Aristotle I PHIL301 Prof. Oakes Winthrop University updated: 3/14/14 8:48 AM

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1 Aristtle I PHIL301 Prf. Oakes Winthrp University updated: 3/14/14 8:48 AM The Categries - The Categries is ne f several imprtant wrks by Aristtle n metaphysics. His tpic here is the classificatin f beings and the ntlgical relatinships amng them. Ontlgical: f r pertaining t the nature f being - His infrmatin surce in the Categries is linguistic: he appeals t features f ur language, f ur talk abut being and beings, t classify and characterize being and beings. Nte the cnnectin, then, with the ratinalist traditin: lgi themselves may be investigated fr clues t the fundamental nature f reality. Cmpare Parmenides and Zen. - In additin, as abve, Aristtle s methd is bradly empiricist. This means, rughly, that he prceeds by (a) gathering infrmatin (data), primarily by sense bservatin, and (b) distilling frm the gathered data such rganizatin as becmes evident. This latter prcess f classificatin is facilitated by identifying similarities and differences amng the data. Aristtle s wrk t identify a bilgical taxnmy is paradigmatic: amng the things that there are, sme are living (i.e., have a sul r internal principle f change); amng these, sme are capable nly f grwth (plants), sme are capable f mtin and perceptin (animals), and sme are capable f ratinal thught (humans). Further differences and similarities amng these general kinds yield the beginning f the genus-species taxnmy by which we nw identify bilgical kind. In the Categries, Aristtle begins by gathering infrmatin abut wrds (lgi). (See the first Aristtle study guide fr sme further details.) - Mre specifically, Aristtle ntices tw types f predicatin, that in which we say smething f a thing, and that in which we say smething t be in a thing. Predicate: a linguistic frm attributing t a subject sme quality r prperty Subject: in a linguistic cntext, that t which a predicate applies typically a term referring t sme thing (bject, event, etc.); Aristtle als will als t subjects as the substrate f change (i.e., the thing underging change). - T say smething f a thing is t classify that thing. E.g., we say f Barbar that he was a hrse. Thus, Barbar belngs t the class f hrses. Nte that the said f relatin is transitive: if hrse is said f Barbar and if mammal is said f hrse, then mammal will be said f Barbar. These relatinships determine a hierarchy f beings, fr Aristtle. This hierarchy is the rigin f ur cntemprary bilgical taxnmy. - That which is said in a thing indicates a relatinship f ntlgical dependence. Ontlgical dependence: x is ntlgically dependent n y iff x can exist nly if y exists. Fr example, curage may be said t be in Barbar; and if s, then (that particular instance f) curage cannt exist unless Barbar exists.

2 We shuld distinguish this in f ntlgical dependence frm the in f spatial lcatin: it is nt the same relatin as that hlding between a muse and a bx, e.g., fr a muse is nt ntlgically dependent n any bx. Nr is it the relatin that parts have t whles: althugh ne s kidney may nt be able t functin utside ne s bdy, that is nt a relatin f ntlgical dependence, but rather ne f bilgical dependence. A kidney can exist whether it is in a bdy r nt. Curage, by cntrast, cannt exist independently f sme persn (r similar creature). Nte here the departure frm Plat. Aristtle is a nminalist, evidently: ne wh denies the existence f a class f things if nne f its members exists. - The fact f ntlgical dependence, implicit in the said in relatin, is f cnsiderable metaphysical significance. It means, fr Aristtle, that there will be sme things that are ntlgically secndary with respect t thers. That is, nt all things that exist can exist independently; sme require the existence f ther things t exist at all. Substances and nn-substances - By further reference t the varius ways we have f talking abut things (i.e., variety in ur wrds), Aristtle identifies ten categries f being. Primary amng these are the substances, and Aristtle distinguishes primary frm secndary substances. Primary substances are thse things that are neither said f nr said in anything. E.g., individual hrses, individual men: Barbar (the name f a famus hrse) cannt be said f anything nthing, that is, has Barbarhd ; there is n class f Barbars nt, at least, as we rdinarily use the wrd Barbar. Similarly, Barbar is nt a quality that inheres in anything, as we rdinarily use the term. Secndary substances, by cntrast, are thse things that are said f but nt said in anything. Thus, the species and higher genera : hrse, mammal, and animal are all said f Barbar; but nne f these things is said in Barbar, as Aristtle has it. Nte that Aristtle thinks f a hrse as being a fully independent if nn-specific being. Hrse and animal are nt t be understd as prperties r qualities that inhere in smething. Rather, they are substances f a certain kind. The varius kinds f substance (r nn-substance) are determined by the differentiae distinguishing ne srt f being frm anther, such as fted and tw-fted. (A differentia is a prperty identifying a difference in classes f things.) Substances are always particular things, a this (3b10). Primary substances (individual hrses, individual men, etc.) are particular beings (this hrse, this man). We may als pick ut particulars by use f species and genus terms i.e., the secndary substance terms. - The hierarchy f substances, then, fr Aristtle, has nly ne level, in this sense: it cnsists f individual things (particular, independent beings) variusly classified i.e., thse things that cannt be either said f r said in anything. The classificatin system is itself hierarchical. But that is nt t say that there are intermediate r lesser substances. (2b24) - This is despite the fact that species is clser t primary substance than genus. But what this tells us is simply that species is mre infrmative than are the genera f the nature f a substance. (2b8-14) - On the ther hand, Aristtle des recgnize a class f dependent beings, things that are real but cannt exist alne r independently. These are the things ppulating the ther nine categries, which are specified by varius interrgative prnuns: the hw, the where, the hw many, the hw arranged, the hw affected, etc.

3 Quantity tw, three Quality white, grammatical Relatin duble, half, larger Where in the Lyceum When yesterday, nw, next year Arrangement lying, sitting Having n wearing shes Ding cutting, burning Being Affected being cut - These things can be said f r said in smething, but nly in virtue f the existence f substances. If there were n substances, there wuld be n nn-substances (quantities, qualities, etc.), either. - Nte that many cmmentatrs find Aristtle s specificatin f the nn-substance categries arbitrary. Particulars and Universals, Essence and Accident - Aristtle s classificatin system distinguishes between thse things that can be said f and thse that cannt. Thse that can be said f a subject are universals, as we smetimes call them. (Plat culd call them Frms.) I.e., these are predicates that can apply t mre than ne thing, such as hrse, man, clr, and red. - By cntrast, thse things that cannt be said f anything are what we smetimes call particulars. The names f particulars apply nly t single things, such as Barbar, Sea Biscuit, and Secretariat. We can als use nun phrases ( definite descriptins ) t refer t particulars: e.g., the first black president f the United States. - Ntice, t, that Aristtle distinguishes tw different frms f predicatin that we may call essential and accidental. Predicatin within a categry i.e., what may be said f a subject is essential predicatin: the essence f a subject is specified by such predicatin. E.g., Barbar is a hrse, a mammal, an animal, etc., essentially. The categrial predicates applying t Barbar identify qualities that he cannt fail t have; the differentiae defining the varius classes f which he is a member define his essence: fur-legged, warm-blded, capable f mtin and sense perceptin, etc. Ntice, then, that bth the names (that which is said f) f a thing and its varius differentiae are bth predicable f it (2a19-26). - Crss-categrial predicatin, by cntrast i.e., what is said in a subject identifies accidental features f things, i.e., features nt essential t the subject s existence. E.g., while curage is said in Barbar, it is nt essential t him: he might have been a cwardly hrse (as Aristtle sees the matter). Mre generally, the precise quantity, quality, lcatin, etc. f a particular thing (substance) are nt essential t it but are rather subject t change. (On change, see the Physics.) Prperties f Substances - differentiae - n cntraries - n mre r less - Change: nly substances are capable f underging change. (4a10-21) This is wing t the fact, fr Aristtle, that nly substances can accept cntraries. That is, nly a substance can instantiate ppsite qualities (at different times), such as pale and dark, r gd and bad. Nn-substance particulars and universals cannt change. A given clr, bth in general and in the given instance, fr example, cannt at ne time be dark and at anther light. (Cmpare Plat s assertin that frms are immutable.)

4 The Dilemma f Participatin - In his dialgue Parmenides, Plat psed a number f prblems fr his thery f frms. (See 130e-135d.) - One f these prblems is the dilemma f participatin (130e-131c): 1. Particulars have prperties by participatin in frms (accrding t the thery f frms). 2. The particular shares either the whle r a part f a frm. 3. If the whle, then a frm is separate frm itself (which presumably is incherent). 4. If a part, then a frm is divisible, and, wrse, thse things sharing it have nthing in cmmn. (I.e., since it will be ne part f whiteness that a given thing has and a different part that anther thing has, they will have nthing in cmmn. And dn t say that they have whiteness in cmmn, since that is what their sharing parts f whiteness is suppsed t analyze.) 5. Cnsequently, particulars d nt have prperties by means f participatin in frms. (I.e., the thery f frms is false.) - Aristtle s thery f being and predicatin may be seen as an attempt t avid this difficulty. His slutin is t reject whiteness as a being distinct frm thse particulars that share in it. Rather, he cntents himself with saying that the predicate white is said f thse particular instances f whiteness. That is, whiteness cnsists in particular instances, themselves lcated in certain primary substances. Whether this cnstitutes a satisfactry accunt f tw things bth being white is cntrversial. Aristtle s thery is distinct frm Plat s insfar as he rejects the independent existence f whiteness as against its instances. But can it simply be white being said f tw white particulars, a and b that makes it the case that a and b are white? In supprt f Aristtle s psitin, we might say that, ever the careful empiricist, he wishes simply t reprt what we d say and knw. We recgnize the existence f primary substances, such as the man Scrates and the hrse, Barbar. Sme f these things are white, s we can recgnize the particular bits f whiteness that these things have. Hw are we t analyze the fact that tw given things happen t be white? Aristtle may be reluctant t answer this questin directly, satisfying himself with recgnizing the fact that we d, in any case, say that whiteness is in them bth, r that whiteness is said f bth f the clrs in them. This may nt explain what it is fr tw things t be white. But it may be as much as we can say, truthfully, abut the matter. - A secnd difficulty fr Plat s thery f frms is the s-called Third Man argument, Parmenides 132a-b. The argument appears t be as fllws: 1. A given set f large things, a, b, and c imply the existence f a frm, largeness, in virtue f which a, b, and c are all large. (This is an applicatin f the thery f frms.) 2. Since the frm largeness itself must be understd t be large, we can cnstruct the further set f large things, a, b, c, and largeness. 3. But this, as abve, will imply the existence f a further frm, largeness*, in virtue f which all fur are similarly large. And this further frm, largeness*, will f curse itself be large*, as are a, b, c, and largeness, s that all five are similar in this respect. Thus, there will be sme frm largeness** in respect f which all five are alike, etc., resulting in an infinite regress.

5 4. This regress is vicius, because it entails that n frm can be defined in finite terms, making it impssible fr a human mind t understand the given frm, which makes knwledge impssible, cntrary t Plat s suppsitin. If Aristtle s accunt f being and predicatin can avid the Dilemma f Participatin, it wuld seem able als t avid the Third Man prblem, since it is distinguishing a frm frm its instances that allws bth prblems t arise.