A Paradox on Traffic Networks

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Transcription:

A Paradox on Traffic Networks Dietrich Braess Bochum Historical remarks. The detection of the paradox is also counterintuitive Is the mathematical paradox consistent with the psychological behavior of the car drivers? People knowing the paradox make conclusions forgetting that there are counterintuitive effects. Quantitative estimates of the deterioration Typeset by FoilTEX 1

The Traffic Assignment Problems The point of departure is the following question: How is the traffic flow distributed in a transportation network when the demand for each origin/destination pair is given. The travel time on each road depends on the amount of the traffic on that road. The time becomes larger if the traffic increases. Otherwise the problem would be easy. Each car chooses the shortest path. It is easily computed. Typeset by FoilTEX 2

An Example Münster Typeset by FoilTEX 3

institute region of nerve-racking traffic home Münster Typeset by FoilTEX 4

Notation u α link in a road map arc in a graph (the graph is directed) ϕ α traffic flow on u α t α = t α (ϕ) travel time for passing u α U β path from the origin to the destination Φ β flow along the path U β T β (Φ) travel time for the path U β T β (Φ) = α t α(ϕ α ) the sum runs over α with u α U β Typeset by FoilTEX 5

Properties of the time function: t α (0) 0, t α (ϕ) is monotonously increasing t α (ϕ) is continuous or semicontinuous from the left t(ϕ) ϕ Time function of a broad and a narrow street Typeset by FoilTEX 6

Wardrop s two principles System-optimal traffic: A central controller routes the traffic in an optimal way. User-optimal traffic: The travellers select their routes independently according to their knowledge. The travel times of all routes actually used for one origin/destination pair are equal, The result is a Nash equilibrium. An additional road can change the flow in a counterintuitive way! Typeset by FoilTEX 7

Historical Remarks. I was not aware of Wardrop s research and the book by Beckmann, McGuire and Winston. Lucky for me! Knödel has given a talk in Münster, and I wanted to study his algorithm. There was the need of emphasizing the differences. I had just moved from Theoretical Physics to Mathematics. A counterintuitive symmetry breaking argument was essential. A uniqueness result in the literature could not be true. Counterintuitive effects good for demonstrating differences. Counterintuitive effects in numerical methods are dangerous (Here even for people who know the paradox) Typeset by FoilTEX 8

System-Optimal Traffic Criterium that is democratic and fits to the comparison with the equilibrium. The travel time of the latest car is to be as small as possible. Optimal Flow: Given Φ tot, determine Φ β for all routes U β subject to Φ β =Φ tot β such that max β Φ β >0 T β (Φ) min! Typeset by FoilTEX 9

User-Optimal Traffic Equilibrium Definition. A traffic flow Φ is in an equilibrium state if there exists a (resulting) time T = T eq such that T β (Φ) = T for all used routes, T β (Φ) T for all routes not used. In the more general semicontinuous case the conditions are T β (Φ) T for all used routes, T β (Φ+) T for all routes, Φ+ := Φ + one more car on U β. Typeset by FoilTEX 10

The equilibrium property holds also for all nodes between origin and destination. Methods of proof of existence: Convex programming and fixed-point theorems for set-valued mappings. [Beckmann et al, Dafermos et al] Special case: one origin/destination pair. Set f α (ϕ) := ϕ tα (ψ)dψ. Find an admissible flow such that f α (ϕ α ) min! α Although we have an optimization with a slightly different cost function, the behavior is different! Typeset by FoilTEX 11

Psychological Effects The route through the center looks more time-consuming than it is for car drivers who like to go fast. Some people rather drive 5 minutes than wait 5 minutes. Typeset by FoilTEX 12

Another psychological argument: 1st route: First part slow, second part fast, 2nd route: First part fast, second part slow. total time is the same. Many drivers consider the second route as better. No problem for the mathematical treatment: Weight slow links at the beginning of a tour with a factor > 1. Typeset by FoilTEX 13

A Conflict: User-Optimization System-Optimization Old German city: 1st route through the city: short and narrow 2nd route on the by-pass: longer, insensitive to the load city by-pass river Night: The road through the city is faster in spite of lower speed. Day: About 10% of the global traffic would produce congestion. Travel time in the equilibrium = time for the by-pass. Remedy: Forbid global traffic through the city. Improvement of the road through the city is no help. Typeset by FoilTEX 14

Paradox in Dubben, Beck Bornholdt Typeset by FoilTEX 15

Paradox 4 5 1 2 origin destination 3 t 1 (ϕ) =t 3 (ϕ) = 10ϕ, t 2 (ϕ) =t 4 (ϕ) = 50 + ϕ, t 5 (ϕ) = 10 + ϕ. Φ tot =6 Typeset by FoilTEX 16

t 1 (ϕ) =t 3 (ϕ) = 10ϕ, t 2 (ϕ) =t 4 (ϕ) = 50 + ϕ, t 5 (ϕ) = 10 + ϕ. 53 3 3 3 3 30 53 30 83 53 30 0 Equilibrium without arc no. 5. 10 30 53 0 83 Typeset by FoilTEX 17

New Equilibrium with Arc no. 5 53 4 2 2 4 2 40 52 30 0 53 92 is greater than 83 30 When arc no. 5 is opened, it looks very favorable. You save 13. Later, however! Typeset by FoilTEX 18

Amount of Deterioration How large can T eq T opt be? Question studied by Roughgarden, Tardos and Kameda et al. Theorem. If all t α are arbitrary monotonous functions of ϕ and if all used paths in the optimal distribution have at most m links, then T eq mt opt. Theorem. If all functions t α (ϕ) are linear (as in internet traffic), then T eq 4 3 T opt. Typeset by FoilTEX 20

Deterioration and Paradoxial Behavior destination origin 0 ε 2ε 1+3ε destination origin 0 1 2 3 2/3 1 1+ε Number of levels: m =3. Total flow: Φ tot = m 1=2. Left: Φ=m/(m +1)=2/3 on every route. Right: No flow on red arcs. Modification of study by Roughgarden and Tardos Typeset by FoilTEX 21

Idea of Roughgarden s Proof The load function l α (ϕ) :=ϕt α (ϕ) is a quadratic polynomial if t α is linear, and slope = t(ϕ) l(ϕ) l( 1 2 ϕ) 1 4 l(ϕ), l ( 1 2 ϕ)=t(ϕ). same slope ϕ/2 ϕ Consider Taylor s expansion at 1 2 ϕ eq and estimate the global costs/load. Typeset by FoilTEX 22

Consider the total load C(Φ) := β T β (Φ)Φ β = α t α (ϕ α )ϕ α = α l α (ϕ α ) The convex function is expanded at 1 2 Φ eq. C(Φ) C( 1 2 Φ eq)+ α = C( 1 2 Φ eq)+ β l α ϕ (1 2 ϕ eq)[ϕ α 1 2 ϕ eq,α] T eq,β [Φ β 1 2 Φ eq,β] 1 4 C(Φ eq)+t eq Φ β 1 2 C(Φ eq) = 3 4 C(Φ eq) β Apply the inequality to the optimum. Typeset by FoilTEX 23

When do we encounterr paradoxial behavior in real-life traffic? There is one route with the tendency of congestion and a parallel one with heavy traffic. What happens if the congested road is made faster? Answer (Mathematics only): The time T eq will be nearly the same as before since a portion of the traffic will be shifted. Answer (Mathematics and Psychology): The situation will be worse on the congested road since the psychological barrier is reduced by the improvement of the road. Typeset by FoilTEX 24