AP1000 European 19. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Design Control Document
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1 19.15 Chemical and Volume Control System System Description See subsection System Operation See subsection Performance during Accident Conditions See subsection Initiating Event Review The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section System Logic Models Assumptions and Boundary Conditions The following assumptions are used for the chemical and volume control system PRA model: a. - i. The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. j. Either one of the two makeup pumps is sufficient to deliver borated water to the reactor coolant system. To simplify the PRA model, it is assumed that one makeup pump is always the operating pump and the other makeup pump is always the standby pump. k. - q. The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section Fault Tree Models The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section Human Interactions The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section Common Cause Failures The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
2 TABLES THROUGH NOT USED. FIGURE NOT USED. EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
3 19.16 Containment Hydrogen Control System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
4 19.17 Normal Residual Heat Removal System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
5 19.18 Component Cooling Water System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
6 19.19 Service Water System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
7 19.20 Central Chilled Water System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
8 19.21 ac Power System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
9 19.22 Class 1E dc & UPS System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
10 19.23 Non-Class 1E dc & UPS System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
11 19.24 Containment Isolation See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
12 19.25 Compressed and Instrument Air System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
13 19.26 Protection and Safety Monitoring System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
14 19.27 Diverse Actuation System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
15 19.28 Plant Control System See subsection EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
16 19.29 Common Cause Analysis The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
17 19.30 Human Reliability Analysis The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
18 19.31 Other Event Tree Node Probabilities The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
19 19.32 Data Analysis and Master Data Bank The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
20 19.33 Fault Tree and Core Damage Quantification The design certification of the AP1000 included consideration by the NRC of the topic referred to in this section. EPS-GW-GL Revision 1
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