such that W, R, V, B is a pw-model model. Strong Characterization problem Which frames admit a pw-model on every valuation?

Possible worlds semantics Definition A frame W, R admits a pw-model on every valuation iff for every valuation V on W, R there is a such that B such that W, R, V, B is a pw-model. Definition A frame admits a pw-model iff the frame admits a pw-model on some valuation, that is, iff there is a valuation V such that W, R, V, B is a pw-model model. Strong Characterization problem Which frames admit a pw-model on every valuation?

Possible worlds semantics Lemma (normality) Suppose W, R, V, B is a pw-model, w W and φ, ψ sentences of L. Then the following holds: 1. If V(u), B(u) φ for all u W, then V(w), B(w) φ. 2. V(w), B(w) φ ψ ( φ ψ)

Possible worlds semantics Lemma 1. If a frame W, R is transitive and W, R, V, B a pw-model on that frame, we have for all sentences φ in L and worlds w W: V(w), B(w) φ φ 2. If a frame W, R is reflexive and W, R, V, B a pw-model on that frame, we have for all sentences φ in L and worlds w W: V(w), B(w) φ φ

The paradoxes w Theorem (liar paradox) The frame W 1, R 1 does not admit a pw-model.

The paradoxes Example (Montague) If W, R admits a pw-model, then W, R is not reflexive.

The paradoxes Example The frame two worlds see each another displayed above does not admit a pw-model.

The paradoxes The following frame does not admit a pw-model.

The paradoxes Example The frame one world sees itself and one other world does not admit a pw-model. We call the frame W 3, R 3. w 1 w 2

The paradoxes Example The frame ω, Pre does not admit a pw-model. Here ω is the set of all natural numbers and Pre is the successor relation. Hence every world n sees n + 1 but no other world. The frame ω, Pre can be displayed by the following diagram: 0 1 2

The paradoxes Theorem The frame ω, < does not admit a pw-model. Here < is the usual smaller than relation on the natural numbers: The frame ω, < can be displayed by the following diagram: 0 1 2

Frames with possible worlds models Example The frame {w}, Ø admits a pw-model on every valuation.

Frames with possible worlds models By Suc we denote the successor relation { k, n k = n + 1} on the set ω of natural numbers. Example The frame ω, Suc admits a pw-model on every valuation. 2 1 0

Frames with possible worlds models Definition A frame W, R is converse wellfounded (or Noetherian) iff for every non-empty M W there is a w M that is R-maximal in M. Lemma Every converse wellfounded frame W, R admits a pw-model on every valuation.

Frames with possible worlds models Definition A frame W, R is converse wellfounded (or Noetherian) iff for every non-empty M W there is a w M that is R-maximal in M. Lemma Every converse wellfounded frame W, R admits a pw-model on every valuation.

The Strong Characterization Problem Theorem (Strong Characterization theorem) A frame admits a pw-model on every valuation iff it is converse wellfounded.

The Strong Characterization Problem We define x as n..... x. n can be defined properly using the diagonal lemma. corresponds ot the transitive closure of R. Lemma For all sentences φ and ψ und pw-models W, R, V, B the following holds: 1. If V(w), B(w) φ for all w W, then V(w), B(w) φ. 2. V(w), B(w) φ ψ ( φ ψ) 3. V(w), B(w) φ φ 4. V(w), B(w) φ φ φ

The Strong Characterization Problem Lemma The transitive closure R of the accessibility relation R of any pw-model that admits a pw-model on every valuation is converse wellfounded. Lemma A frame W, R is converse wellfounded iff its transitive closure W, R is converse wellfounded. This concludes the proof of the Strong Characterization theorem.

All worlds share the same domain, the set of all expressions. The definition of a standard model can be generalized, so that a standard model also specifies a set of contingent objects. Since some of them may lack names, the unary predicate is replaced with a binary predicate applying to formulae and sequences of objects (variable assignments). This requires a theory sequences of arbitrary objects (symbols or contingent objects). Extensions

Löb s theorem is the mother of all paradoxes as long as the modality is normal. Various predicate modalities aren t normal in this sense, for instance, KF. Conclusion

Thank you. Conclusion

Now for something completely different... Conclusion

Classical Determinate Truth The theory CD is formulated in the language of arithmetic augmented with the new predicate symbols D and T. The axioms below are added to the axioms of PA with the schema of induction is expanded to the language with D and T.

Classical Determinate Truth Determinateness axioms (d1) s t D(s=. t) (d2) x ( Sent(x) (D(. x) Dx)) (d3) x y ( Sent(x. y) (D(x. y) Dx Dy)) (d4) v x ( Sent(. vx) (D(. vx) t Dx[t/v])) (d5) s(dṭs Ds Sent(s ))) Truth axioms (t1) s t(ts=. t s = t ) (t2) s( Sent(s ) Ds (TṬs Ts )) (t3) x ( Sent(x) (T(. x) Tx)) (t4) x y ( Sent(x. y) (T(x. y) Tx Ty)) (t5) v x ( Sent(. vx) (T(. vx) t Tx[t/v]))

Classical Determinate Truth Optional axioms (o1) s(dḍs Ds Sent(s ))) (o1) Can we add s( Sent(s ) Ds TḌs Ds ))