A Model of Modeling. Itzhak Gilboa, Andy Postelwaite, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler. March 2, 2015

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Transcription:

A Model of Modeling Itzhak Gilboa, Andy Postelwaite, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler March 2, 2015 GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 1 / 26

Outline Four distinctions: Theories and paradigms Rationality Models in decision theory Models in economics The common structure GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 2 / 26

Theories and Paradigms Theories concrete concepts: growth, inequality, price... Paradigms more flexible concepts: Decision under certainty: alternative Under uncertainty: state, outcome Game theory: player, strategy... GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 3 / 26

Are Decision/Game Theory Refutable? Examples The Ultimatum Game Are there framing effects? Can consequentialism be violated? Conceptual Frameworks (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001) Theories are not refuted, they are embarrassed (Amos Tversky) GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 4 / 26

Two Notions of Rationality Objective: one can convince any reasonable person that one is right Subjective: it is not the case that any reasonable person would be convinced that one is wrong GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 5 / 26

Two Ways of Using Decision Models Classical OR: one models the problem (variables, objective, constraints) and gets the optimal solution from the software. Example: Google maps Mere consistency check: one tests whether one s intuition makes sense; or what does it take to justify it Example: Investment; Emigration; Job And a whole gamut (of a dialog) in between GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 6 / 26

Two Ways of Thinking about Economics Classical: a science that should make predictions Whether in a Popperian, rule-based way or in a case-based way (refutable with specified similarity) Alternative: criticism of reasoning; testing whether arguments makes sense logically (mathematics) economically (equilibrium analysis...) empirically (empirical and experimental work...) GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 7 / 26

Our goal To offer a formal model of the act of modeling In which we can capture one aspect of each of the four distinctions See the analogies between them Prove some results GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 8 / 26

Example 1: Decision under Certainty Act (a) means that a A (a, b) means that (a, b) The theory takes a set of statements and augments it Say, to { (a, b), (b, c)} add { (a, c)} GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 9 / 26

Example 2: Game Theory Battle of the Sexes: Player (P1), Player (P2) Act (P1, A1), Act (P1, B1) Act (P2, A2), Act (P2, B2) Outcome (o 1 ), Outcome (o 2 ),Outcome (o 3 ), Outcome (o 4 ) Result (A1, B1, o 1 ), Result (A1, B2, o 2 ) Result (A2, B1, o 3 ), Result (A2, B2, o 4 ) (P1, o 1, o 4 ), (P1, o 4, o 2 ), (P1, o 2, o 3 ), (P1, o 3, o 2 ),... (P2, o 4, o 1 ), (P2, o 1, o 2 ), (P2, o 2, o 3 ), (P2, o 3, o 2 ),... Add May (o 1 ), May (o 4 ) GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 10 / 26

Descriptions Entities E Ê (Ê infinite) Predicates: a k-place predicate f : E k {0, 1} More convenient to define irrelevant; unknown a description X = X 0 {, } E = k 1 E k, d : F E X the degree of f according to d: m such that k = m, e E k, d (f, e) =. D = D(F, E ) be the set of all descriptions for the set of entities E and predicates F. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 11 / 26

Example: The Dictator Game E = {P1, P2, 0,...,100, (100; 0),..., (0, 100)} F = {Player, Act, Outcome, Result,, May} Values of predicates given by the description: d (Player, (P1)) = 1, d (Act, (P1)) = 0, d (Player, (0)) = 0, d (Act, (0)) = 1,..., d (Player, (P1, 0)) =,... d (, (P1, (100; 0), (99; 1))) = 1, d (, (P1, (99; 1), (100; 0))) = 0,..., d (, (P1, (99; 1))) =,... GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 12 / 26

Compatibility of Descriptions Two descriptions d, d D are compatible if: (i) for every f F and every e E, d (f, e) = d (f, e) = (ii) for every f F, every e E, and every x, y X 0, if d (f, e) = x and d (f, e) = y then x = y. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 13 / 26

Extension of a Description (d, d D) d is an extension of d, denoted d d, if: (i) for every f F and every e E, d (f, e) = d (f, e) = (ii) for every f F, every e E, and every x X 0, d (f, e) = x d (f, e) = x. Clearly, if d d then d and d are compatible. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 14 / 26

Reality Reality Representation Language (F R, E R ) (F, E ) Input, or question d R d. Output, or answer d R d Figure: We model reality as a set of entities E R and predicates F R, with d R characterizing what is known and an extension d R characterizing a possible output of answer. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 15 / 26

Models Formally, a model is a quintuple M = (F R, E R, F, E, φ = φ F φ E ) such that: F R ˆF R ; E R Ê R ; F ˆF ; E Ê φ F : F R F is a bijection φ E : E R E is a bijection. Acceptable models: given d R D (F R, E R ), and a set of bijections Φ F { φ F φ F : F R F, φ F is a bijection The set of acceptable models Φ (F R, E R ) consists of the bijections obtained by the union of a φ F : F R F in Φ F and any bijection φ E : E R E. }. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 16 / 26

Theories Given a set of descriptions D = D(F, E ), a theory is a function T : D D such that, for all d D, T (d) d GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 17 / 26

Using Theories to Examine Reality Given a model M = (F R, E R, F, E, φ = φ F φ E ), a description of reality, d R D (F R, E R ), and a theory T, define the M-T -extension of d R, d R (d R, M, T ) as follows: (i) define a description d D (F, E ) by d (f, e) = d R ( φ 1 (f ), φ 1 (e) ) for all (f, e) F E; denote this description by d R φ 1 ; (ii) apply T to obtain an extension of d, d = T (d) (iii) define a description d R = d R (d R, M, T ) D (F R, E R ) by d R (f, e) = d (φ (f ), φ (e)) for all (f, e) F R E R ; denote this description d φ. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 18 / 26

Theories and Reality Figure 2 illustrates a trivial but important point given by the following. Reality Representation Language (F R, E R ) (F, E ) Input, or question d R φ d = d R φ 1 T Output, or answer φ 1 d = T (d) = T d R Figure: An illustration of how a theory is used to draw conclusions about reality. Beginning with a description of reality d R, we use the model M to construct the formal description d satisfying d(f, e) = d R (φ 1 (f ), φ 1 (e)). The theory T then gives the extension T (d), at which point we again use the model to construct the description of reality given by d R = d R (d R, M, T ) = T ( d R φ 1) φ. d R is the M-T -extension of d R. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 19 / 26

A Simple Observation For every model M = (F R, E R, F, E, φ), description d R D (F R, E R ), and theory T, the M-T -extension of d R, is an extension of d R. d R (d R, M, T ) = T ( d R φ 1) φ D (E R, E R ) GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 20 / 26

Compatibility for a Given Model Given d R (new data...) Reality Representation Language (F R, E R ) (F, E ) Input, or question d R φ d = d R φ 1 Output, or answer N T d R d R φ 1 d = T (d) = Figure: Illustration of how data, normative considerations, or other considerations are used to evaluate a theory. Given a description d R, the model M and theory T are used to construct its M-T -extension d R, as described in Figure 2. The process N, perhaps representing the collection of additional data, generates the extension d R. We say that the theory T is weakly compatible with d R if there is at least one acceptable model M for which the M-T -extension d is compatible GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 21 / 26

Compatibility Given a description of reality d R D (F R, E R ), an extension thereof, and a theory T, d R T is strongly compatible with d R if it is M-compatible with d R for every model M = (F R, E R, F, E, φ) derived from an acceptable φ Φ. T is weakly compatible with d R if it is M-compatible for at least one such model M. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 22 / 26

Necessitation for a Given Model For a given (f, e) F R E R such that d R (f, e) =, and a value x X 0, define d R (f, e, x) by the minimal extension of d R such that d R (f, e) = x. A theory T M-necessitates (f, e, x) if d R is an extension of d R (f, e, x). GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 23 / 26

Necessitation Given a description of reality d R D (F R, E R ), a pair (f, e) E R F R such that d R (f, e) =, a value x X 0, a conclusion (f, e, x) and a theory T, we say that T strongly necessitates (f, e, x) if, for every φ Φ, T M-necessitates (f, e, x) for M = (F R, E R, F, E, φ). T weakly necessitates (f, e, x) if, there exists φ Φ, such that T M-necessitates (f, e, x) (for M as above). GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 24 / 26

Complexity Results Proposition Given a description of reality d R D (F R, E R ), a pair (f, e) F R E R such that d R (f, e) =, a value x X 0, a conclusion (f, e, x), a theory T, and a set Φ, it is NP-Hard to determine whether T weakly necessitates (f, e, x). Next we show that a similar conclusion applies to strong necessitation. Proposition Given a description of reality d R D (F R, E R ), a pair (f, e) E R F R such that d R (f, e) =, a value x X 0, a conclusion (f, e, x), a theory T, and a set Φ, it is NP-Hard to determine whether T strongly necessitates (f, e, x). GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 25 / 26

Conclusion The distinction between strong ( ) and weak ( ) necessitation captures some of the distinctions between: Refutations of theories vs. conceptual frameworks Judgments of objective vs. subjective Rationality Uses of decision theory models Roles of economics The discussion of economics, game and decision theory can be more focused if we better understand the act of modeling and the degree of freedom involved. GPSS () Model of Modeling March 2, 2015 26 / 26