Technical Appendix to "Sequential Exporting"

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Technical Appendix to "Sequential Exporting""

Transcription

1 Not for publication Technical ppendix to "Sequential Exporting" acundo lbornoz University of irmingham Héctor. Calvo Pardo University of Southampton Gregory Corcos NHH Emanuel Ornelas London School of Economics bstract Here we show that our main results and empirical predictions are robust to: i adopting a demand function of the form pq = max {d q, 0} Non-negative prices, and to ii an arbitrary positive correlation across time or destinations Non-negative correlation. - Non-negative Prices Here we show as a result of forcing prices to be non-negative pq = max {d q, 0}, optimal export quantities in t = increase, while volumes in t = remain unaffected. Since expected export profits also increase, there is also more entry. Intuitively, such a demand function "convexifies" the revenue function, providing implicit insurance to the risk neutral producer against the event of negative prices, inducing the producer to take more risk, producing larger volumes conditional on entry, and becoming more propense to enter. ecause the surviving threshold in t = remains unchanged >, there is also more exit. Therefore our empirical predictions and 3 are if anything, strengthened. Since optimal export quantities in t = increase, while volumes in t = remain unaffected, predicted average second year growth is lower, but still positive as long as minimum marginal costs lie above expected willigness to pay. Hence, also our empirical prediction survives. More entry and larger volumes in t = translate into higher expected first period operational profits, inducing more experimentation. nd because expected first period operational profits are Technically, it just introduces a first order stochastically dominant SD shift in first period profitability, irrespective of destinations. I

2 Not for publication larger, some firms that would have entered sequentially, now enter simultaneously, as well as some non-entrants now will rather enter sequentially than not. Therefore our propositions and obtain, and so do their implications for trade policy proposition 3. Thus, avoiding negative prices has no effect on the expected value of information either across periods or destinations. This is why in the main text we impose the minor technical restriction d > E, instead of exposing the reader to the cumbersome technicalities displayed here. Proposition irst period export volumes are larger under a non-negative price restriction Proof. We want to show that: q j qj where: { } q j arg max E max d q, 0 q c+ j q q 0 q j arg max E d q q c+ j q q 0 The corresponding necessary and suffi cient OCs are, under the assumption of independence between demand d and supply c shocks: { } { } E j {d>q } qj +E max d q j, 0 }{{} MR p0 q j E + d q j }{{} MR = E c+ j }{{} MC = E c+ j }{{} MC Noting that E { {d>q} q } = qe { {d>q} } = q Kq q, q d, d, and { } { E max d q, 0 max E d q }, 0 = {Ed>q } E d q E d q, it follows that the marginal revenue is larger under the non-negative price restriction, MR p 0 q MRq, q d, d II

3 Not for publication because the marginal revenue is a non-increasing function of the quantity. Since the marginal cost remains the same MC, we have that q j qj. To be able to say if there is more or less sequential entry, we would need to know how do expected profits compare under the non-negative price restriction relative to its absence. irst, notice that: Proposition Conditional on entry, expected first period operational profits are larger when imposing a non-negative price restriction. Proof. Expected first period operational profits under a non-negative price restriction are: Ψq j ; j V j = { max E q 0 { max q 0 { max q 0 { } } max d q, 0 q c+ j q { max E d q } }, 0 q E c+ j q E d q q E c+ j q } = Ψ q j ; j V j Where the second inequality follows from the convexity of the max operator and Jensen s inequality, { and the third from noting that max E d q }, 0 = {Ed>q } E d q E d q, q. 3 Second, it is also true that: Corollary 3 Operational profits under a non-negative price restriction are larger 4 Proof. Notice that the definitions of V j and of W ; in the main text remain unchanged by the imposition of a non-negative price-restriction. The reason being that they constitute the ex-ante evaluation of ex-post optimal entry decisions, which rule out negative prices, i.e. = p 0 rom Leibniz s rule, we have that MR p0q q = Kq = MRq q, q 3 fter some tedious algebra, it can be shown that expected first period operational profits are equal to Ψq j ; j = Pd > q j q j + V j. 4 In the case of imperfect correlation across destinations, second period optimal output of sequential entrants is based on the conditional expectation of prices. s a result, prices can also be negative and the non-negative price restriction also constraints second period optimal outputs to be larger than they would absent the restriction. ut because profits are larger, the new entry cutoff would also allow for more entry, and a similar reasoning applies. III

4 Not for publication : V j = j j j dg = E j j { j > j } = Pr j > j E j j j > j ; W ; = + dg = Pr > + E > +. Therefore, the previous corollary implies that: Ψq j ; j Ψ q j ; j, j s a result: Corollary 4 oth sequential and simultaneous entry strategies display higher profits under a nonnegative price restriction. restriction, Therefore, the fixed cost entry thresholds under a non-negative price and Sm, are less binding. Proof. Defining Ψq j ; j Ψ j, Π Ψ +W ;, Π Sm Ψ +Ψ, the previous corollary implies: Π Π and Π Sm Π Sm Since the profit function is decreasing in the sunk entry cost, we immediately have: The definition of Sm and the previous corollary imply that: Sm +W ; Sm = Ψ Ψ = Sm +W ; Sm Since d +W ; d = G + 0, we immediately have that Sm Sm. irms that in the absence of a non-negative price restriction did not enter, now adopt a sequential entry strategy, and some of the previous sequential entrants, now would rather enter simultaneously. Therefore: IV

5 Not for publication Corollary 5 Proof. > Sm, i.e. Proposition survives a non-negative price restriction = Ψ + W ; > Ψ Ψ > Ψ W ; Sm = Sm where the weak inequality follows from the assumption that, and the strict inequalities obtain because under perfect positive correlation, the option value of entering sequentially is strictly positive, W ; > 0,. Consequently, our empirical predictions entry and 3 exit prevail, and are even reinforced by the adoption of a non-negative price restriction. The next proposition shows that under an economically reasonable condition, also prediction holds despite of being weakened: Proposition 6 Empirical prediction holds if c Ed. Proof. rom the OC we obtain the following expression for q j : q j = E j +λ {E> j +λ} P d > q j where Prd > q j Kq j, and λ Prd q j E need to show that: c Ed = Eq j qj 0 d d q j 0, q j d, d. We Noting that Eq j = E q j = E > j j, omitting the non-negativity restriction on quantities in the profit maximization problem, the above implication is equivalent to: The proof proceeds in 3 steps. c Ed = E > j j Step : Simplifying the RHS of the above implication. E j +λ Prd > q j fter cancelling common terms and rearranging, we can express the RHS as : Prd > q j E > j E Prd q j E d d q j + j V

6 Not for publication by definition of λ. Since E = Prd > q j E d > q j + Prd q j E this expression into the above inequality and rearranging yields: Prd> q j {E > j } E d > q j Prd q j {E d q j, plugging } d q j E d d q j j Substituting in the definition of = d c, and taking advantage of the assumption of independence between demand and supply shocks, we get: Prd> q j {E d d > c + j E d d > q j +Ec E c c < d j} Prd q j { Ec j} Noting that the proof of empirical prediction in the online appendix implies that: Prd > q j { Ec E c c < d j} 0, we can then move this term to the RHS of the inequality to obtain, after some simplifications: Prd>q j {E d d > c + j } E d d > q j Therefore the RHS of the inequality is negative. Step : The LHS of the inequality is positive if c + j > q j, c. { Ec E c c < d j} Prd q j { E c c < d j + j} It follows from an extension of the proof of empirical prediction in the online appendix: 5 = E > E >,,, Step 3: c > Ed = c + j > q j, c. Notice that c + j c + j + j j Ec Prd > q j c Prd > q j = c Ec j Prd > q j 5 The proof proceeds similarly to the proof of empirical prediction in the online appendix: integrate by parts both expressions and subtract them to obtain E > E > = because G. is a non-decreasing function. G > d + G G G d 0 G G VI

7 Not for publication and also that Ed Ec j Prd > q j = E j j +λ Prd > q j E Prd > q j = qj Since the inequality must be true for all realizations of c, if c > Ed it must be true that Ed Ec j Prd>q j and therefore that c, c + j > q j, completing the proof. c Ec j Prd>q j > - Non-negatively correlated export profitabilities Here we show that our results generalize to the case of positive but imperfect statistical dependence between random variables and. To keep the model symmetric, we assume distributions G and G are identical, although this is not essential. Upper-bar variables denote the counterparts to the variables in the main text under perfect correlation. or brevity, we denote E = u by E, where u denotes a particular realization of the random variable. -. Output choice: Output decisions in at all times and in at t = are taken in the same way as in the main text. Output choice in at t = takes into account the realization of. rom the convexity of the max function and Jensen s inequality, max q 0 q q dg dg max q 0 q q dg, where dg = dg dg. Expected profits are larger when an optimal production decision in is made taking into account the experience acquired in. Hence, optimal output is q E = {E > }. -. Value of the sequential exporting strategy: The conditional expectation of random variable can be expressed as E = E +u E d du G w = u dw, - u=u 0 }{{} ϖ VII

8 Not for publication where ϖ captures the statistical dependence between and. 6 t t = a firm enters market if E = u E / +. - Define u ; as the that solves - with equality. The firm enters market at t = if u ;. Plugging - in - yields u ; E +ϖu E =, which is strictly decreasing in. Comparing u ; with its analog under perfect correlation, we have that E = E implies lim u ; =. ϖ Expressed in t = 0 expected terms, entering market at t = yields profits, { W ; E max max E q q }, 0 { q 0 } E = E { > ϖ} {E > } = E ϖ dg, where ϖ / + ϖ ϖ ϖ E is the cutoff realization of export profitability in above which a sequential exporter enters in at t =. or expositional clarity, notice that if and follow a bivariate normal distribution with parameters E, E, σ, σ, ρ, the cutoff varies with ϖ = ρ as follows: Thus, when E d ρ = E / + dρ ρ. > / + the cutoff rises as ρ increases, implying a lower value from experimentation. This simply reflects the fact that, if E > / +, it is optimal to enter market already at t =. 6 The proof of - can be found at the end of this appendix. Conversely, when E < / + the cutoff falls as ρ rises, VIII

9 Not for publication implying a higher value from experimentation. This indicates that experimentation becomes more worthwhile as the statistical dependence between and increases. Experimentation is most valuable in the case of perfect correlation assumed in the main text, when it is worth W ;. Experimentation is least valuable when and are independent, when it has no value. 7 Derivation of -: Here we show how the conditional expectation can be expressed as a function of the unconditional expectation, as in -. Integrating by parts both expectations and taking the difference we obtain: E = u E = G w G w = u dw = G w G w = u dw Since G w G w, = G w G = G w, w,, because G =. y definition, G w = G w = u dg u, which inserted above yields: E = u E = G w = u dg u G w = u dw = G w = u dg u G w = u dg u dw }{{} = G w = u G w = u dg u dw. Now assuming that G w. C,, by the mean-value theorem, we obtain: u 0, : G w = u G w = u = u u E = u E = u u d du G w = u = d du G w = u u=u 0 u=u 0 dg u dw 7 Under independence between and, entry in conveys no information about profitability in. Thus, if it is not worthwhile to enter market at t =, it is not worthwhile entering at t = either. Conversely, if it pays to enter market at t =, it must pay to enter also at t =, to avoid forgoing profits in the first period. Thus, under independence waiting to enter at t = is never optimal. or a formal proof of this statement, see.n. 4 below. IX

10 Not for publication Since the term d du G w = u u=u0 is a constant, it follows that: E = u E = E u d = u E du G w = u u=u0 dw d du G w = u u=u0 dw We use Lehmann s 966, p.43-4 definition of regression dependence, which is in our context: Definition 7 non-increasing non-decreasing in u. is positively negatively regression dependent on if G w = u is Our assumption of statistical dependence between and implies regression dependence. Thus we can sign the integrand in the last equality above. inally by rearranging the last equality, we obtain -: if and are positively associated, d du G w = u u=u0 0 and d du G w = u u=u0 0, w so that d du G w = u u=u0 dw 0. Now if export profitability in was better than expected u E, expected export profitability to increases E = u E. Example: normal distribution. Consider a joint normal distribution of and. It is enough to compute 8 : where G w = u w = + σ exp π ρ d du G w = u ρ u=u 0 dw s E +ρ σ σ u E ds is the conditional distribution of, such that = u NE +ρ σ σ u E, σ ρ. We note that 9 : i dg s = u is a continuous function of s, u R, ii d du dg s = u exists and is continuous, and iii w dg s = u ds is continuous. Therefore we can differentiate 8 lthough expression - is defined for random variables on bounded supports, we conjecture that it can be extended to random variables over unbounded supports as long as their c.d.f., say G, possess an absolute moment of order ψ > 0, i.e if and only if 966, p.49. ψ G + G is integrable over, +, see Lemma in eller 9 acts i - iii are stated without proof, but since exp x is continuous, positive and bounded above by an integrable function exp x + : exp x + dx = e, on R, the proofs are left to the interested reader. R σ X

11 Not for publication inside the integral: d du G w = u = w = w d du exp { dg s = u ds σ π ρ ρ ρ σ σ σ ρ s E +ρ σ σ u E s E +ρ σ σ u E σ σ } ds which substituted above yields: + d du G w = u and hence the well-known relationship: = ρ σ σ G w = u, u=u 0 dw = + ρ σ σ G w = u 0 dw = ρ σ σ E = E +ρ σ σ E -3 which is a particular case of - where ϖ ρ σ σ. -.3 Choice of export strategy extension of Proposition, main text: s in the main text, is the fixed cost that makes a firm indifferent between exporting sequentially and not exporting, whereas Sm makes a firm indifferent between simultaneous and sequential exporting strategies: : Ψ +W ; =, Sm : Ψ W ; Sm = Sm Since Ψ j is monotonically decreasing in j and, and since W ; is non-negative, there is a non-degenerate interval of fixed costs where firms choose the sequential export strategy. -.4 Comparing imperfect with perfectly correlated export profitabilities Here we show that when profitabilities are non-negatively regression dependent, the option value of learning one s export profitability in market by entering in market first, W ;, is bounded by the option values in the two polar cases of i.i.d. correlation above. distributions below and perfect positive XI

12 Not for publication We start with the lower bound. With i.i.d. marginal distributions of and we have E = E = E and therefore ϖ = 0. ccordingly, the entry condition - becomes E / + so that lim ϖ 0 W ; = {E> / + } {E> } E. ut then entering market sequentially is dominated by a simultaneous entry strategy at t = : lim W ; < Ψ. The reason is that by entering at t = the firm only sacrifices ϖ 0 positive expected profits, V, because under independence, export experience in is useless in..hence lim ϖ 0 W ; = 0, and the firm will never adopt a sequential entry strategy. igure below illustrates this case. 0 Consider now the upper bound. Under perfect positive correlation between and, the 0 nalytically, we only need to examine whether there are values of such that Π Sm Π when ϖ = 0 : Ψ + Ψ Ψ + lim ϖ 0 W ; Cancelling terms and substituting the expression for lim ϖ 0 W ;, E Ψ {E> / + } {E> } ccording to the first indicator function, we must distinguish two cases: i if E > / +, the inequality reduces to V 0, which is false. Hence, there is no value of that satisfies it. ii If E / +, the inequality reduces to Ψ 0, meaning that the only values of that satisfy the inequality are those for which early entry in is not worth e = 0. Since late entry in is worth only when Ψ V, V > 0 and the above inequality imply that: Ψ > Ψ V, a contradiction. Therefore, there is no value of either that satisfies the inequality. Consequently, the sequential entry strategy is never adopted. XII

13 Not for publication Π Ψ + Ψ Π Sm Ψ + Ψ V Π simultaneous entry only enter and will never enter no entry E 0 = Sm = Ψ = Ψ igure : With independent export profitabilities ϖ = 0, a firm will never enter sequentially. term that captures the degree of statistical dependence ϖ in expression - becomes : d du G w = u u=u 0 dw =. Plugging this condition into expression -, and since E = E = E, E =, we obtain that as ϖ : lim W ; = W ; ϖ Under perfect positive correlation between and, G w if w u = u = 0 if w < u, which is a Heavyside step function or unit step function T w u = u δw sds, where δw s denotes a Dirac + if w = s delta function δw s = such that δw sdw =, s,. Since d T w u = δw u du 0 otherwise we have: d du G w = u u=u0 dw = δw u 0dw =. XIII

14 Not for publication which is the expression in the main text. inally, notice that: { } W ; = E max max q q, 0 q 0 { } = E E max max q q, 0 q 0 { E max maxe q 0 q q }, 0 { = E max max E q q }, 0 q 0 = W ;, ϖ 0 where the inequality obtains from applying twice Jensen s inequality and the convexity of the max {.} operator, while the third equality above follows from the law of iterated expectations, i.e. E f = E E f. Therefore: 0 W ; W ; s in the main text, those bounds on the option values correspond to sunk entry cost thresholds above which the exporter prefers to enter sequentially Sm, as illustrated in igure. Hence, the region defined by Proposition where it is optimal to adopt a sequential entry strategy shrinks as the statistical dependence of export profitabilities across the two destinations is reduced from Notice that in figure in accordance with notation in the main text Π Π ϖ= whereas, Π Π ϖ=0. lso notice from the figure that Π > Π, ϖ=. The only non-trivial point is to prove that Π 0 = V Π 0 = Ψ V convexity of the max {.} operator: V = E max qq = E q0 max E qq = q0 {E> } which follows from the application of Jensen s inequality and the {> } E Ψ V XIV

15 Not for publication Π Ψ + Ψ Ψ +V Ψ + Ψ V Π Π Π Sm Sm Sm = Ψ W ; Sm ϖ = ϖ = = Ψ + W ; no sequential entry entry simultaneous entry only enter no entry 0 Sm ϖ = 0 = Ψ ϖ = 0 = Ψ igure : ounds on sunk entry thresholds, Sm and, as a function of the statistical dependence ϖ between export profitabilites. perfect to no correlation: Sm Ψ + W ; Ψ W ; Sm = Ψ Ψ + W ; + W ; Sm Ψ Ψ +W ; +W ; Sm Sm >ϖ>0 Ψ Ψ Sm ϖ=0-3 References eller, W. 966, n Introduction to Probability Theory and Its pplications, Vol. II, Wiley Series in Probability and Mathematical Statistics, John Wiley and Sons. Lehmann, E. L. 966, "Some Concepts of Dependence", The nnals of Mathematical Statistics 375, XV

Online Appendix for Dynamic Ex Post Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Trading Frequency in Double Auctions

Online Appendix for Dynamic Ex Post Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Trading Frequency in Double Auctions Online Appendix for Dynamic Ex Post Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Trading Frequency in Double Auctions Songzi Du Haoxiang Zhu September 2013 This document supplements Du and Zhu (2013. All results

More information

Growing competition in electricity industry and the power source structure

Growing competition in electricity industry and the power source structure Growing competition in electricity industry and the power source structure Hiroaki Ino Institute of Intellectual Property and Toshihiro Matsumura Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo [Preliminary

More information

THE CHOICE BETWEEN MULTIPLICATIVE AND ADDITIVE OUTPUT UNCERTAINTY

THE CHOICE BETWEEN MULTIPLICATIVE AND ADDITIVE OUTPUT UNCERTAINTY THE CHOICE BETWEEN MULTIPLICATIVE AND ADDITIVE OUTPUT UNCERTAINTY Moawia Alghalith University of St. Andrews and Ardeshir J. Dalal Northern Illinois University Abstract When modeling output uncertainty,

More information

Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers

Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers September 6, 016 ONLINE APPENDIX In this Appendix we present in full additional results and extensions which are only mentioned in the paper. In the exposition

More information

Design Patent Damages under Sequential Innovation

Design Patent Damages under Sequential Innovation Design Patent Damages under Sequential Innovation Yongmin Chen and David Sappington University of Colorado and University of Florida February 2016 1 / 32 1. Introduction Patent policy: patent protection

More information

Endogenous information acquisition

Endogenous information acquisition Endogenous information acquisition ECON 101 Benhabib, Liu, Wang (2008) Endogenous information acquisition Benhabib, Liu, Wang 1 / 55 The Baseline Mode l The economy is populated by a large representative

More information

Online Appendix to A search model of costly product returns by Vaiva Petrikaitė

Online Appendix to A search model of costly product returns by Vaiva Petrikaitė Online Appendix to A search model of costly product returns by Vaiva Petrikaitė 27 May A Early returns Suppose that a consumer must return one product before buying another one. This may happen due to

More information

Online Supplementary Appendix B

Online Supplementary Appendix B Online Supplementary Appendix B Uniqueness of the Solution of Lemma and the Properties of λ ( K) We prove the uniqueness y the following steps: () (A8) uniquely determines q as a function of λ () (A) uniquely

More information

Microeconomic Theory (501b) Problem Set 10. Auctions and Moral Hazard Suggested Solution: Tibor Heumann

Microeconomic Theory (501b) Problem Set 10. Auctions and Moral Hazard Suggested Solution: Tibor Heumann Dirk Bergemann Department of Economics Yale University Microeconomic Theory (50b) Problem Set 0. Auctions and Moral Hazard Suggested Solution: Tibor Heumann 4/5/4 This problem set is due on Tuesday, 4//4..

More information

Answer Key: Problem Set 1

Answer Key: Problem Set 1 Answer Key: Problem Set 1 Econ 409 018 Fall Question 1 a The profit function (revenue minus total cost) is π(q) = P (q)q cq The first order condition with respect to (henceforth wrt) q is P (q )q + P (q

More information

Online Supplement for Bounded Rationality in Service Systems

Online Supplement for Bounded Rationality in Service Systems Online Supplement for Bounded ationality in Service Systems Tingliang Huang Department of Management Science and Innovation, University ollege London, London W1E 6BT, United Kingdom, t.huang@ucl.ac.uk

More information

Trade policy III: Export subsidies

Trade policy III: Export subsidies The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies - wiiw June 25, 2015 Overview Overview 1 1 Under perfect competition lead to welfare loss 2 Effects depending on market structures 1 Subsidies to

More information

Regret Aversion, Regret Neutrality, and Risk Aversion in Production. Xu GUO and Wing-Keung WONG

Regret Aversion, Regret Neutrality, and Risk Aversion in Production. Xu GUO and Wing-Keung WONG Division of Economics, EGC School of Humanities and Social Sciences Nanyang Technological University 14 Nanyang Drive Singapore 637332 Regret Aversion, Regret Neutrality, and Risk Aversion in Production

More information

Online Supplement to

Online Supplement to Online Supplement to Pricing Decisions in a Strategic Single Retailer/Dual Suppliers Setting under Order Size Constraints Ali Ekici Department of Industrial Engineering, Ozyegin University, Istanbul, Turkey,

More information

Online Appendix for "Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect" Not intended for publication

Online Appendix for Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect Not intended for publication Online Appendix for "Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect" Not intended for publication Stephan Lauermann Gabor Virag March 19, 2012 1 First-price and second-price

More information

Lecture Notes - Dynamic Moral Hazard

Lecture Notes - Dynamic Moral Hazard Lecture Notes - Dynamic Moral Hazard Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn October 27, 2011 1 Marginal Cost of Providing Utility is Martingale (Rogerson 85) 1.1 Setup Two periods, no discounting Actions

More information

Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness. On-Line Appendix

Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness. On-Line Appendix Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness On-Line Appendix Jérôme Dugast Thierry Foucault August 30, 07 This note is the on-line appendix for Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness. It contains

More information

Revisiting Rate of Return Regulation under Uncertainty

Revisiting Rate of Return Regulation under Uncertainty Revisiting Rate of Return Regulation under Uncertainty By Jingang Zhao * December 2001 Department of Economics Iowa State University 260 Heady Hall Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 jingang@iastate.edu Fax: (515)

More information

Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example. Chad Syverson

Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example. Chad Syverson Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example. Chad Syverson 2004 Hotelling s Circular City Consumers are located uniformly with density D along a unit circumference circular city. Consumer buys

More information

Advanced Microeconomic Analysis, Lecture 6

Advanced Microeconomic Analysis, Lecture 6 Advanced Microeconomic Analysis, Lecture 6 Prof. Ronaldo CARPIO April 10, 017 Administrative Stuff Homework # is due at the end of class. I will post the solutions on the website later today. The midterm

More information

Firms and returns to scale -1- John Riley

Firms and returns to scale -1- John Riley Firms and returns to scale -1- John Riley Firms and returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale and monopoly pricing 2. Natural monopoly 1 C. Constant returns to scale 21 D. The CRS economy 26 E. pplication

More information

Bertrand Model of Price Competition. Advanced Microeconomic Theory 1

Bertrand Model of Price Competition. Advanced Microeconomic Theory 1 Bertrand Model of Price Competition Advanced Microeconomic Theory 1 ҧ Bertrand Model of Price Competition Consider: An industry with two firms, 1 and 2, selling a homogeneous product Firms face market

More information

Economic Growth: Lecture 13, Stochastic Growth

Economic Growth: Lecture 13, Stochastic Growth 14.452 Economic Growth: Lecture 13, Stochastic Growth Daron Acemoglu MIT December 10, 2013. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Economic Growth Lecture 13 December 10, 2013. 1 / 52 Stochastic Growth Models Stochastic

More information

Online Appendix for Investment Hangover and the Great Recession

Online Appendix for Investment Hangover and the Great Recession ONLINE APPENDIX INVESTMENT HANGOVER A1 Online Appendix for Investment Hangover and the Great Recession By MATTHEW ROGNLIE, ANDREI SHLEIFER, AND ALP SIMSEK APPENDIX A: CALIBRATION This appendix describes

More information

Online Appendix for. Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects. American Economic Review, forthcoming

Online Appendix for. Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects. American Economic Review, forthcoming Online Appendix for Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects American Economic Review, forthcoming by Brett Green and Curtis R. Taylor Overview This supplemental

More information

Stochastic Dynamic Programming: The One Sector Growth Model

Stochastic Dynamic Programming: The One Sector Growth Model Stochastic Dynamic Programming: The One Sector Growth Model Esteban Rossi-Hansberg Princeton University March 26, 2012 Esteban Rossi-Hansberg () Stochastic Dynamic Programming March 26, 2012 1 / 31 References

More information

ECOM 009 Macroeconomics B. Lecture 2

ECOM 009 Macroeconomics B. Lecture 2 ECOM 009 Macroeconomics B Lecture 2 Giulio Fella c Giulio Fella, 2014 ECOM 009 Macroeconomics B - Lecture 2 40/197 Aim of consumption theory Consumption theory aims at explaining consumption/saving decisions

More information

Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO

Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO Lecture 4: Euler Equations and Finite Dependence in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models Victor Aguirregabiria (University of Toronto) Carlos III, Madrid

More information

Mathematical Foundations -1- Constrained Optimization. Constrained Optimization. An intuitive approach 2. First Order Conditions (FOC) 7

Mathematical Foundations -1- Constrained Optimization. Constrained Optimization. An intuitive approach 2. First Order Conditions (FOC) 7 Mathematical Foundations -- Constrained Optimization Constrained Optimization An intuitive approach First Order Conditions (FOC) 7 Constraint qualifications 9 Formal statement of the FOC for a maximum

More information

SELECTION EFFECTS WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: ONLINE APPENDIX

SELECTION EFFECTS WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: ONLINE APPENDIX SELECTION EFFECTS WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: ONLINE APPENDIX Monika Mrázová University of Geneva and CEPR J. Peter Neary University of Oxford, CEPR and CESifo Appendix K: Selection into Worker Screening

More information

International Trade Lecture 16: Gravity Models (Theory)

International Trade Lecture 16: Gravity Models (Theory) 14.581 International Trade Lecture 16: Gravity Models (Theory) 14.581 Week 9 Spring 2013 14.581 (Week 9) Gravity Models (Theory) Spring 2013 1 / 44 Today s Plan 1 The Simplest Gravity Model: Armington

More information

Advanced Microeconomics

Advanced Microeconomics Advanced Microeconomics Leonardo Felli EC441: Room D.106, Z.332, D.109 Lecture 8 bis: 24 November 2004 Monopoly Consider now the pricing behavior of a profit maximizing monopolist: a firm that is the only

More information

Firms and returns to scale -1- Firms and returns to scale

Firms and returns to scale -1- Firms and returns to scale Firms and returns to scale -1- Firms and returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale and monopoly pricing 2. Constant returns to scale 19 C. The CRS economy 25 D. pplication to trade 47 E. Decreasing

More information

Labor Economics, Lecture 11: Partial Equilibrium Sequential Search

Labor Economics, Lecture 11: Partial Equilibrium Sequential Search Labor Economics, 14.661. Lecture 11: Partial Equilibrium Sequential Search Daron Acemoglu MIT December 6, 2011. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Sequential Search December 6, 2011. 1 / 43 Introduction Introduction

More information

Answer Key: Problem Set 3

Answer Key: Problem Set 3 Answer Key: Problem Set Econ 409 018 Fall Question 1 a This is a standard monopoly problem; using MR = a 4Q, let MR = MC and solve: Q M = a c 4, P M = a + c, πm = (a c) 8 The Lerner index is then L M P

More information

In the Name of God. Sharif University of Technology. Microeconomics 1. Graduate School of Management and Economics. Dr. S.

In the Name of God. Sharif University of Technology. Microeconomics 1. Graduate School of Management and Economics. Dr. S. In the Name of God Sharif University of Technology Graduate School of Management and Economics Microeconomics 1 44715 (1396-97 1 st term) - Group 1 Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi Chapter 10: Competitive Markets

More information

General Equilibrium and Welfare

General Equilibrium and Welfare and Welfare Lectures 2 and 3, ECON 4240 Spring 2017 University of Oslo 24.01.2017 and 31.01.2017 1/37 Outline General equilibrium: look at many markets at the same time. Here all prices determined in the

More information

Productivity Losses from Financial Frictions: Can Self-financing Undo Capital Misallocation?

Productivity Losses from Financial Frictions: Can Self-financing Undo Capital Misallocation? Productivity Losses from Financial Frictions: Can Self-financing Undo Capital Misallocation? Benjamin Moll G Online Appendix: The Model in Discrete Time and with iid Shocks This Appendix presents a version

More information

LAST-IN FIRST-OUT OLIGOPOLY DYNAMICS: CORRIGENDUM

LAST-IN FIRST-OUT OLIGOPOLY DYNAMICS: CORRIGENDUM May 5, 2015 LAST-IN FIRST-OUT OLIGOPOLY DYNAMICS: CORRIGENDUM By Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 1 In Abbring and Campbell (2010), we presented a model of dynamic oligopoly with ongoing demand

More information

Durable goods monopolist

Durable goods monopolist Durable goods monopolist Coase conjecture: A monopolist selling durable good has no monopoly power. Reason: A P 1 P 2 B MC MC D MR Q 1 Q 2 C Q Although Q 1 is optimal output of the monopolist, it faces

More information

Simplifying this, we obtain the following set of PE allocations: (x E ; x W ) 2

Simplifying this, we obtain the following set of PE allocations: (x E ; x W ) 2 Answers Answer for Q (a) ( pts:.5 pts. for the de nition and.5 pts. for its characterization) The de nition of PE is standard. There may be many ways to characterize the set of PE allocations. But whichever

More information

Stochastic Equilibrium Problems arising in the energy industry

Stochastic Equilibrium Problems arising in the energy industry Stochastic Equilibrium Problems arising in the energy industry Claudia Sagastizábal (visiting researcher IMPA) mailto:sagastiz@impa.br http://www.impa.br/~sagastiz ENEC workshop, IPAM, Los Angeles, January

More information

3.3.3 Illustration: Infinitely repeated Cournot duopoly.

3.3.3 Illustration: Infinitely repeated Cournot duopoly. will begin next period less effective in deterring a deviation this period. Nonetheless, players can do better than just repeat the Nash equilibrium of the constituent game. 3.3.3 Illustration: Infinitely

More information

Endogenous Information Choice

Endogenous Information Choice Endogenous Information Choice Lecture 7 February 11, 2015 An optimizing trader will process those prices of most importance to his decision problem most frequently and carefully, those of less importance

More information

The Impact of Advertising on Media Bias. Web Appendix

The Impact of Advertising on Media Bias. Web Appendix 1 The Impact of Advertising on Media Bias Esther Gal-Or, Tansev Geylani, Tuba Pinar Yildirim Web Appendix DERIVATIONS OF EQUATIONS 16-17 AND PROOF OF LEMMA 1 (i) Single-Homing: Second stage prices are

More information

Addendum to: International Trade, Technology, and the Skill Premium

Addendum to: International Trade, Technology, and the Skill Premium Addendum to: International Trade, Technology, and the Skill remium Ariel Burstein UCLA and NBER Jonathan Vogel Columbia and NBER April 22 Abstract In this Addendum we set up a perfectly competitive version

More information

Lecture Notes - Dynamic Moral Hazard

Lecture Notes - Dynamic Moral Hazard Lecture Notes - Dynamic Moral Hazard Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn October 23, 2012 1 Dynamic Moral Hazard E ects Consumption smoothing Statistical inference More strategies Renegotiation Non-separable

More information

Appendix for "O shoring in a Ricardian World"

Appendix for O shoring in a Ricardian World Appendix for "O shoring in a Ricardian World" This Appendix presents the proofs of Propositions - 6 and the derivations of the results in Section IV. Proof of Proposition We want to show that Tm L m T

More information

Electronic Companion to Tax-Effective Supply Chain Decisions under China s Export-Oriented Tax Policies

Electronic Companion to Tax-Effective Supply Chain Decisions under China s Export-Oriented Tax Policies Electronic Companion to Tax-Effective Supply Chain Decisions under China s Export-Oriented Tax Policies Optimality Equations of EI Strategy In this part, we derive the optimality equations for the Export-Import

More information

Mathematical Foundations II

Mathematical Foundations II Mathematical Foundations 2-1- Mathematical Foundations II A. Level and superlevel sets 2 B. Convex sets and concave functions 4 C. Parameter changes: Envelope Theorem I 17 D. Envelope Theorem II 41 48

More information

CEMMAP Masterclass: Empirical Models of Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 1 Lecture 3: Gravity Models

CEMMAP Masterclass: Empirical Models of Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 1 Lecture 3: Gravity Models CEMMAP Masterclass: Empirical Models of Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 1 Lecture 3: Gravity Models Dave Donaldson (MIT) CEMMAP MC July 2018 1 All material based on earlier courses taught

More information

6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 7: Supermodular Games

6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 7: Supermodular Games 6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 7: Asu Ozdaglar MIT February 25, 2010 1 Introduction Outline Uniqueness of a Pure Nash Equilibrium for Continuous Games Reading: Rosen J.B., Existence

More information

Supermodular Games. Ichiro Obara. February 6, 2012 UCLA. Obara (UCLA) Supermodular Games February 6, / 21

Supermodular Games. Ichiro Obara. February 6, 2012 UCLA. Obara (UCLA) Supermodular Games February 6, / 21 Supermodular Games Ichiro Obara UCLA February 6, 2012 Obara (UCLA) Supermodular Games February 6, 2012 1 / 21 We study a class of strategic games called supermodular game, which is useful in many applications

More information

Online Appendix: An Economic Approach to Generalizing Findings from Regression-Discontinuity Designs

Online Appendix: An Economic Approach to Generalizing Findings from Regression-Discontinuity Designs Online Appendix: An Economic Approach to Generalizing Findings from Regression-Discontinuity Designs Nirav Mehta July 11, 2018 Online Appendix 1 Allow the Probability of Enrollment to Vary by x If the

More information

Efficient Random Assignment with Cardinal and Ordinal Preferences: Online Appendix

Efficient Random Assignment with Cardinal and Ordinal Preferences: Online Appendix Efficient Random Assignment with Cardinal and Ordinal Preferences: Online Appendix James C. D. Fisher December 11, 2018 1 1 Introduction This document collects several results, which supplement those in

More information

Contents. Set Theory. Functions and its Applications CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2. Preface... (v)

Contents. Set Theory. Functions and its Applications CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2. Preface... (v) (vii) Preface... (v) CHAPTER 1 Set Theory Definition of Set... 1 Roster, Tabular or Enumeration Form... 1 Set builder Form... 2 Union of Set... 5 Intersection of Sets... 9 Distributive Laws of Unions and

More information

Department of Agricultural Economics. PhD Qualifier Examination. May 2009

Department of Agricultural Economics. PhD Qualifier Examination. May 2009 Department of Agricultural Economics PhD Qualifier Examination May 009 Instructions: The exam consists of six questions. You must answer all questions. If you need an assumption to complete a question,

More information

Price vs. Quantity in Oligopoly Games

Price vs. Quantity in Oligopoly Games Price vs. Quantity in Oligopoly Games Attila Tasnádi Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Budapest, H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8, Hungary July 29, 2005. Appeared in the International Journal

More information

Mathematical Appendix. Ramsey Pricing

Mathematical Appendix. Ramsey Pricing Mathematical Appendix Ramsey Pricing PROOF OF THEOREM : I maximize social welfare V subject to π > K. The Lagrangian is V + κπ K the associated first-order conditions are that for each I + κ P I C I cn

More information

Economics 2010c: Lectures 9-10 Bellman Equation in Continuous Time

Economics 2010c: Lectures 9-10 Bellman Equation in Continuous Time Economics 2010c: Lectures 9-10 Bellman Equation in Continuous Time David Laibson 9/30/2014 Outline Lectures 9-10: 9.1 Continuous-time Bellman Equation 9.2 Application: Merton s Problem 9.3 Application:

More information

Rules of Differentiation

Rules of Differentiation Rules of Differentiation The process of finding the derivative of a function is called Differentiation. 1 In the previous chapter, the required derivative of a function is worked out by taking the limit

More information

Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Vertical Oligopoly: Revisited

Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Vertical Oligopoly: Revisited Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Vertical Oligopoly: Revisited Hiroshi Kurata a, Takao Ohkawa b, Makoto Okamura c a Department of Economics, Tohoku Gakuin University, Japan b Department of Economics,

More information

The Envelope Theorem

The Envelope Theorem The Envelope Theorem In an optimization problem we often want to know how the value of the objective function will change if one or more of the parameter values changes. Let s consider a simple example:

More information

Market Power. Economics II: Microeconomics. December Aslanyan (VŠE) Oligopoly 12/09 1 / 39

Market Power. Economics II: Microeconomics. December Aslanyan (VŠE) Oligopoly 12/09 1 / 39 Market Power Economics II: Microeconomics VŠE Praha December 2009 Aslanyan (VŠE) Oligopoly 12/09 1 / 39 Microeconomics Consumers: Firms: People. Households. Monopoly. Oligopoly Now Perfect Competition.

More information

SUPPLEMENT TO Random Authority

SUPPLEMENT TO Random Authority SUPPLEMENT TO Random Authority Siguang Li Xi Weng September 15, 2015 In this Online Appendix, we provide a complete proof of Proposition 2, and extend the analysis of optimal authority allocation to asymmetric

More information

Designing Optimal Pre-Announced Markdowns in the Presence of Rational Customers with Multi-unit Demands - Online Appendix

Designing Optimal Pre-Announced Markdowns in the Presence of Rational Customers with Multi-unit Demands - Online Appendix 087/msom070057 Designing Optimal Pre-Announced Markdowns in the Presence of Rational Customers with Multi-unit Demands - Online Appendix Wedad Elmaghraby Altan Gülcü Pınar Keskinocak RH mith chool of Business,

More information

Sensitivity Analysis and Duality in LP

Sensitivity Analysis and Duality in LP Sensitivity Analysis and Duality in LP Xiaoxi Li EMS & IAS, Wuhan University Oct. 13th, 2016 (week vi) Operations Research (Li, X.) Sensitivity Analysis and Duality in LP Oct. 13th, 2016 (week vi) 1 /

More information

The New Keynesian Model: Introduction

The New Keynesian Model: Introduction The New Keynesian Model: Introduction Vivaldo M. Mendes ISCTE Lisbon University Institute 13 November 2017 (Vivaldo M. Mendes) The New Keynesian Model: Introduction 13 November 2013 1 / 39 Summary 1 What

More information

1 Stochastic Dynamic Programming

1 Stochastic Dynamic Programming 1 Stochastic Dynamic Programming Formally, a stochastic dynamic program has the same components as a deterministic one; the only modification is to the state transition equation. When events in the future

More information

Dynamic Pricing for Non-Perishable Products with Demand Learning

Dynamic Pricing for Non-Perishable Products with Demand Learning Dynamic Pricing for Non-Perishable Products with Demand Learning Victor F. Araman Stern School of Business New York University René A. Caldentey DIMACS Workshop on Yield Management and Dynamic Pricing

More information

Linear Contracts. Ram Singh. February 23, Department of Economics. Ram Singh (Delhi School of Economics) Moral Hazard February 23, / 22

Linear Contracts. Ram Singh. February 23, Department of Economics. Ram Singh (Delhi School of Economics) Moral Hazard February 23, / 22 Ram Singh Department of Economics February 23, 2015 Ram Singh (Delhi School of Economics) Moral Hazard February 23, 2015 1 / 22 SB: Linear Contracts I Linear Contracts Assumptions: q(e, ɛ) = e + ɛ, where

More information

Appendix (For Online Publication) Community Development by Public Wealth Accumulation

Appendix (For Online Publication) Community Development by Public Wealth Accumulation March 219 Appendix (For Online Publication) to Community Development by Public Wealth Accumulation Levon Barseghyan Department of Economics Cornell University Ithaca NY 14853 lb247@cornell.edu Stephen

More information

Getting to page 31 in Galí (2008)

Getting to page 31 in Galí (2008) Getting to page 31 in Galí 2008) H J Department of Economics University of Copenhagen December 4 2012 Abstract This note shows in detail how to compute the solutions for output inflation and the nominal

More information

Wars of Attrition with Budget Constraints

Wars of Attrition with Budget Constraints Wars of Attrition with Budget Constraints Gagan Ghosh Bingchao Huangfu Heng Liu October 19, 2017 (PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE: COMMENTS WELCOME) Abstract We study wars of attrition between two bidders who

More information

Merger Policy with Merger Choice

Merger Policy with Merger Choice Merger Policy with Merger Choice Volker Nocke University of Mannheim, CESifo and CEPR Michael D. Whinston Northwestern University and NBER September 28, 2010 PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE Abstract We analyze

More information

Optimal Control. Macroeconomics II SMU. Ömer Özak (SMU) Economic Growth Macroeconomics II 1 / 112

Optimal Control. Macroeconomics II SMU. Ömer Özak (SMU) Economic Growth Macroeconomics II 1 / 112 Optimal Control Ömer Özak SMU Macroeconomics II Ömer Özak (SMU) Economic Growth Macroeconomics II 1 / 112 Review of the Theory of Optimal Control Section 1 Review of the Theory of Optimal Control Ömer

More information

Melitz, M. J. & G. I. P. Ottaviano. Peter Eppinger. July 22, 2011

Melitz, M. J. & G. I. P. Ottaviano. Peter Eppinger. July 22, 2011 Melitz, M. J. & G. I. P. Ottaviano University of Munich July 22, 2011 & 1 / 20 & & 2 / 20 My Bachelor Thesis: Ottaviano et al. (2009) apply the model to study gains from the euro & 3 / 20 Melitz and Ottaviano

More information

Cross-Country Differences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection

Cross-Country Differences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection Cross-Country Differences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection Eric Bartelsman, John Haltiwanger & Stefano Scarpetta American Economic Review (2013) Presented by Beatriz González January

More information

An Introduction to Rational Inattention

An Introduction to Rational Inattention An Introduction to Rational Inattention Lecture notes for the course Bounded Rationality and Macroeconomics December 2, 2005 1 Introduction The objective of modelling economic agents as being rationally

More information

Week 7: The Consumer (Malinvaud, Chapter 2 and 4) / Consumer November Theory 1, 2015 (Jehle and 1 / Reny, 32

Week 7: The Consumer (Malinvaud, Chapter 2 and 4) / Consumer November Theory 1, 2015 (Jehle and 1 / Reny, 32 Week 7: The Consumer (Malinvaud, Chapter 2 and 4) / Consumer Theory (Jehle and Reny, Chapter 1) Tsun-Feng Chiang* *School of Economics, Henan University, Kaifeng, China November 1, 2015 Week 7: The Consumer

More information

arxiv: v1 [math.oc] 28 Jun 2016

arxiv: v1 [math.oc] 28 Jun 2016 On the Inefficiency of Forward Markets in Leader-Follower Competition Desmond Cai, Anish Agarwal, Adam Wierman arxiv:66.864v [math.oc] 8 Jun 6 June 9, 6 Abstract Motivated by electricity markets, this

More information

Introduction to General Equilibrium: Framework.

Introduction to General Equilibrium: Framework. Introduction to General Equilibrium: Framework. Economy: I consumers, i = 1,...I. J firms, j = 1,...J. L goods, l = 1,...L Initial Endowment of good l in the economy: ω l 0, l = 1,...L. Consumer i : preferences

More information

Melitz, M. J. & G. I. P. Ottaviano. Peter Eppinger. July 22, 2011

Melitz, M. J. & G. I. P. Ottaviano. Peter Eppinger. July 22, 2011 Melitz, M. J. & G. I. P. Ottaviano University of Munich July 22, 2011 & 1 / 20 & & 2 / 20 My Bachelor Thesis: Ottaviano et al. (2009) apply the model to study gains from the euro & 3 / 20 Melitz and Ottaviano

More information

Mixed duopolies with advance production

Mixed duopolies with advance production Mixed duopolies with advance production Tamás László Balogh Department of Economic Analysis and Business Informatics, University of Debrecen and Attila Tasnádi MTA-BCE Lendület Strategic Interactions Research

More information

Week 10: Theory of the Firm (Jehle and Reny, Chapter 3)

Week 10: Theory of the Firm (Jehle and Reny, Chapter 3) Week 10: Theory of the Firm (Jehle and Reny, Chapter 3) Tsun-Feng Chiang* *School of Economics, Henan University, Kaifeng, China November 22, 2015 First Last (shortinst) Short title November 22, 2015 1

More information

Bresnahan, JIE 87: Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: 1955 Price War

Bresnahan, JIE 87: Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: 1955 Price War Bresnahan, JIE 87: Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: 1955 Price War Spring 009 Main question: In 1955 quantities of autos sold were higher while prices were lower, relative

More information

LINEAR INEQUALITIES. Chapter Overview

LINEAR INEQUALITIES.  Chapter Overview LINEAR INEQUALITIES Chapter 6 6.1 Overview 6.1.1 A statement involving the symbols >, 3, x 4, x + y 9. (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Inequalities which do not involve

More information

The ambiguous impact of contracts on competition in the electricity market Yves Smeers

The ambiguous impact of contracts on competition in the electricity market Yves Smeers The ambiguous impact of contracts on competition in the electricity market Yves Smeers joint work with Frederic Murphy Climate Policy and Long Term Decisions-Investment and R&D, Bocconi University, Milan,

More information

Vertical Product Differentiation and Credence Goods: Mandatory Labeling and Gains from International Integration

Vertical Product Differentiation and Credence Goods: Mandatory Labeling and Gains from International Integration Vertical Product Differentiation and Credence Goods: Mandatory Labeling and Gains from International Integration Ian Sheldon and Brian Roe (The Ohio State University Quality Promotion through Eco-Labeling:

More information

Optimal Insurance of Search Risk

Optimal Insurance of Search Risk Optimal Insurance of Search Risk Mikhail Golosov Yale University and NBER Pricila Maziero University of Pennsylvania Guido Menzio University of Pennsylvania and NBER November 2011 Introduction Search and

More information

WHEN ARE SIGNALS COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES?

WHEN ARE SIGNALS COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES? Working Paper 07-25 Departamento de Economía Economic Series 15 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid March 2007 Calle Madrid, 126 28903 Getafe (Spain) Fax (34-91) 6249875 WHEN ARE SIGNALS COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES?

More information

G5212: Game Theory. Mark Dean. Spring 2017

G5212: Game Theory. Mark Dean. Spring 2017 G5212: Game Theory Mark Dean Spring 2017 Adverse Selection We have now completed our basic analysis of the adverse selection model This model has been applied and extended in literally thousands of ways

More information

Fixed Term Employment Contracts. in an Equilibrium Search Model

Fixed Term Employment Contracts. in an Equilibrium Search Model Supplemental material for: Fixed Term Employment Contracts in an Equilibrium Search Model Fernando Alvarez University of Chicago and NBER Marcelo Veracierto Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago This document

More information

Chapter 1 - Preference and choice

Chapter 1 - Preference and choice http://selod.ensae.net/m1 Paris School of Economics (selod@ens.fr) September 27, 2007 Notations Consider an individual (agent) facing a choice set X. Definition (Choice set, "Consumption set") X is a set

More information

Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms

Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms Andrew Bernard, Tuck and NBER Stephen e Redding, LSE and CEPR Peter Schott, Yale and NBER 1 Introduction How do economies respond when opening to trade? Classical

More information

Bilateral Trading in Divisible Double Auctions

Bilateral Trading in Divisible Double Auctions Bilateral Trading in Divisible Double Auctions Songzi Du Haoxiang Zhu March, 014 Preliminary and Incomplete. Comments Welcome Abstract We study bilateral trading between two bidders in a divisible double

More information

Simple Consumption / Savings Problems (based on Ljungqvist & Sargent, Ch 16, 17) Jonathan Heathcote. updated, March The household s problem X

Simple Consumption / Savings Problems (based on Ljungqvist & Sargent, Ch 16, 17) Jonathan Heathcote. updated, March The household s problem X Simple Consumption / Savings Problems (based on Ljungqvist & Sargent, Ch 16, 17) subject to for all t Jonathan Heathcote updated, March 2006 1. The household s problem max E β t u (c t ) t=0 c t + a t+1

More information

Figure T1: Consumer Segments with No Adverse Selection. Now, the discounted utility, V, of a segment 1 consumer is: Segment 1 (Buy New)

Figure T1: Consumer Segments with No Adverse Selection. Now, the discounted utility, V, of a segment 1 consumer is: Segment 1 (Buy New) Online Technical Companion to Accompany Trade-ins in Durable Goods Markets: Theory and Evidence This appendix is divided into six main sections which are ordered in a sequence corresponding to their appearance

More information

When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China - Errata and Further Results

When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China - Errata and Further Results When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China - Errata and Further Results Alex Cukierman and Ehud Menirav September 19 2004 Abstract This note points out and corrects an algebraic error that occured in the

More information

3 Intertemporal Risk Aversion

3 Intertemporal Risk Aversion 3 Intertemporal Risk Aversion 3. Axiomatic Characterization This section characterizes the invariant quantity found in proposition 2 axiomatically. The axiomatic characterization below is for a decision

More information