Coordination Games with Information Aggregation
|
|
- Archibald Parks
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 1 / 13 Coordination Games with Information Aggregation Mehdi Shadmehr University of Miami Dan Bernhardt University of Illinois MET October, 2012
2 2 / 13 incumbent challenger incumbent h, h w, l challenger l, w θ, θ Lobbying: Two interest groups deciding whether to support an incumbent or an untried challenger. The incubment wins unless both groups support the challenger. If the incumbent wins, he rewards the loyal and punished the disloyal group: l < h < w.
3 2 / 13 incumbent challenger incumbent h, h w, l challenger l, w θ, θ Lobbying: Two interest groups deciding whether to support an incumbent or an untried challenger. The incubment wins unless both groups support the challenger. If the incumbent wins, he rewards the loyal and punished the disloyal group: l < h < w. Investment: Two firms deciding whether to invest in/adopt a new technology that pays off if and only if they both invest. Relationships: Two individuals deciding whether to break up their current relationships to be together. Contentious Politics: Coups, protests, revolutions, wars.
4 3 / 13 Coordination Games with Information Aggregation action 0 action 1 action 0 h, h w, l action 1 l, w θ, θ Citizens receive private signals about θ, then act simultaneously. Uncertainty remains after signals. Miscoordination is costly: l < h.
5 Coordination Games with Information Aggregation action 0 action 1 action 0 h, h w, l action 1 l, w θ, θ Citizens receive private signals about θ, then act simultaneously. Uncertainty remains after signals. Miscoordination is costly: l < h. Economic Forces: Strategic complements: If you take action 1 more, I have more incentive to take action 1 because it is less likley that I get punished. Strategic substitutes: If you take action 1 more, it means you take action 1 after worse signals about θ, implying that E[θ success] is lower. Thus, I have less incentive to take action 1. 3 / 13
6 4 / 13 Coordination Information Aggregation Literature on coordination games, including global games, feature supermodularity. Best responses are monotone.carlsson and va Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998), Chassang (2010), Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2010). Many papers do applications. Literature on information aggregation, feature global strategic substitutes. Best responses are monotone. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Duggan and Martinelli (2001), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1998), McMurray (2012). We analyze the middle ground, where both economic forces exist. Best responses are non-monotone.
7 5 / 13 What We Want to Know Equilibrium Characterization: Number of equilibria. Equilibrium selection. Comparative statics: punishment level (h l) and predatory incentive (w). Should the incumbent punish more harshly or reward more generously? Does an interest group gain if the incumbent reward it more? (Welfare) Does the challenger receive enough support?
8 6 / 13 Best Responses: Single Crossing Property action 0 action 1 action 0 h, h w, l action 1 l, w θ, θ Action 1: Pr(s j > k j s i ) E[θ s j > k j, s i ] + Pr(s j k j s i ) l. Action 0: Pr(s j > k j s i ) w + Pr(s j k j s i )h. µ h l. Player i s expected net payoff from taking action 1 rather than action 0 is (s i ; k j ) = Pr(s j > k j s i ) (E[θ s j > k j, s i ] w + µ) µ. lim (s i ; k j ) < 0 and s i lim (s i ; k j ) > 0. s i
9 7 / 13 Best Responses: Non-monotonicity We want to know ki (k j ) =?. k j ( ) k 1 sign i = sign ( δ(k i ; k j ) ), with k j 2 Sign δ(k i, k j ): δ(k i ; k j ) = E[θ k j, k i (k j )] + h w l. dδ(k i ; k j ) dk j = E[θ kj, k i (k j )] k j + E[θ kj, k i (k j )] f (k j k i ) δ(k j, k i ) k i (k i ;k j ) 1 δ > 0 dδ(ki ;k j ) dk j > 0. 2 δ > 0 if and only if k j is large. k i.
10 7 / 13 Best Responses: Non-monotonicity We want to know ki (k j ) =?. k j ( ) k 1 sign i = sign ( δ(k i ; k j ) ), with k j 2 Sign δ(k i, k j ): δ(k i ; k j ) = E[θ k j, k i (k j )] + h w l. dδ(k i ; k j ) dk j = E[θ kj, k i (k j )] k j + E[θ kj, k i (k j )] f (k j k i ) δ(k j, k i ) k i (k i ;k j ) 1 δ > 0 dδ(ki ;k j ) dk j > 0. 2 δ > 0 if and only if k j is large. k i. There is a critical cutoff k s.t. k i (k j ) exhibits strategic complemts if and only if k j > k. As j takes action 1 more, there is a unique switch from SC to SS.
11 8 / 13 Equilibria action 0 action 1 action 0 h, h w, l action 1 l, w θ, θ If predatory incentives are high, w > w, there are no equilibria in finite cutoff strategies. Otherwise, there are multiple.
12 8 / 13 Equilibria action 0 action 1 action 0 h, h w, l action 1 l, w θ, θ If predatory incentives are high, w > w, there are no equilibria in finite cutoff strategies. Otherwise, there are multiple. With s i = θ + ν i, ν i N, there are two symmetric ones and no asymmetric one.
13 8 / 13 Equilibria action 0 action 1 action 0 h, h w, l action 1 l, w θ, θ If predatory incentives are high, w > w, there are no equilibria in finite cutoff strategies. Otherwise, there are multiple. With s i = θ + ν i, ν i N, there are two symmetric ones and no asymmetric one. Equilibrium Selection: Only the largest is stable, call its associated cutoff k.
14 Equilibria action 0 action 1 action 0 h, h w, l action 1 l, w θ, θ If predatory incentives are high, w > w, there are no equilibria in finite cutoff strategies. Otherwise, there are multiple. With s i = θ + ν i, ν i N, there are two symmetric ones and no asymmetric one. Equilibrium Selection: Only the largest is stable, call its associated cutoff k. Comparative Statics: k w, k µ > 0. 8 / 13
15 9 / 13 Reward or Punishment? Suppose Pr(s j > k s i = k) is decreasing in k. Then, k only if players are sufficiently likley to take action 1. w > k µ > 0 if and To maintain the status quo, harsher punishment is more effective than better rewards if and only if punishment or the reward are already high.
16 10 / 13 Welfare payoff complement/substitutes stategic complement/substitutes. Action are payoff complements if and only if a player s gain from mis-coordination exceeds the other s loss: w > l. Suppose coordination on action 1 is better than coordination on aciton 0. Then, it is socially optimum for palyers to take action 1 more often than they do in equilibrium if and only if w > l.
17 11 / 13 Welfare Effects of Asymmetric Changes incumbent challenger incumbent h, h w i = w + ɛ, l challenger l, w θ, θ 1 Direct Effect: Increases i s welfare. 2 Strategic Effect: i takes action 1 less. If actions are SS, j takes action 1 more. Further increases welfare. If actions are SC, j takes action 1 less. Decreases welfare, and can swamp the positive, direct effect, making i worse off.
18 12 / 13 Welfare Effects of Asymmetric Changes incumbent challenger incumbent h, h w, l challenger l i = l + ɛ, w θ, θ 1 Direct Effect: Increases i s welfare. 2 Strategic Effect: i takes action 1 more. If actions are SS, j takes action 1 less. Decreases welfare, and can swamp the positive, direct effect, making i worse off. If actions are SC, j takes action 1 more. Further increases welfare. SC-SS in Equilibrium: In equilibrium, actions are SS if and only if miscoordination punishment µ is small.
19 13 / 13 Robustness action 0 action 1 action 0 h w action 1 h µ θ no invest invest no invest 0 0 invest α θ k θ α = 1 leads to global strategic complements (supermodular game). We analyze α = 0, where we have both strategic complements and strategic substitutes. With α < 1 strategic substitutes appear again. k = 0 corresponds to infromation aggregation literature.
Monotone and Bounded Interval Equilibria in a Coordination Game with Information Aggregation 1
Monotone and Bounded Interval Equilibria in a Coordination Game with Information Aggregation 1 Mehdi Shadmehr 2 Dan Bernhardt 3 1 We thank Raphael Boleslavsky, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Odilon Camara, Juan
More informationGlobal Games I. Mehdi Shadmehr Department of Economics University of Miami. August 25, 2011
Global Games I Mehdi Shadmehr Department of Economics University of Miami August 25, 2011 Definition What is a global game? 1 A game of incomplete information. 2 There is an unknown and uncertain parameter.
More informationStrategic Abuse and Accuser Credibility
1 / 33 Strategic Abuse and Accuser Credibility HARRY PEI and BRUNO STRULOVICI Department of Economics, Northwestern University November 16th, 2018 Montréal, Canada 2 / 33 Motivation Many crimes/abuses
More informationSun Spot Transparency:
Sun Spot Transparency: On Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland s Model of Information, Autocracy and Political (In)Stability Mehdi Shadmehr 1 Dan Bernhardt 2 1 Harris School of Public Policy, University of
More informationA Theory of State Censorship 1
A Theory of State Censorship 1 Mehdi Shadmehr 2 Dan Bernhardt 3 1 We thank Raphael Boleslavsky, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Odilon Camara, Georgy Egorov, John Londregan, Paulina Marek, Aya Kachi, Patrick
More informationDo Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules. Supplement
Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules Supplement Ernst Maug Kristian Rydqvist September 2008 1 Additional Results on the Theory of Strategic Voting
More informationDeceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers
Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers September 6, 016 ONLINE APPENDIX In this Appendix we present in full additional results and extensions which are only mentioned in the paper. In the exposition
More informationLecture Notes Morris-Shin and Global Games
14.462 Lecture Notes Morris-Shin and Global Games George-Marios Angeletos MIT Department of Economics Spring 2004 1 Framework Actions, Outcomes and Payoffs. Therearetwopossibleregimes,thestatusquo andanalternative.
More informationVulnerability and Cooperation: The Role of Social Policy in the Promotion of Trade
Vulnerability and Cooperation: The Role of Social Policy in the Promotion of Trade PRELIMINARY DRAFT Chris Bidner Ken Jackson December 15, 2010 Abstract Cooperation in the face of moral hazard is a critical
More informationDiscussion Paper Series
INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN ECONÓMICA Discussion Paper Series Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information? César Martinelli Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
More informationInformation and Incentives in A Model of Contest Between Large Groups
Information and Incentives in A Model of Contest Between Large Groups Eduardo Perez perezedu@stanford.edu Abstract This paper studies a model of social contest between two large groups, in which individual
More informationObserving Each Other s Observations in the Electronic Mail Game 1
Observing Each Other s Observations in the Electronic Mail Game 1 Dominik Grafenhofer Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany. Email: grafenhofer@coll.mpg.de.
More informationCOMPETITION IN MARKETS WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES. Fatma Busra Gunay
COMPETITION IN MARKETS WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES Fatma Busra Gunay A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements
More informationWhen to Ask for an Update: Timing in Strategic Communication
When to Ask for an Update: Timing in Strategic Communication Work in Progress Ying Chen Johns Hopkins University Atara Oliver Rice University March 19, 2018 Main idea In many communication situations,
More informationKnowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition Christian Hellwig and Laura Veldkamp UCLA and NYU Stern May 2006 1 Hellwig and Veldkamp Two types of information acquisition Passive
More informationDEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY P.O. Box New Haven, CT
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY P.O. Box 208268 New Haven, CT 06520-8268 http://www.econ.yale.edu/ Economics Department Working Paper No. 25 Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1619 Information
More informationPandering and Electoral Competition
Pandering and Electoral Competition Gabriele Gratton UNSW December 28, 2013 Abstract We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the
More informationEconomics 2102: Final Solutions
Economics 10: Final Solutions 10 December, 006 1. Auctions with Correlated Values: Solutions (a) There are initially eight constraints. Clearly, IR hh and IR hl are redundant. Ignoring IC ll and IC lh
More informationCoordinating Expectations: Global Games with Strategic Substitutes
: Global Games with Strategic Substitutes Stephen Morris Colin Clark lecture at the 2008 Australasian Meetings of the Econometric Society July 2008 Uniqueness versus Multiplicity in Economic Models I Economists
More informationCommunication with Self-Interested Experts Part II: Models of Cheap Talk
Communication with Self-Interested Experts Part II: Models of Cheap Talk Margaret Meyer Nuffield College, Oxford 2013 Cheap Talk Models 1 / 27 Setting: Decision-maker (P) receives advice from an advisor
More informationCommunication and Voting With Double-Sided Information
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Business Economics and Public Policy Papers Wharton Faculty Research 8-2003 Communication and Voting With Double-Sided Information Ulrich Doraszelski Dino Gerardi
More informationAspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism
Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism HENG CHEN University of Hong Kong WING SUEN University of Hong Kong September 7, 2015 Abstract. We propose a regime change model in which people are
More informationUnrestricted Information Acquisition
Unrestricted Information Acquisition Tommaso Denti MIT June 7, 2016 Introduction A theory of information acquisition in games Endogenize assumptions on players information Common extra layer of strategic
More informationRecap Social Choice Functions Fun Game Mechanism Design. Mechanism Design. Lecture 13. Mechanism Design Lecture 13, Slide 1
Mechanism Design Lecture 13 Mechanism Design Lecture 13, Slide 1 Lecture Overview 1 Recap 2 Social Choice Functions 3 Fun Game 4 Mechanism Design Mechanism Design Lecture 13, Slide 2 Notation N is the
More informationRobust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information joint with Stephen Morris (Princeton University) November 2010 Payoff Environment in games with incomplete information, the agents are uncertain
More informationRobust Comparative Statics in Large Static Games
Robust Comparative Statics in Large Static Games Daron Acemoglu and Martin Kaae Jensen Abstract We provide general comparative static results for large finite and infinite-dimensional aggregative games.
More informationThe Case for Responsible Parties
USC FBE APPLIED ECONOMICS WORKSHOP presented by Dan Bernhardt FRIDAY, Nov. 13, 2009 1:30 pm - 3:00 pm, Room: ACC-201 The Case for Responsible Parties Dan Bernhardt Department of Economics and Department
More informationThe Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem
The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem David S. Ahn University of California, Berkeley Santiago Oliveros Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley September 2010 Abstract Two issues can be decided in a single election
More informationModels of Reputation with Bayesian Updating
Models of Reputation with Bayesian Updating Jia Chen 1 The Tariff Game (Downs and Rocke 1996) 1.1 Basic Setting Two states, A and B, are setting the tariffs for trade. The basic setting of the game resembles
More informationCostly Voting: Voter Composition and Turnout
Costly Voting: Voter Composition and Turnout Jannet Chang Department of Economics, Virginia Tech October, 004 Abstract Given voting is costly, we analyze under what conditions rational agents vote and
More informationGame Theory. Monika Köppl-Turyna. Winter 2017/2018. Institute for Analytical Economics Vienna University of Economics and Business
Monika Köppl-Turyna Institute for Analytical Economics Vienna University of Economics and Business Winter 2017/2018 Static Games of Incomplete Information Introduction So far we assumed that payoff functions
More informationLearning from Others Outcomes
Learning from Others Outcomes Alexander Wolitzky MIT BFI, July 21, 2017 Wolitzky (MIT) Learning from Others Outcomes BFI, July 21, 2017 1 / 53 Introduction Scarcity of Cost-Saving Innovation Development
More informationWould Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?
Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information? César Martinelli September 8, 2003 Abstract In order to study the aggregate implications of Downs s rational ignorance hypothesis, we analyze an election
More informationSorting via Screening vs. Signaling
Sorting via Screening vs. Signaling - Static Frame and Experimental Evidence - Werner Güth and Fabian Winter 1. Introduction 2. Static Frame 3. Experimental Design 4. Main Findings 5. Conclusions 1. Introduction
More informationRobust comparative statics in large static games
Robust comparative statics in large static games The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation As Published Publisher Acemoglu,
More informationUC Berkeley Haas School of Business Game Theory (EMBA 296 & EWMBA 211) Summer 2016
UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Game Theory (EMBA 296 & EWMBA 211) Summer 2016 More on strategic games and extensive games with perfect information Block 2 Jun 12, 2016 Food for thought LUPI Many players
More informationCompetition in Markets with Network Externalities
Competition in Markets with Network Externalities Fatma Busra Gunay Bendas Washington and Lee University gunayf@wlu.edu December 2, 2013 Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of network externalities
More informationCostly Expertise. Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv yz. Current Version: December, 2007
Costly Expertise Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv yz Current Version: December, 007 In many environments expertise is costly. Costs can manifest themselves in numerous ways, ranging from the time that is required
More informationInformation Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance.
Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance. Laura Veldkamp New York University, Stern School of Business, CEPR and NBER Spring 2009 1 Veldkamp What information consumes is rather obvious: It consumes
More informationCommunication and Voting with Double-Sided Information
Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information Ulrich Doraszelski Hoover Institution Dino Gerardi Yale University Francesco Squintani University of Rochester March 2002 An earlier version of this
More informationReward and Punishment in a Regime Change Game 1
Reward and Punishment in a Regime Change Game 1 Stephen Morris 2 Mehdi Shadmehr 3 May, 2017 1 We are grateful for comments of Nemanja Antic, Dan Bernhardt, Raphael Boleslavsky, seminar participants at
More informationCoordination without Common Knowledge
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin Arizona State University March 006 Introduction Coordination games have multiple equilibria Relaxing common knowledge assumptions gives uniqueness { Carlsson and van Damme
More informationRepeated Downsian Electoral Competition
Repeated Downsian Electoral Competition John Duggan Department of Political Science and Department of Economics University of Rochester Mark Fey Department of Political Science University of Rochester
More informationInformation Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions
Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions Dirk Bergemann Xianwen Shi Juuso Välimäki July 16, 2008 Abstract We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can
More informationGovernment 2005: Formal Political Theory I
Government 2005: Formal Political Theory I Lecture 11 Instructor: Tommaso Nannicini Teaching Fellow: Jeremy Bowles Harvard University November 9, 2017 Overview * Today s lecture Dynamic games of incomplete
More informationCrowdsourcing contests
December 8, 2012 Table of contents 1 Introduction 2 Related Work 3 Model: Basics 4 Model: Participants 5 Homogeneous Effort 6 Extensions Table of Contents 1 Introduction 2 Related Work 3 Model: Basics
More informationIntroduction to Game Theory
Introduction to Game Theory Part 2. Dynamic games of complete information Chapter 2. Two-stage games of complete but imperfect information Ciclo Profissional 2 o Semestre / 2011 Graduação em Ciências Econômicas
More informationThe Social Value of Credible Public Information
The Social Value of Credible Public Information Ercan Karadas NYU September, 2017 Introduction Model Analysis MOTIVATION This paper is motivated by the paper Social Value of Public Information, Morris
More informationAbstract We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players' preferences. We consider two players who vote on fo
Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information Λ Ulrich Doraszelski Northwestern University y Dino Gerardi Northwestern University z Francesco Squintani University of Rochester x April 200 Λ An
More informationCompeting to Coordinate: Crowding Out in Coordination Games *
Competing to Coordinate: Crowding Out in Coordination Games * Sarita Bunsupha and Saran Ahuja December 2, 218 Job Market Paper Click here for most recent version Abstract This paper develops a framework
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CONFLICT AND DETERRENCE UNDER STRATEGIC RISK. Sylvain Chassang Gerard Padro i Miquel
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CONFLICT AND DETERRENCE UNDER STRATEGIC RISK Sylvain Chassang Gerard Padro i Miquel Working Paper 3964 http://www.nber.org/papers/w3964 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 050
More informationSURPLUS SHARING WITH A TWO-STAGE MECHANISM. By Todd R. Kaplan and David Wettstein 1. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. 1.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW Vol. 41, No. 2, May 2000 SURPLUS SHARING WITH A TWO-STAGE MECHANISM By Todd R. Kaplan and David Wettstein 1 Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel In this article we consider
More informationBayesian Learning in Social Networks
Bayesian Learning in Social Networks Asu Ozdaglar Joint work with Daron Acemoglu, Munther Dahleh, Ilan Lobel Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Department of Economics, Operations
More informationModule 8: Multi-Agent Models of Moral Hazard
Module 8: Multi-Agent Models of Moral Hazard Information Economics (Ec 515) George Georgiadis Types of models: 1. No relation among agents. an many agents make contracting easier? 2. Agents shocks are
More informationWhen to Ask for an Update: Timing in Strategic Communication. National University of Singapore June 5, 2018
When to Ask for an Update: Timing in Strategic Communication Ying Chen Johns Hopkins University Atara Oliver Rice University National University of Singapore June 5, 2018 Main idea In many communication
More informationMechanism Design: Implementation. Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham
Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Bayesian Game Setting Extend the social choice setting to a new setting where agents can t be relied upon to disclose their preferences honestly Start
More informationLecture Note II-3 Static Games of Incomplete Information. Games of incomplete information. Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information (cont )
Lecture Note II- Static Games of Incomplete Information Static Bayesian Game Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Applications: Auctions The Revelation Principle Games of incomplete information Also called Bayesian
More informationEconomics 3012 Strategic Behavior Andy McLennan October 20, 2006
Economics 301 Strategic Behavior Andy McLennan October 0, 006 Lecture 11 Topics Problem Set 9 Extensive Games of Imperfect Information An Example General Description Strategies and Nash Equilibrium Beliefs
More informationPROPERTY RIGHTS IN GROWTH THEORY
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GROWTH THEORY Costas Azariadis Washington University and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Preliminary Draft May 2013 1. CONTENTS 1. Issues and Goals 2. Main Results 3. Related Literature
More informationGains in evolutionary dynamics. Dai ZUSAI
Gains in evolutionary dynamics unifying rational framework for dynamic stability Dai ZUSAI Hitotsubashi University (Econ Dept.) Economic Theory Workshop October 27, 2016 1 Introduction Motivation and literature
More informationBasics of Game Theory
Basics of Game Theory Giacomo Bacci and Luca Sanguinetti Department of Information Engineering University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy {giacomo.bacci,luca.sanguinetti}@iet.unipi.it April - May, 2010 G. Bacci and
More informationCoordination and Continuous Choice
Coordination and Continuous Choice Stephen Morris and Ming Yang Princeton University and Duke University December 2016 Abstract We study a coordination game where players choose what information to acquire
More informationWeak Robust (Virtual) Implementation
Weak Robust (Virtual) Implementation Chih-Chun Yang Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei 115, Taiwan April 2016 Abstract We provide a characterization of (virtual) implementation in iterated
More information5. Relational Contracts and Career Concerns
5. Relational Contracts and Career Concerns Klaus M. Schmidt LMU Munich Contract Theory, Summer 2010 Klaus M. Schmidt (LMU Munich) 5. Relational Contracts and Career Concerns Contract Theory, Summer 2010
More informationA Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design
A Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design Jidong Chen Mark Fey Kristopher W. Ramsay March 15, 2016 Abstract Various well known agreement theorems show that if players have common
More informationVirtual Robust Implementation and Strategic Revealed Preference
and Strategic Revealed Preference Workshop of Mathematical Economics Celebrating the 60th birthday of Aloisio Araujo IMPA Rio de Janeiro December 2006 Denitions "implementation": requires ALL equilibria
More informationOptimal Objective Function
Optimal Objective Function Junichi Haraguchi Taku Masuda June 5 017 PRELIMINARY. ANY COMMENTS APPRECIATED. 1 Introduction In a framework of industrial organization we basically assume firms objective is
More informationGame Theory. Wolfgang Frimmel. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Game Theory Wolfgang Frimmel Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium / 22 Bayesian Nash equilibrium and dynamic games L M R 3 2 L R L R 2 2 L R L 2,, M,2, R,3,3 2 NE and 2 SPNE (only subgame!) 2 / 22 Non-credible
More informationStatic Information Design
Static Information Design Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris Frontiers of Economic Theory & Computer Science, Becker-Friedman Institute, August 2016 Mechanism Design and Information Design Basic Mechanism
More informationOn Reputation with Imperfect Monitoring
On Reputation with Imperfect Monitoring M. W. Cripps, G. Mailath, L. Samuelson UCL, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Yale Theory Workshop Reputation Effects or Equilibrium Robustness Reputation Effects: Kreps,
More informationPreference Signaling with Multiple Agents
Preference Signaling with Multiple Agents Zachary Grossman (Florida State) Belief-Based Utility Conference CMU June 12 13, 2017 n image-conscious agents decide: Act (a i = 1) to bring about joint outcome
More informationSocial Learning with Endogenous Network Formation
Social Learning with Endogenous Network Formation Yangbo Song November 10, 2014 Abstract I study the problem of social learning in a model where agents move sequentially. Each agent receives a private
More informationImperfect Common Knowledge of Preferences in Global Coordination Games
Imperfect Common Knowledge of Preferences in Global Coordination Games Christian Hellwig U.C.L.A. October 2002 Abstract I study a simple global game, in which I relax the assumption that preferences are
More informationA Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design
A Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design Jidong Chen Mark Fey Kristopher W. Ramsay September 23, 2016 Abstract Various well known agreement theorems show that if players have common
More informationStrategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing
Strategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing Eric J. Friedman Department of Economics, Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ 08903. January 27, 2000 Abstract We show that serial cost sharing
More informationPledge-and-Review Bargaining
Pledge-and-Review Bargaining Bård Harstad University of Oslo August 2018 Harstad (University of Oslo) Pledge-and-Review Bargaining August 2018 1 / 29 Introduction -The pledge-and-review strategy is completely
More informationCrises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks
Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks Stephen Morris and Muhamet Yildiz November 2016 Abstract We study the informational events that trigger equilibrium shifts in coordination games with incomplete
More informationGames of Elimination
Dmitry Ilinsky, Sergei Izmalkov, Alexei Savvateev September 2010 HSE Overview Competition The driving force in economies and economics. Overview Competition The driving force in economies and economics.
More informationInvestor Sentiments. Sergei Izmalkov and Muhamet Yildiz. December 22, Abstract
Forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Investor Sentiments Sergei Izmalkov and Muhamet Yildiz December 22, 2008 Abstract We consider a general class of games that have been used to model
More informationGame Theory Correlated equilibrium 1
Game Theory Correlated equilibrium 1 Christoph Schottmüller University of Copenhagen 1 License: CC Attribution ShareAlike 4.0 1 / 17 Correlated equilibrium I Example (correlated equilibrium 1) L R U 5,1
More informationTheory of Auctions. Carlos Hurtado. Jun 23th, Department of Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Theory of Auctions Carlos Hurtado Department of Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign hrtdmrt2@illinois.edu Jun 23th, 2015 C. Hurtado (UIUC - Economics) Game Theory On the Agenda 1 Formalizing
More informationCHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES. 1. Introduction
CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK* TIJMEN R. DANIËLS FRANK HEINEMANN TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN Abstract. Global games are widely
More informationCoordination on Networks
Coordination on Networks Matt Leister 1 Yves Zenou 1,2 Junjie Zhou 3 1 Monash, 2 IFN, 3 National University of Singapore Workshop on Game Theory at NUS June 4, 2018 Motivating examples Games with complements,
More informationCOMMUNICATION IN GLOBAL GAMES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
COMMUNICATION IN GLOBAL GAMES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT ALA AVOYAN JOB MARKET PAPER Latest version at: www.alaavoyan.com JANUARY 14, 2018 Abstract This paper introduces communication as a strategic choice
More informationINFORMATION AND INTERACTION. Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, and Stephen Morris. May 2017 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO.
INFORMATION AND INTERACTION By Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, and Stephen Morris May 2017 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO 2088 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY Box 208281
More informationRobust Mechanism Design and Robust Implementation
Robust Mechanism Design and Robust Implementation joint work with Stephen Morris August 2009 Barcelona Introduction mechanism design and implementation literatures are theoretical successes mechanisms
More informationPolitical Economy of Transparency
Political Economy of Transparency Raphael Galvão University of Pennsylvania rgalvao@sas.upenn.edu November 20, 2017 Abstract This paper develops a model where short-term reputation concerns guide the public
More informationAppendix. First, we show that the sequence {θ k } is bounded below. By. ProofofLemma4.
Appendix ProofofLemma4. First, we show that the sequence {θ k } is bounded below. By contradiction: for every N finite there exists k> such that N [θ k 1, θ k ) for some θ k 1 >. Bydefinition of PBEC and
More informationInformation Sharing in Private Value Lottery Contest
Information Sharing in Private Value Lottery Contest Zenan Wu Jie Zheng May 4, 207 Abstract We investigate players incentives to disclose information on their private valuations of the prize ahead of a
More informationConflict Games with Payoff Uncertainty 1
Conflict Games with Payoff Uncertainty 1 Sandeep Baliga Northwestern University Tomas Sjöström Rutgers University June 2011 1 This paper has benefitted from insightful comments by Stephen Morris. Abstract
More informationDynamic Common Agency
Dynamic Common Agency Dirk Bergemann Juuso Välimäki January 2001 Abstract A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium
More informationCombinatorial Voting
Combinatorial Voting David S. Ahn University of California, Berkeley Santiago Oliveros Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley June 009 Abstract We study elections with multiple issues, where voters have
More informationMicroeconomics II Lecture 4: Incomplete Information Karl Wärneryd Stockholm School of Economics November 2016
Microeconomics II Lecture 4: Incomplete Information Karl Wärneryd Stockholm School of Economics November 2016 1 Modelling incomplete information So far, we have studied games in which information was complete,
More informationGame Theory. Strategic Form Games with Incomplete Information. Levent Koçkesen. Koç University. Levent Koçkesen (Koç University) Bayesian Games 1 / 15
page.1 Game Theory Strategic Form Games with Incomplete Information Levent Koçkesen Koç University Levent Koçkesen (Koç University) Bayesian Games 1 / 15 page. Games with Incomplete Information Some players
More informationCommon Belief Foundations of Global Games
of Global Games Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin Econometric Society Winter Meetings Chicago January 2007 Introduction Coordination games have multiple equilibria Relaxing common knowledge assumptions
More informationGames and Economic Behavior
Games and Economic Behavior 67 009 17 3 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Games and Economic Behavior www.elsevier.com/locate/geb Membership in citizen groups Stefano Barbieri a, Andrea Mattozzi
More informationUsing Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers
Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers Daeyoung Jeong October 30, 015 Abstract This paper develops a model of strategic information transmission from an expert with informational
More informationNash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
Florida International University FIU Digital Commons Economics Research Working Paper Series Department of Economics 8-9-2008 Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution Nejat Anbarci Department
More informationSimple Decision Rules in Small Groups: Collegial Rule v. Rotational Rule
Simple Decision Rules in Small Groups: Collegial Rule v. Rotational Rule Mehdi Shadmehr a Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, University of Miami, 5250 University Dr., 517 Jenkins
More informationA theory of esteem based peer pressure
A theory of esteem based peer pressure Fabrizio Adriani University of Leicester Silvia Sonderegger University of Nottingham Status and Esteem [A]part from economic payoffs, social status seems to be the
More information