Pitfalls in designing substitution boxes

Similar documents
Structures of cryptographic functions with strong avalanche characteristics

Comments on "Generating and Counting Binary Bent Sequences"

Well known bent functions satisfy both SAC and PC(l) for all l n, b not necessarily SAC(k) nor PC(l) of order k for k 1. On the other hand, balancedne

Non-Separable Cryptographic Functions

Maximum Correlation Analysis of Nonlinear S-boxes in Stream Ciphers

On the Symmetric Property of Homogeneous Boolean Functions

Hadamard Matrices, Bent Functions and Cryptography. The University of Wollongong. Abstract

Transform Domain Analysis of DES. Guang Gong and Solomon W. Golomb. University of Southern California. Tels and

Generalized hyper-bent functions over GF(p)

Cryptographically Robust Large Boolean Functions. Debdeep Mukhopadhyay CSE, IIT Kharagpur

Smart Hill Climbing Finds Better Boolean Functions

The primary aim of this paper is to introduce a new class of functions to facilitate the design of cryptographically good functions. It turns out that

hold or a eistel cipher. We nevertheless prove that the bound given by Nyberg and Knudsen still holds or any round keys. This stronger result implies

Decomposing Bent Functions

An average case analysis of a dierential attack. on a class of SP-networks. Distributed Systems Technology Centre, and

Perfect Secret Sharing Schemes from Room Squares

Nonlinearity and propagation characteristics of balanced boolean functions

Revisit and Cryptanalysis of a CAST Cipher

Towards Provable Security of Substitution-Permutation Encryption Networks

Extended Criterion for Absence of Fixed Points

How to Find the Sufficient Collision Conditions for Haval-128 Pass 3 by Backward Analysis

Fast Algebraic Immunity of 2 m + 2 & 2 m + 3 variables Majority Function

Differential properties of power functions

Analysis of Some Quasigroup Transformations as Boolean Functions

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In x2 we explain how both detectable and undetectable trapdoors can be built into S-boxes. x3 deals wi

A Conjecture on Binary String and Its Applications on Constructing Boolean Functions of Optimal Algebraic Immunity

Statistical and Linear Independence of Binary Random Variables

Affine equivalence in the AES round function

Constructing differential 4-uniform permutations from know ones

Some new constructions of orthogonal designs

Finding good differential patterns for attacks on SHA-1

Algebraic nonlinearity and its applications to cryptography

On Pseudo Randomness from Block Ciphers

Block Ciphers and Systems of Quadratic Equations

Céline Blondeau, Anne Canteaut and Pascale Charpin*

Improved Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Rijndael and Crypton

Statistical and Algebraic Properties of DES

Quadratic Equations from APN Power Functions

Finding Low Degree Annihilators for a Boolean Function Using Polynomial Algorithms

Hyper-bent Functions

1-Resilient Boolean Function with Optimal Algebraic Immunity

Quadratic Almost Perfect Nonlinear Functions With Many Terms

CCZ-equivalence and Boolean functions

A New Class of Bent Negabent Boolean Functions

A Five-Round Algebraic Property of the Advanced Encryption Standard

Computing the biases of parity-check relations

On values of vectorial Boolean functions and related problems in APN functions

Substitution-Permutation Networks Resistant to Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

A New Characterization of Semi-bent and Bent Functions on Finite Fields

Provable Security Against a Dierential Attack? Aarhus University, DK-8000 Aarhus C.

Boolean functions in cryptography

DK-2800 Lyngby, Denmark, Mercierlaan 94, B{3001 Heverlee, Belgium,

Provable Security Against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

New Constructions for Resilient and Highly Nonlinear Boolean Functions

arxiv:math/ v1 [math.co] 24 Oct 2000

Some matrices of Williamson type

Third-order nonlinearities of some biquadratic monomial Boolean functions

Hadamard Matrices, d-linearly Independent Sets and Correlation-Immune Boolean Functions with Minimum Hamming Weights

Impossible Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round CLEFIA-128

Functions on Finite Fields, Boolean Functions, and S-Boxes

Cryptanalysis of a Generalized Unbalanced Feistel Network Structure

arxiv: v5 [cs.it] 4 Nov 2009

Bose's method of differences applied to construct Bhaskar Rao designs

On Cryptographic Properties of the Cosets of R(1;m)

DIFFERENTIAL cryptanalysis is the first statistical attack

AES side channel attacks protection using random isomorphisms

On Boolean functions which are bent and negabent

Virtual isomorphisms of ciphers: is AES secure against differential / linear attack?

N.G.Bean, D.A.Green and P.G.Taylor. University of Adelaide. Adelaide. Abstract. process of an MMPP/M/1 queue is not a MAP unless the queue is a

Cryptanalysis of Patarin s 2-Round Public Key System with S Boxes (2R)

The ANF of the Composition of Addition and Multiplication mod 2 n with a Boolean Function

A matrix approach for constructing quadratic APN functions

Construction and Count of Boolean Functions of an Odd Number of Variables with Maximum Algebraic Immunity

Haar Spectrum of Bent Boolean Functions

Distinguishing Attacks on a Kind of Generalized Unbalanced Feistel Network

Vectorial Boolean Functions for Cryptography

K. T. Arasu Jennifer Seberry y. Wright State University and University ofwollongong. Australia. In memory of Derek Breach.

Cryptanalysis of the Oil & Vinegar Signature Scheme

Balanced Boolean Function on 13-variables having Nonlinearity strictly greater than the Bent Concatenation Bound

Secret-sharing with a class of ternary codes

Highly nonlinear 0-1 balanced boolean functions satisfying strict avalanche criterion

Some results on the existence of t-all-or-nothing transforms over arbitrary alphabets

2. Accelerated Computations

Provable Security Against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

An infinite family of Goethals-Seidel arrays

Some Results on the Known Classes of Quadratic APN Functions

On the computation of best second order approximations of Boolean Functions ΕΤΗΣΙΑ ΕΚΘΕΣΗ 2010

Cryptanalysis of the Wu}Dawson Public Key Cryptosystem

DES S-box Generator. 2 EPFL, Switzerland

Perfect Secret Sharing Schemes from Room. Squares. Ghulam-Rasool Chaudhry. Centre for Computer Security Research. University of Wollongong

Dirichlet Product for Boolean Functions

Minimal and Maximal Critical Sets in Room Squares

Linear Algebra (part 1) : Vector Spaces (by Evan Dummit, 2017, v. 1.07) 1.1 The Formal Denition of a Vector Space

The decomposability of simple orthogonal arrays on 3 symbols having t + 1 rows and strength t

Royal Holloway University of London

Solving Systems of Modular Equations in One Variable: How Many RSA-Encrypted Messages Does Eve Need to Know?

Elementary 2-Group Character Codes. Abstract. In this correspondence we describe a class of codes over GF (q),

G-Perfect Nonlinear Functions

Cryptanalysis of a Message Authentication Code due to Cary and Venkatesan

Open problems related to algebraic attacks on stream ciphers

Transcription:

University of Wollongong Research Online Faculty of Informatics - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences 1994 Pitfalls in designing substitution boxes Jennifer Seberry University of Wollongong, jennie@uow.edu.au Xian-Mo Zhang University of Wollongong, xianmo@uow.edu.au Yuliang Zheng University of Wollongong, yuliang@uow.edu.au Publication Details Seberry, J, Zhang, XM and Zheng, Y, Pitfalls in designing substitution boxes, Desmedt, Y (ed), Crypto'94 - Advances in Cryptography, 839, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1994, 383-396. Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Pitfalls in designing substitution boxes Abstract Two significant recent advances in cryptanalysis, namely the differential attack put forward by Biham and Shamir [3] and the linear attack by Matsui [7, 8] have had devastating impact on data encryption algorithms. An eminent problem that researchers are facing is to design S-boxes or substitution boxes so that an encryption algorithm that employs the S-boxes is immune to the attacks. In this paper we present evidence indicating that there are many pitfalls on the road to achieve the goal. In particular, we show that certain types of S-boxes which are seemly very appealing do not exist. We also show that, contrary to previous perception, techniques such as chopping or repeating permutations do not yield cryptographically strong S-boxes. In addition, we reveal an important combinatorial structure associated with certain quadratic permutations, namely, the dfference distribution table of each differentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation embodies a Hadamard matrix. As an application of this result, we show that chopping a differentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation results in an S-box that is very prone to the differential cryptanalytic attack. Disciplines Physical Sciences and Mathematics Publication Details Seberry, J, Zhang, XM and Zheng, Y, Pitfalls in designing substitution boxes, Desmedt, Y (ed), Crypto'94 - Advances in Cryptography, 839, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1994, 383-396. This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/1109

Pitfalls in Designing Substitution Boxes Jennifer Seberry Xian-Mo Zhang Yuliang Zheng Department of Computer Science The University of Wollongong Wollongong, NSW 2522, AUSTRALIA E-mail: fjennie,xianmo,yuliangg@cs.uow.edu.au Abstract Two signicant recent advances in cryptanalysis, namely the dierential attack put forward by Biham and Shamir [3] and the linear attack by Matsui [7, 8],have had devastating impact on data encryption algorithms. An eminent problem that researchers are facing is to design S-boxes or substitution boxes so that an encryption algorithm that employs the S-boxes is immune to the attacks. In this paper we present evidence indicating that there are many pitfalls on the road to achieve the goal. In particular, we show that certain types of S-boxes which are seemly very appealing do not exist. We also show that, contrary to previous perception, techniques such aschopping or repeating permutations do not yield cryptographically strong S-boxes. In addition, we reveal an important combinatorial structure associated with certain quadratic permutations, namely, the dierence distribution table of each dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation embodies a Hadamard matrix. As an application of this result, we show that chopping a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation results in an S-box that is very prone to the dierential cryptanalytic attack. Key Words substitution boxes (S-boxes), permutations, dierential attack, Hadamard matrix, cryptography. 1 Basic Denitions Denote by V n the vector space of n tuples of elements from GF (2). Let =(a 1 ::: a n ) and =(b 1 ::: b n )betwo vectors in V n. The scalar product of and, denoted by h i, is dened by h i = a 1 b 1 a n b n, where multiplication and addition are over GF (2). In this paper we consider Boolean functions from V n to GF (2) (or simply functions on V n ). Let f be a function on V n. The (1 ;1)-sequence dened by((;1) f( 0),(;1) f ( 1), :::,(;1) f( 2 n ;1) ) is called the sequence of f, and the (0 1)-sequence dened by (f( 0 ), f( 1 ), :::, f( 2 n ;1)) is called 1

the truth table of f, where 0 =(0 ::: 0 0), 1 =(0 ::: 0 1), :::, 2 n ;1 =(1 ::: 1 1). f is said to be balanced if its truth table has 2 n;1 zeros (ones). An ane function f on V n is a function that takes the form of f = a 1 x 1 a n x n c, where a j c 2 GF (2), j =1 2 ::: n.furthermore f is called a linear function if c = 0. The sequence of an ane (or linear) function is called an ane (or linear) sequence. The Hamming weight ofavector 2 V n, denoted by W (), is the number of ones in the vector. A(1 ;1)-matrix H of order m is called a Hadamard matrix if HH t = mi m,whereh t is the transpose of H and I m is the identity matrix of order m. ASylvester-Hadamard matrix or Walsh- Hadamard matrix of order 2 n, denoted by H n, is generated by the following recursive relation H 0 =1 H n = " Hn;1 # H n;1 n=1 2 :::: H n;1 ;H n;1 Now we introduce bent functions, an important combinatorial concept discovered by Rothaus in the mid 1960's, although his pioneering work was not published until some ten years later [14]. Denition 1 A function f on V n is said to be bent if 2 ; n 2 X x2v n (;1) f (x)h xi = 1 for every 2 V n. Here x =(x 1 ::: x n ) and f(x) h xi is considered asareal valued function. Bent functions can be characterized in various ways. In particular, the following statements are equivalent (see also [6]): (i) f is bent. (ii) h `i = 2 1 2 n for any ane sequence ` of length 2 n, where is the sequence of f. (iii) f(x) f(x ) is balanced for any non-zero vector 2 V n, where x =(x 1 ::: x n ). An n s S-box or substitution box is a mapping from V n to V s, where n > = s.nowwe consider a nonlinearity criterion that measures the strength of an S-box against dierential cryptanalysis [3, 4]. The essence of a dierential attack is that it exploits particular entries in the dierence distribution tables of S-boxes employed by a block cipher. The dierence distribution table of an n s S-box is a 2 n 2 s matrix. The rows of the matrix, indexed by thevectors in V n, represent thechange in the input, while the columns, indexed by the vectors in V s, represent thechange in the output of the S-box. An entry in the table indexed by ( ) indicates the number of input vectors which, when changed by (in the sense of bit-wise XOR), result in a change in the output by (also in the sense of bit-wise XOR). Note that an entry in a dierence distribution table can only take aneven value, the sum of the valuesinarow is always 2 n, and the rst row isalways (2 n 0 ::: 0). As entries with higher values in the table are particularly useful to dierential cryptanalysis, a necessary condition for an S-box to be immune to dierential cryptanalysis is that it does not have large values in its dierential distribution table (not counting the rst entry in the rst row). 2

Denition 2 Let F be annss-box, where n > = s. Let be the largest value in dierential distribution table of the S-box (not counting the rst entry in the rst row), namely, = max max jfxjf(x) F (x ) =gj: 2V n 6=0 2V s Then F is said to be dierentially -uniform, and accordingly, is called the dierential uniformity of F. Obviously the dierential uniformity of an n s S-box is constrained by 2 n;s < = < = 2 n. Extensive research has been carried out in constructing dierentially -uniform S-boxes with a low [1, 13, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Some constructions, in particular those based on permutation polynomials on nite elds, are simple and elegant. However, caution must be taken with Denition 2. In particular, it should be noted that low dierential uniformity (a small ) is only a necessary, but not a sucient condition for immunity to dierential attacks. This is shown by the fact that S-boxes constructed in [1, 9], which have a at dierence distribution table, are extremely weak to dierential attacks, despite that they achieve thelowest possible dierential uniformity =2 n;s [4, 5, 15]. A more complete measurement that takes into account the number of nonzero entries in the rst column of a dierence distribution table is the robustness introduced in [15]. Denition 3 Let F =(f 1 ::: f s ) be anns S-box, where f i is a function on V n, i =1 ::: s,and n > = s. Denote by L the largest value in the dierence distribution table of F, and by N the number of nonzero entries in the rst column of the table. In either case the value 2 n in the rst row is not counted. Then we say that F is R-robust against dierential cryptanalysis, where R is dened by R =(1; N 2 n )(1 ; L 2 n ): Robustness gives more accurate information about the strength of an S-box against the dierential attack than dierential uniformity does. However, dierential uniformity has an advantage over robustness in that the former is easier to discuss than the latter. For this reason, dierential uniformity is employed as the rst indicator for the strength of an S-box against the dierential attack, while robustness is considered when more complete information about the strength is needed. An n s S-box F =(f 1 ::: f s ) is said to be regular if F runs through each vector in V s 2 n;s times while x runs through V n once. S-boxes employed by a block cipher must be regular, since otherwise the cipher would be prone to statistical attacks. For a regular n s S-box, its dierential uniformity is larger than 2 n;s (see also Lemma 2 of [17]). The robustness of the S-box is further determined by the number of nonzero entries in the rst column of the table. We are particularly interested in n s S-boxes that have the following property: for any nonzero vector 2 V n, F (x) F(x ) runs through half of the vectors in V s,each2 n;s+1 times, but not through the other half of the vectors in V n. With each row in the dierence distribution table of such ans-box, half of its entries contain a value 2 n;s+1 while the other half contain a value zero. For simplicity, wesaysuch a dierence distribution table to be uniformly half-occupied. Clearly an n s S-box with a UHODDT or uniformly half-occupied dierence distribution table achieves the dierential uniformity of2 n;s+1. In Theorem 3 of [17], it has been proved that for quadratic S-boxes, 2 n;s+1 is the lower bound on dierential uniformity. Note that a dierentially 2-uniform permutation is also a permutation with a UHODDT, and vice versa. These permutations have many nice properties [13, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12]. In particular, they 3

achieve the highest possible robustness against the dierential attack. The concept of n s S-boxes with a UHODDT can be viewed as a generalization of dierentially 2-uniform permutations. Hence n s S-boxes with a UHODDT are very appealing and have received extensive research (see for instance [2]). There are two important questions about S-boxes with a UHODDT, namely (i) Do there exist S-boxes with a UHODDT? If there do, how to construct them? (ii) What is the robustness of an S-box with a UHODDT? When n = s, the answer to the rst question is \yes". It has been shown in [13, 11, 2] that certain permutation polynomials on GF (2 n ), n odd, have a UHODDT. So far no result has been known regarding the case of n>s. In Section 2, we will partially solve the problem by showing that there exist no quadratic ns S-boxes with a UHODDT, if either n or s is even. The second question will be discussed in Section 3. We willprove that the robustness of an S-box with a UHODDT is very low. Another important question is the synthesis of S-boxes, namely (iii) How to construct S-boxes from existing ones? This question will be discussed in Section 4. We will show that many synthesis methods which were previously taken for granted, in fact do not yield strong S-boxes, even though the starting S- boxes employed are all strong ones. Section 5 is solely devoted to the investigation of combinatorial properties of the dierential distribution table of an quadratic permutation. We reveal a result that is very interesting even from the point of view of pure combinatorics, namely, every uniformly halfoccupied dierence distribution table of a quadratic permutation embodies a Sylvester-Hadamard matrix. 2 Nonexistence of Certain Quadratic S-boxes 2.1 On Quadratic S-boxes with a UHODDT As mentioned in the previous section, an n s S-box with a UHODDT or uniformly half-occupied dierence distribution table achieves the dierential uniformityof2 n;s+1, and for quadratic S-boxes, 2 n;s+1 is the lower bound on dierential uniformity. In the following weshow an impossibility result, namely, there exist no quadratic S-boxes that have a UHODDT if either n or s is even. Assume that F =(f 1 ::: f s ) is a quadratic n s S-box with a UHODDT, where n>s. We prove that neither n nor s can be even. Recall that a vector 2 V n is called a linear structure of a function f on V n if f(x) f(x ) is a constant. The set of the linear structures of f forms a linear subspace. The dimension of the subspace is called the linearity dimension of f. Let 1 ::: 2 n ;1 be the 2 n ; 1 nonzero vectors in V n and g 1 ::: g 2 s ;1 be the 2 s ;1 nonzero linear combinations of f 1 ::: f s.we construct a bipartite graph whose vertices comprise 1 ::: 2 n ;1 on one side and g 1 ::: g 2 s ;1 on the other side. An edge or link between i and g j exists if and only if i is a linear structure of g j. Theorem 2 of [17] states that n;`i is even, where `i is the linearity dimension of g i.equivalently, n and `i must be both even or both odd. Since each g i is balanced, it can not be bent. By Lemma 5 4

of [17], a quadratic function is bent if and only if it does not have linear structures. Hence we have `i > = 1. On the other hand, from the proof for Corollary 1 of [17], we have `i < = n;2. We distinguish the following two cases: Case 1: n is odd and `i is 1 3 5 :::,orn ; 2. Case 2: n is even and `i is 2 4 6 :::,orn ; 2. First we consider Case 1. Let p j denote the number of `i, 1< = i < = 2 n ; 1, such that`i = j. Then we have a sequence of numbers p 1 p 3 p 5 ::: p n;2 : Obviously, p 1 + p 3 + p 5 + + p n;2 =2 s ; 1: (1) Since F is a S-box with a UHODDT, for any nonzero vector k 2 V n F(x) F(x k )=(f 1 (x) f 1 (x k ) ::: f s (x) f s (x k )) is not regular. Thus, by Lemma 1, there exists a linear combination of f 1 (x)f 1 (x k ) ::: f s (x) f s (x k ), say g j (x)g j (x k ), such that g j (x)g j (x k ) is not balanced. Since g j (x)g j (x k ) is ane, g j (x) g j (x k )must be constant. This proves that any nonzero vector k 2 V n is a linear structure of a g j, a linear combination of f 1 ::: f s. On the other hand, by Theorem 4 of [17], for each k, there exists at most one g j among g 1 ::: g 2 s ;1 such that k is a linear structure of g j. By the construction of the bipartite graph, each k is linked to a unique g j. Also each g i with `i = j has j linearly independent linear structures and 2 j ; 1 nonzero linear structures. Hence we have (2 1 ; 1)p 1 +(2 3 ; 1)p 3 +(2 5 ; 1)p 5 + +(2 n;2 ; 1)p n;2 =2 n ; 1: (2) >From (1) and (2) we have or equivalently (2 1 ; 2)p 1 +(2 3 ; 2)p 3 +(2 5 ; 2)p 5 + +(2 n;2 ; 2)p n;2 =2 n ; 2 s (2 2 ; 1)p 3 +(2 4 ; 1)p 5 + +(2 n;3 ; 1)p n;2 =2 s;1 (2 n;s ; 1) (3) Note that 2 k ; 1 is divisible by 3 if and only k > = 2iseven. Thus the left hand side of (3) is divisible by 3. This implies that the (2 n;s ;1) part in the right hand side of the equation is divisible by 3. Hence s must be odd. Thus there exists no quadratic n s S-box with a UHODDT if n is odd (n > = 5) and s is even. We now consider Case 2. Let q j denote the number of `i, 1< = i < = 2 n ; 1, such that `i = j. Similarly to Case 1, we have a sequence of numbers q 2 q 4 q 6 ::: q n;2, and By simple deduction, q 2 + q 4 + q 6 + q n;2 =2 s ; 1 (2 2 ; 1)q 2 +(2 4 ; 1)q 4 +(2 6 ; 1)q 6 + +(2 n;2 ; 1)q n;2 =2 n ; 1: (2 3 ; 2)q 4 +(2 5 ; 2)q 6 + +(2 n;3 ; 2)q n;2 =2 n;1 ; 3 2 s;1 +1: (4) It is not hard to see that the left hand side of (4) is even when n > = 4, while the right handside of (4) is always odd for s > = 2. >From this we can conclude that there exists no quadratic n s S-box with a UHODDT if n is even with n > = 4. Summarizing Case 1 and Case 2, we have 5

Theorem 1 For n > = 4,there exists no quadratic n s S-box with a UHODDT if either n or s is even. Theorem 1 can be viewed as an extension of Corollary 2 in [17], which states that there exists no dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on an even dimensional vector space. By Theorem 1, n s S-boxes with a UHODDT do not exist if either n or s is even. When n is odd and n = s, as mentioned before, we do have dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation [13, 2, 11]. Thus a problem that is left open is whether there are quadratic S-boxes with a UHODDT for n>s, both n and s odd. It should be pointed out that an S-box which has an odd number of input bits and also an odd number of output bits may notbevery useful in practice. 2.2 An Extension The result in the previous subsection can be extended to a special kind of dierentially 2 n;s+t - uniform quadratic S-boxes. Let F be a n s S-box such that for any nonzero vector 2 V n, F(x) F(x ) runs through 2 s;t vectors in V s,each2 n;s+t times, but not through the remaining 2 s ; 2 s;t vectors in V s, where t > = 1. The case when t = 1 has been discussed in the previous subsection. In the following we present a nonexistence result on the case when t>1. Assume that F is a dierentially 2 n;s+t -uniform quadratic S-boxes such that for any nonzero vector 2 V n, F (x) F(x ) runs through 2 s;t vectors in V s, each 2 n;s+t times, but not through the remaining 2 s ; 2 s;t vectors in V s. Similarly to the previous discussions, we can construct a bipartite graph with 1 ::: 2 n ;1, the 2 n ; 1 nonzero vectors in V n on one side and g 1 ::: g 2 s ;1, the nonzero linear combinations of f 1 ::: f s on the other side. An edge between i and g j exists if and only if i is a linear structure of g j. By Theorem 4 of [17], each i is associated with at most 2 n;s+t edges. In addition, one can see that each i is associated with exactly 2 n;s+t edges. Now assume further that n is odd. By a similar argument to Case 1 in the previous section, we have p 1 + p 3 + p 5 + + p n;2 =2 s ; 1 and Hence (2 1 ; 1)p 1 +(2 3 ; 1)p 3 + +(2 n;2 ; 1)p n;2 =(2 n;s+t ; 1)(2 n ; 1): (2 1 ; 2)p 1 +(2 3 ; 2)p 3 + +(2 n;2 ; 2)p n;2 =(2 n;s+t ; 1)(2 n ; 1) ; (2 s ; 1): (5) where p j denotes the number of `i, 1< = i < = 2 n ;1, such that `i = j, and`i is the linearity dimension of g i. Now weprove that (5) can not hold for n odd and t even. Again we consider two cases: s odd and s even. First we suppose that s is odd. The left hand side is divisible by 3. With the right hand side, 2 n;s+t ; 1 is divisible by 3 (since n ; s + t is even), while 2 s ; 1 is not. Thus (5) cannot hold when t is even and both n and s are odd. The other case is that s is even. In this case, the left hand side of (5) is divisible by 3. Since n ; s + t is odd, 2 n;s+t ; 1 is not divisible by 3,while2 s ; 1is.Thus (5) cannot stand when t is even, n is odd and s is even. In summary, we have 6

Theorem 2 If n is odd and t is even, there exists no quadratic n s S-boxes such that for any nonzero vector 2 V n, F(x) F (x ) runs through 2 s;t vectors in V s,each 2 n;s+t times, but not through the remaining vectors in V s. 3 Columns of a UHODDT In the previous section we proved that there does not exist a quadratic ns S-box with a UHODDT if either n or s is even. It is not clear whether or not higher degree S-boxes with a UHODDT exist. If there do exist such S-boxes, we would like to know whether or not they satisfy a more stringent requirement, namely high robustness. Results to be shown below give a negative answer to the question. The following lemma is exactly the same as Theorem 1 of [17]. Lemma 1 Let F =(f 1 ::: f s ) be a mapping from V n to V s, where each f j is a function on V n. Then F is regular if and only if each nonzero linear combination of f 1 ::: f s is balanced. It is easy to show that the prole of the dierence distribution table of an S-box is not changed by a nonsingular linear transformation on input coordinates (see for instance [2, 17]). In particular we have Lemma 2 Let F =(f 1 ::: f s ) be aregular S-box with a UHODDT or uniformly half-occupied dierence distribution table. Let A be a nonsingular matrix of order n and B a nonsingular matrix of order s over GF (2). Then both Let G(x) =F(xA) =(f 1 (xa) ::: f n (xa)) and H(x) =F(x)B = (f 1 (x) ::: f n (x))b are regular S-boxes with a UHODDT. By denition, each row in a uniformly half-occupied dierence distribution table, except the rst, contains an equal number of zero and nonzero entries. The following lemma shows that a similar result holds with columns in the table. Lemma 3 Let F be aregular n s S-box with a UHODDT. Then each column, except the rst, in the dierence distribution table contains an equal number of zero and nonzero entries. Proof. We prove that for each nonzero 2 V s, there exist 2 n;1 nonzero 2 V n such that F(x) F(x ) = has solutions for x. Fix x 0 2 V n. Since the dierence distribution table of F is uniformly half-occupied, F (x 0 ) F(x 0 ) runs through each nonzero 2 V s 2 n;s times while runs through V n.asx 0 is arbitrary, for each nonzero 2 V s, there exist 2 n 2 n;s pairs (x ) such that F(x) F(x ) =, where 6= 0. On the other hand, since the dierence distribution table of F is uniformly half-occupied, F(x) F(x ) = either has 2 n;s+1 solutions or has no solution for x. Thus for each nonzero 2 V s there exist 2 n 2 n;s =2 n;s+1 =2 n;1 nonzero vectors 2 V n such thatf(x) F (x ) = has solutions for x. ut Recall that the robustness of an S-box is determined by the largest value in the dierence distribution table of the S-box, and also by the number of nonzero entries in the rst column of the table. The lemma described below gives the precise number of nonzero entries in the rst column of a uniformly half-occupied dierence distribution table. 7

Lemma 4 Let F be aregular n s S-box with a UHODDT. Then there are 2 n;1 ; 2 s;1 nonzero entries in the rst column of the dierence distribution table (excluding the rst entry). Proof. We show that there exist 2 n;1 ; 2 s;1 nonzero 2 V n such that F(x) F(x ) = 0 has solutions for x. Fix x 0 2 V n. Since the dierence distribution table of F is uniformly half-occupied, F(x 0 ) F(x 0 ) runs through each 2 V s 2 n;s times while runs through V n. In particular, F(x 0 )F(x 0 ) runs through the zero vector in V s 2 n;s times, while runs through V n. Note that = 0 is a trivial case. Hence F(x 0 ) F (x 0 ) runs through the zero vector in V s 2 n;s times while runs through all nonzero vectors in V n. In other words, there exist 2 n;s ; 1nonzero2V n such that F (x 0 ) F(x 0 ) = 0. Since x 0 is arbitrary, for each nonzero 2 V s, there exist 2 n (2 n;s ; 1) pairs (x ) such thatf (x) F(x ) = 0, where 6= 0. Recall that F (x) F(x ) =0 either has 2 n;s+1 solutions or has no solution for x. Thus for each nonzero 2 V s there exist 2 n (2 n;s ; 1)=2 n;s+1 =2 n;1 ; 2 s;1 nonzero vectors 2 V n such that F (x) F(x ) = 0 has solutions for x. ut As an immediate consequence of Lemma 4, we obtain the robustness of an S-box with a UHODDT: R =[1; (2 n;1 ; 2 s;1 )=2 n ](1 ; 2 n;s+1 =2 n )=(1=2+2 ;n+s;1 )(1 ; 2 ;s+1 ): When n = s, wehave R =1; 2 ;n+1, which is the highest possible value for robustness. However, when s is relatively smaller than n, say n ; s>3, R is very close to 1=2. For comparison, we note that the robustness of S-boxes constructed in [15] is at least 7=8. 4 On Methods for Synthesizing S-boxes This section is concerned with methods for constructing S-boxes from existing ones. We show that a number of techniques which were previously taken for granted do not yield good S-boxes. 4.1 Chopping Permutations Chopping permutations which are cryptographically strong has been conceived as a promising method to construct S-boxes for DES-like encryption algorithms. For this reason, many researchers have focused their attention on permutations, especially those on a nite eld [2, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Results to be present in this subsection indicate that, contrary to the common perception, this practice does not produce good S-boxes. First we prove the following: Theorem 3 Let F =(f 1 ::: f s ) be aregular n s S-box with a UHODDT, where n > = s and each f j is a function on V n. The following two statements hold: (i) Let 1 < = t < = s ; 1 and let G be an S-box obtained bydropping s ; t component functions from F, say G =(f 1 ::: f t ). Then the dierence distribution table of G is not uniformly half-occupied. 8

(ii) Let n > = t > = s +1 and let H be ans-box obtained by adding t ; s component functions to F, say H =(f 1 ::: f s f s+1 ::: f t ), where f s+1 ::: f t are newly added. Then the dierence distribution table of H is not uniformly half-occupied. Proof. (i) Since F has a UHODDT, for any nonzero 6= 0,F (x) F (x ) runs through 2 s;1 vectors in V s, each 2 n;s+1 times, but not through the other 2 s;1 vectors in V s,while runs through V n. Fix a nonzero vector, say =(0 ) 2 V s, where 0 is the zero vector in V t and is a nonzero vector in V s;t. By Lemma 3 there exist 2 n;1 nonzero vector such that F(x) F(x ) = has solutions for x. Thus there exist 2 n;1 nonzero vector such thatg(x) G(x ) =0,where0is the zero vector in V t, has solutions for x. It is easy to show that G is not uniformly half-occupied. Since G is regular there exist 2 n;1 ; 2 t;1 nonzero vector such thatg(x) G(x ) =0(see Lemma 3) if G is uniformly half-occupied. (ii) follows (i). ut >From Theorem 3 chopping a regular S-box with a UHODDT does not yield a regular S-box with a UHODDT. In particular, chopping a dierentially 2-uniform permutation on V n does not produce an S-box with a UHODDT. As quadratic permutations with a UHODDT or dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations have been studied very extensively, an important problem is about the structure of the dierence distribution table of an S-box obtained by chopping such a permutation. We will devote a single section, Section 5, to this topic. In addition to chopping permutations, other techniques, such as linear transforms or modulo operations on inputs or outputs of dierentially 2-uniform permutations, and repeating dierentially 2-uniform permutations, are also conceived as possible S-box synthesis methods. In the following we show that none of these methods generates an S-box with a UHODDT. 4.2 Linear Transforms Applied on Inputs Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform permutation on V s, B amatrixoforderns (n >s)over GF (2). Set G(y) =F(yB) where y 2 V n. Since the rank of B is s, yb runs through 2 s vectors in V s each 2 n;s times while y runs through V n. Since F is a permutation on V s, G(y) is a regular n s S-box. Unfortunately the dierence distribution table of G(y) is not uniformly half-occupied. The reason is described in the following. Since n>sthere exists a nonzero vector, say, such that B = 0, where 0 is the zero vector in V s. Note that G(y) G(y ) =F (yb) F ((y )B) = F(yB) F (yb B) =F(yB) F (yb) = 0, where 0 is the zero vector in V s,forevery y 2 V n. 4.3 Linear Transforms Applied on Outputs Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform permutation on V s,andb a matrix of order n s (n >s)over GF (2). Set G(x) =F(x)B. Note that the rank of B is s. Hence yb runs through 2 s vectors in V s each 2 n;s times while y runs through V n.asf is a permutation on V n, G is a regular n s S-box. Since n>s, there exists a matrix of order n (n ; s), say D, such that the matrix A =[BD] of order n is nonsingular. Set (x) = F(x)A. By Lemma 2, is a also a dierentially 2-uniform permutation. By Theorem 3, G is not an S-box with a UHODDT. 9

4.4 Connecting Permutations in Parallel Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform permutation on V s.set G(y) =(1 x s+1 )F(x) x s+1 F(x ) where x =(x 1 ::: x s ), y =(x 1 ::: x s x s+1 ), 2 V s. Note that G(x 0) = F(x), G(x 1) = F (x). Since F is permutation on V s G is a regular (s +1) s S-box. Let =( 1). Clearly G(y ) =G(y) forevery y 2 V s+1.thus G(y) G(y ) = 0, where 0 is the zero vector in V s, for every y 2 V n.thus the dierence distribution is very bad in this case, and G(y) isnotans-box with a UHODDT. The above discussions can be extended to the general case where F is repeated 2 k times, k > = 1. 4.5 Enlarging Inputs or Reducing Outputs by Modulo Operations Let =(a 1 ::: a n ) 2 V n. Rewrite as = a 1 a 2 x a n x n;1. Thus V n and the set of polynomials of degree at most n ; 1 over GF (2) have a one-to-one correspondence. Let (x) be a primitive polynomial of degree s (s <n). For any 2 V n,wehave = h where the degree of h is less than or equal to n ; s ; 1, the degree of is less than s. Thus we have dened a mapping from V n to V s :!. Now let be a vector in V n and avector in V s. Let F() be a dierentially 2-uniform permutation on V s. Set G() =F(). This gives an n s S-box. Note that =. This means that the mapping from V n to V s,!, is linear. Hence G() isnotans-boxwitha UHODDT, although it is regular (see Subsection 5.1). Now let() be a dierentially 2-uniform permutation on V n. Set () =(). is an n s S-box. A similar argument shows that the dierence distribution table of () is not uniformly half-occupied. 5 Hadamard Matrices Embodied in Dierence Distribution Table In this section we reveal a very important combinatorial property of dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations, namely, every dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation is associated with a Sylvester-Hadamard matrix. As an application of the result, we show that chopping a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation results in an S-box whose dierence distribution table is nearly at. Such an S-box is very weak to the dierential attack. 5.1 Dierence Distribution Tables and Incidence Functions Let F =(f 1 ::: f n ) be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n, namely, a quadratic permutation with a UHODDT or uniformly half-occupied dierence distribution table. Let W be the set of vectors F (x) F(x ) runs through when x runs through V n, namely, W = ff(x) F(x )jx 2 V n g (6) 10

Obviously if =0thenW = f0g. Since each f j is quadratic f j (x)f j (x) is an ane function. Write f j f j (x ) =c 1j x 1 c nj x n d j, j =1 ::: n. Set C =(c ij ), =(d 1 ::: d n ). Thus F(x) F (x ) =xc and W = ff (x) F (x )jx 2 V n g = fxc jx 2 V n g. Now let 6= 0. Since F is a permutation, F(x) F(x ) 6= 0 for any x 2 V n. Hence 0 62 W. Since F(0) F() =,wehave 6= 0. And by the denition of a UHODDT, jw j =2 n;1 and hence rank(c )=n ; 1. Thus we have Lemma 5 Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n.if 6= 0then (i) 0 62 W, (ii) 6=0, (iii) jw j =2 n;1, and (iv) rank(c )=n ; 1. Now setw 0 = fxc jx 2 V n g. Then we have Lemma 6 Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n. If 6= 0then V n = W [ W 0 and W \ W 0 =. Proof. Suppose that W \ W 0 6=. Then there exists a 2 V n such that 2 W \ W. 0 Thus = C and = C for some, 2 V n. Hence ( )C =0. This implies that 0 2 W,which contradicts Lemma 5. This proves that W \ W 0 =. Notethatrank(C )=n; 1. Hence we have jw 0j =2n;1 and W [ W 0 = V n. ut Lemma 7 Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n. Let 6= 0. Then the following statements hold: (i) If, 0 2 W then 0 2 W 0, (ii) if 2 W, 0 2 W 0 then 0 2 W, (iii) if, 0 2 W 0 then 0 2 W 0. Proof. (i) Write = C and 0 = 0 C for some, 0 2 V n. Hence 0 =( 0 )C. This implies that 2 W 0. (ii) Write = C and 0 = 0 C for some, 0 2 V n. Hence 0 =( 0 )C and 2 W. (iii) Write = C and 0 = 0 C for some, 0 2 V n. Hence 0 =( 0 )C and 2 W 0. ut Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n and let W be the same as (6). For each 2 V n we dene an incidence function ' as follows: ' () = 8>< >: 0 if =0 As is to be proved below, each ' is in fact a linear function on V n. (7) 1 if 6= 0 and 2 W 0 if 6= 0 and 62 W 11

Lemma 8 Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n. Then ', dened in (7), is a linear function on V n for every vector 2 V n. Proof. The lemma is true trivially true when =0.Nowlet 6= 0 and consider ' (x)' (x!). We distinguish between! 2 W and! 62 W. Case 1:! 2 W. In this case we have ' (!) =1. Case 1.1: Consider x 2 W.Wehave ' (x) = 1. By Lemma 7, x! 62 W. Hence ' (y!) =0. Furthermore we have ' (x) ' (x!) =' (!) =1. Case 1.2: Now we consider x 62 W.Wehave ' (x) = 0. By Lemma 7, x! 2 W and hence ' (x!) = 1. Therefore ' (x) ' (x!) =' (!) =1. Case 2:! 62 W. In this case we have ' (!) = 0. By an argument similar to the above, we have ' (x) ' (x!) =' (!) = 0 regardless whether or not x 2 W. In summary, ' (x) ' (x!) =' (!) holds in all cases. This proves that ' is a linear function on V n. ut Lemma 9 Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n.if 6= 0, then ' 6= ' 0. Proof. When =0or 0 =0,thelemma is clearly true. Next we consider the case when 6= 0and 0 6= 0. Suppose the lemma is not true. Then we have ' = ' 0, namely, W = W 0 for 6= 0. Note that F(x 0 ) F (x 0 0 ) 2 W 0 for each xed x 0 2 V n. Rewrite F(x 0 ) F(x 0 0 )=F(x 0 ) F(x 0 ) F(x 0 ) F(x 0 0 ). Since F (x 0 ) F (x 0 ) 2 W, F (x 0 ) F (x 0 0 ) 2 W 0 and W = W 0,byLemma7, we have F (x 0 ) F(x 0 0 ) 2 W. 0 As x 0 is arbitrary, wehave W 0 W. 0 Note that jw 0j = jwj 0 =2 n;1.thus W 0 = W 0 (8) By Lemma 5, 0 62 W.ThenbyLemma 6, 0 2 W 0. On the other hand, by Lemma 5, 0 62 W 0. This contradicts (8). ut 5.2 Hadamard Matrices in Dierence Distribution Tables Lemma 8 states that each row of the dierential distribution table is associated with a linear function on V n, while Lemma 9 indicates that these linear functions are all dierent. Hence we have Theorem 4 Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n. Then ' runs through all linear functions on V n while runs through the vectors in V n. Recall that 0 1 ::: 2 n ;1 are all the vectors in V n,with 0 =(0 ::: 0), :::, 2 n ;1 =(1 ::: 1). Let M =(m ij )bea(1 ;1)-matrix dened by m ij =(;1) ' i ( j) M is called the dierence trait matrix of F. Essentially, M is a matrix obtained from the dierence distribution table of the S-box by replacing each zero entry by 1 and each nonzero entry by ;1, with an exception that the rst entry in the rst row is replaced by 1. 12 (9)

Theorem 5 Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation on V n. Then M, the dierence trait matrix of F, is a Sylvester-Hadamard matrix if the row-order is ignored. Proof. From Theorem 4, the 2 n rows of M comprise all the linear sequences of length 2 n. By Lemma 1 of [16], each linear sequence of length 2 n is a row ofh n.thus M canbechanged to H n by re-ordering its rows. ut Obviously, W, ' and M can be dened for any permutation on V n, not restricted to quadratic ones. Theorem 6 Let F be a dierentially 2-uniform (not necesarrily quadratic) permutation on V n and M be the dierence trait matrix of F. Then F ;1, the inverse of F, is also a dierentially 2-uniform permutation, and the dierence trait matrix of F ;1 is the transpose of M. Proof. Suppose that F ;1 (y) F ;1 (y ) = (10) where, 6= 0. Setx = F ;1 (y). Then we have y = F(x), F ;1 (y ) =x, F(F ;1 (y )) = F(x ), y = F (x ), and F (x) = F(x ). Hence F (x) F(x ) =: (11) Since F is dierentially 2-uniform, by Lemma 3, for any nonzero 2 V n there exist 2 n;1 nonzero vectors 2 V n such that (11) holds. Note that if (11) holds then (10) also holds. Thus for any nonzero 2 V n there exist 2 n;1 nonzero vectors 2 V n such that (10) holds. This proves that F ;1 is also dierentially 2-uniform. This result has also been obtained by Nyberg (Proposition 2 of [11]). We can dene W, 0 ' 0 and M 0 for F ;1 as we did with W, ' and M for F. Since (10) and (11) stand in parallel, we can conclude that ' 0 () =' () andm 0 is identical to the transpose of M. Since M ia an Hadamard matrix, so is M 0 ut Note that for a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation F based on a cubic polynomial on GF (2 n ), n odd, the algebraic degree of F ;1 is larger than (n +1)=2. By Theorems 5 and 6, both the dierence trait matrix of F and that F ;1 are Sylvester-Hadamard Matrices, with the former being subject to re-ordering its rows while the later its columns. 5.3 Chopping Quadratic Permutations Let F =(f 1 ::: f n ) be a dierentially 2-uniform permutation on V n.letg be an S-box obtained by chopping a component function of F, say G =(f 2 ::: f n ). Similarly to W, ' and M corresponding to F (see (6), (7) and (9)), we can dene U = fg(x) G(x )jx 2 V n g 13

where 2 V n, and the incidence function () = 8>< >: 0 if =0 1 if 6= 0 and 2 U 0 if 6= 0 and 62 U where 2 V n;1. Let 0 1 2 n ;1 be the ordered vectors in V n and 0 1 2 n;1 ;1 the ordered vectors in V n;1.denea2 n 2 n;1 (1, -1)-matrix, say N =(n ij ), where n ij =(;1) i ( j). Write M =[M 1 M 2 ] where each M j is of order 2 n 2 n;1, M 1 =(m ij ), and M 2 =(m ij+2 n;1). It is easy to see that () = 1 if and only if ' (0 )=1or' (1 ) = 1. In other words, n ij = ;1 if and only if m ij = ;1 orm ij+2 n;1 = ;1. Since F is a dierentially 2-uniform " quadratic permutation, by Theorem 5, each rowofm is a Hn;1 H row ofh n.nowrecall that H n = n;1 #.Write H H n;1 ;H n =(h ij ), i j =1 ::: 2 n.we can see n;1 that ;h ij = h ij+2 n;1 if i>2 n;1. This implies that h ij = ;1 orm ij+2 n;1 = ;1, if i>2 n;1. Note that M and H n have the same set of rows. This proves that there exists 2 n;1 nonzero 2 V n such that is constant 1.InthiscaseG(x) G(x ) runs through every vector (including the zero vector) in V n;1, for some 2 n;1 nonzero vectors 2 V n and hence the robustness of G is less than 1. 2 To summarize the above discussions, the dierence distribution table of an S-box obtained by chopping a component function of a dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation has the following prole: it can be viewed as a folded (right to left) version of the uniformly half-occupied table of the original permutation, with half of the rows containing a value 2 in all their entries, and the remaining rows, not counting the rst row, containing an equal number of 0s and 4s. Similarly, chopping two component functions from a permutation results in an S-box whose dierence distribution table is almost at: it can be viewed as a twice-folded (right to left) version of the uniformly half-occupied table of the original permutation, and three quarters of the rows contain a value 4 in all their entries, while the remaining rows, not counting the rst row, have an equal number of 0s and 8s. This observation can be extended to the case when three or more component functions are chopped. In conclusion, S-boxes obtained by chopping dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations have an almost at dierence distribution table, which renders a DES-like encryption algorithm that employs such S-boxes very prone to the dierential attack. 6 Concluding Remarks Wehaveshown that certain S-boxes that are seemly very appealing do not exist. Wehave also shown that various methods for synthesizing S-boxes do not produce cryptographically desirable S-boxes. In addition, we have revealed an important combinatorial structure in quadratic permutations, namely, each dierentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation embodies a Hadamard matrix. In Section 2, we obtained a nonexistence result for quadratic S-boxes with a UHODDT or uniformly half-occupied dierence distribution table. This result might be extended in several directions. One direction is to dierentially 2 n;s+1 -uniform quadratic S-boxes which include quadratic S-boxes with a UHODDT as a special case. Another direction is to higher degree S-boxes. 14

Acknowledgments The rst author was supported in part by the Australian Research Council under the reference numbers A49130102, A49131885 and A49232172, the second author by A49130102, and the third author by A49232172. All authors were supported byauniversityofwollongong Research Program grant and the rst two by ATERB C010/058. The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for Crypto'94 for their helpful comments. References [1] C. M. Adams. On immunity against Biham and Shamir's \dierential cryptanalysis". Information Processing Letters, 41:77{80, 1992. [2] T. Beth and C. Ding. On permutations against dierential cryptanalysis. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'93, volume 765, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 65{76. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1994. [3] E. Biham and A. Shamir. Dierential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 4, No. 1:3{72, 1991. [4] E. Biham and A. Shamir. Dierential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard. Springer- Verlag, New York, Heidelberg, Tokyo, 1993. [5] L. Brown, M. Kwan, J. Pieprzyk, and J. Seberry. Improving resistance to dierential cryptanalysis and the redesign of LOKI. In Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT'91, volume 739, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 36{50. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1993. [6] J. F. Dillon. A survey of bent functions. The NSA Technical Journal, pages 191{215, 1972. (unclassied). [7] M. Matsui. Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher. In Advances in Cryptology - EURO- CRYPT'93, volume 765, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 386{397. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1994. [8] M. Matsui. Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher (II). In Proceedings of 1994 Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, Japan, 1994. [9] K. Nyberg. Perfect nonlinear S-boxes. In Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'91, volume 547, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 378{386. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1991. [10] K. Nyberg. On the construction of highly nonlinear permutations. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'92, volume 658, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 92{98. Springer- Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1993. 15

[11] K. Nyberg. Dierentially uniform mappings for cryptography. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'93, volume 765, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 55{65. Springer- Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1994. [12] K. Nyberg and L. R. Knudsen. Provable security against dierential cryptanalysis. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'92, volume 740, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 566{574. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1993. [13] J. Pieprzyk. Bent permutations. In Proceeding of the International Conference on Finite Fields, Coding Theory, and Advances in Communications and Computing, LasVegas, 1991. [14] O. S. Rothaus. On \bent" functions. Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Ser. A, 20:300{305, 1976. [15] J. Seberry, X. M. Zhang, and Y. Zheng. Systematic generation of cryptographically robust S- boxes. In Proceedings of the rst ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 172 { 182. The Association for Computing Machinery, New York, 1993. [16] J. Seberry, X. M. Zhang, and Y. Zheng. Nonlinearly balanced boolean functions and their propagation characteristics. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'93, volume 773, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 49{60. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1994. [17] J. Seberry, X. M. Zhang, and Y. Zheng. Relationships among nonlinearity criteria. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'94, volume 950, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 376{ 388. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1995. 16