Why Care About Counterfactual Support? The Cognitive Uses of Causal Order Lecture 2
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1 Why Care About Counterfactual Support? The Cognitive Uses of Causal Order Lecture 2
2 You Do Care About Counterfactual Support
3 Two Regularities All uranium spheres are less than a mile in diameter All gold spheres are less than a mile in diameter
4 Two Regularities All uranium spheres are less than a mile in diameter All gold spheres are less than a mile in diameter
5 Two More Regularities All ravens are black All members of the 1964 Greenbury School Board are bald
6 Two More Regularities All ravens are black All members of the 1964 Greenbury School Board are bald
7 Conclusion Some true generalizations are law-like ; some are not But what is lawlikeness?
8 Answer A lawlike generalization supports counterfactuals
9 Two Counterfactuals If these two ravens were to mate, their offspring would be black If Hilary Clinton were elected to the 1964 Greenbury School Board, her hair would fall out
10 Counterfactuals and Lawlikeness The baldness of the school board members is a coincidence; if things had gone differently, baldness would not be universal The blackness of ravens is not a coincidence; if things had gone (somewhat) differently, blackness would still be universal
11 Counterfactuals and Lawlikeness The baldness of the school board members is a coincidence; if things had gone differently, baldness would not be universal The blackness of ravens is not a coincidence; if things had gone (somewhat) differently, blackness would still be universal
12 Counterfactual Support A generalization All Fs are G offers counterfactual support if 1. Actual Fs in non-actual circumstances would still be G 2. Non-actual Fs would be G A matter of degree
13 You Care About Counterfactual Support If you care about the distinction between law-like and accidental regularities There are other reasons, too
14 The Empiricist Case Against Caring
15 The Logical Empiricists Rudolf Carnap Hans Reichenbach Carl Hempel
16 The Empiricist Program 1. Science as the only path to knowledge 2. Expunge from science all metaphysical ways of thinking Causation Modality
17 The Actual and the Modal Actual fact: a fact about what happens in the actual (even observable) world Modal fact: facts about possibilities, necessities, what might but did not happen, what could not happen
18 Two Positivist Theses Only the actual is knowable Only the actual has practical significance
19 Only the Actual Has Practical Significance Modal facts cannot make a difference to our realizing the goals of science
20 The Goals of Science 1. Explanation 2. Prediction 3. Control
21 The Empiricist Theory of Explanation Hempel: To understand a phenomenon is to be able to predict the phenomenon (at least in retrospect) In order to explain, learn how to predict
22 The Goals of Science 1. Explanation 2. Prediction 3. Control
23 The Actual and the Modal Aspects of a Regularity 1. Actual: All actual ravens are actually black 2. (a) In some counterfactual circumstances, some actual ravens would be black (b) Some non-actual ravens, if they existed, would be black
24 Prediction and Control Are about actual outcomes Thus they are covered by the actual part of a regularity Nothing else matters In particular, the modal part does not matter
25 The Empiricist Position We may care about counterfactual support but we should not Find a new definition of law-likeness
26 Against the Empiricists But Not Against Empiricism
27 My Claims Paying attention to counterfactual facts can make a difference to prediction and control Even given all empiricist assumptions Because counterfactual facts are at bottom facts about the actual world important facts!
28 Explaining Caring about Counterfactual Support I will put one piece of an explanation in place: explain practical significance of caring What then must be added: evolution? something else?
29 Some Attempts To Care
30 Two Failed Attempts to Explain Caring 1. Planning explanation 2. Induction explanation
31 Planning Explanation
32 Planning Explanation Planning my actions requires counterfactual thinking
33 Planning Explanation When I plan what to do, I select from several possible actions the one that will best realize my goal For each action I ask: what would happen if I were to do that? I decide by the counterfactual answers
34 Empiricist Reply This may be the way that humans actually plan, but there is another way to plan that does not require counterfactual thinking
35 Empiricist Planning Look at actual frequencies Perform the action that most often leads to the goal (other things being equal) Claim: this is for practical purposes identical to counterfactual planning
36 Induction Explanation
37 Induction Explanation In order to learn the actual part of a regularity, I must learn its modal part If the actual part is the practical end, the modal part is the means to that end
38 Inductive Argument From the fact that All observed Fs are G infer that All Fs are G
39 Thesis In order to perform this inference, you must have reason to believe that All observed Fs are G is not an accident or a coincidence So: require counterfactual knowledge
40 Problem The thesis is implausibly strong A better thesis: in order to make the inference, you should lack reason to believe that the G-ness of observed Fs is a coincidence
41 The Theses Contrasted To infer All Fs are G, must have reason to believe that the G-ness of observed Fs is not an accident To infer All Fs are G, must lack reason to believe that the G-ness of observed Fs is an accident
42 Otherwise, How Can Induction Get Started? We cannot have reason to believe that a pattern is not an accident until we have done some inductive inference
43 Let s look for something else
44 What Is Counterfactual Support, Really?
45 How Counterfactuals Work Robert Stalnaker David Lewis Jonathan Bennett
46 How Counterfactuals Work If I were to drop this pen, it would fall to the ground Stalnaker/Lewis: find the closest possible world(s) where the pen is dropped; see if it falls to the ground
47 Closest Possible Worlds? Sounds like the truth or falsity of the counterfactual depends on the spatial structure of some hyper-universe full of nonactual worlds
48 World Proximity The relevant closest possible worlds are those which are like the actual world, except that something goes slightly differently so that the counterfactual antecedent occurs (e.g., the pen is dropped)
49 World Proximity 1. Same history as actual world 2. Something in recent past goes slightly differently, so that pen is dropped 3. Same fundamental laws as actual world Note that (2) implies partial exceptions to (1) and (3): make these very small
50 Very Small The thing that happens, so that the pen is dropped, must 1. Change as little as possible about past history 2. Violate the laws as little as possible
51 Putting it all together
52 Truth for Counterfactuals If A had happened, then B would have happened is true if B happens in all the evaluation worlds for A
53 Evaluation Worlds for A (Lewis, Bennett) 1. Same history as actual world until shortly before occurrence of A 2. Then there is a conservative deviation from actual history that brings about A 3. From then on, actual laws determine what occurs
54 Conservative Deviation (Lewis, Bennett) 1. Happens as close to A as possible 2. Has as few side effects as possible 3. If possible, violates no laws and is not too improbable 4. If violation is necessary, it is discreet
55 Restrictions This story is correct for ordinary counterfactuals
56 Closest Possible Worlds? Sounds like the truth or falsity of the counterfactual depends on the spatial structure of some hyper-universe full of nonactual worlds Wrong
57 Closest Possible Worlds What happens in the closest worlds depends on: 1. Actual history 2. Actual laws 3. Criteria for conservative deviation
58 Closest Possible Worlds What makes counterfactual claims true or false are facts about the actual world Specifically: Ordinary occurrent facts and facts about laws Empiricists are OK with both
59 Thesis If the facts that make a counterfactual claim true are actual facts, then the modal aspect of a regularity is something actual And so can make a difference even in the empiricists sense prediction & control
60 Question Still, even if an interest in counterfactuals is an interest in actual facts, why these actual facts? They look like a rather arbitrary selection
61 The Modal Aspect of a Regularity
62 The Actual and the Modal Aspects of a Regularity 1. Actual: All actual ravens are actually black 2. (a) In some counterfactual circumstances, some actual ravens would be black (b) Some non-actual ravens, if they existed, would be black
63 What Is In the Modal Part? What facts make the raven counterfactuals true?
64 All Ravens Are Black If these two ravens had mated, their offspring would have been black If this raven had been fed a diet of worms, it would still have been black
65 Some Raven Physiology Tyrosinase helps to covert tyrosine to melanin inside the melanosomes Melanosomes are incorporated into feather-producing cells Much physical structure: bundle it together and call it P
66 All Ravens Have P That is, they all have this complicated physical structure that makes them black Include in P the physical structure that ensures that P is passed from parents to offspring
67 A Raven Counterfactual If these two ravens had mated, their offspring would have been black Find the closest worlds where the ravens mate
68 Closest Mating Worlds 1. Same history as actual world until shortly before mating 2. Conservative deviation brings about mating 3. From then on, actual laws apply
69 Closest Mating Worlds 1. Same history, so raven parents have P 2. Deviation brings about mating conservative, so does not undermine the P-hood of the parents 3. Actual laws apply, so parents P-hood causes P-hood, blackness, of offspring
70 Relevant Facts 1. That actual ravens have P 2. Actual laws (by which P-hood replicates itself and causes blackness) 3. Facts in virtue of which the conservative deviations leading to mating do not undermine the P-hood of the parents
71 Relevant Facts P-hood of parents is not undermined by the deviation to mating because: 1. P-hood has causal inertia 2. P-hood is separable from mating (conservatism: minimize side effects)
72 Separability 1. Physical separability: the fact of mating consists of physical facts distinct from P 2. Causal separability: the fact of mating consists of physical facts that are not creating or sustaining causes of P
73 Contrast Case If this raven had had some genetic defects, it still would have been black Blackness not present in every evaluation world because genetic defects not separable from P
74 Why You Care About Counterfactual Support
75 Overview Regularities in the real world are very finegrained Knowledge of reasons for a regularity s counterfactual support provides compact basis for knowledge of fine-grained details
76 Overview We care about regularities that offer counterfactual support because we care about having a compact basis for learning a regularity s fine-grained details
77 Fineness of Grain All ravens are not black Bleached ravens Albino ravens
78 Fineness of Grain All ravens for which conditions Z hold, are black Z is very complex Learning Z is learning fine-grained details about a regularity This is one-half of fineness of grain
79 It Is Good to Know Fine- Grained Details Better prediction; more control To do: show how knowledge of fine-grained details comes from knowledge of the facts that determine counterfactual support
80 What Counterfactual Support Depends On 1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness
81 Simpler Case: Causal Antecedents
82 Antecedents Antecedent of a generalization: All Fs are G Antecedent of a counterfactual: If A had occurred, then B would have occurred
83 Fire Burns Fire itself is doing the causing
84 Good Things to Know 1. It is hotter above than beside a fire 2. Short term exposure may not cause damage 3. Damage more severe with length of exposure
85 How To Know Them Don t just memorize factoids. Learn about mechanisms: 1. Damage comes from heat accumulation 2. Heat accumulation falls off with distance 3. Heat rises
86 What Counterfactual Support Depends On 1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness
87 Social Generalizations If you have more material possessions than other people, they will tend to envy you
88 Non-Causal Antecedents
89 Roasted Raven Is Good to Eat The antecedent, ravenhood, does not do the causing It is some physical property P of ravens that makes them edible
90 To Know Fine-Grained Details 1. Learn conditions under which ravens have P 2. Learn conditions under which P has its characteristic effect (taste, nutrition)
91 To Know Fine-Grained Details 1. Learn conditions under which ravens have P 2. Learn conditions under which P has its characteristic effect (taste, nutrition)
92 Learning Fine-Grained Details In conditions Z, ravens have P How to learn Z? Method 1: learn about the mechanism that causes ravens to have P Problem: P is unobservable
93 Learning Fine-Grained Details Method 2: Assume that most ravens in normal circumstances have P Worry about the final phase, where the raven is removed from normal circumstances: killing, dressing, cooking Do these actions interfere with P?
94 It s All About Interference What actions interfere with or undermine a raven s P-hood? Those that manipulate things that are not separable from P
95 What Counterfactual Support Depends On 1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness
96 Summary
97 Assumptions 1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness
98 Source of Knowledge of Fine- Grained Details 1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness
99 Conclusion, Part 1 To learn or predict fine-grained details of a regularity, learn the facts in virtue of which it provides counterfactual support These are actual facts that predict other actual facts
100 Conclusion, Part 2 Pay special attention to regularities that provide counterfactual support, because with these regularities, there is a compact basis for learning fine-grained details
101 Michael Strevens Philosophy Department New York University
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