Improvised Chemical Devices, Chemical Security and the CWC

Transcription

1 Improvised Chemical Devices, Chemical Security and the CWC Dr Bob Mathews Head, NBC Arms Control Unit, DSTO Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Australian Government or any other entity.

2 Overview of Presentation A. Introductory remarks B. Chemical Terrorism - ICDs C. Relevance of the CWC D. International Cooperation to raise barriers to ICDs E. Concluding Comments

3 Toxins including Ricin Improvised Chemical Devices Traditionally, improvised devices have contained: Nerve agents including Sarin (Aum Shinryko) Blister agents Iraq insurgents Blood agents Including Mobtaker device Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) including recent use of chlorine in Iraq

4 Tokyo Subway March 1995 Improvised device - Sarin 12 died, 5000 affected

5 Concerns of large ICDs: Especially since 9/11 Deliberate large scale release of toxic chemicals from: plant site storage area transport vehicle Chemicals could include: Pharmaceuticals Pesticides Other TICs also Flammable chemicals and Explosive chemicals

6 Raising the Barriers to Chemical Terrorism An effective strategy to counter chemical terrorism will require a variety of measures, including: addressing societal issues that result in terrorism; international cooperation; cooperation between a range of government agencies accurate intelligence; criminalisation of chemical terrorism related activities; effective law enforcement; limitation of access to, and misuse of, chemicals through chemical safety/security regulations and related measures; awareness of chemical communities; and science and technology analytical capabilities.

7 Raising the Barriers to Improvised Chemical Devices: Relevance of the CWC and the OPCW An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure!! [28.35 mg of prevention is worth more than kg of cure]

8 Relevance of the CWC / OPCW: The CWC is not a Counter-terrorism Treaty but... The CWC prohibits development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, including improvised terrorist devices containing toxic chemicals: Article I, 1(d) : Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances... to assist, encourage or induce in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. Article II Paras 1 and 2 - All toxic chemicals for non-permitted purposes are included in CWC definition of chemical weapon. Article IV and V - CWC Destruction obligation will make it more difficult for a terrorist group to obtain CW from military stockpiles.

9 The CWC is not a Counter-terrorism Treaty but... Article VI - makes it more difficult for a terrorist group to acquire Scheduled chemicals (especially Schedule 1) for terrorist purposes. Article VII - requires enactment of national legislation which prohibits chemical terrorist related activities. Article IX Challenge inspection / Investigation of alleged use could include terrorist activities. Article X - Protection assistance after a CW-terrorist attack. Article XI - International cooperation including enhanced chemical security to raise barriers to chemical terrorism.

10 The CWC is not a Counter-terrorism Treaty but... OPCW Action Plans on Universality and Article VII are recognised as activities which support efforts to prevent chemical terrorism including preventing safe havens. The Role of the OPCW has recognised in various United Nations initiatives and Resolutions to prevent WMD-terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1456 (20 January 2003) UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004) The OPCW has been active contributor in various UN meetings with objectives to prevent WMD-terrorism. The OPCW has recognised the roles of chemical safety and chemical security in the prevention of chemical terrorism. Based on outcomes of the Second Review Conference.

11 Overlap of CWC provisions with UN SC Res Adopted on 28 April 2004 Obligates all UN Member States not to assist...in the proliferation of WMD, including by non-state actors. These measures include: adopt and enforce domestic laws; establish appropriate controls over WMD-related materials; effective measures to account for WMD-related materials; effective border controls (e.g. export controls); and develop national control lists of relevant dual-use items. Note: Terrorist groups typically try to acquire materials and equipment domestically and improvise. Therefore importance of domestic security / monitoring as well as export controls.

12 Requirements include: Chemical Security Physical security of site Personnel management Information security Management of chemical security activities Allocation of chemical security responsibilities Development of emergency plans Chemical security training Code of conduct (Compare with Laboratory biosecurity WHO, Biorisk Management Laboratory Security Guidance, September 2006, pages Available from: < )

13 Roles of Codes of Conduct It may be useful to think of Codes of Conduct as occurring in a number of layers, including: Guiding Principles (A Universal Code cf. Hippocratic Oath) Scientific Society Codes (Codes of Ethics) Institutional or Workplace Codes (Codes of Practice) We would see these various codes as complementary and mutually reinforcing, and may be most effective if developed as a package. * Australia, Working Paper, BWC/MSP/2005/MX.35 (24 June 2005) * Chair Synthesis Paper, BWC/MSP/2005/L.1 (16 November 2005)

14 Awareness-raising /Security Culture / Codes Raise awareness of CWC/1540 issues, including: CWC/1540-International obligations CWC/1540-related domestic laws and regulations Dual-use dilemma - ICDs Possible inadvertent assistance to ICDs Facilitate development of responsible culture and behaviour in individual scientists and in workplaces, and appropriate workplace regulations and oversight, that minimise the risk of mis-use of chemical sciences for hostile purposes.

15 Chemical Security: Potential benefits of International cooperation under OPCW Complex technical issues in developing chemical security as a means to prevent chemical terrorism Government agencies don t have all the answers There is potential valuable input by chemists / societies / industry associations in: the development of chemical security provisions awareness raising activities codes of conduct This could also be a win-win situation chemical security provisions more effective less burden on chemical industry development of security culture in chemical community

16 Potential contributions of Scientific Community, Associations and Organisations Support to government agencies in the: Identification of relevant chemicals and facilities Associated risk assessment, based on types and quantities of chemicals types of facility location of facility Development of Generic Chemical Security requirements

17 Concluding Comments: Role for the OPCW in raising barriers to ICDs To be most effective, essential for high levels of cooperation between the scientific community (including academics, industry, traders and their respective Association) with Government agencies, and a range of international organisations including: IUPAC; WHO; UNESCO; WCO OPCW has valuable contribution to assisting in preventing chemical terrorism, including: Contribution for OPCW in facilitating this international co-operation on chemical security through Article XI. Guiding and assisting States Parties with limited resources to develop appropriate chemical security strategies (no safe havens ).

18 Any questions?