Computational hardness. Feb 2 abhi shelat
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1 L Computational hardness Feb 2 abhi shelat
2 Eve Alice Bob
3 Eve Alice Bob k Gen k
4 Eve Alice Bob c=enck(mi) k Gen k
5 Eve c Alice Bob c=enck(mi) k Gen k
6 Eve c Alice c=enck(mi) Bob m=deck(c) k Gen k
7 Eve c Alice c=enck(mi) Bob m=deck(c) k Gen k
8 c Eve Test if guess m1 if not. flip coin otherwise. analyze success:
9 c Eve Test if guess m1 if not. flip coin otherwise. analyze success:
10 c Eve Test if guess m1 if not. flip coin otherwise. analyze success:
11 c Eve Test if guess m1 if not. flip coin otherwise. analyze time:
12 c Eve Test if guess m1 if not. flip coin otherwise. analyze time: recall
13 c Eve Test if guess m1 if not. flip coin otherwise. analyze time: recall generic method takes time
14 EFFICIENT COMPUTATION AND EFFICIENT ADVERSARIES
15 WHAT IS AN ALGORITHM?
16 WHAT IS AN ALGORITHM? Turing machine
17 WHAT IS AN ALGORITHM? input tape Turing machine output tape work tape
18 WHAT IS AN ALGORITHM? input tape Turing machine output tape work tape running time is T(n) if machine always halts after at most T(n) steps on input of size n.
19 WHAT IS AN ALGORITHM? input tape Turing machine output tape work tape
20 WHAT IS AN ALGORITHM? input tape Turing machine output tape computes function f(x) if... work tape
21 RANDOMIZED ALGORITHM... input tape Turing machine output tape work tape
22 RANDOMIZED ALGORITHM... input tape Turing machine output tape work tape computes function f(x) if machine always halts with output f(x) on input of x.
23 RANDOMIZED ALGORITHM... input tape Turing machine output tape work tape p.p.t. algorithm probabilistic polynomial time
24 EXAMPLES
25 EXAMPLES Problems solvable by a p.p.t. machine:
26 EXAMPLES Problems solvable by a p.p.t. machine: Problems not known to be solvable by a p.p.t. machine:
27 HOW WE MODEL ADVERSARIES Turing machine 1 machine for all inputs
28 SORTING COMPETITION Quicksort machine
29 HOW WE MODEL ADVERSARIES Turing machine 1 machine for all inputs
30 HOW WE MODEL ADVERSARIES Turing machine Turing machine 1 machine for all inputs
31 HOW WE MODEL ADVERSARIES Turing machine Turing machine 1 machine for all inputs as inputs grow machine grows
32 HOW WE MODEL ADVERSARIES Turing machine Turing machine 1 machine for all inputs as inputs grow machine grows
33 HOW WE MODEL ADVERSARIES Turing machine Turing machine 1 machine for all inputs as inputs grow machine grows
34 NON-UNIFORM P.P.T.... input tape Turing machine output tape work tape for each input len n, adversary has a special Turing machine M n of size poly(n)
35 ALGORITHMS ADVERSARIES Turing machine Turing machine p.p.t. non-uniform p.p.t.
36 KEY PROPERTY OF ENC easy hard
37 WORST-CASE ONE WAY FUNC
38 CRITIQUE OF WORST-CASE
39 NEGLIGIBLE FUNCTION
40 NEGLIGIBLE FUNCTION Definition A function ε(n) is negligible if for every c, there exists some k 0 such that for all k 0 < k, (k) 1 k. Intuitively, a negligible function is c asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any fixed polynomial
41 NEGLIGIBLE FUNCTION Definition A function ε(n) is negligible if for every c, there exists some k 0 such that for all k 0 < k, (k) 1 k. Intuitively, a negligible function is c asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any fixed polynomial
42 NEGLIGIBLE FUNCTION Definition A function ε(n) is negligible if for every c, there exists some k 0 such that for all k 0 < k, (k) 1 k. Intuitively, a negligible function is c asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any fixed polynomial
43 NON-NEGLIGIBLE? Definition A function ε(n) is negligible if for every c, there exists some k 0 such that for all k 0 < k, (k) 1 k. Intuitively, a negligible function is c asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any fixed polynomial.
44 STRONG O.W.F.
45 STRONG O.W.F.
46 STRONG O.W.F.
47 STRONG O.W.F.
48 WEAK O.W.F.
49 DIAGRAM
50 WEAK OWF -> STRONG OWF
51 EXAMPLE MULT
52 Π n =
53 FACTORING ASSUMPTION
54 IS FMULT WEAK OWF?
55 NUMBER OF PRIMES there are certainly infinitely many # of primes < x
56 THM:
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