Logic and Artificial Intelligence Lecture 6

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Logic and Artificial Intelligence Lecture 6 Eric Pacuit Currently Visiting the Center for Formal Epistemology, CMU Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg University ai.stanford.edu/ epacuit e.j.pacuit@uvt.nl September 20, 2011 Logic and Artificial Intelligence 1/26

Example (1) Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separated by a crowd. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 2/26

Example (1) Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separated by a crowd. Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friend from outside the bus yells get off at the next stop to get a drink?. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 2/26

Example (1) Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separated by a crowd. Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friend from outside the bus yells get off at the next stop to get a drink?. Say Ann is standing near the front door and Bob near the back door. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 2/26

Example (1) Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separated by a crowd. Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friend from outside the bus yells get off at the next stop to get a drink?. Say Ann is standing near the front door and Bob near the back door. When the bus comes to a stop, will they get off? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 2/26

Example (1) Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separated by a crowd. Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friend from outside the bus yells get off at the next stop to get a drink?. Say Ann is standing near the front door and Bob near the back door. When the bus comes to a stop, will they get off? D. Lewis. Convention. 1969. M. Chwe. Rational Ritual. 2001. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 2/26

Example (2) A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, but an opposing player is converging on him. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/26

Example (2) A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, but an opposing player is converging on him. He can pass the ball to B, who has a chance to shoot. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/26

Example (2) A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, but an opposing player is converging on him. He can pass the ball to B, who has a chance to shoot. There are two directions in which A can move the ball, left and right, and correspondingly, two directions in which B can run to intercept the pass. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/26

Example (2) A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, but an opposing player is converging on him. He can pass the ball to B, who has a chance to shoot. There are two directions in which A can move the ball, left and right, and correspondingly, two directions in which B can run to intercept the pass. If both choose left there is a 10% chance that a goal will be scored. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/26

Example (2) A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, but an opposing player is converging on him. He can pass the ball to B, who has a chance to shoot. There are two directions in which A can move the ball, left and right, and correspondingly, two directions in which B can run to intercept the pass. If both choose left there is a 10% chance that a goal will be scored. If they both choose right, there is a 11% change. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/26

Example (2) A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, but an opposing player is converging on him. He can pass the ball to B, who has a chance to shoot. There are two directions in which A can move the ball, left and right, and correspondingly, two directions in which B can run to intercept the pass. If both choose left there is a 10% chance that a goal will be scored. If they both choose right, there is a 11% change. Otherwise, the chance is zero. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/26

Example (2) A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, but an opposing player is converging on him. He can pass the ball to B, who has a chance to shoot. There are two directions in which A can move the ball, left and right, and correspondingly, two directions in which B can run to intercept the pass. If both choose left there is a 10% chance that a goal will be scored. If they both choose right, there is a 11% change. Otherwise, the chance is zero. There is no time for communication; the two players must act simultaneously. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/26

Example (2) A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, but an opposing player is converging on him. He can pass the ball to B, who has a chance to shoot. There are two directions in which A can move the ball, left and right, and correspondingly, two directions in which B can run to intercept the pass. If both choose left there is a 10% chance that a goal will be scored. If they both choose right, there is a 11% change. Otherwise, the chance is zero. There is no time for communication; the two players must act simultaneously. What should they do? R. Sugden. The Logic of Team Reasoning. Philosophical Explorations (6)3, pgs. 165-181 (2003). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/26

Example (2) A l B r l 10,10 00,00 r 00,00 11,11 A: What should I do? r if the probability of B choosing r is > 10 21 and l if the probability of B choosing l is > 11 21 (symmetric reasoning for B) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 4/26

Example (2) A l B r l 10,10 0,0 r 0,0 11,11 A: What should I do? r if the probability of B choosing r is > 10 21 and l if the probability of B choosing l is > 11 21 (symmetric reasoning for B) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 4/26

Example (2) A l B r l 10,10 0,0 r 0,0 11,11 A: What should I do? r if the probability of B choosing r is > 10 21 and l if the probability of B choosing l is > 11 21 (symmetric reasoning for B) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 4/26

Example (2) A l B r l 10,10 0,0 r 0,0 11,11 A: What should I do? r if the probability of B choosing r is > 10 21 and l if the probability of B choosing l is > 11 21 (symmetric reasoning for B) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 4/26

Example (2) A l B r l 10,10 0,0 r 0,0 11,11 A: What should we do? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 4/26

Example (2) A l B r l 10,10 0,0 r 0,0 11,11 A: What should we do? Team Reasoning: why should this mode of reasoning be endorsed? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 4/26

Example (2) A l B r l 10,10 0,0 r 0,0 11,11 A: What should we do? Team Reasoning: why should this mode of reasoning be endorsed? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 4/26

Common Knowledge is informally described as what any fool would know, given a certain situation: It encompasses what is relevant, agreed upon, established by precedent, assumed, being attended to, salient, or in the conversational record. It is not Common Knowledge who defined Common Knowledge! Logic and Artificial Intelligence 5/26

Common Knowledge is informally described as what any fool would know, given a certain situation: It encompasses what is relevant, agreed upon, established by precedent, assumed, being attended to, salient, or in the conversational record. It is not Common Knowledge who defined Common Knowledge! Logic and Artificial Intelligence 5/26

The first formal definition of common knowledge? M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969). R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976). The first rigorous analysis of common knowledge D. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969. Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ) G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977). J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987). Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) s entails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditions H. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981. M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 5/26

The first formal definition of common knowledge? M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969). R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976). The first rigorous analysis of common knowledge D. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969. Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ) G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977). J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987). Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) s entails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditions H. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981. M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 5/26

The first formal definition of common knowledge? M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969). R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976). The first rigorous analysis of common knowledge D. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969. Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ) G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977). J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987). Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) s entails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditions H. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981. M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 5/26

The first formal definition of common knowledge? M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969). R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976). The first rigorous analysis of common knowledge D. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969. Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ) G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977). J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987). Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) s entails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditions H. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981. M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 5/26

P. Vanderschraaf and G. Sillari. Common Knowledge, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-knowledge/. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/26

The Standard Account E W R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976). R. Fagin, J. Halpern, Y. Moses and M. Vardi. Reasoning about Knowledge. MIT Press, 1995. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E W W is a set of states or worlds. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E W An event/proposition is any (definable) subset E W Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E W At each state, agents are assigned a set of states they consider possible (according to their information). The information may be (in)correct, partitional,... Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E W Knowledge Function: K i : (W ) (W ) where K i (E) = {w R i (w) E} Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E w W w K A (E) and w K B (E) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E w W The model also describes the agents higher-order knowledge/beliefs Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E w W Everyone Knows: K(E) = i A K i(e), K 0 (E) = E, K m (E) = K(K m 1 (E)) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E w W Common Knowledge: C : (W ) (W ) with C(E) = m 0 K m (E) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E w W w K(E) w C(E) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

The Standard Account E w W w C(E) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/26

Fact. For all i A and E W, K i C(E) = C(E). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/26

Fact. For all i A and E W, K i C(E) = C(E). Suppose you are told Ann and Bob are going together, and respond sure, that s common knowledge. What you mean is not only that everyone knows this, but also that the announcement is pointless, occasions no surprise, reveals nothing new; in effect, that the situation after the announcement does not differ from that before....the event Ann and Bob are going together call it E is common knowledge if and only if some event call it F happened that entails E and also entails all players knowing F (like all players met Ann and Bob at an intimate party). (Aumann, pg. 271, footnote 8) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/26

Fact. For all i A and E W, K i C(E) = C(E). An event F is self-evident if K i (F ) = F for all i A. Fact. An event E is commonly known iff some self-evident event that entails E obtains. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/26

Fact. For all i A and E W, K i C(E) = C(E). An event F is self-evident if K i (F ) = F for all i A. Fact. An event E is commonly known iff some self-evident event that entails E obtains. Fact. w C(E) if every finite path starting at w ends in a state in E The following axiomatize common knowledge: C(ϕ ψ) (Cϕ Cψ) Cϕ (ϕ ECϕ) C(ϕ Eϕ) (ϕ Cϕ) (Fixed-Point) (Induction) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/26

An Example Two players Ann and Bob are told that the following will happen. Some positive integer n will be chosen and one of n, n + 1 will be written on Ann s forehead, the other on Bob s. Each will be able to see the other s forehead, but not his/her own. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 9/26

An Example Two players Ann and Bob are told that the following will happen. Some positive integer n will be chosen and one of n, n + 1 will be written on Ann s forehead, the other on Bob s. Each will be able to see the other s forehead, but not his/her own. Suppose the number are (2,3). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 9/26

An Example Two players Ann and Bob are told that the following will happen. Some positive integer n will be chosen and one of n, n + 1 will be written on Ann s forehead, the other on Bob s. Each will be able to see the other s forehead, but not his/her own. Suppose the number are (2,3). Do the agents know there numbers are less than 1000? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 9/26

An Example Two players Ann and Bob are told that the following will happen. Some positive integer n will be chosen and one of n, n + 1 will be written on Ann s forehead, the other on Bob s. Each will be able to see the other s forehead, but not his/her own. Suppose the number are (2,3). Do the agents know there numbers are less than 1000? Is it common knowledge that their numbers are less than 1000? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 9/26

(6,7) B A (4,5) (6,5) B A (2,3) (4,3) B A (0,1) (2,1) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 10/26

The Fixed-Point Definition Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) = i A C(E) = C(E) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) = i A C(E) = C(E) The are other fixed points of f E : f E ( ) = Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) = i A C(E) = C(E) The are other fixed points of f E : f E ( ) = f E is monotonic: Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) = i A C(E) = C(E) The are other fixed points of f E : f E ( ) = f E is monotonic: A B implies E A E B. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) = i A C(E) = C(E) The are other fixed points of f E : f E ( ) = f E is monotonic: A B implies E A E B. Then f E (E A) = K(E A) K(E B) = f E (E B) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) = i A C(E) = C(E) The are other fixed points of f E : f E ( ) = f E is monotonic: A B implies E A E B. Then f E (E A) = K(E A) K(E B) = f E (E B) (Tarski) Every monotone operator has a greatest (and least) fixed point Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) = i A C(E) = C(E) The are other fixed points of f E : f E ( ) = f E is monotonic: A B implies E A E B. Then f E (E A) = K(E A) K(E B) = f E (E B) (Tarski) Every monotone operator has a greatest (and least) fixed point Let K (E) be the greatest fixed point of f E. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition f E (X ) = K(E X ) = i A K i(e X ) C(E) is a fixed point of f E : f E (C(E)) = K(E C(E)) = K(C(E)) = i A K i(c(e)) = i A C(E) = C(E) The are other fixed points of f E : f E ( ) = f E is monotonic: A B implies E A E B. Then f E (E A) = K(E A) K(E B) = f E (E B) (Tarski) Every monotone operator has a greatest (and least) fixed point Let K (E) be the greatest fixed point of f E. Fact. K (E) = C(E). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/26

The Fixed-Point Definition Separating the fixed-point/iteration definition of common knowledge/belief: J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987). J. van Benthem and D. Saraenac. The Geometry of Knowledge. Aspects of Universal Logic (2004). A. Heifetz. Iterative and Fixed Point Common Belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1999). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 12/26

Some Issues Logic and Artificial Intelligence 13/26

Some Issues What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can a group (come to) know/believe/accept? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 13/26

Some Issues What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can a group (come to) know/believe/accept? C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective. Episteme (2008). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 13/26

Some Issues What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can a group (come to) know/believe/accept? C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective. Episteme (2008). Other group informational attitudes : distributed knowledge, common belief,... Logic and Artificial Intelligence 13/26

Some Issues What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can a group (come to) know/believe/accept? C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective. Episteme (2008). Other group informational attitudes : distributed knowledge, common belief,... Where does common knowledge come from? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 13/26

Some Issues What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can a group (come to) know/believe/accept? C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective. Episteme (2008). Other group informational attitudes : distributed knowledge, common belief,... Where does common knowledge come from? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 14/26

Distributed Knowledge D G (E) = {w ( ) R i (w) E} i G Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/26

Distributed Knowledge D G (E) = {w ( ) R i (w) E} i G K A (p) K B (p q) D A,B (q) D G (ϕ) i G K iϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/26

Distributed Knowledge D G (E) = {w ( ) R i (w) E} i G K A (p) K B (p q) D A,B (q) D G (ϕ) i G K iϕ F. Roelofsen. Distributed Knowledge. Journal of Applied Nonclassical Logic (2006). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/26

Distributed Knowledge D G (E) = {w ( ) R i (w) E} i G K A (p) K B (p q) D A,B (q) D G (ϕ) i G K iϕ F. Roelofsen. Distributed Knowledge. Journal of Applied Nonclassical Logic (2006). w K G (E) iff R G (w) E (without necessarily R G (w) = R i (w)) i G A. Baltag and S. Smets. Correlated Knowledge: an Epistemic-Logic view on Quantum Entanglement. Int. Journal of Theoretical Physics (2010). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/26

Common p-belief The typical example of an event that creates common knowledge is a public announcement. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 16/26

Common p-belief The typical example of an event that creates common knowledge is a public announcement. Shouldn t one always allow for some small probability that a participant was absentminded, not listening, sending a text, checking facebook, proving a theorem, asleep,... Logic and Artificial Intelligence 16/26

Common p-belief The typical example of an event that creates common knowledge is a public announcement. Shouldn t one always allow for some small probability that a participant was absentminded, not listening, sending a text, checking facebook, proving a theorem, asleep,... We show that the weaker concept of common belief can function successfully as a substitute for common knowledge in the theory of equilibrium of Bayesian games. D. Monderer and D. Samet. Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs. Games and Economic Behavior (1989). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 16/26

Common p-belief: definition Let (W, {R i } i A, p, V ) be a Bayesian model. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 17/26

Common p-belief: definition Let (W, {R i } i A, p, V ) be a Bayesian model. B p i (E) = {w p(e R i (w)) p} Logic and Artificial Intelligence 17/26

Common p-belief: definition Let (W, {R i } i A, p, V ) be a Bayesian model. B p i (E) = {w p(e R i (w)) p} An event E is evident p-belief if for each i A, E B p i (E) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 17/26

Common p-belief: definition Let (W, {R i } i A, p, V ) be a Bayesian model. B p i (E) = {w p(e R i (w)) p} An event E is evident p-belief if for each i A, E B p i (E) An event F is common p-belief at w if there exists and evident p-belief event E such that w E and for all i A, E B p i (F ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 17/26

Common p-belief: example H, H (1 ɛ) 2 H, D w 1 w 2 D, H D, D w 3 w 4 Two agents either hear (H) or don t hear (D) the announcement. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/26

Common p-belief: example H, H (1 ɛ) 2 H, D (1 ɛ)ɛ w 1 w 2 D, H ɛ(1 ɛ) D, D ɛ 2 w 3 w 4 The probability that an agent hears is 1 ɛ. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/26

Common p-belief: example H, H (1 ɛ) 2 H, D (1 ɛ)ɛ w 1 w 2 D, H ɛ(1 ɛ) D, D ɛ 2 w 3 w 4 The agents know their type. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/26

Common p-belief: example H, H (1 ɛ) 2 H, D (1 ɛ)ɛ w 1 w 2 D, H ɛ(1 ɛ) D, D ɛ 2 w 3 w 4 The event everyone hears (E = {w 1 }) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/26

Common p-belief: example H, H (1 ɛ) 2 H, D (1 ɛ)ɛ w 1 w 2 D, H ɛ(1 ɛ) D, D ɛ 2 w 3 w 4 The event everyone hears (E = {w 1 }) is not common knowledge Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/26

Common p-belief: example H, H (1 ɛ) 2 H, D (1 ɛ)ɛ w 1 w 2 D, H ɛ(1 ɛ) D, D ɛ 2 w 3 w 4 The event everyone hears (E = {w 1 }) is not common knowledge, but it is common (1 ɛ)-belief Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/26

Common p-belief: example H, H (1 ɛ) 2 H, D (1 ɛ)ɛ w 1 w 2 D, H ɛ(1 ɛ) D, D ɛ 2 w 3 The event everyone hears (E = {w 1 }) is not common knowledge, but it is common (1 ɛ)-belief: B (1 ɛ) i (E) = {w p(e Π i (w)) 1 ɛ} = {w 1 } = E, for i = 1, 2 w 4 Back Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/26

Some Issues What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can a group (come to) know/believe/accept? C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective. Episteme (2008). Other group informational attitudes : distributed knowledge, common belief,... Where does common knowledge come from? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/26

Digression: Lewis common knowledge R. Cubitt and R. Sugden. Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy, 19, pgs. 175-210, 2003.. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/26

Reason to Believe B i ϕ: i believes ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 21/26

Reason to Believe B i ϕ: i believes ϕ vs. R i (ϕ): i has a reason to believe ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 21/26

Reason to Believe B i ϕ: i believes ϕ vs. R i (ϕ): i has a reason to believe ϕ Although it is an essential part of Lewis theory that human beings are to some degree rational, he does not want to make the strong rationality assumptions of conventional decision theory or game theory. (CS, pg. 184). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 21/26

Reason to Believe B i ϕ: i believes ϕ vs. R i (ϕ): i has a reason to believe ϕ Although it is an essential part of Lewis theory that human beings are to some degree rational, he does not want to make the strong rationality assumptions of conventional decision theory or game theory. (CS, pg. 184). Anyone who accept the rules of arithmetic has a reason to believe 618 377 = 232, 986, but most of us do not hold have firm beliefs about this. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 21/26

Reason to Believe B i ϕ: i believes ϕ vs. R i (ϕ): i has a reason to believe ϕ Although it is an essential part of Lewis theory that human beings are to some degree rational, he does not want to make the strong rationality assumptions of conventional decision theory or game theory. (CS, pg. 184). Anyone who accept the rules of arithmetic has a reason to believe 618 377 = 232, 986, but most of us do not hold have firm beliefs about this. Definition: R i (ϕ) means ϕ is true within some logic of reasoning that is endorsed by (that is, accepted as a normative standard by) person i...ϕ must be either regarded as self-evident or derivable by rules of inference (deductive or inductive) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 21/26

A indicates to i that ϕ A is a state of affairs A ind i ϕ: i s reason to believe that A holds provides i s reason for believing that ϕ is true. (A1)For all i, for all A, for all ϕ: [R i (A holds) (A ind i ϕ)] R i (ϕ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 22/26

Some Properties Logic and Artificial Intelligence 23/26

Some Properties [(A holds) entails (A holds)] A ind i (A holds) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 23/26

Some Properties [(A holds) entails (A holds)] A ind i (A holds) [(A ind i ϕ) (A ind i ψ)] A ind i (ϕ ψ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 23/26

Some Properties [(A holds) entails (A holds)] A ind i (A holds) [(A ind i ϕ) (A ind i ψ)] A ind i (ϕ ψ) [(A ind i [A holds]) (A ind i ϕ)] A ind i ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 23/26

Some Properties [(A holds) entails (A holds)] A ind i (A holds) [(A ind i ϕ) (A ind i ψ)] A ind i (ϕ ψ) [(A ind i [A holds]) (A ind i ϕ)] A ind i ϕ [(A ind i ϕ) (ϕ entails ψ)] A ind i ψ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 23/26

Some Properties [(A holds) entails (A holds)] A ind i (A holds) [(A ind i ϕ) (A ind i ψ)] A ind i (ϕ ψ) [(A ind i [A holds]) (A ind i ϕ)] A ind i ϕ [(A ind i ϕ) (ϕ entails ψ)] A ind i ψ [(A ind i R j [A holds]) R i (A ind j ϕ)] A ind i R j (ϕ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 23/26

Reflexive Common Indicator Logic and Artificial Intelligence 24/26

Reflexive Common Indicator A holds R i (A holds) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 24/26

Reflexive Common Indicator A holds R i (A holds) A ind i R j (A holds) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 24/26

Reflexive Common Indicator A holds R i (A holds) A ind i R j (A holds) A ind i ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 24/26

Reflexive Common Indicator A holds R i (A holds) A ind i R j (A holds) A ind i ϕ (A ind i ψ) R i [A ind j ψ] Logic and Artificial Intelligence 24/26

Let R G (ϕ): R i ϕ, R j ϕ,..., R i (R j ϕ), R j (R i (ϕ)),... iterated reason to believe ϕ. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 25/26

Let R G (ϕ): R i ϕ, R j ϕ,..., R i (R j ϕ), R j (R i (ϕ)),... iterated reason to believe ϕ. Theorem. (Lewis) For all states of affairs A, for all propositions ϕ, and for all groups G: if A holds, and if A is a reflexive common indicator in G that ϕ, then R G (ϕ) is true. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 25/26

Lewis and Aumann Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition of common knowledge ( Aumann common knowledge ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/26

Lewis and Aumann Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition of common knowledge ( Aumann common knowledge ), but the converse is not generally true... Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/26

Lewis and Aumann Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition of common knowledge ( Aumann common knowledge ), but the converse is not generally true... Example. Suppose there is an agent i G that is authoritative for each member of G. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/26

Lewis and Aumann Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition of common knowledge ( Aumann common knowledge ), but the converse is not generally true... Example. Suppose there is an agent i G that is authoritative for each member of G. So, for j G, i states to j that ϕ is true indicates to j that ϕ. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/26

Lewis and Aumann Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition of common knowledge ( Aumann common knowledge ), but the converse is not generally true... Example. Suppose there is an agent i G that is authoritative for each member of G. So, for j G, i states to j that ϕ is true indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately to each member of G, i states that ϕ and R G (ϕ) are true. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/26

Lewis and Aumann Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition of common knowledge ( Aumann common knowledge ), but the converse is not generally true... Example. Suppose there is an agent i G that is authoritative for each member of G. So, for j G, i states to j that ϕ is true indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately to each member of G, i states that ϕ and R G (ϕ) are true. Then, we have R i ϕ and R i (R G (ϕ)) for each i G. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/26

Lewis and Aumann Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition of common knowledge ( Aumann common knowledge ), but the converse is not generally true... Example. Suppose there is an agent i G that is authoritative for each member of G. So, for j G, i states to j that ϕ is true indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately to each member of G, i states that ϕ and R G (ϕ) are true. Then, we have R i ϕ and R i (R G (ϕ)) for each i G. But there is no common indicator that ϕ is true. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/26

Lewis and Aumann Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition of common knowledge ( Aumann common knowledge ), but the converse is not generally true... Example. Suppose there is an agent i G that is authoritative for each member of G. So, for j G, i states to j that ϕ is true indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately to each member of G, i states that ϕ and R G (ϕ) are true. Then, we have R i ϕ and R i (R G (ϕ)) for each i G. But there is no common indicator that ϕ is true. The agents j G may have no reason to believe that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agents in G treat i as authoritative. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/26