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1 FINANCE&ECONOMICS [ ] : (perspective) ( reference) 20 ( benchmark) (analytical tools) - (Arrow - Debreu Theorem) (Coase Theorem) - : (Modigliani - Miller Theorem) ( Kenneth Ar2 row) : ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ; ( ) ( ) :? 1
2 FINANCE&ECONOMICS (rational choice) : ( Sanford Gro ssman ) ( Oliver Hart) (John Moore) : - (J ean - J acques Laffont) (J ean Tirole) ( ) (Martin Weitzman) ( )? (Douglas Diamond) ( Philip Dybvig) ( ( self - fulfilling prophecy) (empirical ) : ; : : ; ; : ( Paul Samuelson) ( overlapping generation model) 2
3 FINANCE&ECONOMICS Holmstrom) ( career concern) : ( Steven Cheung) ( ) (Jo seph Stiglitz) 1974 (Ameri2 can Economic Review) (Journal of Economic Literature) (Journal of Economic Per2 spectives) (Michael J ensen) ( William Meckling) 1976 : (idea) man) ( Eugene Fama) ; 70 ( Bengt 3 ( Milton Fried2
4 FINANCE&ECONOMICS (corporate finance) (Ronald Coase) (John Nash) ( ) 70 ( norma2 tive) (po sitive) 80 ( ) ; (An2 drei Shleifer) ( Robert Vishny) (voting) (in2 terest group) ( ) 90 ; ; (Duncan Black) (the median voter theorem) (political economics) ( social capital) 4 (Mansur Olson)
5 FINANCE&ECONOMICS : ( Torsten Persson) ( Guido Tabellini) ( Gene Gro ssman) ( Elhanan Helpman) ( Michael Spence) ( ) (behavioral economics) ( ) ( behavioral finance) ( ) ( Richard 70 Thaler)? 1970 ( George Akerlof) 2001 ( 70 : 40 ; ( Clark Medal) ; ( Matthew Rabin) ( Gerard Roland) 5
6 FINANCE&ECONOMICS 80 90? ( 50 ) 80 ( ) : 6
7 FINANCE&ECONOMICS and the Theory of the Firm1 Journal of Political Econo my 88 (2) pp April [ 10 ] Gro ssman Gene and Elhanan Help2 man1 Special Interest Politics1 Cambridge MA : MIT Press [ 11 ] Grossman Sanford and Oliver Hart1The Co sts and Benefits of Ownership : A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration1 Journal of Political Economy 94 (4) pp August [ 12 ] Hart Oliver and John Moore1 Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm1 90 Journal of Political Economy 98 ( 6 ) pp1 ( ) December ( ) [ 13 ] Holmstro m Bengt1Managerial In2 centive Problems - - A Dynamic Perspective1Review of Econo mic Studies1 66 (1) pp J anuary [14 ] J ensen Michael and William H1 Meckling1Theory of the Firm : Managerial Be2 havior Agency Costs and Ownership Struc2 ture Journal of Financial Econo mics 3 (4 ) pp October : [ 1 ] Akerlof George1 The Market for Lemons : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism1Quarterly Journal of Econo mics1 84 (3) pp August [ 2 ] Akerlof George1Procrastination and Obedience1American Econo mic Review Pa2 pers and Proceedings1 Richard T1 Ely Lecture1 81 (1) pp May [ 3 ] Arrow Kenneth and Frank Hahn1 General Competitive Analysis1 Amsterdam : North - Holland [4 ] Black Duncan1 The Theory of Com2 90 mittees and Elections1 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press [5 ] Cheung Steven N1S1 The Theory of Share Tenancy1 Chicago : University of Chicago Press [6 ] Coase Ronald1The Problem of So2 cial Co st1 Journal of Law and Econo mics 3 pp October [ 7 ] Debreu Gerald1 Theory of Value1 New Haven : Yale University Press [ 8 ] Diamond Douglas and Philip Dyb2 vig1bank Runs Depo sit Insurance and Liq2 uidity1 Journal of Political Economy 91 (3) pp J une [ 9 ] Fama Eugene1 Agency Problems 7 [15 ] La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez - de - Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vish2 ny1investor Protection and Corporate Gover2 nance1journal of Financial Econo mics1 58 (1) pp October [16 ] Laffont J ean - J acques and J ean Tirole1Using Co st Observations to Regulate Firms1 Journal of Political Economy1 94 (3) pp J une [ 17 ] Modigliani Franco and Merton Miller1The Co st of Capital Corporation Fi2 nance and the Theory of Investment1 The American Econo mic Review 48 (3) pp J une [18 ] Nash John1 Non - Cooperative Games1 The Annals of Mathematics 54 (2) pp September [ 19 ] Nash John1 The Bargaining Prob2 lem1econo metrica 18 (2) pp April ( 8 )
8 FINANCE&ECONOMICS 1 [ ] 2 [ ] ( 7 ) [ 20 ] Olson Mancur1 The Logic of Collec2 tive Action : Public Goods and the Theory of Groups1 Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press [ 21 ] Persson Torsten ; and Guido Tabelli2 ni1 Political Economics : Explaining Economic Policy1 Cambridge MA : MIT Press [ 22 ] Rabin Matthew1Psychology and Econo mics1journal of Econo mics Literature1 36 (1) pp March [23 ] Roland Gerard1 Transition and Eco2 nomics : Politics Markets and Firms1 Cam2 bridge MA : MIT Press [ 24 ] Rothschild Michael and Joseph Stiglitz1Equilibrium in Co mpetitive Insurance Markets : An Essay on the Economics of Im2 perfect Information1Quarterly Journal of Eco2 no mics1 90 ( 4) pp November [25 ] Samuelson Paul1An Exact Con2 sumption - Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money1 Journal of Political Economy 66 (6) pp December [ 26 ] Shleifer Andrei1 Inefficient Mar2 kets : An Introduction to Behavioral Finance1 Clarendon Lectures in Economics1 New York : Oxford University Press [ 27 ] Shleifer Andrei and Robert Vishny1 A Survey of Corporate Governance1Journal of Finance1 52 (2) pp J une [28 ] Spence Michael1Job Market Sig2 naling1quarterly Journal of Econo mics1 87 (3) pp August [ 29 ] Stiglitz Jo seph1 Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping1Review of E2 conomic Studies1 41 ( 2 ) pp April [ 30 ] Thaler Richard1 The Winner s Curse : Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life1 Princeton : Princeton University Press [ 31 ] Thaler Richard (editor) 1 Advances in Behavioral Finance1 New York : Russell Sage Foundation
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