Numerical Solvers in Cryptanalysis

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Numerical Solvers in Cryptanalysis M. Lamberger, T. Nad, V. Rijmen Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) Graz University of Technology Inffeldgasse 16a, A-8010 Graz, Austria Tomislav.Nad@iaik.tugraz.at 1

1 Motivation 2 Trivium (Bivium A) 3 Conversion Methods 4 Numerical Methods 2

Motivation Linear and differential cryptanalysis Successful techniques to break many existing ciphers New ciphers try to resist New techniques needed Numerical solvers Well researched Fast and efficient Working on real numbers 3

Basic Approach GF(2) equations solution GF(2) 4

Basic Approach GF(2) equations linear/ differential cryptanalysis solution GF(2) 4

Basic Approach GF(2) equations conversion R equations solution GF(2) 4

Basic Approach GF(2) equations conversion R equations numerical methods solution GF(2) solution R 4

Basic Approach GF(2) equations conversion R equations numerical methods solution GF(2) inverse conversion solution R 4

1 Motivation 2 Trivium (Bivium A) 3 Conversion Methods 4 Numerical Methods 5

Trivium and Bivium A Designed by Christophe De Cannière [1] Synchronous stream cipher estream finalist 6

Trivium and Bivium A Designed by Christophe De Cannière [1] Synchronous stream cipher estream finalist 288 bit internal state 6

Trivium and Bivium A Designed by Christophe De Cannière [1] Synchronous stream cipher estream finalist 288 bit internal state Reduced variant by Raddum [4] Bivium A 6

Trivium and Bivium A Designed by Christophe De Cannière [1] Synchronous stream cipher estream finalist 288 bit internal state Reduced variant by Raddum [4] Bivium A Attack Known plaintext attack Goal: state recovery 6

Keystream generation 7

Keystream generation: Bivium A 7

Keystream generation: Bivium A S 69 T 2 7

Keystream generation: Bivium A For i=1 to N do T 1 S 66 + S 93 T 2 S 162 + S 177 Z i T 2 T 1 T 1 + S 91 S 92 + S 171 T 2 T 2 + S 175 S 176 + S 69 (S 1, S 2,, S 93 ) (T 2, S 1, S 2,, S 92 ) (S 94, S 95,, S 177 ) (T 1, S 94, S 95,, S 176 ) end for 8

Keystream generation: Bivium A For i=1 to N do T 1 S 66 + S 93 T 2 S 162 + S 177 Z i T 2 T 1 T 1 + S 91 S 92 + S 171 T 2 T 2 + S 175 S 176 + S 69 (S 1, S 2,, S 93 ) (T 2, S 1, S 2,, S 92 ) (S 94, S 95,, S 177 ) (T 1, S 94, S 95,, S 176 ) end for 8

Keystream generation: Bivium A For i=1 to N do T 1 S 66 + S 93 T 2 S 162 + S 177 S 178 S 179 Z i T 2 T 1 T 1 + S 91 S 92 + S 171 T 2 T 2 + S 175 S 176 + S 69 (S 1, S 2,, S 93 ) (T 2, S 1, S 2,, S 92 ) (S 94, S 95,, S 177 ) (T 1, S 94, S 95,, S 176 ) end for 8

System of Equations First round S 162 + S 177 + Z 1 = 0 S 162 + S 177 + S 175 S 176 + S 69 + S 178 = 0 S 66 + S 93 + S 91 S 92 + S 171 + S 179 = 0 177 keystream bits Z i needed for a fully determined system 327 equations and variables 177 linear equations 150 nonlinear equations 9

1 Motivation 2 Trivium (Bivium A) 3 Conversion Methods 4 Numerical Methods 10

Conversion: Requirements Convert from a normal form Algebraic Normal Form A solution for the Boolean system should be a solution for the real system A solution for the real system should be a solution for the Boolean system Low degrees Simple as possible 11

Conversion Methods Standard Conversion GF(2) = {0, 1} {0, 1} R X 1 X 2 = x 1 x 2 X 1 + X 2 = x 1 + x 2 2 x 1 x 2 Multiplication in GF(2) becomes mult. in R Increasing amount of monomials Increasing degree Multilinearity 12

Conversion Methods (cont d) Fourier Conversion GF(2) = {0, 1} {1, 1} R X 1 X 2 = 1 2 (1 + x 1 + x 2 x 1 x 2 ) X 1 + X 2 = x 1 x 2 Addition in GF(2) becomes mult. in R Variables can cancel out (x 2 = 1) Increasing amount of monomials Increasing degree 13

Adapted Standard Conversion (ASC) S 162 + S 177 + Z 1 = 0 Type I S 162 + S 177 + S 175 S 176 + S 69 + S 178 = 0 Type II S 66 + S 93 + S 91 S 92 + S 171 + S 179 = 0 Type II Convert each type of equation separately Do not change the structure of the equations Keep the degree low Evaluate over GF(2) and over the reals Introduce new variables for each possible real value 14

ASC (cont d) 15

ASC (cont d) 15

ASC (cont d) 777 equations and variables Fewer monomials More equations and variables Maximum degree is 3 New type of equations are linear 15

Other Conversion Tricks Convert each side separately S 66 + S 93 + S 171 + S 179 = S 91 S 92 16

Other Conversion Tricks Convert each side separately S 66 + S 93 + S 171 + S 179 = S 91 S 92 Split equations and Standard Conversion S 91 S 92 = R 1 S 66 + S 93 = R 1 + R 2 S 171 + S 179 = R 2 16

Other Conversion Tricks Convert each side separately S 66 + S 93 + S 171 + S 179 = S 91 S 92 Split equations and Standard Conversion S 91 S 92 = R 1 S 66 + S 93 = R 1 + R 2 S 171 + S 179 = R 2 s 91 s 92 r 1 = 0 s 66 + s 93 s 66 s 93 r 1 r 2 + 2r 1 r 2 = 0 s 171 + s 179 2s 171 s 179 r 2 = 0 16

Conversion Methods: Comparison S 66 + S 93 + S 171 + S 179 + S 91 S 92 = 0 Standard Conversion 17

Conversion Methods: Comparison S 66 + S 93 + S 171 + S 179 + S 91 S 92 = 0 Fourier Conversion 17

Conversion Methods: Comparison S 66 + S 93 + S 171 + S 179 + S 91 S 92 = 0 Adapted Standard Conversion 17

Conversion Methods: Comparison S 66 + S 93 + S 171 + S 179 + S 91 S 92 = 0 Splitting 17

Summary for Bivium A Standard Conversion 327 equations and variables Degree is 6 High amount of monomials with high degree Fourier Conversion 327 equations and variables Degree is 6 Less monomials No variables cancel out Adaptive Standard Conversion 777 equations and variables Degree is 3 Low amount of monomials Splitting 627 variables and equations Degree is 2 Low amount of monomials 18

1 Motivation 2 Trivium (Bivium A) 3 Conversion Methods 4 Numerical Methods 19

Converted System: Facts Large systems of polynomials Highly nonlinear, degrees between 2 and 6 Multilinear Coefficients are 1 Sparse Fully determined Possible over-determined 20

Converted System: Facts Large systems of polynomials Highly nonlinear, degrees between 2 and 6 Multilinear Coefficients are 1 Sparse Fully determined Possible over-determined Solution exists Solution is {0, 1} n or { 1, 1} n respectively Precomputed solution available Continuously differentiable Regular Jacobian in the solution Ill-conditioned Jacobian A lot of singular points 20

Optimization Problem min F (s) 2 2 21

Optimization Problem min F (s) 2 2 l i s i u i (i = 1,, n) Box-bounded optimization problem s, l, u R n F : R n R n Iterative algorithms Starting point needed Global and local convergence Global and local optimum 21

Interior Reflective Newton Method [2] [2] Box constrained problem Iterates are between upper and lower bounds Good global convergence Scales well with the system size 22

DIRECT Algorithm [3] Box constrained problem Global optimization, global search Good results on random systems Good results on systems with more than one global optimum [3] 23

Experiments Bivium A Standard Fourier ASC Splitting Starting point Random walk on the cube Random in (0, 1) or ( 1, 1) respectively Guessing bits (variables) 24

Results System Starting point Result Bivium A (F) a,b local optimum c (250) solution found Bivium A (S) a,b local optimum c (250) solution found Bivium A (ASC) a,b real-valued solution c (580) solution found Bivium A (Splitting) a,b local optimum c (470) solution found a Random in {0, 1} n or { 1, 1} n respectivley b Random in (0, 1) n or ( 1, 1) n respectivley c Guessing bits (variables) 25

Conclusions Hard problem Converted systems are difficult Large and highly nonlinear High influence on the system over the reals Many possibilities to model the problem over the reals Mixed Integer Linear Problem Mixed Integer Nonlinear Problem Adding constraints to the problem High amount of different solvers/algorithms/strategies Does a real-valued solution contain useful information? Does a local optimum contain useful information? 26

Thank you for your attention! 27

References [1] Christophe De Cannière. Trivium: A stream cipher construction inspired by block cipher design principles. In ISC, pages 171 186, 2006. [2] Thomas F. Coleman and Yuying Li. On the convergence of interior-reflective newton methods for nonlinear minimization subject to bounds. Math. Program., 67(2-17):189 224, 1994. [3] D. R. Jones, C. D. Perttunen, and B. E. Stuckman. Lipschitzian optimization without the lipschitz constant. J. Optim. Theory Appl., 79(1):157 181, 1993. [4] Havard Raddum. Cryptanalytic Result on Trivium. estream project. 2006. 28