Distinct difference configurations and Wireless Sensor Networks

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Distinct difference configurations and Wireless Sensor Networks Simon R. Blackburn Joint work with: Tuvi Etzion, Keith M. Martin, Maura B. Paterson Royal Holloway, University of London 12th May 2009 S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 1 / 23

1 WSN Key predistribution 2 Distinct difference configurations 3 Constructions 4 Bounds 5 Related models S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 2 / 23

Wireless Sensor Networks A Wireless Sensor Network consists of: A large number of devices (nodes); Each node has low computational power; A node can sense something; A node can communicate wirelessly with its neighbours. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 3 / 23

Wireless Sensor Networks A Wireless Sensor Network consists of: A large number of devices (nodes); Each node has low computational power; A node can sense something; A node can communicate wirelessly with its neighbours. Recommended for applications in military, disaster recovery, Royal andholloway scientific lo monitoring situations. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 3 / 23

The main question Question How do nodes form a secure connected network? S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 4 / 23

The main question Question How do nodes form a secure connected network? The answer depends on the application. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 4 / 23

The main question Question How do nodes form a secure connected network? The answer depends on the application. If we don t know how our nodes will be distributed: use Eschenauer Gligor. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 4 / 23

The main question Question How do nodes form a secure connected network? The answer depends on the application. If we don t know how our nodes will be distributed: use Eschenauer Gligor. What happens if we know how our sensors will be arranged? S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 4 / 23

Our model We assume: There is a node at all positions (x, y) Z 2. A pair of nodes can communicate when they are within distance d. Nodes cannot use public key cryptography. Nodes can be preloaded with m secret keys. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 5 / 23

Our model We assume: There is a node at all positions (x, y) Z 2. A pair of nodes can communicate when they are within distance d. Nodes cannot use public key cryptography. Nodes can be preloaded with m secret keys. Issues we are interested in: Maximize the number of nodes that can communicate securely. Minimize the number of keys per node. Use lots of keys in case nodes are compromised. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 5 / 23

Our model S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 6 / 23

Our model We want at most one key shared by any pair of nodes. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 6 / 23

Distinct Difference Configurations An example with 3 dots (we will use this later): S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 7 / 23

Distinct Difference Configurations An example with 3 dots (we will use this later): Important property Any two shifts of a distinct difference configuration have at most one dot in common. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 7 / 23

Distinct Difference Configurations Definition A distinct difference configuration with m dots is a set {v 1, v 2,..., v m } Z 2 such that the differences v i v j for i j are all distinct. We abbreviate the above to DD(m). S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 8 / 23

Distinct Difference Configurations Definition A distinct difference configuration with m dots is a set {v 1, v 2,..., v m } Z 2 such that the differences v i v j for i j are all distinct. We abbreviate the above to DD(m). So {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)} is a DD(3) with differences given by: (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) ( 1, 0) ( 1, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 1) S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 8 / 23

Distinct Difference Configurations The following is a DD(9): S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 9 / 23

Distinct Difference Configurations The following is a DD(9): All pairs of dots are at distance at most 7. This is the largest such example. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 9 / 23

Distinct Difference Configurations Definition A distinct difference configuration with m dots of diameter d is a DD(m) such that v i v j d for all i, j. So any pair of dots is at distance d or less. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 10 / 23

Distinct Difference Configurations Definition A distinct difference configuration with m dots of diameter d is a DD(m) such that v i v j d for all i, j. So any pair of dots is at distance d or less. We abbreviate the above to DD(m, d). Our running example is a DD(3, 2). S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 10 / 23

How are the configurations used? Shift the configuration over the entire grid. For each shift s Z 2, generate a key k s. Give k s to nodes under the dots of the shift: in other words at positions s + v i, i = 1, 2,..., m. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 11 / 23

How are the configurations used? Shift the configuration over the entire grid. For each shift s Z 2, generate a key k s. Give k s to nodes under the dots of the shift: in other words at positions s + v i, i = 1, 2,..., m. In our DD(3) example: A node X at position (x, y) gets 3 keys: k (x,y), k (x 1,y), k (x,y 1) ; Each key is shared with 2 other nodes; X shares a key with 6 nodes, at positions: (x + 1, y), (x, y + 1), (x 1, y), (x 1, y + 1), (x, y 1), (x + 1, y 1). All shared keys are with nodes within distance 2 or less. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 11 / 23

Performance In general, when a DD(m, d) is used: A node receives m keys. Each key is shared with m 1 other nodes; A node shares a key with m(m 1) nodes; These m(m 1) nodes are at distance at most d. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 12 / 23

Performance In general, when a DD(m, d) is used: A node receives m keys. Each key is shared with m 1 other nodes; A node shares a key with m(m 1) nodes; These m(m 1) nodes are at distance at most d. Main combinatorial question When d is fixed, how big can m be? S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 12 / 23

Some constructions Definition An n n Costas array is a DD(n) contained in {0, 1,..., n 1} 2 with no pair of dots parallel with the x-axis, and no pair of points parallel with the y-axis. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 13 / 23

Costas arrays There exist several constructions of Costas arrays. For example let p be a prime. Let α be a primitive root mod p. Construction Let n = p 2. Put a dot in position (i, j) when α i+1 + α j+1 = 1. Then the dots form an n n Costas array. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 14 / 23

Costas arrays There exist several constructions of Costas arrays. For example let p be a prime. Let α be a primitive root mod p. Construction Let n = p 2. Put a dot in position (i, j) when α i+1 + α j+1 = 1. Then the dots form an n n Costas array. So when m is large, there exists a DD(m) contained in an n n square with n m. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 14 / 23

A lower bound on m Costas arrays give: Theorem There exists a DD(m, d) with m = 1 2 d o(d) 0.70711d. Proof: Place an n n square in a circle of diameter d. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 15 / 23

A lower bound on m Costas arrays give: Theorem There exists a DD(m, d) with m = 1 2 d o(d) 0.70711d. Proof: Place an n n square in a circle of diameter d. In fact we have an explicit construction such that: Theorem There exists a DD(m, d) with m 0.80795d. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 15 / 23

A corresponding upper bound Theorem A DD(m, d) must satisfy m ( π/2)d o(d) 0.88623d. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 16 / 23

A corresponding upper bound Theorem A DD(m, d) must satisfy m ( π/2)d o(d) 0.88623d. Sketch proof: The convex hull of the DD(m, d) has area at most (π/4)d 2. Cover the convex hull with small circles of radius l d 2/3 whose centers lie in Z 2. There are w small circles where w (π/4)d 2. Each circle contains a points in Z 2, where a πl 2. Write m i for the number of points of the DD(m, d) in the ith small circle; the mean of the m i is µ = am/w. Then wµ 2 w(µ 2 µ) w m i (m i 1) a(a 1) a 2. i=1 S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 16 / 23

A new distance measure A DD(m, d) is a DD(m) in which every pair of dots are at Manhattan distance at most d. Our running example is a DD(3, 2). S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 17 / 23

A new distance measure A DD(m, d) is a DD(m) in which every pair of dots are at Manhattan distance at most d. Our running example is a DD(3, 2). Theorem There exists a DD(m, d) with m = (1/ 2)d o(d). Moreover, Royal Holloway in any lo DD(m, d) we have that DD(m, d) (1/ 2)d + o(d). S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 17 / 23

A new grid A DD (m) is a set of vectors in the hexagonal grid whose differences are all distinct. 1 S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 18 / 23

The hexagonal grid If all pairs of dots are within Euclidean distance d, we have a DD (m, d). Theorem There exists a DD (m, d) with m = 0.86819d o(d). In any DD (m, d) we have that DD(m, d) 0.95231d + o(d). S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 19 / 23

The hexagonal grid If all pairs of dots are within Euclidean distance d, we have a DD (m, d). Theorem There exists a DD (m, d) with m = 0.86819d o(d). In any DD (m, d) we have that DD(m, d) 0.95231d + o(d). Open Problem Close this gap. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 19 / 23

Hexagonal distance If we replace Euclidean distance by hexagonal distance we call the resulting object a DD (m, d). Theorem There exists a DD (m, d) with m = 0.79444d o(d). In any DD (m, d) we have that DD(m, d) 0.86603d + o(d). S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 20 / 23

Honeycomb arrays Definition (Golomb and Taylor 1984) A honeycomb array of radius r is a DD (2r + 1) contained in a hexagonal sphere of radius r, with the property that there is exactly one dot in every row, where rows go in three directions. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference 1 configurations and WSNs 21 / 23

Honeycomb arrays Honeycomb arrays are known to exist for r = 0, 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 13 and 22. Theorem (Anastasia Panoui, 2009) This list is complete for r 13. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 22 / 23

Honeycomb arrays Honeycomb arrays are known to exist for r = 0, 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 13 and 22. Theorem (Anastasia Panoui, 2009) This list is complete for r 13. A Honeycomb array is a DD (m, d) where m = 2r + 1 and d = 2r. But we know that m 0.86603d + o(d). So there are only finitely many honeycomb arrays! Theorem Honeycomb arrays of radius r do not exist when r 644. S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 22 / 23

Some links This talk will appear soon on my homepage: http://www.ma.rhul.ac.uk/sblackburn Our preprint Two-dimensional patterns with distinct differences Constructions, Bounds and Maximal Anticodes is available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3832 The following preprint explores other combinatorial properties motivated by our key predistribution scheme: http://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3896 S.R. Blackburn (RHUL) Distinct difference configurations and WSNs 23 / 23