Fixing a Balanced Knockout Tournament

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1 Fixing a Balanced Knockout Tournament Haris Aziz and Serge Gaspers and Simon Mackenzie and Nicholas Mattei NICTA and UNSW, Sdne, Australia {haris.aziz, serge.gaspers, simon.mackenzie, nicholas.mattei}@nicta.com.au Paul Stursberg Technische Universität München, German paul.stursberg@ma.tum.de Tob Walsh NICTA and UNSW, Sdne, Australia tob.walsh@nicta.com.au Abstract Balanced knockout tournaments are one of the most common formats for sports competitions, and are also used in elections and decision-making. We consider the computational problem of finding the optimal draw for a particular plaer in such a tournament. The problem has generated considerable research within AI in recent ears. We prove that checking whether there exists a draw in which a plaer wins is NP-complete, thereb settling an outstanding open problem. Our main result has a number of interesting implications on related counting and approximation problems. We present a memoization-based algorithm for the problem that is faster than previous approaches. Moreover, we highlight two natural cases that can be solved in polnomial time. All of our results also hold for the more general problem of counting the number of draws in which a given plaer is the winner. Introduction Balanced knockout tournaments are one of the most widelused formats for sports competitions (Horen and Riezman 1985; Connoll and Rendleman 2011; Groh et al. 2012). A prominent example is the Wimbledon Men s tennis tournament in which 128 plaers enter the tournament and the plaer who wins seven consecutive matches right from the first round to the final wins the tournament. The format is also used in certain elimination stle election and decision making schemes and has received considerable interest in AI (Vu, Altman, and Shoham 2009; Vassilevska Williams 2010) as well as economics and operations research (Rosen 1986; Vu et al. 2013; Tullock 1980; Laslier 1997). Consider the setting in which there is a set of plaers N = [n] (we use the notation [n] := {1,..., n}) where n = 2 c for some integer c. Given N, an ordered balanced knockout tournament T(N, π) is defined as a balanced binar tree with n leaf nodes where the seeding π specifies the labelling of the leaf nodes with respect to N. All ordered balanced knockout tournaments that are isomorphic to each other (with respect to the labelling of the leaf nodes) are said to have the same draw. The are represented b a single (unordered) balanced knockout tournament (BKT) T(N, σ) where σ denotes the draw. The set of all draws is denoted Copright c 2014, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence ( All rights reserved. b Σ. Whereas the total number of seedings is n!, the number of draws is n! 2 but even this grows ver rapidl. For a tournament like n 1 Wimbledon, n = 128 and the number of distinct draws is This is significantl more than the number of atoms in the universe, or even a googol. A BKT T(N, σ) is conducted in the following fashion. Plaers that correspond to sibling leaf nodes pla a match against each other. The winner of the match proceeds up the tree to the next round. The winner of T(N, σ) is the plaer who reaches the root node. We are given a pairwise comparison matrix P such that P jk [0, 1] denotes the probabilit of plaer j beating plaer k in a pairwise elimination match and 0 P ij = 1 P ji 1. Given N, P and a draw σ, each plaer i N has a certain probabilit wp(i, N, P, σ) of being the winner of T(N, σ). This probabilit can be computed in time O(n 2 ) via a recursive formulation (Vu, Altman, and Shoham 2009). We denote b mwp(i, N, P ) := max σ Σ (wp(i, N, P, σ)) the maximum possible winning probabilit of i in T(N, σ) taken over all draws σ Σ. We consider the PROBABILISTIC TOURNAMENT FIXING PROBLEM (PTFP) in which the probabilit of each plaer beating another plaer is known and the goal is to find a draw that maximizes the probabilit of a certain plaer winning the BKT. PROBABILISTIC TOURNAMENT FIXING PROBLEM (PTFP) Instance: Plaer set N, pairwise comparison matrix P, a distinguished plaer i N, and target probabilit q [0, 1]. Question: Does there exist a draw σ for the plaer set N for which the probabilit of i winning T(N, σ) is at least q? PTFP was proposed b Vu, Altman, and Shoham (2009) and has been studied in numerous papers (see e.g., (Stanton and Vassilevska Williams 2011a; 2011c; 2011b)). It is a well-motivated problem in sports analtics (Silver 2011). Vu, Altman, and Shoham (2009) and Vassilevska Williams (2010) showed that PTFP is NP-hard for various restrictions. These results also impl that computing the maximum possible winning probabilit of a given plaer is NP-hard. Nevertheless, the computational complexit of a particularl natural and interesting problem,

2 the TOURNAMENT FIXING PROBLEM (TFP), has remained a major open question. In the TFP, P is deterministic i.e., P jk {0, 1} for all plaers j, k N. We sa that plaer j beats plaer k iff P jk = 1. The winner of each match is deterministicall known beforehand and the question is whether there exists a draw for which a given plaer can win in the corresponding BKT. TOURNAMENT FIXING PROBLEM (TFP) Instance: Plaer set N, deterministic pairwise comparison matrix P, and a distinguished plaer i N. Question: Does there exist a draw σ for the plaer set N for which i is the winner of T(N, σ)? TFP is equivalent to checking whether there exists a seeding π for which i is the winner of T(N, π). We note that TFP is a special case of the problem with same name as defined in (Vassilevska Williams 2010). 1 TFP is also a special case of #TFP the problem of counting the number of draws for which a given plaer is the winner. This count can be used to compute the probabilit of a plaer winning in a draw chosen uniforml at random. It can also be considered as the relative strength of the plaer. Contributions. We first settle the computational complexit of TFP b showing that it is NP-complete. The problem was explicitl stated as an open problem a number of times (Vu, Altman, and Shoham 2009; Vassilevska Williams 2010; Russell and van Beek 2011; Stanton and Vassilevska Williams 2011b; 2011a; 2011c; Lang et al. 2012; Vu et al. 2013). As a corollar, we show that unless P = NP, there exists no polnomial-time approximation algorithm for computing the maximal winning probabilit of a plaer. The inapproximabilit result provides additional motivation for the line of work in which heuristic algorithms have been proposed for PTFP (Vu et al. 2013). Another corollar is that there exists no full polnomial time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS) for counting the number of draws for which a plaer is the winner. In view of these intractabilit results, we identif two natural cases for which even #TFP can be solved in polnomial time. In the first case, the plaers can be divided into a constant number of plaer tpes. It appeals to the scenario where plaers can be divided into groups based on similar intrinsic abilit. In the second case, there is a linear ordering on the abilit of plaers with a constant number of exceptions where a plaer with lower abilit beats a plaer with higher abilit. 2 Finall, we provide an exact memoization-based algorithm to solve #TFP that is faster than known exact ap- 1 In the version of TFP defined in (Vassilevska Williams 2010), there can be additional constraints in which certain matches are disallowed. 2 The condition is quite natural since in man competitions there is a clear-cut ranking of the plaers according to their skills with onl a few pairs of plaers for which the weaker plaer can beat the stronger plaer. For example, as of 15/01/2014, Nikola Davdenko was the onl tennis plaer among the men s top 64 who had a winning head-to-head record against Rafael Nadal. proaches to solve the problem: it runs in time O( n ) and uses space O( n ). If onl polnomial space is available, the running time becomes 4 n+o(n), and we give a range of possible time-space trade-offs. Related Work. After the work of Vu, Altman, and Shoham (2009), PTFP and TFP have been studied in a number of AI papers. Vassilevska Williams (2010) identified various sufficient conditions for a plaer to be a winner of a BKT. In a followup paper, Stanton and Vassilevska Williams (2011c) focused on when weak plaers can possibl win a BKT. Stanton and Vassilevska Williams (2011b; 2011a) identified conditions in a probabilistic model under which the tournament organizer can fix the tournament with high probabilit. In (Vu and Shoham 2011), the problem of designing fair draws was considered. Lang et al. (2007) and Lang et al. (2012) examined winner determination in voting trees that need not be balanced. TFP can also be considered as the problem of checking whether a plaer is a possible winner in a BKT. Computing possible winner for other voting rules where the information on the preferences is not complete has been studied extensivel (Xia and Conitzer 2011; Aziz et al. 2012). Another related problem is checking whether a sports team can still win a round-robin competition when all the matches have not et been completed (Kern and Paulusma 2004; Gusfield and Martel 2002). TFP is NP-complete In this section, we settle the complexit of TFP. For convenience, we will represent the pairwise comparison matrix P as a graph where an edge from i to j exists iff i beats j. Theorem 1. TFP is NP-complete. Proof. We reduce from the NP-hard variant of the 3SAT problem in which ever literal appears at most twice. Given such a 3SAT instance F = (X, C) where X = {x 1,..., x X } is the set of variables and C the set of clauses, we build an instance of TFP where a draw exists such that a distinguished plaer m 1 wins iff F is satisfiable. The TFP instance consists of a set of plaers N = {1,..., n} where n is the smallest power of 2 greater than 32 X. The resulting knock-out tournament will thus consist of R := log(32 X ) 1 5 rounds where the first (lowest) four rounds will be used to store the gadgets while the later rounds will enforce certain outcomes for the gadgets. We can decompose the set of plaers N as follows N = M S G X G CG G F (1) where plaers in G X are used in the choice gadgets that will model the variable assignment, plaers in G CG are used in the clause/garbage gadgets that will model the behaviour of the clauses, and plaers in G F are used in filler gadgets that will be used to balance the BKT. Plaers in S are special plaers that will ensure the connection between choice and clause gadgets. Finall we will show that for m 1 to win the BKT, all k := n 16 plaers in M = {m 1, m 2,..., m k } will have to proceed to the fifth round. We will use a total of

3 s j 3: 2: S xj s 1 x j s 2 x j s 3 x j S xj s 1 x j s 2 x j s 3 x j 1: a 1 j a 2 j b 1 j b 2 j 0: x j x j Figure 1: The spawning process. B the shown draw, the leftmost plaer can win the BKT. u j m j k gadgets where each m i will be associated with one particular gadget. This gadget will ensure that m i can proceed to the fifth round. More precisel, we use X choice gadgets numbered from 1 to X, X clause/garbage gadgets (that ma each contain multiple clauses) numbered from X + 1 to 2 X and (k 2 X ) filler gadgets numbered from (2 X + 1) to k. Using this numbering, we can further partition the above sets as follows: G X = X j=1 G j ; G CG = 2 X j= X +1 G j ; G F = k G j (2) j=2 X +1 Note that the sets G j have 10, 13 or 15 elements, depending on whether the are a subset of G X, G CG or G F, respectivel. Set M. The relation between elements of the set of winners M is recursivel defined via a linear ordering of plaers as follows: We start with plaer m 1. At each iteration, ever plaer a spawns a new plaer b placed directl to his right. In the pairwise comparison graph, each plaer beats all plaers to his left in this construction except for the one that spawned him. This recursive construction is repeated until a total of k plaers are present (see Figure 1). Lemma 1. There is a draw σ such that m 1 wins the BKT T (M, σ). Proof. Seeding all plaers in M from left to right according to the spawning process makes m 1 win the tournament (see Figure 1): Whenever two plaers meet, the left plaer in the match has spawned the right plaer, thus the left plaer wins. As the leftmost plaer, m 1 wins the tournament. Global structure. We now describe how the sets from (1) and (2) relate to each other. In man places, we will use the right-left-rule, that is elements from sets with a higher index will beat elements from sets with a lower index. For instance, for all j > j and elements i {m j } G j, i {m j } G j where (i, i ) (m j, m j ) we have that i beats i. All members of S beat all other plaers unless explicitl stated otherwise. The set S can be partitioned into subsets S j corresponding to each variable of the SAT instance, such that j [ X ] : S j = S xj S xj {s j } where d j e j Figure 2: Pairwise comparisons in the j-th choice gadget. All arrows not shown in the figure run downwards, horizontal arcs run right to left. Vertices grouped in a component have the same relation with vertices outside the component. S xj = 3 and S xj = 3. We further define the set of particles (these will move between the choice and clause/garbage gadgets) b S p := j [ X ] (S x j S xj ). The members of S p follow the right-left rule between each other, i.e., for j > j, elements from S xj and S xj beat elements from S xj and S xj. The plaers in {s j j [ X ]} follow the right-left rule amongst themselves. For each j [ X ], s j is beaten b all other members of S j and beats all members of S p \ S j. c j Choice gadget. For each j [ X ], the j-th choice gadget consists of plaer m j, all ten elements of G j and all of S j. Note that some elements of S j will appear again in the clause/garbage gadgets. The pairwise comparison graph for these elements (for fixed j) is shown in Figure 2. The choice gadget is structured in such a wa that it is possible for m j to win a subtournament composed of all elements in the gadget except two elements of either S xj or S xj, as illustrated in Figure 4. We will also show that this is the onl wa in which m j can reach the fifth round in a tournament won b m 1. Clause/garbage gadget. We now describe the internal structure of the clause/garbage gadgets. The j-th gadget consists of m j and the 13 elements of G j, two of these are denoted c/g. The pairwise comparison graph for these plaers is shown in Figure 3. For each clause c i C we will call one of the plaers denoted c/g associated with clause c i, all remaining plaers c/g are garbage plaers. All plaers shown in the figure are beaten b all plaers in S with the following exceptions: (i) garbage plaers beat all plaers from S p, (ii) plaers associated with clause c i beat all plaers from the set S xj or S xj if x j or x j occurs in clause c i, respectivel. The clause gadget is structured in such a wa that it is possible for m j to win a subtournament composed of all elements in the gadget with the addition of a compatible S p element for both clause/garbage plaers included. We will

4 m j m j a j b j c j d j e j a j b j c j d j e j c/g c/g Figure 3: Pairwise comparison graph for a clause/garbage gadget. All arrows not shown in the figure run downwards, horizontal arcs run right to left. m j m j d j c j e j x j a 1 j a 2 j s 1 x j x j u j b 1 j s 1 x j b 2 j s 2 x j s 3 x j s j Figure 4: The subtournament for choice gadget j. In this case, x j =true is selected. also show that if we want m 1 to win the tournament, this is the onl wa in which m j can reach the fifth round. The filler gadget j consists of m j and the plaers in set G j. To create the pairwise comparison graph relating them to one another, we use the same method of spawning new plaers as for M, starting from plaer m j (see Figure 1). We note that for all j [k], plaer m j beats exactl four plaers from the set G j. Lemma 2. For all j [k] the following hold: a) Let σ be a draw where i < j, plaer m i reaches the fifth round b winning a 16-plaer subtournament that contains all plaers from G i and m j plas against all four plaers from G j that he beats. Then, the 16-plaer subtournament b which m j proceeds to the fifth round consists exactl of: i) if the j-th gadget is a choice gadget: {m j } G j S j where two elements of either S xj {s j } or of S x j {s j } are removed, ii) if the j-th gadget is a clause/garbage gadget: {m j } G j and for each of the c/g plaers in G j one additional element of S p that he can beat, iii) if the j-th gadget is a filler gadget: {m j } G j. b) If the 16-plaer subtournament for the first four rounds in which m j is placed consists exactl of i), ii), or iii) for the respective tpe of the j-th gadget, then a draw for the subtournament exists b which m j reaches the fifth round. The proof of Lemma 2 is eas but length and thus omitted. Figure 4 shows the relevant subtournament for a choice gadget. We can now show the following, which will also show that for all j [k] the antecedent of Lemma 2a) is satisfied and thus the consequent holds. Lemma 3. For m 1 to win the tournament, all plaers m j M must reach the fifth round, winning a 16-plaer subtournament that contains all plaers from G j b plaing against all four plaers from G j that the can beat. Proof. Let M l denote the set of 2 l plaers from M that are present after the l-th iteration of the spawning process. Furthermore, denote b l j the smallest l such that m j M l. We use induction over the set M. The induction will proceed from left to right according to the order specified in the description of the spawning process. First, note that for all j [k], plaer m j beats exactl (R 4 l j ) plaers from M that are to his right. The induction hpothesis is as follows. In order for m 1 to win the tournament, the following must hold for all j [k]: (i) In some round, m j plas against the plaer that spawned him, (ii) m j must reach round (R + 1 l j ) and be beaten in that round, (iii) m j plas against all plaers from G j that he can beat, (iv) the subtournament consisting of the first four rounds that m j wins contains all plaers from G j. For the base case, consider m 1. For (i) and (ii) there is nothing to show, as m 1 must win the tournament. As m 1 onl beats a total of R plaers, he needs to pla against all of these, which proves Part (iii). Part (iv) is implied b Lemma 2. We now show that for a plaer m j M, the induction hpothesis holds, provided that it holds for all plaers m j M with j < j. Consider the plaer m j that spawned m j. For (i), note that b the induction hpothesis, all plaers from G j with j < j have to be placed in the subtournament won b m j. Similarl, all plaers m j with j < j have to pla (and lose) against the plaer that spawned them, therefore the cannot pla against m j (as the would lose). Thus, m j can onl pla against plaers from G j and plaers m r from M to m j s right and the respective sets G r. He beats exactl four plaers in G j, none in the other G j and (R 4 l j ) from M to his right. B the induction hpothesis, he thus needs to pla against all of these (including m j ) to proceed to round (R + 1 l j ). For (ii), note that to the left of m j there are (R 4 l j ) other plaers that are spawned b m j. Denote them b m j 1, m j 2,..., m j R 4 lj and note that R + 1 l j i = i + 4. Thus, m j cannot face m j in round 5, 6,..., R l j (as other plaers need to pla against m j in these rounds) and has to proceed at least until round (R + 1 l j ). B the same argument as for m j above, before m j faces m j, he can onl pla against plaers from G j and plaers m r from M to m j s right and the respective sets G r. Plaer m j onl beats a total of R l j plaers among these, thus m j must be beaten in round R l j. Furthermore, he must pla against all of the above plaers that he can beat, which settles Part (iii). Again, Part (iv) is implied b Lemma 2 as b the argument above, m j needs to pla against all four plaers from G j that he can beat. We can now finall show the following lemma. Lemma 4. There exists a draw such that m 1 wins the tournament if and onl if the SAT instance is satisfiable. Proof. First, note that b Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, m 1 can win the tournament iff all plaers from the set M reach the

5 fifth round. As onl M plaers can reach the fifth round in total, m 1 can win the tournament iff each plaer m j M can win a 16-plaer subtournament that consists exactl of the plaers stated in Lemma 2. We thus have to show that a draw in which each plaer m j M wins a 16-plaer subtournament with exactl the plaers stated in Lemma 2 exists iff the 3SAT instance is satisfiable. ( ) Let the formula F be satisfied b a truth assignment A. We construct a BKT over N in which m 1 wins. For all j where the j-th gadget is a choice gadget, we place all plaers from {m j } G j S j with the exception of two plaers from S xj (if A(x j ) = true) or S xj (if A(x j ) = false) in one subtournament for the first four rounds. These are exactl 16 plaers and b Lemma 2b), we can choose the draw in such a wa that m j wins the subtournament. Note that the choice gadgets use all plaers from S except for two plaers of each set S xj (or S xj ) where x j (or x j ) is a literal that evaluates to true. In other words, for ever literal that evaluates to true, two plaers remain that can be beaten b ever plaer associated with a clause in which the literal plaers appear. For the clause/garbage gadgets, to use Lemma 2b) we need for each c/g plaer one additional plaer that he beats. If c/g is associated with a clause c i C, pick one of the literals in c i that evaluates to true, sa x j, and assign one of the two plaers from S xj mentioned above to this c/g plaer. Note that at most two such plaers are required for an literal, as ever literal onl appears twice. To all garbage plaers, assign an arbitrar remaining plaer from set S. Note that, after composing the subtournaments for all choice gadgets, 2 X plaers from the set S were left. As there are 2 X c/g plaers, we can assign a plaer from S to each of these. For all j where the j-th gadget is a clause/garbage gadget, we now place all plaers from {m j } G j in one subtournament for the first four rounds, together with the two plaers that are assigned to the c/g plaers in G j. B Lemma 2b), we can chose a draw such that m j wins this subtournament. For all j where the j-th gadget is a filler gadget, we place all plaers from {m j } G j in one tournament for which, b Lemma 2b), we can find a draw where m j wins. ( ) Let a draw be given such that all plaers in M win a 16-plaer subtournament consisting exactl of the plaers stated in Lemma 2. First, note that whenever a plaer s j is not placed in the j-th choice gadget, we get a contradiction as b Lemma 2, this plaer cannot be placed anwhere else while all plaers from M still reach the fifth round. The following truth assignment is thus well-defined: A(x j ) = true if m j s subtournament includes all plaers from S j except two plaers from S xj, A(x j ) = false if m j s subtournament includes all plaers from S j except two plaers from S xj We now show that A satisfies all clauses. Let c i C be a clause and c/g the plaer associated with that clause. Let j be the 16-plaer subtournament including c/g. B the assumption, m j wins the subtournament, thus Lemma 2 implies that it contains a plaer that c/g beats, i.e. a plaer from set S xj or (S xj ) where x j or ( x j ) occurs in clause C i. B the definition of A, that plaer can onl be used in the subtournament if the corresponding literal evaluates to true (as otherwise, the plaer is used in m j s subtournament). This concludes the proof of the theorem. Implications of Theorem 1 Theorem 1 simultaneousl implies a number of results from the literature, in particular Theorem 1, 2, and 3 in (Vu, Altman, and Shoham 2009) and Theorem 1 in (Vassilevska Williams 2010). It also ields some further corollaries. For PTFP and α 1, an algorithm is called an α-approximation algorithm for the maximum winning probabilit if it can find a draw in which the winning probabilit of the given plaer i is at least mwp(i, N, P )/α. Corollar 1. Unless P = NP, there exists no polnomialtime algorithm for PTFP that approximates the maximum winning probabilit of a plaer within an given factor. It immediatel follows from Theorem 1 that #TFP is NP-hard. We next highlight that even randomisation is not ver helpful for #TFP. Let Γ be a finite alphabet in which we agree to describe our problem instances and solutions. A full polnomial time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS) for a function f : Γ Q is an algorithm that takes input x Γ and a parameter ɛ Q >0, and returns with probabilit at least 3 4 a number between f(x)/(1 + ɛ) and (1 + ɛ)f(x). Moreover, an FPRAS runs in time polnomial in the size of x and 1 /ɛ. RP is the complexit class consisting of problems that can be solved in randomized polnomial time. The statement below follows from Proposition 8 in (Welsh and Merino 2000) and Theorem 1. Corollar 2. Unless NP = RP, there is no FPRAS for #TFP. Hence, unless NP = RP, there also does not exist an FPRAS for computing the probabilit of a plaer winning a BKT for a draw chosen uniforml at random. Tractable Cases We first examine a natural case in which plaers are divided into plaer tpes: All plaers of one tpe beat exactl the same subset of plaers of other tpes. The result of matches between plaers of the same tpe is irrelevant as we do not care which plaer in each tpe wins. In this variant that we call #TFP-tpes, the objective is to count the number of draws for which a plaer of a given tpe wins. We first adapt the concept of the pairwise comparison matrix. For two plaer tpes i and j, define P ij = 1 if an i-plaer wins a match between i and j and P ij = 0 otherwise. Note that this definition is chosen such that P ii = 1 for all plaer tpes i. Theorem 2. #TFP-tpes is polnomial-time solvable if there are a constant number of plaer tpes. Proof. We will use a dnamic programming scheme. All vectorial inequalities assume equal dimensions and are meant component-wise. Let N x := {η = (η 1,..., η k ) 0 η η k = 2 x } and denote b #TFP(i, x, η N x ) the number of draws for an x-round tournament involving η j plaers of tpe j for all j [k] in which a plaer of tpe i wins the tournament. We will assume that the plaers of one tpe are not distinguishable. For fixed i and x, there are

6 ( k+2 x ) k such problems that potentiall need to be considered. #TFP(i, x, η) is computed via the following recursion. #TFP(i, x, η) = η N x 1 η η j [k] P ij=1 η j <ηj #TFP(i, x 1, η ) #TFP(j, x 1, η η ) (3) The base cases are given b { 1 ηi = 1 and j i : η #TFP(i, 0, η) = j = 0 0 otherwise for all i [k]. Eq. (3) onl uses values of #TFP(j,, η ) with < x, thus ever problem onl needs to be solved once. For constant k, solving a problem requires O(n k ) operations and for constant k it holds that ( ) k+2 x k O(n k ). Thus, O(log(n)n 2k ) operations are necessar to compute #TFP(i, log(n), (n 1,..., n k )). The second tractable case that we identif is: Theorem 3. #TFP is polnomial-time solvable if there is a linear ordering of strengths of the plaers with at most a constant number of pairwise relations flipped. Proof. Let b be the number of backwards arcs that do not respect the linear ordering. We can show b induction that the problem can be reduced to #TFP-tpes with at most 4b+ 3 plaer tpes. Since the number of plaer tpes is constant, the theorem follows from Theorem 2. An Exponential Time Algorithm for #TFP #TFP can be triviall solved in time 2 O(n log n) via a bruteforce enumeration of all possible draws. In exponential time algorithmics (Fomin and Kratsch 2010), the aim is to design algorithms solving the problem exactl with worstcase running times outperforming the brute-force solution. In this section we give an algorithm for #TFP running in time O( n ) using space O( n ). If onl polnomial space is available, the running time becomes 4 n+o(n), and we give a range of possible time-space trade-offs. The algorithm is based on the recursion formula (3) and memoization used at various levels of the recursion. We use pol(n) to stand for a polnomial function in n. Theorem 4. For ever, 2 log n, there is an algorithm solving #TFP in time T (n) = pol(n) 1 p=0 n 2 2 n/2p ( ) p n n/2 and space S(n) = pol(n) (2 ) n/ Proof Sketch. The algorithm recursivel evaluates the formula (3) for the special case where each plaer tpe consists of one plaer, starting from #TFP(i, log n, (1,..., 1)). It uses memoization for all recursive calls #TFP(, x, ) where x (log n). That is, the algorithm uses a table indexed b plaers, level, and plaer tpe vector. To (4) time T (n) space S(n) 2 O( n ) O( n ) 3 O( n ) O( n ) 4 O( n ) O( n ) log n 4 n+o(n) pol(n) Table 1: Running times and space requirements for the algorithm of Theorem 4 for various time-space trade-offs. evaluate #TFP(, x, ) with x (log n), the algorithms first checks in this table whether this recursive call has alread been evaluated. Onl if the value has not et been computed, it computes the result recursivel, and stores it in the table. Then, it returns the result that is stored in the table. The number of table entries used b memoization is upper bounded b n times the number of subsets of size at most n/2. Using Stirling s approximation for factorials, the space usage of the algorithm can be upper ( ) n n/2 bounded b S(n) = pol(n) (2 ) n/ The running time of the algorithm is the time used for the recursion without memoization, pol(n) Π 1 p=0 n 2 2 n/2p, plus the time for the part with memoization, which p is upper bounded b S(n) n 2 n/4 = O( n ). Thus, for an, 2 log n, we obtain an algorithm with running time T (n) = pol(n) Π 1 p=0 n 2 2 n/2p using space p ( S(n) = pol(n) (2 ) n/ ) n n/2. Various time and space requirements of the algorithm are reported in Table 1. Using the rule of thumb that for current computing architectures, the space requirements of an algorithm become a bottleneck if the exceed the square root of the time requirements, the analses for = 2 and = 3 currentl seem the most relevant. Conclusions In this paper we considered problems related to tournament fixing. Although being able to change draws is not alwas realistic, the computational problems that are considered have been analzed in post analsis of tournament draws and also shed light on the relative strengths of plaers. Our main result is that TFP is NP-complete. We discussed a number of implications of the result. We complement the computational hardness result in the paper b presenting algorithms for #TFP both for the general case as well as restricted cases. A possible future direction is to propose parametrized algorithms for TFP. Acknowledgments NICTA is funded b the Australian Government as represented b the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Econom and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence program. Serge Gaspers is the recipient of an Australian Research Council Discover Earl Career Researcher Award (project number DE ).

7 References Aziz, H.; Brill, M.; Fischer, F.; Harrenstein, P.; Lang, J.; and Seedig, H. G Possible and necessar winners of partial tournaments. In Proceedings of the 11th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Sstems (AAMAS), IFAAMAS. Connoll, R. A., and Rendleman, R. J Tournament qualification, seeding and selection efficienc. Technical Report , Tuck School of Business. Fomin, F. V., and Kratsch, D Exact Exponential Algorithms. Springer. Groh, C.; Moldovanu, B.; Sela, A.; and Sunde, U Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments. Economic Theor 49(1): Gusfield, D., and Martel, C The structure and complexit of sports elimination numbers. Algorithmica 32(1): Horen, J., and Riezman, R Comparing draws for single elimination tournaments. Operations Research 33(2): Kern, W., and Paulusma, D The computational complexit of the elimination problem in generalized sports competitions. Discrete Optimization 1(2): Lang, J.; Pini, M. S.; Rossi, F.; Venable, K. B.; and Walsh, T Winner determination in sequential majorit voting. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Lang, J.; Pini, M. S.; Rossi, F.; Salvagnin, D.; Venable, K. B.; and Walsh, T Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes. Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Sstems 25(1): Laslier, J.-F Tournament Solutions and Majorit Voting. Springer-Verlag. Rosen, S Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. The American Economic Review 76(4): Russell, T., and van Beek, P An empirical stud of seeding manipulations and their prevention. In Proceedings of the Twent-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2011), IJCAI/AAAI. Silver, N When 15th is better than 8th: The math shows the bracket is backward. On Five-ThirtEight Blog, 15th-is-better-than-8th-the-math-shows-the-bracket-isbackward/. Last Accessed Feb Stanton, I., and Vassilevska Williams, V. 2011a. Manipulating single-elimination tournaments in the Braverman- Mossel model. In IJCAI Workshop on Social Choice and Artificial Intelligence. Stanton, I., and Vassilevska Williams, V. 2011b. Manipulating stochasticall generated single-elimination tournaments for nearl all plaers. In Proceedings of 7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), Stanton, I., and Vassilevska Williams, V. 2011c. Rigging tournament brackets for weaker plaers. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Tullock, G Toward a Theor of the Rent-seeking Societ. Texas A&M Universit Press. Vassilevska Williams, V Fixing a tournament. In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), AAAI Press. Vu, T.; Altman, A.; and Shoham, Y On the complexit of schedule control problems for knockout tournaments. In Proceedings of the 8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Sstems (AA- MAS), Vu, T., and Shoham, Y Fair seeding in knockout tournaments. ACM Transactions on Intelligent Sstems Technolog 3(1):1 17. Vu, T.; Hazon, N.; Altman, A.; Kraus, S.; Shoham, Y.; and Wooldridge, M On the complexit of schedule control problems for knock-out tournaments. Welsh, D. J. A., and Merino, C The potts model and the tutte polnomial. Journal of Mathematical Phsics 41(3): Xia, L., and Conitzer, V Determining possible and necessar winners under common voting rules given partial orders. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 41(2):25 67.

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