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1 1 Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence 24. April 2008

: If an aggregation rule is quasi-transitive, weakly Paretian and independent of irrelevant alternatives, then it is oligarchic.

Definition: Aggregation Aggregation rule: An aggregation rule is a mapping f : R n B, where R n is the set of all possible preference profiles and B is the set of all possible complete orderings over the set of alternatives.

Definition: Aggregation Aggregation rule: An aggregation rule is a mapping f : R n B, where R n is the set of all possible preference profiles and B is the set of all possible complete orderings over the set of alternatives. Nontechnically a preference aggregation rule is simply a decision-mechanism which takes the preferences of the individuals in a committee and aggregates those preferences in a complete collective preference ordering over the alternatives.

Definition: Quasi-transitivity An aggregation rule is quasi-transitive if for all x, y, z X, xpy and ypz, imply xpz.

Definition: Quasi-transitivity An aggregation rule is quasi-transitive if for all x, y, z X, xpy and ypz, imply xpz. Nontechnically quasi-transitivity means that if an alternative x is collectively strictly preferred to an alternative y, and y is collectively strictly preferred to z, then x is also collectively strictly preferred to z.

Definition: Quasi-transitivity An aggregation rule is quasi-transitive if for all x, y, z X, xpy and ypz, imply xpz. Nontechnically quasi-transitivity means that if an alternative x is collectively strictly preferred to an alternative y, and y is collectively strictly preferred to z, then x is also collectively strictly preferred to z. Quasi-transitivity and completeness of the collective preference ordering jointly guarantee that there is an optimal alternative.

Definition: Weak Pareto Optimality An aggregation is weakly Paretian if, xp i y for all i N implies xpy for all x, y X.

Definition: Weak Pareto Optimality An aggregation is weakly Paretian if, xp i y for all i N implies xpy for all x, y X. Nontechnically weak Pareto optimality means that if all individuals agree that x is strictly better than y, then under the preference aggregation rule f, x should collectively be strictly preferred to y.

Definition: Independence of irrelevant alternatives An Aggregation rule is independent of irrelevant alternatives, if for all p, p R n such that xr i y iff xr i y for all i N, it follows that xry iff xry for all x, y X.

Definition: Independence of irrelevant alternatives An Aggregation rule is independent of irrelevant alternatives, if for all p, p R n such that xr i y iff xr i y for all i N, it follows that xry iff xry for all x, y X. Nontechnically independence of irrelevant alternatives means that the collective preference relation regarding two alternatives x and y only depends on the individual preferences with respect to x and y.

Definition: Oligarchy An oligarchy is a set of individuals L N such that each i N has a veto, and L is decisive.

Definition: Oligarchy An oligarchy is a set of individuals L N such that each i N has a veto, and L is decisive. An individual i has a veto for x against y if for all p R n, xp i y implies that ypx does not hold. An individual i has a veto, if i has a veto for x against y, for all x, y X.

Definition: Oligarchy An oligarchy is a set of individuals L N such that each i N has a veto, and L is decisive. An individual i has a veto for x against y if for all p R n, xp i y implies that ypx does not hold. An individual i has a veto, if i has a veto for x against y, for all x, y X. A set L is decisive if for all p R n, [xp i y, for all i N] implies xpy.

Bibliography Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks, 1999: Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Gibbard, Allan, 1969: Social Choice and the Arrow Conditions, Discussion Paper, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan.