On Greedy Algorithms and Approximate Matroids

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Transcription:

On Greedy Algorithms and Approximate Matroids a riff on Paul Milgrom s Prices and Auctions in Markets with Complex Constraints Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University) 1

A 50-Year-Old Puzzle Persistent mystery: why do so many heuristics for optimization problems work so well in practice? 2

A 50-Year-Old Puzzle Persistent mystery: why do so many heuristics for optimization problems work so well in practice? Why should economists care?: real-world market design often requires heuristics. 3

A 50-Year-Old Puzzle Persistent mystery: why do so many heuristics for optimization problems work so well in practice? Why should economists care?: real-world market design often requires heuristics. 1. Computational reasons. Not enough time/computational power to solve exactly. [Nisan/Ronen 99, Lehmann/O Callaghan/Shoham 99] 2. Economic reasons. Descending clock implementations require reverse greedy algorithms. [Milgrom/Segal 14] 4

Two Example Problems LOS99 setup: each bidder has a desired bundle of items and a valuation for it. goal: select winners to max social welfare subject to no item being allocated twice 5

Two Example Problems LOS99 setup: each bidder has a desired bundle of items and a valuation for it. goal: select winners to max social welfare subject to no item being allocated twice Milgrom-Segal/FCC Incentive Auction: each station has valuation for its current license. goal: select subset of stations to max welfare winners keep their licenses subject to repacking winners into target # of channels 6

General Formalism Packing problem: ground set X, collection C of subsets (C satisfies free disposal/downward-closure ). each x in X has a nonnegative value v x goal: choose S from C to maximize Σ x in S v x Examples: (all NP-hard) knapsack single-minded bidders (LOS99) [ independent set] station repacking (MS14) [ graph coloring] 7

Matroids: A Solvable Special Case Definition: (X,C) is a matroid if... [omitted] One property: all maximal subsets of C have the same cardinality (the rank of the matroid). 8

Matroids: A Solvable Special Case Definition: (X,C) is a matroid if... [omitted] One property: all maximal subsets of C have the same cardinality (the rank of the matroid). Example: acyclic subgraphs Non-example: matchings 9

Matroids: A Solvable Special Case Definition: (X,C) is a matroid if... [omitted] One property: all maximal subsets of C have the same cardinality (the rank of the matroid). Example: acyclic subgraphs Non-example: matchings 1 1+ε Fact: greedy algorithm always optimal iff matroid. 1 10

Approximate Matroids/Substitutes? Substitutability index: [Milgrom] ρ(c) := max (min matroid.r C X C (max X ' X X ' R X ' X ))) 11

Approximate Matroids/Substitutes? Substitutability index: [Milgrom] ρ(c) := max (min matroid.r C X C (max X ' X X ' R X ' X ))) Heuristic #1: Define R * = argmax above. Optimize over R * (e.g., using greedy) instead of over C. Theorem: [Milgrom] for every C, worst-case (over v x s) approximation is exactly ρ(c). 12

On the Substitutability Index Open question: is the substitutability index close to 1 in the FCC Incentive Auction?

On the Substitutability Index Open question: is the substitutability index close to 1 in the FCC Incentive Auction? In general: substitutability index can be unreasonably small. substitutability index of matchings in K n,n? 14

On the Substitutability Index Open question: is the substitutability index close to 1 in the FCC Incentive Auction? In general: substitutability index can be unreasonably small. substitutability index of matchings in K n,n = 1/n 15

An Alternative Parameterization Rank quotient: [Korte/Hausmann 78] α(c) := min X,X 'maximal.in.c X ' X Heuristic #2: Run greedy algorithm w.r.t. C. one pass through elements from highest to lowest add current element iff preserves feasibility 16

An Alternative Parameterization Rank quotient: [Korte/Hausmann 78] α(c) := min S X min X,X 'maximal.in.π S (C ) X ' X Heuristic #2: Run greedy algorithm w.r.t. C. one pass through elements from highest to lowest add current element iff preserves feasibility 17

An Alternative Parameterization Rank quotient: [Korte/Hausmann 78] α(c) := min S X min X,X 'maximal.in.π S (C ) X ' X Heuristic #2: Run greedy algorithm w.r.t. C. one pass through elements from highest to lowest add current element iff preserves feasibility Theorem: [Korte/Hausmann] for every C, worst-case (over v x s) approximation is exactly α(c). 18