5th nternational Conference on Advanced Material and Computer cience (CAMC 206) Multi Contrained Optimization model of upply Chain Baed on ntelligent Algorithm Han Juan chool of Management hanghai Univerity junah432@qq.com Key word: upply Chain ntelligent Algorithm Logitic Abtract. n order to reearch the quality coordination mechanim of logitic ervice upply chain in condition of bounded rationality baed on reearch method of logitic upply chain optimization model of evolutionary game theory of intelligent algorithm evolutionary game model for quality coordination of logitic ervice upply chain i built and alo analyzed. The reearch reult indicate: the factor affecting quality coordination of logitic ervice upply chain are coordination cot etraneou income default cot ece earning complaint probability reputation lo and lo haring coefficient. By adjuting the value of thee parameter the quality coordination of logitic ervice upply chain can be effectively facilitated. ntroduction n ervice economy age the proportion of ervice indutry in whole national economy i tepping up which ha promoted the networking large-cale and branding management of ervice indutry and the networking development of ervice enterprie ha promoted the generation of ervice upply chain. A a kind of typical ervice upply chain the logitic ervice upply chain ha been put forward by vat cholar and reearched peritently. Currently the reearche on logitic ervice upply chain by mot cholar are focued on it intenion[-3] tructural feature[3] management method[3] upplier election[4] coordination mechanim[57-3] ditribution mechanim[6] and other apect while the reearche on ervice quality coordination of logitic ervice upply chain are relatively le. On the bai of above reearche the paper ha analyzed the influence of ervice quality behavior of joint enterprie in logitic ervice upply chain on quality coordination and it evolutionary proce baed on evolutionary game theory and concluded approach to facilitate balanced quality coordination of logitic ervice upply chain. The obtained concluion ha certain theoretical value and referential meaning. Building of evolutionary game model According to payoff matri of game the epected revenue and average revenue of logitic integrator in trategie of coordination and ditribution repectively are: u y (π + C ) + ( y )(π C + c u y (π c + v + ( y )(π pλ ) 2 u u + ( )u 2 y C + c yc + yv yv + π pλ + pλ + ypλ ypλ The replicator dynamic equation of logitic integrator i d dt (u u ) ( )[( v pλ ) y C + pλ + c] n the ame way the epected revenue and average revenue of logitic ubcontractor in trategie of coordination and ditribution repectively are: u (π + C ) + ( )(π C + c u (π c + v + ( )[π p ( λ ) ] 2 206. The author - Publihed by Atlanti Pre 47
u yu + ( y) u y 2 yc + yc c + v yv + π p( λ) + p( λ) + yp( λ) yp( λ) The replicator dynamic equation of logitic ubcontractor i dy yu ( u) dt y( y) {[ v p( λ) ] C + c + p( λ) } Aume d dy F( ) F ( y) ( ) 0 2 dt dt and F then the break-even of hall be 0 C c or pλ. At thi moment the proportion of F( ) 2 y v pλ logitic integrator who have adopted coordination trategy in enterprie group of logitic ervice upply chain i table. n the ame way aume F y then the break-even of ( ) hall be y 0 y or 2 C c p( λ) v p( λ) 2 ( ) 0. At thi time the proportion of logitic ubcontractor who have adopted coordination trategy in enterprie group of logitic ervice upply chain i table. Therefore according to relevant theory of evolutionary game on the plane M {( y)/0 y } five partial break-even in quality coordination game ytem of logitic ervice upply chain repectively are: y where O (0 0) A (0) B ( 0) () C ( ) C c p( λ) v p( λ) C c pλ y v pλ F y 2 () (2) tability analyi of logitic upply chain coordination Under Friedman [5] concluion the tability of break-even of evolution ytem can be got from partial tability of Jacobian matri in thi ytem. o according to the replicator dynamic equation of logitic integrator and ubcontractor the Jacobian matri in thi ytem i F( ) F( ) J F( y) F( y) ( 2 )[( v pλ) y ( )( v pλ) C + pλ + c] [ v p( λ) ] y( y)[ v p( λ) ] ( 2 y) C + cp( λ ) The determinant value of J i F( ) F( y) F( ) F( y) det J And the trace i F ( ) F( y). f the break-even make det J > 0 and trj < 0 the break-even trj + hall be in partially table tate. The partially table reult of the break-even in thi ytem are howed in Table. 48
Table Partial tability analyi of break-even Break-even det J TrJ eult (0 0) + - table (0) - - Untable ( 0) - - Untable () + - table ( y ) - 0 addle From Table it can be known that in five break-even only O (0 0) and C() are table and they are evolutionary tabilization trategie which are repectively correponding to two trategie of integrator and ubcontractor (ditribution ditribution) and (coordination coordination). A(0) C() ( y ) Figure ytem evolution phae diagram n order to undertand Table better ytem dynamic evolution phae diagram (Figure ) hould be combined. Figure decribe dynamic evolution proce of quality coordination game of integrator and ubcontractor. The broken line AB connected by two untable break-even A (0) and B ( 0) a well a addle ( y) contitute critical line of contrained tate of ytem. When the original tate i in ABC area the ytem hall be contrained in break-even C() i.e. the integrator and ubcontractor in logitic ervice upply chain hall both adopt coordination trategy; when the original tate i in ABO area the ytem hall be contrained in break-even O(0 0) i.e. the integrator and ubcontractor hall both adopt ditribution trategy. The ytem evolution i a long-term proce o during the evolution the ytem hall be preented a coeited tate of coordination and ditribution trategie. nfluence factor of evolution reult Combined with phae diagram of ytem effect of every parametric variation on ytem evolution behavior will be dicued below. Figure how that quality coordination of upply chain of logitic ervice depend on ize of area ABO of region ABO and area ABC of region. f and probability of adopting coordination i bigger than ABO > ABC probability of C() along route of C. On the decentralized trategy ytem will evolve toward contrary if > then ytem will evolve toward O(00)along route of O. f ABO ABC ABO O(00) B(0) ABC then direction of evolution of ytem i not clear. From Figure area of region ABO i a follow: 49
( ABO + y ) 2 (3) According to formula () (2) and (3)and Figure everal factor affecting evolution of ytem can be obtained. Coordination cot According to formula ()and(2) decreae of coordination cot C C will lead to decreae of y. According to formula (3)and phae diagram (Figure ) addle of ytem ( y) will move toward bottom left thu reulting in decreae of area ABO ABO) and increae of area ABC ABC) imultaneouly and probability that ytem will evolve toward C() in overall coordination direction along route of C will increae. That i to ay the le the coordination cot of integrator and ub-contractor i the higher the probability that both ide chooe coordination trategy i. o with coordination cot decreaing probability that integrator and ub-contractor in logitic ervice upply chain chooe coordination trategy will be higher. Etraneou income coming from breach of contract According to formula ()and(2) decreae of etraneou income v coming from breach of contract will reult in decreae of y. According to formula (3)and phae diagram (Figure ) addle of ytem ( y) will move toward bottom left thu reulting in decreae of area ABO ABO) and increae of area ABC ABC) imultaneouly and probability that ytem will evolve toward C() in overall coordination direction along route of C will increae. That i to ay the le the etraneou income gained by breaking quality contract by integrator and ub-contractor i the higher the probability that both ide chooe coordination trategy i. To promote quality coordination of LC integrator and ub-contractor hould try their bet to lower ubcription of logitic ervice between them. Penalty cot According to formula ()and(2) increae of penalty cot c of different enterprie group in logitic ervice upply chain will reult in decreae of y. According to formula (3) and phae diagram (Figure ) addle of ytem ( y) will move toward bottom left thu reulting in decreae of area ABO) and increae of area ABO ABC ABC) imultaneouly and probability that ytem will evolve toward C() in overall coordination direction along route of C will increae. To promote quality coordination of LC integrator and ub-contractor mut fi penalty cot on a higher level when they contruct quality contract to avoid breach of contract of logitic integrator and ub-contractor. Ece earning According to formula ()and(2) increae of ece earning gained by integrator and ub-contractor will reult in decreae of y. According to formula (3) and phae diagram (Figure ) addle of ytem ( y) will move toward bottom left thu reulting in decreae of area ABO) and increae of area ABC) ABO ABC imultaneouly and probability that ytem will evolve toward C() in overall coordination direction along route of C will increae. f ub-contractor and integrator chooe to increae upernormal profit gained through quality coordination trategy the probability that both ide chooe coordination trategy will increae which will puh ytem to evolve toward overall coordination direction. 50
Complaint probability According to formula ()and(2) increae of complaint probability p from cutomer enterprie will reult in decreae of y. According to formula (3)and phae diagram (Figure ) addle of ytem ( y) will move toward bottom left thu reulting in decreae of area ABO ABO) and increae of area ABC ABC) imultaneouly and probability that ytem will evolve toward C() in overall coordination direction along route of C will increae. f client increae complaint probability to logitic ervice it will puh the increae of the probability that integrator and ub-contractor chooe coordination trategy which will puh ytem to evolve toward overall coordination direction. eputation lo According to formula () and(2) increae of reputation lo of integrator and ub-contractor will lead to decreae of y. According to formula (3)and phae diagram (Figure ) addle of ytem ( y) will move toward bottom left thu reulting in decreae of area ABO) and increae of area ABO ABC ABC) imultaneouly and probability that ytem will evolve toward C() in overall coordination direction along route of C will increae. f reputation lo created by choice of decentralized trategy by integrator and ub-contractor i greater it will puh the increae of the probability that integrator and ub-contractor chooe coordination trategy which will puh ytem to evolve toward overall coordination direction. Concluion ealizing quality coordination of logitic ervice upply chain i an important way to enhance ervice quality of logitic enterprie and to promote cutomer atifaction. A carrier of logitic ervice node enterprie in logitic ervice upply chain i affected by penalty cot coordination cot etraneou income complaint probability propective earning reputation lo and lo apportionment coefficient when it chooe behavioral trategy on quality. Above parameter mut be adjuted well to guarantee that trategy choice of joint enterprie in logitic ervice upply chain evolve toward coordination direction and retrain itelf to trategy (coordination coordination). pecifically promote that integrator and ub-contractor can evolve toward direction (coordination coordination) to eentially improve ervice quality in logitic ervice upply chain by etablihing ome reaonable intitutional arrangement for eample enhancing propective earning lowering coordination cot igning quality contract and building fair mechanim and reputation mechanim. eference [] He J. Geng Y. Wan Y. Li. and Pahlavan K. (203). A cyber phyical tet-bed for virtualization of F acce environment for body enor network. enor Journal EEE 3(0) 3826-3836. [2] Lv Z Tek A a ilva F et al. Game on cience-how video game technology may help biologit tackle viualization challenge[j]. Plo one 203 8(3): 57990. [3] u T Wang W Lv Z et al. apid elaunay triangulation for randomly ditributed cloud data uing adaptive Hilbert curve[j]. Computer & Graphic 206 54: 65-74. [4] Jinyu Hu Zhiwei Gao and Weien Pan. Multiangle ocial Network ecommendation Algorithm and imilarity Network Evaluation[J]. Journal of Applied Mathematic 203 (203). 5