Confronting Theory with Experimental Data and vice versa. Lecture I Choice under risk. The Norwegian School of Economics Nov 7-11, 2011

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Confronting Theory with Experimental Data and vice versa Lecture I Choice under risk The Norwegian School of Economics Nov 7-11, 2011

Preferences Let X be some set of alternatives (consumption set). Formally, we represent the consumer s preferences by a binary relation % defined on the consumption set X. For any pair of baskets (or bundles) x and y, if the consumer says that x is at least as good as y, wewritex % y and say that x is weakly preferred to y. Bear in mind: economic theory often seeks to convince you with simple examples and then gets you to extrapolate. This simple construction works in wider (and wilder circumstances).

The basic assumptions about preferences The theory begins with two (not three!) assumptions about preferences [1] Completeness x % y or y % x for any pair of bundles x and y. [2] Transitivity if x % y and y % z then x % z or any three bundles x, y and z.

Together, completeness and transitivity constitute the formal definition of rationality as the term is used in economics. Rational economic agents are ones who [1] have the ability to make choices, and [2] whose choices display a logical consistency. The preferences of a rational agent can be represented, or summarized, by a utility function (more later).

The paternity of decision theory and game theory (1944)

Preferences toward risk The standard model of decisions under risk (known probabilities) is based on von Neumann and Morgenstern Expected Utility Theory. Let X be a set of lotteries, or gambles, (outcomes and probabilities). A fundamental assumption about preferences toward risk is independence: For any lotteries x, y, z and 0 <α<1 x  y implies αx +(1 α)r  αy +(1 α)r.

Experiments à la Allais Allais (1953) I Choose between the two gambles:.33 % A :=.66 $25, 000 $24, 000 B := 1 $24, 000 &.01 $0

Allais (1953) II Choose between the two gambles: 33 $25 000 $24 000 % := := & 67 34 % & $0 66 $0

The Marschak-Machina probability triangle 1 P H Increasing preference 0 P L 1 H, M, and L are three degenerate gambles with certain outcomes H>M>L

A test of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 1 P H B A D 0 P L C 1 EUT requires that indifference lines are parallel so one must choose either A and C, or B and D.

Contributions Results have generated the most impressive dialogue between observation and theorizing (Camerer, 1995): Violations of EUT raise criticisms about the status of the Savage axioms as the touchstone of rationality. These criticisms have generated the development of various alternatives to EUT, such as Prospect Theory.

Limitations Choice scenarios narrowly tailored to reveal anomalies limits the usefulness of data for other purposes: Subjects face extreme rather than typical decision problems designed to encourage violations of specific axioms. Small data sets force experimenters to pool data and to ignore individual heterogeneity.

Research questions Consistency Is behavior under uncertainty consistent with the utility maximization model? Structure Is behavior consistent with a utility function with some special structural properties?

Recoverability Can the underlying utility function be recovered from observed choices? Extrapolation Given behavior in the laboratory, can we forecast behavior in other environments?

A new experimental design An experimental design that has a couple of fundamental innovations over previous work: A selection of a bundle of contingent commodities from a budget set (a portfolio choice problem). A graphical experimental interface that allows for the collection of a rich individual-level data set.

The experimental computer program dialog windows

Rationality Let {(p i,x i )} 50 i=1 be some observed individual data (pi denotes the i-th observation of the price vector and x i denotes the associated portfolio). A utility function u(x) rationalizes the observed behavior if it achieves the maximum on the budget set at the chosen portfolio u(x i ) u(x) for all x s.t. p i x i p i x.

Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) Paul A. Samuelson (1915 2009) the first American Nobel laureate in economics and the foremost (academic) economist of the 20th century (and the uncle of Larry Summers ).

Revealed preference A portfolio x i is directly revealed preferred to a portfolio x j if p i x i p i x j,andx i is strictly directly revealed preferred to x j if the inequality is strict. The relation indirectly revealed preferred is the transitive closure of the directly revealed preferred relation.

Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) If x i is indirectly revealed preferred to x j,thenx j is not strictly directly revealed preferred (i.e. p j x j p j x i )tox i. GARP is tied to utility representation through a theorem, which was first proved by Afriat (1967).

Afriat s Theorem The following conditions are equivalent: The data satisfy GARP. There exists a non-satiated utility function that rationalizes the data. There exists a concave, monotonic, continuous, non-satiated utility function that rationalizes the data.

Afriat s critical cost efficiency index (CCEI) The amount by which each budget constraint must be relaxed in order to remove all violations of GARP. The CCEI is bounded between zero and one. The closer it is to one, the smaller the perturbation required to remove all violations and thus the closer the data are to satisfying GARP.

The construction of the CCEI for a simple violation of GARP x 2 D C B A y x The agent is wasting' as much as A/B<C/D of his income by making inefficient choices. x 1

A benchmark level of consistency A random sample of hypothetical subjects who implement the power utility function ( ) = 1 1 commonly employed in the empirical analysis of choice under uncertainty, with error. The likelihood of error is assumed to be a decreasing function of the utility cost of an error.

More precisely, we assume an idiosyncratic preference shock that has a logistic distribution Pr( )= ( ) R ( ) : =1 where the precision parameter reflects sensitivity to differences in utility. If utility maximization is not the correct model, is our experiment sufficiently powerful to detect it?

0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 The distributions of GARP violations ρ=1/2 and different γ γ=5 γ=10 γ=1 γ=1/2 γ=1/4 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 CCEI

0.90 0.95 1.00 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 Bronnars (1987) test (γ=0) n=50 n=20 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 CCEI n=15 n=5 n=10 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00

The distributions of CCEI scores two assets 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 Fraction of subjects 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 CCEI Risk Random

The distributions of CCEI scores three assets 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 Fraction of subjects 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 CCEI Ambiguity Risk Random

Recoverability Revealed preference relations in the data contain the information that is necessary for recovering preferences. Varian (ECMA, 1982) uses GARP to generate an algorithm that can recover preferences from choices. This approach is purely nonparametric making no assumptions about the parametric form of the underlying utility function.

Risk neutrality

Infinite risk aversion

Loss / disappointment aversion

Individual-level data A review of the full data set reveals striking regularities within and marked heterogeneity across subjects. A quick look at the individual-level data indicates that whatever is going on is not consistent with the standard interpretation of EUT. Examples that reveal some of the unexpected features of the data and illustrate the role of heuristics.

Diagonal

Boundary

Smooth

Diagonal and boundary

Diagonal, boundary and smooth

Diagonal, boundary and smooth

Center Vertex

Centroid (budget shares) Edge

Bisector Center and bisector

Edge and bisector Center, vertex, and edge

Vertex and edge Center and bisector