AP1000 European 19. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Design Control Document

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19.15 Chemical and Volume Control System 19.15.1 System Description See subsection 9.3.6.2. 19.15.2 System Operation See subsection 9.3.6.4. 19.15.3 Performance during Accident Conditions See subsection 9.3.6.4.5. 19.15.4 Initiating Event Review The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. 19.15.5 System Logic Models 19.15.5.1 Assumptions and Boundary Conditions The following assumptions are used for the chemical and volume control system PRA model: a. - i. The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. j. Either one of the two makeup pumps is sufficient to deliver borated water to the reactor coolant system. To simplify the PRA model, it is assumed that one makeup pump is always the operating pump and the other makeup pump is always the standby pump. k. - q. The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. 19.15.5.2 Fault Tree Models The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. 19.15.5.3 Human Interactions The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. 19.15.5.4 Common Cause Failures The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.15-1 Revision 1

TABLES 19.15-1 THROUGH 19.15-9 NOT USED. FIGURE 19.15-1 NOT USED. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.15-2 Revision 1

19.16 Containment Hydrogen Control System See subsection 6.2.4. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.16-1 Revision 1

19.17 Normal Residual Heat Removal System See subsection 5.4.7. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.17-1 Revision 1

19.18 Component Cooling Water System See subsection 9.2.2. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.18-1 Revision 1

19.19 Service Water System See subsection 9.2.1. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.19-1 Revision 1

19.20 Central Chilled Water System See subsection 9.2.7. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.20-1 Revision 1

19.21 ac Power System See subsection 8.3.1. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.21-1 Revision 1

19.22 Class 1E dc & UPS System See subsection 8.3.2.1.1. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.22-1 Revision 1

19.23 Non-Class 1E dc & UPS System See subsection 8.3.2.1.2. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.23-1 Revision 1

19.24 Containment Isolation See subsection 6.2.3. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.24-1 Revision 1

19.25 Compressed and Instrument Air System See subsection 9.3.1. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.25-1 Revision 1

19.26 Protection and Safety Monitoring System See subsection 7.1.2. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.26-1 Revision 1

19.27 Diverse Actuation System See subsection 7.7.1.11. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.27-1 Revision 1

19.28 Plant Control System See subsection 7.1.3. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.28-1 Revision 1

19.29 Common Cause Analysis The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.29-1 Revision 1

19.30 Human Reliability Analysis The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.30-1 Revision 1

19.31 Other Event Tree Node Probabilities The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.31-1 Revision 1

19.32 Data Analysis and Master Data Bank The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.32-1 Revision 1

19.33 Fault Tree and Core Damage Quantification The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL-700 19.33-1 Revision 1