Numerical illustration

Similar documents
The "demand side" effect of price caps: uncertainty, imperfect competition, and rationing

Bertrand Model of Price Competition. Advanced Microeconomic Theory 1

Advanced Microeconomics

Answer Key: Problem Set 3

Firms and returns to scale -1- John Riley

Firms and returns to scale -1- Firms and returns to scale

Oligopoly Theory. This might be revision in parts, but (if so) it is good stu to be reminded of...

Chapter 5. Transmission networks and electricity markets

Topic 8: Optimal Investment

Online Appendix to A search model of costly product returns by Vaiva Petrikaitė

Online Supplementary Appendix B

Y j R L divide goods into produced goods (outputs) > 0 output, call its price p < 0 input, call its price ω

A three-level MILP model for generation and transmission expansion planning

Designing Optimal Pre-Announced Markdowns in the Presence of Rational Customers with Multi-unit Demands - Online Appendix

Systems of Linear Equations in Two Variables. Break Even. Example. 240x x This is when total cost equals total revenue.

Oligopoly. Oligopoly. Xiang Sun. Wuhan University. March 23 April 6, /149

The ambiguous impact of contracts on competition in the electricity market Yves Smeers

ONLINE APPENDIX. Upping the Ante: The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools

Investment under Dynamic Competition in Wholesale Electricity Markets

Industrial Organization, Fall 2011: Midterm Exam Solutions and Comments Date: Wednesday October

Price and Capacity Competition

1 Oligopoly: Bertrand Model

Final Exam Review. MATH Intuitive Calculus Fall 2013 Circle lab day: Mon / Fri. Name:. Show all your work.

Congestion Equilibrium for Differentiated Service Classes Richard T. B. Ma

Econ 201: Problem Set 3 Answers

The DC Optimal Power Flow

Increasingly, economists are asked not just to study or explain or interpret markets, but to design them.

Answer Key: Problem Set 1

Real-Time Demand Response with Uncertain Renewable Energy in Smart Grid

Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers

3. (1.2.13, 19, 31) Find the given limit. If necessary, state that the limit does not exist.

Lecture 7. The Dynamics of Market Equilibrium. ECON 5118 Macroeconomic Theory Winter Kam Yu Department of Economics Lakehead University

A Merchant Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion

USAEE/IAEE. Diagnostic metrics for the adequate development of efficient-market baseload natural gas storage capacity.

On revealed preferences in oligopoly games

A Contract for Demand Response based on Probability of Call

4. Partial Equilibrium under Imperfect Competition

in Search Advertising

Master 2 Macro I. Lecture notes #12 : Solving Dynamic Rational Expectations Models

Wireless Network Pricing Chapter 6: Oligopoly Pricing

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES PRICE AND CAPACITY COMPETITION. Daron Acemoglu Kostas Bimpikis Asuman Ozdaglar

x ax 1 2 bx2 a bx =0 x = a b. Hence, a consumer s willingness-to-pay as a function of liters on sale, 1 2 a 2 2b, if l> a. (1)

Study Unit 3 : Linear algebra

Basics of Game Theory

Javier Contreras Sanz- Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha Jesús María López Lezama- Universidad de Antioquia Antonio Padilha-Feltrin- Universidade

Oligopoly. Firm s Profit Maximization Firm i s profit maximization problem: Static oligopoly model with n firms producing homogenous product.

EC611--Managerial Economics

Mathematical Foundations -1- Constrained Optimization. Constrained Optimization. An intuitive approach 2. First Order Conditions (FOC) 7

OPTIMIZATION UNDER CONSTRAINTS

Review for Final Review

Course notes for EE394V Restructured Electricity Markets: Locational Marginal Pricing

ECON 255 Introduction to Mathematical Economics

Online Math 1314 Final Exam Review

Technical Appendix for: Complementary Goods: Creating, Capturing and Competing for Value

SECTION 5.1: Polynomials

Math 1325 Final Exam Review

Pure or Hybrid?: Policy Options for Renewable Energy 1

arxiv: v1 [math.oc] 28 Jun 2016

Advanced Microeconomic Analysis, Lecture 6

Planned Obsolescence by Duopolists:

Econ 58 Gary Smith Spring Final Exam Answers

Tutorial letter 201/2/2018

Addendum to: Dual Sales Channel Management with Service Competition

UNIVERSITY OF KWA-ZULU NATAL

Free entry and social efficiency in an open economy. Arghya Ghosh, Jonathan Lim, and Hodaka Morita

Vertical Product Differentiation and Credence Goods: Mandatory Labeling and Gains from International Integration

EconS Advanced Microeconomics II Handout on Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPNE)

Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance.

Concave programming. Concave programming is another special case of the general constrained optimization. subject to g(x) 0

Department of Agricultural Economics. PhD Qualifier Examination. May 2009

Industrial Organization Lecture 7: Product Differentiation

Growing competition in electricity industry and the power source structure

Marginal Revenue Competitive Equilibrium Comparative Statics Quantity Tax. Equilibrium (Chapter 16)

Equilibrium in Factors Market: Properties

A technical appendix for multihoming and compatibility

APPENDIX Should the Private Sector Provide Public Capital?

Lecture 6: Sections 2.2 and 2.3 Polynomial Functions, Quadratic Models

Exercises - SOLUTIONS UEC Advanced Microeconomics, Fall 2018 Instructor: Dusan Drabik, de Leeuwenborch 2105

Second Welfare Theorem

ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Slides to accompany 13. Markets and Efficient Risk-Bearing: Examples and Extensions

Monopoly Regulation in the Presence of Consumer Demand-Reduction

Electronic Companion Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Assets under Competition

Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Vertical Oligopoly: Revisited

problem. max Both k (0) and h (0) are given at time 0. (a) Write down the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Equation in the dynamic programming

Welfare consequence of asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly

Microeconomic Theory (501b) Problem Set 10. Auctions and Moral Hazard Suggested Solution: Tibor Heumann

Lecture 2 The Centralized Economy

A model for competitive markets

Pumping Water to Compete in Electricity Markets

Wireless Network Pricing Chapter 6: Oligopoly Pricing

Online Appendix. (S,S) for v v1. (F,F) for v1 S < v

Capacity Constraints as a Commitment Device in Dynamic Pipeline Rent Extraction

Part A: Answer question A1 (required), plus either question A2 or A3.

Monetary Economics: Solutions Problem Set 1

Moral Hazard: Part 1. April 9, 2018

Bresnahan, JIE 87: Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: 1955 Price War

Bringing Renewables to the Grid. John Dumas Director Wholesale Market Operations ERCOT

Introduction to General Equilibrium: Framework.

International Prices and Exchange Rates Econ 2530b, Gita Gopinath

RATIONING RULES AND BERTRAND-EDGEWORTH OLIGOPOLIES

Transcription:

A umerical illustration Inverse demand is P q, t = a 0 a 1 e λ 2t bq, states of the world are distributed according to f t = λ 1 e λ 1t, and rationing is anticipated and proportional. a 0, a 1, λ = λ 1 λ 2, and bq where Q = a 0 p 0 b is the maximum demand for price p 0, are the parameters to be estimated. λ is estimated by Maximum Likelihood using the load duration curve for France in 2010. The same load duration curve provides an expression of a 0 and a 1 as a function of bq. The average demand elasticity η is then used to estimate bq. Two estimates of demand elasticity at price p 0 = 100 /MWh are tested: η = 0.01 and η = 0.1, respectively the lower and upper bound proposed by Lijesen 2007. The resulting estimates are for η = 0.1 bq = 1 873 /MW h a 0 = 1 973 /MW h a 1 = 1 236 /MW h λ = 1.78, and for η = 0.01 bq = 18 727 /MW h a 0 = 18 827 /MW h a 1 = 12 360 /MW h λ = 1.78. Generation costs are those of a gas turbine, c = 72 /MW h and r = 6 /MW h as provided by the International Energy Agency, IEA 2010. The regulated energy price is p R = 50 /MW h, from Eurostat 1. B Physical capacity certificates B.1 o short sale condition Suppose first the SO imposes no condition on certificates sales. Producer n s expected profit, including revenues from the capacity market is: Π n M kn, φ n, k n, φ n = Π n k n, k n φ n H Φ. Since φ n does not enter Π n k n, k n, Π n M k n = Πn k n : 1 Table 2 Figure 2 from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/images/a/a1/energy% _prices_2011s2.xls 1

the certificate market has no impact on equilibrium investment. Suppose now the SO imposes k n φ n. onsider the case where producers first sell credits, then install capacity. When selecting capacity, each producer maximizes Π n M k n, k n subject to k n φ n. The first-order condition is then L n k n = Π n k n µn 1, where µ n 1 is the shadow cost of the constraint kn φ n. Suppose first ˆφ n < ˆk n n, then µ n 1 = 0 n and ˆk n = at the symmetric equilibrium. When selecting the amount of credits sold, the producers then maximize φ n H Φ. Given the shape of H., the symmetric equilibrium is ˆφ n. But then, > Φ, which is a contradiction, hence ˆφ n = ˆk n. Since k n = φ n We prove below that at the equilibrium, producer n program is maxπ n M k n, k n, = Π n k n, k n k n H kn is the unique symmetric equilibrium. B.2 Equilibrium investment if generation produces at capacity before the cap is reached Suppose ˆt, c, ˆt 0 W. As observed by Zöttl 2011, the profit function Π n k 1 k n k is not concave in k n, so one must separately consider a positive and negative deviation from a symmetric equilibrium candidate to prove existence of the equilibrium. onsider first a negative deviation, i.e., k 1 1 <, Π 1 M < while kn = for all n > 1. Since = k1 k 1, = k Π1, r. 1 2

Analysis of the two-stage ournot game Zöttl 2011 for α = 1, Léautier 2013 for α 0, 1 yields: Π 1 k 1, = ˆ ˆt,c, t 1 ρ ˆQ k1, t ˆQ k 1 ρ q ˆQ k1, t c f t dt ˆ ˆt 0, p W ρ k 1 ρ q c f t dt B.1 ˆt,c, ˆt 0, p W p W c f t dt r, where t 1 is the first state of the world where producer 1 is constrained, ˆQ k 1, t = k 1 1 φ k 1, t is the aggregate production, and φ k 1, t is the equilibrium production from the remaining 1 identical producers, that solves ρ k 1 1 φ k 1, t φ k 1, t ρ q k1 1 φ k 1, t = c. φ k 1, t k 1 for t [ t 1, ˆt, c, ] : lower-capacity producer 1 is constrained, while the 1 higher capacity producers are not. quantities are strategic substitutes, φ k1 0 < ˆQ < 0 and φ = 1 1 k < 1. 1 Since ρ ˆQ k 1 ρ q ˆQ c = k 1 φ ρ q ˆQ ˆQ 0 for t [ t 1, ˆt, c, ]. k1 ρ, ˆt, c, k 1 ρ q, ˆt, c, = c, and ρ t k 1 ρ qt 0, hence ρ k 1 ρ q c 0 for t ˆt, c,. Therefore Π 1 k 1, r > 0 for k 1 < : no negative deviation is profitable. onsider now a positive deviation, i.e., k > while kn = for all 3

n <. Since = k 1 > : Π M k and 2 Π M k 2, k = Π k, k k H H,, k = 2 Π k 2, k k H 2H. Zöttl 2011 shows that, for k >, 2 Π k 2, k = < 0. ˆ ˆt 0, p W t [2ρ q ˆ, t k ρ qq ˆ, t ] f t dt k ρ q ˆ, ˆt 0 W f ˆt 0 W ˆt 0 W k B.2 Thus, Π M k, k < Π k H r < 0 since condition 2 implies H r < 0. Hence, is a symmetric equilibrium. Finally, no other symmetric equilibrium exists since Π n H is concave. B.3 Equilibrium investment if the cap is reached before generation produces at capacity Suppose ˆt 0 W < ˆt, c,. To simplify the exposition, generators are ordered by increasing capacity k 1... k, and suppose that the price cap is reached before the first generator produces at capacity. Léautier 2014 4

proves that the expected equilibrium profit is Π n k n, k n = ˆ t 0 0 ˆQ t ρ ˆQ c f t dt p W c n 1 i=0 ˆ t i1 t i q i1 t f t dt k n 1 F B.3 where ˆQ t is the unconstrained ournot output in state t, t 0 is the first state of the world such that the price cap is reached, defined by ρ ˆQ t 0, t 0 = p W, t i1 for i = 0 1 is the first state of the world such that i producer i 1 is constrained, defined by ρ j=1 kj j k i1, t = p W, and q i1 t is defined on [ t i, t i1] by i ρ k j j q i1 t, t = p W. j=1 For t t 0, unconstrained ournot competition takes place. For t t 0, the ournot price would exceed the cap, hence wholesale price is capped at p W. All generators play a symmetric equilibrium characterized by ρ q 1 t, t = p W. When t reaches t 1 generator 1 produces its capacity. For t t 1, the remaining 1 generators play a symmetric equilibrium characterized by ρ k 1 1 q 2 t, t = p W. This process continues until all generators produce at capacity. t is such that ρ j=1 kj, t = p W, hence t = ˆt 0 W previously defined. For t > t, since wholesale price is fixed at p W price consumers. and generation is at capacity, the SO must curtail constant Differentiation of equation B.3 yields Π n k1 k = p W c f t dt r, B.4 k n t n t n and 2 Π n k n 2 k1 k = p W c f t n t n k < 0. n Π n k 1 k is concave in k n. The previous analysis then shows that is the unique symmetric equilibrium. 5

B.4 Producers extra profits from the capacity markets Léautier 2014 shows that, for common values of the parameters, ˆt 0 W < ˆt, c,. This is the case considered to evaluate. At a symmetric equilibrium, equation B.3 yields Π n = 1 = Π n t 0 r 0 ˆQ t ρ ˆQ t, t c f t dt p W c ˆt 0, p W t 0 p W c 1 F ˆt 0 r Πn is then estimated numerically. Q t f t dt, Financial reliability options The equilibrium is solved by backwards induction. In the second stage, producers solve the equilibrium of the option market, taking k n, k n as given. We assume that including the option market does not decrease investment, i.e., p S. As suggested by ramton and Ockenfels, the SO imposes the restriction that all capacity is sold forward: θ n k n. This restriction is made operational by conditioning profits from the option market to θ n k n. Since these profits are positive, θ n k n hence holds. is a dominant strategy,.1 Derivation of the profit function if the strike price is reached before generation produces at capacity If reliability options are in effect, the price cap is eliminated. For simplicity, assume that the strike price is reached before the first generator produces at capacity, and denote t 0 this state of the world. For t t 0, consumers consume as if the price was p S, since they internalize the impact of the reliability option. As long as total generation is not at capacity, the wholesale price is indeed p S, and the equilibrium is identical to the previous one. When total generation reaches capacity, since consumers consume using constant price p S, the SO must curtail constant price consumers. The wholesale price 6

reaches the V oll. Generators must then rebate the difference between the wholesale price and the strike price, in proportion to the volume of options sold. The resulting equilibrium profit is Π n k n, k n = ˆ t 0 0 ˆQ t p S c n 1 ˆt 0, p S = Π n k n, k n ˆt 0, p S ρ ˆQ c f t dt i=0 ˆ t i1 t i ˆ ˆt 0, p S q i1 t f t dt k n f t dt k n ρ, t c θn Θ ρ, t p S f t dt rk n k n ρ, t c θn Θ ρ, t p S k n p S c f t dt = Π n k n, k n k n θnθ ˆt 0, p S = Π n k n, k n k n θnθ Ψ S. t n ρ, t p S f t dt.2 Equilibrium in the options market We first establish that dψ dp p, p < 0 and lim p p Ψ p, p = 0, where p is the maximum price cap reached in equilibrium. Differentiation with respect to p yields dψ dp p, p = ˆt 0 p,p d ρ q dp 1 f t dt. Suppose ˆt, c, > ˆt 0 W. Then, p is defined by ˆt 0 p,p p c f t dt = p c 1 F ˆt 0 p, p = r. Full differentiation with respect to p yields 1 F ˆt 0 p c f ˆt 0 ˆt 0 p ˆt 0 7 d = 0 dp

ˆt 0 p ˆt 0 d dp = 1 F ˆt 0 p c f ˆt. 0 Differentiation of ρ, ˆt 0, p = p yields ˆt 0 = ρq ρ t and ˆt 0 p = 1 ρ t. Thus, d 1 ρ q dp = ρ t 1 F ˆt 0 p c f ˆt > 0, 0 therefore dψ dp c p, p < 0. Suppose now ˆt, c, ˆt 0 W. p is defined by ˆ ˆt 0 p,p t p ρ p, t p ρ q Full differentiation with respect to p yields I d dp where I = ˆt 0 yields: 1 t Iρ t d dp ˆt ρ 0 q p ˆt 0 p, t c f t dt p c f t dt = r. ˆt 0 p,p d 1 F ˆt 0 = 0, dp ρ q ρ qq f t dt < 0. Substituting in ˆt 0 and ˆt 0 p ρ q 1 ρ q d dp d 1 ρ q = ρ t 1 F ˆt 0 dp = ρ t ρq 1 F ˆt 0 I > 0, Iρ t ρ2 q therefore dψ dp c p, p < 0. Finally, p converges when p p, thus P c p, t c is bounded, thus lim p p Ψ c p, p = 0 since lim p pˆt 0 c p, p = 0. We now prove that θ n = kn for all n is a symmetric equilibrium if condition 3 holds. Differentiation of equation 4 yields: Π n θ n θ n, θ n = H Θ θ n H Θ Θ θn Θ 2 Ψ S, 8

and 2 Π n θ n 2 θn, θ n = 2H Θ θ n H Θ 2 Θ θn Θ 3 Ψ S. For Θ, 2 Π n θ n 2 θn, θ n = 2 Θ θn Θ 3 Ψ S > 0. Π n θn is increasing, thus the only equilibrium candidates are θ n = θ n = k n. Furthermore, 2 Π n θ n θ m θn, θ n = 2 Θ θn Θ 3 θn Θ 2 Ψ S > 0, and thus Then, Π n θ n θ n, θ n Πn θ n k1 k. Π n θ n k1 k = r kn 2 Ψ S > r Ψ S r Ψ p S, p S > 0 since p S by assumption. Thus, if condition 3 holds, Πn θn θ n, θ n > 0 for all θ n such that θ n k n and Θ. In particular, if θ n = n > 1, no negative deviation θ 1 < is profitable. for all onsider now a positive deviation, i.e., θ for all n <. We have: > k while θ n = Π θ, θ = h Θ θ h Θ Θ θ Θ 2 Ψ S. By construction, Θ = θ 1 > and θ Θ = 1 0, therefore θ > H Θθ H Θ < H Θ Θ H Θ < H H < 0 9

by condition 2, hence Π θ, θ < 0 for all θ positive deviation is profitable. θ n = for all n is therefore an equilibrium. >. o We now prove θ n = kn for all n is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Since Πn θ θn n, θ n > 0, no equilibrium exists for θ n such that θ n k n and Θ. Finally, consider the case θ n = Θ > Π n θ n Θ Θ for all n: = h Θ Θ h Θ 1 Θ Ψ S < 0. There exists no symmetric equilibrium with Θ >..3 Equilibrium investment In the first stage, producers decide on capacity, taking into account the equilibrium of the options market. Denote V n k n, k n producer n profit function: V n k n, k n = Π n k n,, k n, = Π n k n, k n, r k n Ψ S. Differentiation with respect to k n yields V n k n = Πn k n 1 Ψ S k n Ψ..1 A necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium k n = is: V n k n = Πn k n 1 Ψ S V n k n is decreasing since Π n k n is decreasing and Ψ < 0. V n k 0 0 = n Πn k 0 0 1 n Ψ 0, p S > 0 since i Πn k 0 0 > 0 n and ii Ψ 0, p S V > 0 by construction. lim n k = r < 0. Hence, n there exists a unique > 0 such that Πn k n = 0. This is equation 5. We prove in the main text that p S <. 10

We prove below that k n = for all n is an equilibrium, distinguishing the two cases ˆt, c, ˆt 0 S and ˆt, c, > ˆt 0 S..3.1 Generation produces at capacity before the strike price is reached onsider first a negative deviation: k 1 < while kn = n > 1. Total installed capacity is = k 1 1 expression B.1 for Πn k n V 1 k 1, k 1, = ˆ ˆt,c, t 1 for all <. Substituting into equation.1 ρ ˆQ k1, t ˆQ k 1 ρ q ˆQ k1, t ˆ ˆt 0, p S ρ k 1 ρ q c f t dt ˆt,c, ˆt 0, p S p S c 1 ρ, t p S k 1 ρq, t Substituting in equation??, observing that ˆt, c, < ˆt, c, and ˆt 0 S < ˆt 0, p S since <, and rearranging yields V 1 k 1, = ˆ ˆt,c, ρ ˆQ t 1 ˆ ˆt,c, ˆt,c, ˆ ˆt 0, p S ˆt,c, ˆ ˆt 0, ps ˆt 0, p S 1 ˆQ kqρ 1 ˆQ c f t dt ρ k 1 q ρ c f t dt c f t dt f t dt r. ρ k 1 qρ ρ ρ f t dt q p S ρ, t ρ q ˆt 0, ps ρ, t p S f t dt ρ q, t k 1 ρ, t ρ, t f t dt. ρ q, t k 1 1 11

Each term is positive: 1. ρ ˆQ kqρ 1 ˆQ ˆQ c = k k1 1 φ ρ q ˆQ ˆQ k1 0 for t [ t 1, ˆt, c, ] 2. ρ, ˆt, c, k 1 qρ, ˆt, c, = c, and ρ t k 1 ρ qt 0, hence ρ kqρ 1 c 0 for t [ˆt, c,, ˆt, c, ] 3. ρ q Q qρ qq Q < 0, hence ρ k 1 ρ q ρ ρ q ρ ρ q for t [ˆt, c,, ˆt 0 S ] 4. ρ, t p S for t ˆt 0, p S and ρ, t p S for t ˆt 0 S, hence p S ρ, t ρ q 1 ρ, t p S 0 for t [ˆt 0 S, ˆt 0, p S] 5., yields ρ, t ρ, t for all t Thus, Π1 k k1 1, > 0: a negative deviation is not profitable. onsider now a positive deviation, k n <. = k 1 >. > while kn = for all 2 V k 2, k = 2 Π k 2 2 1 Ψ k 2 Ψ 2 = 2 Π k 2 1 2ρ q, t ˆt 0, p S k f t dt ρ qq, t k ρ q, ˆt 0 S f ˆt 0 S ˆt 0 S. 12

Substituting in 2 Π k 2 2 V k 2, k from equation B.2, = ˆ ˆt 0, p S ˆt,c, 1 A positive deviation is not profitable. Therefore an equilibrium. Furthermore, 2 V n k n 2 hence [2ρ q ˆ, t k ρ qq ˆ, t ] f t dt ˆt 0, p S [ ] 2ρ q, t k ρ qq, t f t dt ρ q, ˆt 0 S f ˆt 0 S ˆt 0 S < 0. constitutes ˆ t p S [ = 2ρ q, t ] t ρ qq, t f t dt 2 1 ρ q, ˆt 0 S f ˆt 0 S ˆt 0 S < 0 is the unique symmetric equilibrium. t ps ρ q, t f t dt.3.2 The strike price is reached before generation produces at capacity Substituting expression B.4 for Πn k n k1 k into equation.1 yields V n k n = p S c f t dt 1 ρ, t p S k n Ψ S r. t n ˆt 0, p S Suppose k 1 =... = k 1 =. Then, 2 V k 2 = p S c f t t 1 1 k ˆt 0, p S [ ] 2ρ q, t k ρ qq, t f t dt ρ q, ˆt 0 S f ˆt 0 S ˆt 0 S. 13

Thus, if k <, 2 V k 2 < 0: a negative deviation is not profitable. onsider now a positive deviation, k >. Since producer is the last producer to be constrained, t = ˆt 0 S. Substituting equation B.4 into equation.1 yields V n k n, k = ˆt 0, p S p S c 1 [ p S c 1 ˆt 0, ps ˆ ˆt 0, p S = ˆt 0, ps 1 p S c f t dt ρ, t p S k ρ q, t ρ, t p S] f t dt ˆt 0, p S ρ, t ρ, t f t dt ˆt 0, p S ˆt ρ 0, ps, t p S f t dt k. ˆt 0, p S ρ q, t f t dt Since >, then ˆt 0 S > ˆt 0, p S and ρ, t < ρ, t, hence the first three terms are negative. The last term is negative since k > and ρ q < 0. Thus, V n k n, k < 0: a positive deviation is not profitable. is therefore an equilibrium. Furthermore, 2 V n k n 2 hence = p S c f ˆt ˆt 0 0 2 1 ρ q, t f t dt < 0 ˆt 0, p S is the unique symmetric equilibrium. f t dt D Energy cum operating reserves market Define the total surplus S p, γ, t = αs p t, t 1 α S p, γ, t 14

and total demand D p, γ, t = αs p t, t 1 α D p, γ, t. The social planner s program is: } max { S E p t, γ t, t c D p t, γ t, t r {pt,γt}, st : 1 h t D p t, γ t, t λ t The associated Lagrangian is: [ L = E { S p t, γ t, t c D p t, γ t, t λ t 1 h t D ]} p t, γ t, t r and: L pt L D = {p t [c 1 h t λ t]} ] pt v t [ D p t, γ t, γ t [c 1 h t λ t]} D γt = { L = E [λ t] r First, off-peak λ t = 0 and γ t = 1. Then p t = c = w t. This holds as long as ρ Q 1ht, t = c for Q t ˆt OR 0, c. Second, on-peak, if constant price customers are not curtailed, 1 h t D p t, 1, t = hence λ t > 0 and γ t = 1. Then p t = c λ t 1 h t = ρ 1ht, t and λ t = w t c = pt c 1ht > 0. Finally, constant price customers may have to be curtailed, 1 h t D p t, γ t, t = γt for γ t < 1 such that 1 h t D v, γ t, t =. Then 1 h t λ t = ρ 1ht, t c as before. The optimal capacity OR is then defined by E [λ t] = r which yields equation??. 15