The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity
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- Dominic Franklin
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1 The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity Geir B. Asheim a Tapan Mitra b January 26, 2017 Abstract We show how conditions of intergenerational equity may necessitate time inconsistency of normative criteria. By formalizing the intuition that less sensitivity remains for the future if sensitivity for the interests of the present is combined with time consistency, we point out conflicts (a) between time consistency and the requirement of not letting the present be dictatorial, and (b) between time consistency and equal treatment of generations. We use the results to interpret the time inconsistency of the Chichilnisky criterion and Rank- Discounted Utilitarianism. We also illustrate how such time inconsistent criteria can be applied in the Ramsey model. Keywords: intergenerational equity, time inconsistency JEL Classification Numbers: D63, D71, Q01 We thank Walter Bossert, Claude d Aspremont, Marc Fleurbaey, Sean Horan, Paolo Piacquadio and other seminar participants in Montréal, Lund, Oslo, Taipei and Tucson for helpful comments. This paper is part of the research activities at the Centre for the Study of Equality, Social Organization, and Performance (ESOP) at the Department of Economics at the University of Oslo. ESOP is supported by the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence funding scheme, project number Asheim s research has also been supported by IMéRA Marseille and Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative Montréal. a Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway. g.b.asheim@econ.uio.no. b Department of Economics, Cornell University, 448 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA. tm19@cornell.edu.
2 1 Introduction One might claim that, while time inconsistency is pervasive in individual decisionmaking, it has no place when formulating normative criteria. We disagree with this view for two reasons: Firstly, time inconsistency is not irrational; the question of rationality in this context relates to whether the decision-maker (be it is an individual person or a social planner) is conscious of his time inconsistency and, if so, how this problem is handled. A rational social planner with time inconsistent preferences must be aware that optimal plans might not be followed and instead plan in a sophisticated way by choosing the best plans that will actually be followed (see Pollak, 1968; Blackorby et al., 1973, for early references). Secondly, several normative criteria of intergenerational equity are in fact time inconsistent. Examples are Chichilnisky s (1996) sustainable preference and Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism (see Zuber and Asheim, 2012). Moreover, as we investigate in this paper, one can argue that time inconsistency is unavoidable for any criteria satisfying equity axioms like anonymity or no dictatorship of the present under reasonable sensitivity, coherency, richness and robustness conditions. There is a basic intuition for why time consistency might be in conflict with equitable treatment of generations: If sensitivity for the interests of the present is combined with time consistency, then less sensitivity remains for the future. This has two consequences: Impatience, thereby contradicting equal treatment in the sense of anonymity. No weight remains for infinite future under sufficient continuity, leading to dictatorship of the present. This intuition will be developed in the present paper. 1
3 Intertemporal social choice theory yields axiomatic foundation for criteria of intergenerational equity. As we explore in Section 2, such axioms can be divided into four classes: (1) Equity axioms, like anonymity or non-dictatorship of the present/future. (2) Sensitivity axioms, like different variants of the Pareto principle. (3) Separability axioms, including stationarity. (4) Axioms of coherency (transitivity), richness (completeness) and robustness (continuity). As we show in Section 3, the conjunction of the axioms of separable future and stationarity is sufficient and necessary for the time consistency of a time invariant social welfare relation (swr). In our paper we provide results which show how imposing a requirement of time consistency on an swr leads to conflicts with equity axioms, under various sensitivity axioms. We show in Section 4 that a time invariant, complete and continuous swr that satisfies the strong Pareto principle (hence, it is representable) cannot both be time consistent and satisfy non-dictatorship of the present on the set of converging streams. Hence, the ranking of two converging streams depends only on the properties of the streams before some finite time τ, and will not change even if, beyond time τ, the less preferred stream is changed to a stream leading to bliss and the more preferred stream is changed to one leading to destitution. We show by means of two examples that the dilemma can be resolved by dropping continuity. However, we have not been able to construct an attractive representable swr that combines time consistency and non-dictatorship of the present on the set of converging streams. Chichilnisky (1996) provides a class of representable and sensitive swrs which respect both non-dictatorship of the present and non-dictatorship of the future, but they do not satisfy stationarity and hence are not time consistent. Under the strong Pareto principle, a representable swr cannot be anonymous, as shown by Basu and Mitra (2003). So there is an impossibility even before im- 2
4 posing time consistency. However, a representable and continuous swr can satisfy even strong anonymity, in the sense of being indifferent to all permutations (including infinite ones) by weakening the strong Pareto principle to restricted dominance. Restricted dominance means that a stream is made worse by reducing the wellbeing of the present generation if the starting point is an egalitarian stream. We show in Section 5 that a time invariant and weakly continuous swr that satisfies restricted dominance cannot both be time consistent and satisfy anonymity in its weaker finite version. We demonstrate by means of two examples how the dilemma can be resolved by weakening sensitivity even further, thereby exploring further the difficulty of constructing attractive representable swrs that combine time consistency and anonymity. In Zuber and Asheim s (2012) axiomatization of Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism, they weaken the axiom of separable future to hold only on the set of non-decreasing streams. Therefore, while Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism is a representable swr that satisfies restricted dominance and (even) strong anonymity, it need not yield a time-consistent ranking in the comparison of streams that are not non-decreasing. In Section 6 we discuss further the properties of Chichilnisky s (1996) s criterion and Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism. Time inconsistency turns models of economic growth into intergenerational games. We illustrate in Section 7 such game-theoretic analysis by applying Chichilnisky s (1996) s criterion and Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism in the context of the Ramsey model. We discuss in the final Section 8 how the dilemma between time consistency and equity axioms can resolved by dropping time invariance so that the swr becomes history dependent. We are not aware of previous discussions in the literature of the conflict between time consistency and the requirement of not letting the present be dictatorial. However, we are not the first to point out a conflict between time consistency and equal treatment. In the setting of a numerically representable and sensitive swr, Koopmans (1960) shows through his Theorem 1 how impatience is implied by the axioms of separable future and stationarity (thus implied by time consistency pro- 3
5 vided that time invariance is imposed). In fact, this is the main result of his seminal article, and the implication from stationarity to impatience is reflected by its title. More recently, in the setting of possibly incomplete swrs, Jonsson and Voorneveld (2015) show that if the alternating stream (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0,... ) and (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,... ) are comparable under the strong Pareto principle and the axioms of separable future and stationarity, then the former stream is strictly preferred to the latter, thereby exhibiting a weak form of impatience. In this paper we show how time consistency leads to impatience also in Koopmans (1960) stronger form even under conditions that would otherwise be consistent with strong anonymity, in the sense of being indifferent to all permutations. 2 Framework and axioms Denote by N the set of all positive integers and by R the set of all real numbers. Let, for all t N, x t R be an indicator of the wellbeing of generation t, and let 1 x = (x 1, x 2,..., x t,... ) be an infinite wellbeing stream. Write, for all T N, 1x T = (x 1,..., x T ) and T +1 x = (x T +1, x T +1,... ); these are, respectively, the T - head and the T -tail of 1 x. A wellbeing stream 1 x is constant if there is z R such that x t = z for all t N, and we write 1 x = con z. A wellbeing stream 1 x is non-decreasing if x t x t+1 for all t N. A wellbeing stream 1 x is converging if lim t x t exists. We normalize wellbeing to lie within the unit interval, [0, 1]. This normalization is common in the literature on intergenerational equity and leads to little loss of generality. Write X = [0, 1] N the set of possible wellbeing streams, X + for the subset of non-decreasing streams and X c for the subset of converging streams. We study social welfare relations (swr) that rank elements of X (or X c ). We interpret the swr to the social ranking made at time 1 over streams starting at time 1. We say that a social welfare function (swf) W : X R (or W : X c R) represents an swr if, for all 1 x, 1 y X (or X c ), 1 x 1 y if and only if W ( 1 x) W ( 1 y). 4
6 For 1 x, 1 y X, write 1 x 1 y whenever x t y t for all t N; write 1 x > 1 y if 1x 1 y and 1 x 1 y; and write 1 x 1 y whenever x t > y t for all t N. The axioms that we will consider fall into four classes (where X c substitutes for X for swrs with domain X c ). The first class consists of axioms that concerns the coherency (transitivity), richness (completeness) and robustness (continuity) of the swr. Axiom O (Order) The swr is complete, reflexive and transitive on X. Axiom QO (Quasi Order) The swr is reflexive and transitive on X. An swr satisfying axiom O is called a social welfare order (swo). Clearly, axiom O implies axiom QO. Axiom C (Continuity) For any 1 x, 1 y X, if a sequence 1 x 1, 1 x 2,..., 1 x k,... of allocations in X is such that lim k sup t N x k t x t = 0 and, for all k N, 1x k 1 y (resp. 1 x k 1 y), then 1 x 1 y (resp. 1 x 1 y). Axiom SC (Scalar Continuity) For any x [0, 1] and any 1 y X, if a sequence x 1, x 2,..., x k,... of scalars in [0, 1] is such that lim k x k x = 0 and, for all k N, con x k 1 y (resp. con x k 1 y), then con x 1 y (resp. con x 1 y). Axiom WC (Weak Continuity) For any 1 y X, if y 1 < z and y t = z for all t 2, then there exists x [0, 1] such that con x y. Axiom REP (Representability) There exists an swf W such that W represents the swr. Axiom SC has been introduced by Mitra and Ozbek (2013). Since axiom SC requires continuity only on the diagonal, it is implied by, but does not imply, axiom C, as illustrated by Example 2 below. Axioms O and SC imply WC (provided that axiom M below is invoked), but WC does not imply SC, as illustrated by Examples 3 and 4 below. Axiom REP implies axiom O, but not axiom WC (and thus not axioms SC and C), as illustrated by Example 1 below. The next class provides sensitivity axioms. The strong Pareto principle belongs 5
7 here: Axiom SP (Strong Pareto) For any 1 x, 1 y X, if 1 x > 1 y, then x y. Axiom SP implies the following two axioms. Axiom M (Monotonicity) For any 1 x, 1 y X, if 1 x > 1 y, then x y. Axiom RD (Restricted Dominance) For any 1 x, 1 y X, if x 1 = z > y 1 and x t = z = y t for all t 2, then x y. Axiom RD ensures some sensitivity to the interests of the present generation. Axiom RD is equivalent to the strong Pareto principle on the set of non-decreasing streams when a set of additional axioms are imposed; Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism discussed in Section 6 exemplifies this. Together with axiom M, axiom RD implies the strong Pareto principle on the diagonal; see the proof of Lemma 1 below. Throughout this paper we will be concerned with swrs that satisfy at least axioms QO, WC, M and RD. It follows from the discussion above that this combination is strictly weaker than Q, SC, M and RD, which in turn is strictly weaker than O, C and SP. As shown by Mitra and Ozbek (2013, Proposition 2), the conjunction of axioms O, SC and M implies axiom REP. The following result is useful for our analysis. Lemma 1 Assume that the swr on X satisfies O, SC, M and RD. Then there exists W : X [0, 1] such that W represents and has the property that W ( con z) = z for all z [0, 1]. Proof. Let 1 y X. By axioms O, SC and M, there exists x [0, 1] such that conx 1 y. Suppose there exists z [0, 1] such that z x and con z 1 y. Without loss of generality, suppose z < x. Then by M and RD, 1y con z (z, con x) con x 1 y, which contradicts axiom O. Hence, there exists a unique x [0, 1] such that con x 6
8 1y. Thus, W : X [0, 1] defined by, for all 1 y X, W ( 1 y) = x where con x 1 y, represents and has the property that W ( con z) = z for all z [0, 1]. Throughout we use the symbol W for the swf that represents such that W ( con z) = z for all z [0, 1]. The third class consists of ethical axioms. The two first imposes impartiality by imposing invariance to the set of all or the set of finite permutation. Axiom SA (Strong Anonymity) For any 1 x X, if 1 y is a permutation of 1 x, then 1x 1 y. Axiom FA (Finite Anonymity) For any 1 x X, if 1 y is a finite permutation of 1 x, then 1 x 1 y. Since the set of finite permutations, where only a finite set of positions are reordered, is a strict subset of the set of all permutations, it follows that axiom SA implies axiom FA. As already observed by Diamond (1965), there is conflict between sensitivity and impartiality. Lauwers (1997) shows that SP is incompatible with SA, while Basu and Mitra (2003) show that SP is incompatible also with FA if the swr is required to satisfy REP. But as we will see, if SP is weakened to the conjunction of axioms M and RD, then compatibility with even SA is restored for swrs that satisfy REP. Chichilnisky (1996) says that there is Dictatorship of the Present if, for any 1 x, 1y X with 1 x 1 y, there exists τ N such that for all t τ and 1 u, 1 v X, ( 1 x t, t+1 u) ( 1 y t, t+1 v). Hence, the present is a dictator if only what happens before a finite time matters for the ranking of alternatives. Here, we weaken this axiom by only considering pairs of converging wellbeing streams. Axiom DP (Dictatorship of the Present on the set of converging streams) For any 1x, 1 y X c with 1 x 1 y, there exists τ N such that for all t τ and 1 u, 1 v X, ( 1 x t, t+1 u) ( 1 y t, t+1 v). In particular, when Axiom DP is satisfied, for any 1 x, 1 y X c with 1 x 1 y, there 7
9 exists τ N such that for all t τ, ( 1 x t, con 0) ( 1 y t, con 1). Hence, the ranking of two converging streams depends only on the properties of the streams before some finite time τ, and will not change even if, beyond time τ, the more preferred stream is changed to one leading to destitution and the less preferred stream is changed to one leading to bliss. Note that we do not require the arbitrary streams 1 u and 1 v to be converging. The ethically commendable property is the negation of axiom DP Axiom NDP (Non-Dictatorship of the Present on the set of converging streams) There exist 1 x, 1 y X c with 1 x 1 y such that, for all τ N, there exist t τ and 1 u, 1 v X such that ( 1 x t, t+1 u) ( 1 y t, t+1 v). The fourth and last class consists of separability axioms. Axiom SEP (Separable Present) For any 1 x, 1 y, 1 x, 1 y X such that (i) x t = x t and y t = y t for all t {1, 2} and (ii) x t = y t and x t = y t for all t N \ {1, 2}, 1x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y. Axiom SEP is Postulate 3 a in Koopmans (1960) characterization of discounted utilitarianism. Axiom SEF (Separable Future) For any 1 x, 1 y, 1 x, 1 y X such that (i) x t = x t and y t = y t for all t N \ {1} and (ii) x 1 = y 1 and x 1 = y 1, 1x 1 y if and only if 1x 1 y. Axiom SEF is Postulate 3b in Koopmans (1960) characterization of discounted utilitarianism. Axiom ST (Stationarity) For any 1 x, 1 y, X, there exists z [0, 1] such that 1x 1 y if and only if (z, 2 x ) (z, 2 y ), where x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 t N. for all Axiom ST is Koopmans (1960) stationarity postulate (Postulate 4). The conjunction of axioms SEF and ST is the property Independent Future, as introduced (in a slightly stronger form) by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003): 8
10 Independent Future. For any 1 x, 1 y X with x 1 = y 1, 1 x 1 y if and only if 1x 1 y, where x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 for all t N. Lemma 2 The swr on X satisfies Independent Future if and only if satisfies axioms SEF and ST. Proof. Only if. Assume that satisfies Independent Future. Let 1 x, 1 y, 1 x, 1 y X satisfy (i) x t = x t and y t = y t for all t N \ {1} and (ii) x 1 = y 1 and x 1 = y 1. Let x t = x t+1 = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 = y t+1 for all t N. By Independent Future, 1 x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y and 1 x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y. Hence, 1 x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y, thereby showing that satisfies SEF. It follows directly from Independent Future that, for any 1 x, 1 y, X, and for any z [0, 1], 1 x 1 y if and only if (z, 2 x ) (z, 2 y ), where x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 for all t N, thereby showing that satisfies ST. If. Assume that satisfies axioms SEF and ST. Let 1 x, 1 y X satisfy x 1 = y 1. By ST, there exists z [0, 1] such that (z, 2 x) (z, 2 y) if and only if 1 x 1 y, where x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 for all t N. By SEF and the fact that x 1 = y 1, 1x 1 y if and only if (z, 2 x) (z, 2 y). Hence, 1 x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y, thereby showing that satisfies Independent Future. We end this section by an example satifying axiom REP, but not WC. Example 1 Let the swf V : X [0, 2] be given by: 1 + (1 β) t=1 V ( 1 x) = βt 1 x t if, for all t N, x t 1 2, (1 β) t=1 βt 1 x t if there is t N such that x t < 1 2, where β (0, 1). Then V represents an swr that satisfies axioms REP, SP, SEF, ST and NDP. Note that the swr represented by V does not even satisfy WC. To see this, consider 1 y with y 1 = β and y t = β for all t 2 so that V ( 1y) = 1 2. Then con x y if x [0, 1 2 ) and conx y if x [ 1 2, 1], thus contradicting WC. 9
11 3 Condition for time consistency Time consistency means that the ranking of two streams with a common first element does not change after this first element has been realized. To discuss this concept we need to interpret t x t y as the social ranking made by at time t over streams starting at time t. Time consistency. For any τ N and any 1 x, 1 y, X with x τ = y τ, τ x τ y if and only if τ+1 x τ+1 y. To relate the concept of Time consistency to the separability axioms of the last section, we must introduce the concept of Time invariance. Time invariance. For any τ N and any 1 x, 1 y, X, τ x τ y if and only if τ+1x τ+1 y, where x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 for all t N. With these concepts, we can state the following result. Proposition 1 Assume that the swr on X is Time invariant. Then is Time consistent if and only if satisfies axioms SEF and ST. Proof. Let the swr be Time invariant. Only if. Assume that is Time consistent. Let 1 x, 1 y X satisfy x 1 = y 1. Let x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 for all t N. By Time consistency, 1 x 1 y if and only if 2x 2 y. By Time invariance, 2 x 2 y if and only if 1 x 1 y. Hence, 1 x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y, thereby showing that satisfies Independent Future. By Lemma 2, satisfies axioms SEF and ST. If. Assume that satisfies axioms SEF and ST. By Lemma 2, satisfies Independent Future. Let 1 x, 1 y, X satisfy x τ = y τ. Let x t = x t+τ 1, y t = y t+τ 1, x t = x t+τ and y t = y t+τ for all t N. By repeated use of Time invariance, τ x τ y if and only if 1 x 1 y and τ+1 x τ+1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y. By Independent Future, 1 x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y. Hence, τ x τ y if and only if τ+1 x τ+1 y, thereby showing that satisfies Time consistency. 10
12 The terminology used above corresponds to the one applied by Halevy (2015). From now on, we will abuse notation slightly by writing 2 x for 1 x with x t = x t+1 for all t N. Hence, formally when considering 2 x we will be concerned with rankings at time 1 of streams starting at time 1. However, if Time invariance is imposed, it does matter whether 2 x is interpreted in an actual sense as a stream starting at time 2 and being compared to other streams at that time. Let the swr satisfy axioms O, SC, M, RD, SEF and ST. Since satisfy O, SC, M and RD, it follows from Lemma 1 that there exists W : X [0, 1] such that W represents and has the property that W ( con z) = z for all z [0, 1]. For all (a, b) [0, 1] 2, define the function g : [0, 1] 2 [0, 1] by: g(a, b) = W (a, con b). For all 1 x X, denote W ( 2 x) by z. Hence, W ( 2 x) = z = W ( con z). Since satisfy SEF and ST, it follows from Proposition 1 that: W ( 1 x) = W (x 1, 2 x) = W (x 1, con z) = g(x 1, z) = g(x 1, W ( 2 x)). We call g an aggregator function of present wellbeing and future welfare. It follows directly from the definition of g and axioms M, RD, SEF and ST that g has the following properties: (G.1) g(a, b) < b if a < b and g(a, b) = b if a = b; (G.2) g(a, b) is non-decreasing in a given b; (G.3) g(a, b) is increasing in b given a. In particular, to establish property (G.3), let b < c. Then g(b, b) g(b, c) < g(c, c) 11
13 by M and RD. Therefore, by SEF and ST and invoking Proposition 1, g(a, b) = g(a, g(b, b)) < g(a, g(c, c)) = g(a, c). Moreover, it follows from the definition of g and axiom M that g has the following limited continuity property: (G.4) lim a b g(a, b) = g(b, b) and lim b a g(a, b) = g(a, a). To see that lim a b g(a, b) = g(b, b) in the case where b (0, 1], consider any sequence {a k } of scalars in [0, 1] is such that a k b as k. Let λ be an arbitrary number in (0, 1). Then, there is κ N, such that a k λb for all k κ. By M, we have: c k := g(a k, b) = W (a k, con b) W (λb, con b) W (λb, con λb) = λb (1) for all k κ, where the last equality follows from the fact that W ( con z) = z for all z [0, 1]. Also, by M, we have: c k := g(a k, b) = W (a k, con b) W (b, con b) = W ( con b) = b (2) for all k N. Since λ (0, 1) was chosen arbitrary and (1) and (2) hold for all k κ, we have that g(a k, b) = c k b as k. The proofs of lim a b + g(a, b) = g(b, b), lim b a g(a, b) = g(a, a) and lim b a + g(a, b) = g(a, a) are similar. If, in the set of axioms above, the combination of M and RD is strengthened to SP, then (G.2) is strengthened to: (G.2 ) g(a, b) is increasing in a given b. Moreover, if axiom SC is strengthened to C, then (G.4) is strengthened to: (G.4 ) g(a, b) is continuous in (a, b) on [0, 1] 2. 12
14 Too see that property (G.4 ) does not follow under axiom SC, consider the following example. Example 2 Define the following subset of X (keeping in mind that X = [0, 1] N ): N := { 1 x X : t=1 x t < }, and let I := X\N. Let the swf W : X [0, 1] be given by: (1 β) t=1 W ( 1 x) = βt 1 x t if 1 x I, 0 if 1 x N, where β (0, 1). Then W represents an swr that satisfies axioms O, SC, M, RD, SEF, and ST. We have g(1, b) > 1 β > 0 for all positive b. However, g(1, 0) = 0. Hence, g(a, ) is not a continuous function. 4 Time consistency leads to dictatorship of the present The main result of the present section is to demonstrate that the combination of O, C, SP, SEF and ST implies DP, and thus contradicts NDP. Recall that we have weakened DP (and strengthened NDP) to be concerned with the set of converging streams. Recall also that the aggregator function g : [0, 1] 2 [0, 1] satisfies (G.1), (G.2 ), (G.3) and (G.4 ) under O, C, SP, SEF and ST. To motivate the analysis, we first present a weaker version of the result, where we only consider constant streams. Observation 1 Assume that the swr on X satisfies axioms O, C, SP, SEF and ST. Let be represented by W : X [0, 1]. If a < b, then there exists τ such that, for every t τ, W (a,..., a, }{{} t+1 u) < W (b,..., b, }{{} t+1 v) t times t times 13
15 for all 1 u, 1 v X. In particular, for every t τ, W (a,..., a, }{{} con 1) < W (b,..., b, }{{} con 0). t times t times So in the comparison of constant streams, only what happens before a finite τ matters. Note that τ depends on a and b. Proof. Assume axioms O, C, SP, SEF and ST. Define the sequence {a t } by: a 1 = g(a, 1) = W (a, con 1) a 2 = g(a, a 1 ) = W (a, a, con 1) a t = g(a, a t 1 ) = W (a,..., a, }{{} con 1) t times For all t, a t (a, 1). Furthermore, {a t } is decreasing and bounded below by a. Hence {a t } is a converging sequence: a := lim t a t [a, 1). By continuity of g, a = g(a, a ). If a > a, then a = g(a, a ) < g(a, a ) = a which is a contradiction. Therefore: a = a. Define likewise the sequence {b t } by b t = g(b, b t 1 ) for all t N and b 0 = 0. The same argument implies that b = b. Hence, with a < b, we obtain lim W (a,..., a, t }{{} con 1) = a < b = lim W (b,..., b, t }{{} con 0) t times Hence, there exists τ N such that W (a,..., a, }{{} t+1 u) W (a,..., a, }{{} con 1) t times t times t times 14
16 < W (b,..., b, }{{} con 0) W (b,..., b, }{{} t+1 v) t times t times for all t τ, and 1 u, 1 v X, thereby establishing the proposition. We next turn to our main result, showing that axiom DP (on the set of converging streams) is implied by the set of axioms listed in the proposition. Proposition 2 Assume that the swr on X satisfies axioms O, C, SP, SEF and ST. Let be represented by W : X [0, 1]. If 1 y, 1 z X c satisfy W ( 1 y) < W ( 1 z), then there exists τ such that, for every t τ, W ( 1 y t, t+1 u) < W ( 1 z t, t+1 v) for all 1 u, 1 v X. Define for all 1 x X the sequences {l t ( 1 x)} and {h t ( 1 x)} as follows: For all t 1, l t ( 1 x) = W ( 1 x t, con 0) and h t ( 1 x) = W ( 1 x t, con 1). Clearly, {l t ( 1 x)} is a non-decreasing sequence, bounded above by W ( 1 x), by axiom SP. So it converges to a limit; denote this limit by L( 1 x). Similarly (by axiom SP) we have that {h t ( 1 x)} is a non-increasing sequence, bounded below by W ( 1 x). So it converges to a limit; denote this limit by H( 1 x). Hence, we have: L( 1 x) W ( 1 x) H( 1 x). (3) The following lemma is the key to proving Proposition 2. Lemma 3 Assume that the swr on X satisfies O, C, SP, SEF and ST. Let be represented by W : X [0, 1]. Then L( 1 x) = W ( 1 x) = H( 1 x) for all 1 x X c. 15
17 Proof. Assume axioms O, C, SP, SEF and ST. Let 1 x X c be given, and let a denote lim t x t. We will show that W ( 1 x) = H( 1 x). Given (3), this is established if, for every ε > 0, there is τ 1 such that W ( 1 x t, con 1) W ( 1 x) + ε for all t τ. Let ε > 0 be given. Using axiom C, we can find δ > 0 such that whenever 1 y X satisfies sup t N y t x t δ, we have W ( 1 y) W ( 1 x) ε. Case 1: a [0, 1). Since lim t x t = a, there exists τ 1 such that x t a δ/3 for all t τ. Let ā = a + δ/3. Define the sequence {ā t } inductively by ā 1 = g(ā, 1) and, for all t 1, ā t+1 = g(ā, ā t ). By the proof of Observation 1, {ā t } is decreasing and converges to: lim t ā t = ā. Hence, there exists τ 1 such that ā τ ā + δ/3. By construction, x t a + δ/3 = ā ā τ and x t a δ/3 ā τ 2δ/3 δ/3 = ā τ δ for all t τ. Let τ := τ + τ. Then, for all t τ: W ( 1 x t, con 1) W ( 1 x τ, con 1) W ( 1 x τ, ā,..., ā, }{{} con 1) by axiom SP, τ times = W ( 1 x τ, con ā τ ) by axioms SEF and ST, and the definition of ā τ, W ( 1 x) + ε since x t ā τ δ for all t τ, thereby completing Case 1. Case 2: a = 1. Since lim t x t = 1, there exists τ 1 such that x t 1 δ for all t τ. Hence, for all t τ: W ( 1 x t, con 1) W ( 1 x τ, con 1) W ( 1 x) + ε, thereby completing Case 2. The result that W ( 1 x) = L( 1 x) can be shown in an analogous manner. Proof of Proposition 2. Assume axioms O, C, SP, SEF and ST. Let 1 y, 1z X c satisfy W ( 1 y) < W ( 1 z). Then, ε := W ( 1 z) W ( 1 y) > 0. By Lemma 3 we 16
18 can choose τ large enough so that for all t τ, W ( 1 y t, con 1) < W ( 1 y) + ε/2 and W ( 1 z t, con 0) > W ( 1 z) ε/2. (4) Thus, for all t τ, using (4) and the definition of ε, W ( 1 y t, con 1) < W ( 1 y) + ε/2 = W ( 1 z) ε + ε/2 = W ( 1 z) ε/2 (5) < W ( 1 z t, con 0). Let 1 u, 1 v be arbitrary elements of X. Then, by (5) and axiom SP, W ( 1 y t, t+1 u) W ( 1 y t, con 1) < W ( 1 z t, con 0) W ( 1 z t, t+1 v) for all t τ, thereby establishing the proposition. Example 1 shows how the remaining axioms can be combined with NDP, provided that axiom C is dropped. We end this section by another example showing how REP, SP, SEF, ST and NDP can be simultaneously satisfied even if the weak continuity property entailed by axiom WC is retained. Example 3 As in Example 2, let N := { 1 x X : t=1 x t < } and I := X\N. Let the swf V : X [0, 2] be given by: where β (0, 1). 1 + (1 β) t=1 V ( 1 x) = βt 1 x t if 1 x I, t=1 xt 1+ if 1 x N, t=1 xt Then V represents an swr that satisfies axioms REP, WC, SP, SEF, ST and NDP. Note that the swr represented by V does not satisfy SC. To see this, consider a sequence x 1, x 2,..., x k,... of scalars in (0, 1] such that lim k x k = 0. Then con x k (1, con 0) for all k N, while con 0 (1, con 0), thus 17
19 contradicting SC. The swf of Example 3 represents discounted utilitarianism on the set I of streams with unbounded sum of wellbeing. If subsistence requires wellbeing bounded away from zero, then I is the relevant set of streams in the context of sustainability. The non-continuity between streams in I and streams in N is an artifact to ensure that the swr represented by the swf of Example 3 satisfies NDP. A similar comment can be made in the case of Example 1 with 1 2 as subsistence level. Chichilnisky (1996) defines sustainable preference by the axioms REP, SP and NDP (noting that her axiom Non-Dictatorship of the Future follows from SP). Examples 1 and 3 show that there exist sustainable preferences that are both Time consistent and Time invariant. However, they illustrate also that axioms discussed in the literature actually fail to put adequate restrictions on swrs, and the commonly accepted representation results obtained from these axioms are driven by the imposition of continuity. In particular, a sustainable preference without the additional imposition of continuity might not have commendable properties. Thus, the dilemma posed by a choice between time consistency and intergenerational equity remains. 5 Time consistency leads to impatience In this section we show how combinations of axioms including SEF and ST imply impatience. We start by reproducing a result due to Koopmans (1960). Recall again that the aggregator function g : [0, 1] 2 [0, 1] satisfies (G.1), (G.2 ), (G.3) and (G.4 ) under the axioms O, C, SP, SEF and ST. Observation 2 (Koopmans, 1960) Assume that the swr on X satisfies axioms O, C, SP, SEF and ST. Let be represented by W : X [0, 1]. If a < b, then W (a, b, con b) < W (b, a, con b). (6) If satisfies also axiom SEP, then W (a, b, 3 x) < W (b, a, 3 x) (7) 18
20 for all 3 x X. Proof. Assume axioms O, C, SP, SEF and ST, and let a < b. Define the sequence {z t } by: z 0 = g(a, b) = W (a, con b) z 1 = g(b, z 0 ) = W (b, a, con b) z t = g(b, z t 1 ) = W (b,..., b, a, }{{} con b) t times Suppose z 0 z 1. By induction, z t 1 z t for all t, implying that g(a, b) = z 0 z t for all t. However, by the proof of Observation 1, z t W (b,..., b, }{{} con 0) =: b t b = g(b, b) > g(a, b), t times which is a contradiction. Therefore: W (a, b, con b) = z 0 < z 1 = W (b, a, con b), which establishes (6). Now, (7) follows directly if axiom SEP is added. Observation 2 demonstrates that the combination of O, C, SP, SEF and ST contradicts axiom FA and thus precludes equal treatment of generations. In particular, the observation shows that the streams (a, b, con b) and (b, a, con b) with a < b meets condition (40) of impatience in Koopmans (1960). The result actually follows from part (a) of Koopmans s (1960) Theorem 1. However, as shown by Diamond (1965), axioms O, C and SP alone contradict axiom FA. In fact, as demonstrated by Basu and Mitra (2003), even if axioms O and C are replaced by REP, it is impossible to satisfy both axioms SP and FA. Hence, it is not the imposition of Time Consistency (in a setting of Time invariance) through axioms SEF and ST that rules out equal treatment. 19
21 The following main result of this section shows that axiom FA is contradicted by axioms SEF and ST even if axioms O, C and SP are weakened to axioms QO, WC, M and RD. The significance of this result is that axioms QO, WC, M and RD alone do not contradict FA. In particular, the swr represented by W : X [0, 1] defined by W ( 1 x) = inf t N x t satisfies axioms O, C, M, RD and SA, and thus, axioms QO, WC, M, RD and FA since axioms O and C imply axioms QO and WC and SA strengthens FA. Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism discussed in Section 6 is another example. Hence, under this set of axioms it is the requirement of Time Consistency that causes the conflict with equal treatment as a criterion of intergenerational equity. Proposition 3 Assume that the swr on X satisfies axioms QO, WC, M, RD, SEF and ST. If a, c [0, 1] satisfy a < c, then there exists b (a, c) such that (a, b, con c) (b, a, con c). (8) The following lemma is useful for the proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 4 Assume that the swr on X satisfies axioms QO, M, RD, SEF and ST. If b, c [0, 1] satisfy b < c, then (i) con b con c, (ii) For all a [0, 1], (a, con b) (a, con c). Proof. Note that by axioms M and RD, if a, b, c [0, 1] and b < c, then: conb = (b, con b) (b, con c) (c, con c) = con c, so that by transitivity, we have con b con c. This establishes part (i). Then, by Proposition 1, part (ii) follows from axioms SEF and ST. Proof of Proposition 3. Assume axioms QO, WC, M, RD, SEF and ST, and let a < c. By axiom WC, we can choose b such that con b (a, con c). 20
22 We first show that a < b < c. To show b < c, note by the choice of b and axiom RD, we get con b = (b, con b) (a, con c) (c, con c) = con c, so con b con c by transitivity. Then, since b > c would imply con b con c (by Lemma 4(i)), while b = c would imply con b con c (by reflexivity), we have: b < c. To show a < b, suppose a b. Then, by the choice of b, axiom M, the fact that b < c, and Lemma 4(ii): conb (a, con c) (b, con c) (b, con b) = con b, so that con b con b by transitivity. Since this contradicts reflexivity, we have: a < b. To establish (8), we have by the choice of b and axioms SEF and ST: (a, b, con c) (a, con c) b = (b, con b) (b, a, con c), since, by axiom RD, (b, con c) (c, con c) = c and, by Proposition 1, axioms SEF and ST are equivalent to Independent Future. By transitivity, we obtain (8). We proceed by providing two examples showing how REP (thus implying axioms O and QO), WC, M, SEF and ST can be combined with even SA (implying invariance to set of all permutation) provided that the sensitivity entailed by RD is relaxed. The first one is a variant of Example 3, retaining sensitivity only for summable streams, while the second one has only asymptotic sensitivity. Example 4 As in Examples 2 and 3, let N := { 1 x X : t=1 x t < } and I := X\N. Let the swf V : X [0, 1] be given by: 1 if 1 x I, V ( 1 x) = t=1 xt 1+ if 1 x N. t=1 xt Then V represents an swr that satisfies axioms REP, WC, M, SEF, ST and SA. Note that the swr does not satisfy axiom RD as V (a, con b) = 1 = V ( con b) if a < b, while satisfying the strong Pareto principle on the subset of summable streams. As in Example 3 the swr represented by V does not satisfy SC. To see this, consider 21
23 a sequence x 1, x 2,..., x k,... of scalars in (0, 1] such that lim k x k = 0. Then conx k (1, con 0) for all k N, while con 0 (1, con 0), thus contradicting SC. Example 5 Let the swf W : X [0, 1] be given by: W ( 1 x) = α lim inf t x t + (1 α) lim sup t x t, where α (0, 1). Then W represents an swr that satisfies axioms O, C, M, SEF, ST and SA. Even though the swr does not satisfy axiom RD (as required in Lemma 1), W has the property that W ( con z) = z for all z [0, 1]. In particular, the swr satisfies a uniform Pareto principle in the sense that for all 1 x, 1 y X and ε > 0, if x t y t + ε for all t N, then 1 x is strictly preferred to 1 y. For more on the axiomatic basis for related swrs, see Chambers (2009) and Sakai (2016). These two examples illustrate that one cannot have both sensitivity for the present generation and asymptotic sensitivity in an swr that treats generations equally and is time consistent. In fact, axiom RD is a minimalist way of capturing both types of sensitivity (when combined with the incontrovertible M). And as soon as one imposes axiom RD (in combination with QO, WC and M), we know that axioms SEF and ST lead to impatience, so equal treatment as captured by FA is destroyed. We end this section by noting that there is another route out of the dilemma discussed here, namely to drop the weak continuity requirement that axiom WC represents. Undiscounted utilitarianism and leximin as defined in the setting of infinite wellbeing streams by Basu and Mitra (2007) and Bossert et al. (2007), respectively, satisfy axiom FA as well as axioms QO, SP, SEF and ST, and thus all the remaining axioms of Proposition 3, as axiom SP implies axioms M and RD. However, they fail axiom WC. Moreover, if we impose completeness by strengthening QO to O, then these criteria are necessarily non-constructive (see Zame, 2007; Lauwers, 2010); in particular, they cannot satisfy axiom REP. 22
24 6 Time inconsistent criteria In Section 3 we have shown that Time consistency is equivalent to axioms SEF and ST under Time invariance. In Section 4 we have shown axioms O, C, SEF and ST in combination with axiom SP contradict NDP (on the set of converging streams). The criterion that Chichilnisky (1996) proposes in her Theorems 1 and 2 satisfies O, C, SP and NDP. Thus, either SEF or ST must fail. In first part of this section we take closer look at Chichilnisky s criterion (henceforth referred to as the C-criterion) and show that it satisfies SEF, but fails ST. In Section 5 we have shown axioms QO, WC, SEF and ST in combination with axioms M and RD contradict FA. The criterion of Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism (RDU) suggested by Zuber and Asheim (2012) satisfies O, C, M, RD and SA. Thus, since axioms O, C and M imply axioms QO and WC and SA strengthens FA, this leads to the conclusion that RDU must fail either SEF or ST. In the second part of this section we investigate RDU and show that it satisfies ST, but fails SEF. As preliminaries to both criteria, let u : [0, 1] R be an increasing and continuously differentiable function that maps positive wellbeing into transformed wellbeing (or generalized utility), and define the Time-Discounted Utilitarian (TDU) welfare function W T β : X [0, 1] for the discount factor β (0, 1) as follows: [ Wβ T ( 1x) = u 1 (1 β) ] t=1 βt 1 u(x t ). By multiplying with (1 β), one obtain average discounted generalized utility and, by using the inverse u 1 of the utility function u, average discounted generalized utility is mapped into [0, 1], leading to an swf in the class considered by Lemma 1. The C-criterion (see Chichilnisky, 1996, for a presentation and analysis of this criterion, including an axiomatization) evaluates streams according to a convex combination of TDU welfare and the limit of wellbeing. It is represented by the welfare 23
25 function W C ( 1 x) : X c [0, 1] defined as follows: where γ (0, 1). W C ( 1 x) = (1 γ) W T β ( 1x) + γ lim t x t, This is a particular version within the class of representations considered in Chichilnisky s (1996) Theorems 1 and 2. The C-criterion satisfies axioms O, C, SP, SEP, SEF and NDP on the set X c of converging streams. However, it does not satisfy ST. The reason is that, as when time is advanced, the weight on the stream in TDU part increases, while the weight on the limit is not affected. Therefore, it is not the case that for all 1 x, 1 y X c, there exists z [0, 1] such that 1 x 1 y if and only if (z, 2 x ) (z, 2 y ), where x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 for all t N. Rather, there exist 1x, 1 y X c with W T β ( 1x) > W T β ( 1y) and lim t x t < lim t y t such that, for all z [0, 1], 1 x 1 y, but (z, 2 x ) (z, 2 y ). In particular, if 1x = (1, 1, con 0) and 1 y = (0, 0, con 1) with β = 1/2, γ = 1/4 and u(z) = z, then W T β ( 1x) = 3/4 and W T β ( 1y) = 1/4 so that W C ( 1 x) W C ( 1 y) = 1/8 and W C (z, 2 x ) W C (z, 2 y ) = 1/16 for all z [0, 1]. One gets another perspective on the time inconsistency of the C-criterion by noting that, on the set X c of converging streams, the limit of wellbeing equals the limit of TDU welfare as the discount factor goes to 1. Hence, the following welfare function is an alternative representation of the C-criterion: W C ( 1 x) = (1 γ) W T β ( 1x) + γ lim δ 1 W T δ ( 1x). This means that the C-criterion might be looked at as a Pareto-efficent and nondictatorial aggregation of heterogeneous preferences, with (1 γ) weight on TDU and γ weight on undiscounted utilitarianism. Thus, by Jackson and Yariv (2015, Proposition 1), the C-criterion is time inconsistent. 24
26 Under RDU (see Zuber and Asheim, 2012, for a presentation and analysis of this criterion, including an axiomatization), a wellbeing stream is first reordered into a non-decreasing stream, so that discounting becomes according to rank, not according to time. The definition takes into account that a stream like (1, 0, 0, 0,... ), with elements of infinite rank, cannot be reordered into a non-decreasing stream. Therefore, let l( 1 x) denote lim inf of 1 x, and let L( 1 x) := {t N x t < l( 1 x)}. If L( 1 x) =, then let [1] x = (x [1], x [2],... ) be a non-decreasing reordering of all elements x t with t L( 1 x) (so that x [r] x [r+1] for all ranks r N). If L( 1 x) <, then let (x [1], x [2],..., x [ L(1 x) ]) be a non-decreasing reordering of all elements x t with t L( 1 x) (so that x [r] x [r+1] for all ranks r {1,..., L( 1 x) 1}), and set x [r] = l( 1 x) for all r > L( 1 x). Define the RDU welfare function W R : X [0, 1] for β (0, 1) as follows: W R ( 1 x) = Wβ T ( [1]x). RDU is characterized by axioms O, C, M, RD, RSEP, RSEF, RST and SA, where axioms RSEP, RSEF and RST are axioms SEP, SEF and ST restricted to the set X + of non-decreasing streams: Axiom RSEP (Restricted Separable Present) For any 1 x, 1 y, 1 x, 1 y X + such that (i) x t = x t and y t = y t for all t {1, 2} and (ii) x t = y t and x t = y t for all t N \ {1, 2}, 1 x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y. Axiom RSEF (Restricted Separable Future) For any 1 x, 1 y, 1 x, 1 y X + such that (i) x t = x t and y t = y t for all t N \ {1} and (ii) x 1 = y 1 and x 1 = y 1, 1x 1 y if and only if 1 x 1 y. Axiom RST (Restricted Stationarity) For any 1 x, 1 y, X +, there exists z [0, 1] with z min{x 1, y 1 } such that 1 x 1 y if and only if (z, 2 x ) (z, 2 y ), where x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 for all t N. However, RDU satisfies even axiom ST since, for all 1 x, 1 y X, it holds that 1x 1 y if and only if (0, 2 x ) (0, 2 y ), where x t = x t+1 and y t = y t+1 for all t N. The key is that, by setting z = 0, the internal ranking of the elements of 1 x 25
27 and 1 y remains unchanged when the wellbeing level z = 0 is imposed at time 1 and the elements of 1 x and 1 y are moved one period forward. Thus, it follows from Proposition 2 that RDU cannot satisfy SEF. In view of the fact that RDU satisfies RSEF, an example that illustrates the failure of SEF must involve streams that are not non-decreasing. In particular, if 1x = ( 2 5, 2 5, con 2 5 ) 1y = ( 2 5, 0, con1) 1x = (0, 2 5, con 2 5 ) 1y = (0, 0, con 1) with β = 1/2 and u(z) = z, then W R ( 1 x) = 8/20 > 7/20 = W R ( 1 y), while W R ( 1 x ) = 4/20 < 5/20 = W R ( 1 y ), thereby contradicting SEF. RDU fails also SEP. It follows from the fact that RDU satisfies RSEP, that also an example that illustrates the failure of SEP must involve streams that are not non-decreasing. In particular, if 1x = ( 1 5, 1, con1) 1y = ( 2 5, 2 5, con1) 1x = ( 1 5, 1, con 2 5 ) 1y = ( 2 5, 2 5, con 2 5 ) with β = 1/2 and u(z) = z, then W R ( 1 x) = 12/20 > 11/20 = W R ( 1 y), while W R ( 1 x ) = 3/10 < 4/10 = W R ( 1 y ), thereby contradicting SEP. The intuition for this failure is that we might want to treat the conflict between the worst-off and the second worst-off generation presented by the first comparison differently from the conflict between the worst-off and the best-off generation put forward by the second comparison. RDU satisfies the strong Pareto principle on the set of non-decreasing streams. 26
28 Hence, this criterion illustrates how axiom RD can be equivalent to the strong Pareto principle on the set of non-decreasing streams when a set of additional axioms are imposed. 7 Consequences of time inconsistency In the present section we investigate the consequences of the time inconsistency of the C-criterion and RDU in the Ramsey model (Ramsey, 1928). In this model, at each t N net production, f(k t 1 ), depends on the stock of capital, k t 1, and is split between wellbeing, x t, and net accumulation of capital, k t k t 1 : x t + (k t k t 1 ) = f(k t 1 ), with k 0 = k as initial condition. Capital is assumed to be non-negative, and the net production function f : R + R + is assumed to be increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable, with f(0) = 0, lim k 0 f (k) = and lim k f (k) = 0. Assume also that the utility function u : R + R, in addition to being increasing and continuously differentiable function, is strictly concave and satisfy lim x 0 u (x) =. Note that we, for the analysis of this section, allow wellbeing to take on values in R +, so the restriction to [0, 1] is relaxed and the set of possible wellbeing streams X equals R N +. A Markov strategy σ maps from the stock capital to a feasible flow of wellbeing: σ : k R + σ(k) [0, k + f(k)] For given initial condition k, a Markov strategy σ implements a capital stream: k(σ, k) = 0 k = (k 0, k 1,..., k t,... ) where k 0 = k and, for t N, k t = k t 1 + f(k t 1 ) σ(k t 1 ), 27
29 and a wellbeing stream: x(σ, k) = 1 x = (x 1, x 2,..., x t,... ) where for t N, x t = σ(k t 1 ). A Markov strategy σ is a Markov-perfect equilibrium under an swr represented by the swf W : X R if: For all k R +, W (x(σ, k)) = max x [0,k+f(k)] W (x, x(σ, k + f(k) x)). A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a way of formalizing sophisticated planning if the swr is time inconsistent. It follows from Beals and Koopmans (1969) that there is a unique optimum under TDU, with both capital and consumption streams being strictly monotone, with capital converging to k (β), and with wellbeing converging to f(k (β)), where k (β) is defined by β(1 + f (k (β)) = 1. Since the capital stream is strictly monotone, there exists a TDU Markov strategy, σ T, which implements the TDU optimum. Clearly, σ T is a Markov-perfect equilibrium under the swr represented by Wβ T, because otherwise it would have been possible to improve upon the TDU optimum. Under the C-criterion there is no optimal stream in the Ramsey model. The reason is that it is profitable to delay the concern for the infinite future, while infinite delay is worse. Furthermore, it is straightforward to argue that σ T is a Markov-perfect equilibrium under the C-criterion. The reason is that there is no possibility for any one generation to influence the infinite future, since under σ T wellbeing converges to f(k (β)) independently of the initial capital stock. Hence, it is a best reply for each generation to maximize the TDU criterion, which is what is achieved by following the TDU Markov strategy, σ T. There are other and better non-markovian equilibria under the C-criterion. To see this, let σ[k T, ) be the Markov strategy that implements the TDU optimum given that the stock of capital is constrained to remain at least k, where k > k (β). 28
30 Let a non-markovian strategy (Σ 1, Σ 2,..., Σ t,... ) be defined by, for all t N: Σ t ( 0 k t 1 ) = σ T (k t 1 ) σ[k T, ) (k t 1), if τ {0,..., t 1} such that k τ < k otherwise. Hence, if the initial capital stock k is at least as large as k > k (β), following (Σ 1, Σ 2,..., Σ t,... ) implies that k t converges to k. For an interval of k values exceeding k (β) this is an equilibrium strategy, as the loss in terms of TDU welfare is more than compensated for by a higher limit of wellbeing. Asheim and Ekeland (2016) show how such equilibria can be Markovian in continuous time. Under RDU, there exists a unique optimum for any k R + (Zuber and Asheim, 2012, Proposition 10). This optimum can be implemented by the following Markov strategy whereby the TDU optimum is implemented with a small initial capital stock (so that initial capital productivity is high) and the maximin path is implemented with a large initial capital stock (so that initial capital productivity is low): σ R (k) = σ T (k t 1 ) if k t < k (β), f(k), if k t k (β). Furthermore, σ R is a Markov-perfect equilibrium under RDU. Hence, for any k R +, the RDU optimum is time consistent. However, there are also other and worse Markov-perfect equilibria under RDU. The following is one example of a Markov-perfect equilibrium where capital is depleted asymptotically, so that the limit of wellbeing as time goes to infinity equals zero: σ(k) = f(k) + δk for all k, δ (0, 1]. This is a Markov-perfect equilibrium as any one generation cannot prevent that that the limit of wellbeing as time goes to infinity equals zero, so that all present wellbeing choices are equally bad. The existence of this Markov-perfect equilibrium 29
31 is caused by the RDU criterion not being continuous at infinity. The existence of such unattractive Markov-perfect equilibria calls for refinements that picks out the unique RDU optimum, as this is the obvious consequence of sophisticated planning whereby the best stream that will actually be followed under RDU is chosen. A refinement that works in the case is Revision-proof equilibrium (Asheim, 1997). What can be learned from our application of the C-criterion and RDU in the Ramsey model? We have shown that time inconsistent criteria of intergenerational equity can be applied in a growth model. However, there is a multiplicity of equilibria so that the principles for selection must be carefully considered. 8 Concluding remarks In this paper we have shown how conditions of intergenerational equity may necessitate time inconsistency of normative criteria. Furthermore, we have illustrated how such time inconsistency leads to interesting game theoretic challenges. More precisely, we have shown conditions under which criteria of intergenerational equity that cannot both be time consistent and time invariant. Throughout, we have insisted that the criteria be time invariant, which corresponds to consequentialist social decision-making. In particular, we have pointed to sophisticated planning as a rational manner to tackle the problem of time inconsistency, as illustrated in Section 7. An alternative route is to insist that the criteria be time consistent, and relax the requirement of time invariance. In the case of the C-criterion this means that the weight on the TDU part of the criterion vanishes as time goes to infinity, so that asymptotically only the limit of wellbeing matters. In the case of RDU, insistence of time consistency and relaxation of time invariance makes the criterion history dependent, as past wellbeing levels must be allowed to enter into the ranking of future wellbeing levels. This alternative approach has merit and is worthy of exploration. 30
The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity
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