Equitable Multi-Objective Optimization

Transcription

1 Equitable Multi-Objective Optimization Krzysztof Rzadca Polish-Japanese Institute of Information Technology based on joint work with Denis Trystram, Adam Wierzbicki

2 In many situations, fairness is not equal division Cake gets bigger two halfs peel and juice [ oranges [Fisher, 98]

3 However, sometimes after an equal division the cake gets smaller. gini index higher -> less equal economic crisis most equal distribution 5.00 communism -> capitalism transition GDP per capita, $ (prices from 004) Income inequality vs GDP in Poland

4 Idea: extend multi-objective optimization to include fairness. globally-optimal solution fair solutions decreasing global efficiency Pareto front criteria minimalization

5 Table of Contents definition of multi-agent optimization axioms of equity equitable dominance by Generalized Lorentz Dominance one equitable solution: mapping & comparison all equitable solutions: algorithms & comparison

6 Multi-objective optimization problem with multiple agents that must be treated fairly. Centralized decision maker Agents' utilities depend on each other (shared system) Payoffs not transferable min (f(x), f(x),..., fn(x)) f(x) first agent's objective f(x) second agent's objective fn(x) last agent's objective Examples: multi-agent scheduling [Agnetis et al, 004] robust shortest path [Perny et al, 006] budget redistribution [Kostreva et al, 004] facility location [Marsch, 994]

7 (Values of) agents' utilities have to be directly comparable. fair division cardinal utilities finite goods to distribute each agent: max her share utility functions express strength of preferences utility utility B twice as good as A # received goods facility location [Marsch, 994] budget redistribution [Kostreva et al, 004] A B solutions robust shortest path [Perny et al, 006] multi-agent scheduling [Agnetis et al, 004]

8 economics and social science have similar problem: How to measure fairness of income distribution Sort outcomes from worst to best; measure cumulative outcome of n worst outcomes [wikipedia] Lorentz Curve [Lorentz 905]

9 Gini index expresses the unfairness in Lorentz curve. [Gini, 9] [wikipedia] gini index

10 economic crisis average salary ~ 0$/month end of first boom min salary ~ 00$/month [wikipedia] gini index: lower -> more equal Gini Index can favor inefficient solutions

11 Idea: compare equity of solutions that have the same global efficiency economics: Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers mathematics: majorization multi-agent minimization y = [y, y,..., y',..., y'',..., yn] y' > y'' (y' is worse) y + ε'' ε' preferred to y ε' = [0,...,0,...,ε,...,0,...0] ε''= [0,...,0,...,0,...,ε,...0] e.g. [9,6] is preferred to [0, 5] both [9,6] and [0,5] have the same global efficiency 5

12 Axiomatic theory of fairness: properties of a fair division work to be done 3 symmetry lazy workers (minimizing their work) number of hours: common valuation axioms: optimality principle of transfers

13 A fair solution is symmetric: no one is favored as fair 3 =as 3

14 A fair solution is optimal: it can't be improved unilaterally fairer 3 > than 3

15 Principle of transfers: Rob the riches, feed the poor fairer 3 > than 3

16 We define a relation of equitable dominance that fulfills these axioms Relation L : partial order on RN fulfils axioms of equity Which is more equitable: [4,6] or [0,]? [0, ] =L [, 0] (symmetry) [, 0] <L [4,8] (transfers) [4, 8] <L [4, 6] (Pareto-optimality) So, [0, ] less equitable than [4, 6]

17 These criteria can be encapsulated in a relation of Generalized Lorentz Dominance (3 agents minimizing outcomes) [Chong, 976] sort outcomes from the worst to the best [, 5, 3 ] -> [ 5, 3, ] [, 5, ] -> [ 5,, ] construct cumulative outcome vector: [worst outcome, sum of two worst outcomes,..., some of n worst outcomes] [5, 3, ] -> [ 5, 8, 9 ] [ 5,, ] -> [ 5, 7, 9] compare cumulative vectors by Pareto dominance [ 5, 7, 9] dominates [ 5, 8, 9 ]

18 Lorentz dominance gives us straightforward interpretation f(x) eq worse equitably equal equitably better pareto-better criteria minimization pareto-worse eq worse f(x)

19 f(x) The same results can be obtained by using axioms directly B types of dominance F E A D A[6,]=B[,6] C[00,]<[99,]<A[6,] D[7,0]<[6,]<[5,]<[4,3] < pareto < transfers < equitable C f(x) C<A (none is pareto-dominated by [6,]) A<E A[6,]<[4,4]<E[4,3] F[5,4]>[6,3] and A[6,]<[5,3]<[4,4] (no pareto-dominance)

20 Finding equitably-optimal solutions

21 Example application: scheduling problem with multiple agents [Agnetis et al., 004] One processor Two sets of jobs G ΣC i, ΣC 3 budget based approach: NP-hard i 5 7 red optimization goal: C green optimization goal: R CGi = = 5 R i t = = 6 Pareto-set can have exponential size

22 Multicriteria optimization can model fairness between mutliple users. C g i 3 C 3 =++3 (best total completion time) tg Ci =6 g i =4+5+6 Cgi = = (better for red agent) C g t i =3 Cgi = = 8

23 One Fair Solution

24 Ordered Weighted Average (OWA) with positive, strictly decreasing weights gives an equitable solution. [Ogryczak, 000] OWA [Yager, 988]: sort outcomes by increasing performance, then apply weighted average vector: [, 0, 5] weights: [0.5, 0., 0.] OWA=0.5* * * OWA(y') < OWA(y'') <=> y' equitably-dominates y'' sketch of proof for '<=' symmetry holds: OWA sorts outcomes optimality holds: one outcome decreased -> OWA decreased transfers holds: larger outcomes have larger weights

25 Other equitable aggregation functions are also possible. [Kostreva et al, 004] Aggregator function g(y) maps outcome vector to R min(g(f(x)) Requirements on g(y): strictly increasing (-> on each outcome) impartial (-> not sensitive to permutations of y) strictly Schur-convexity: examples: (s : R -> R, strictly convex, strictly monotonic) g(y) = Σs(yi) so, e.g. g(y) = Σ yik,k >

26 Classic fairness criteria give only one Best solution Σfi min max fi lexmin -> generalizes min max; -> OWA with infinite weight difference Σ-log fi -> ok, as strictly Schur convex Nash Bargaining Solution -> not compatible

27 Sum of criteria is too weak to produce an equitable solution. G R min (ΣC i + ΣC i ) = min ΣCi Minimized by Shortest Processing Time (SPT) schedule:... p p t This is unfair to red agent... Pairs of jobs have to be permutated... p p But should it be the only solution? t

28 min max can result in a very inefficient solution (...but lexmin is equitably optimal) min sum min max inefficiency

29 Nash Bargaining Solution takes into account best alternative to agreement. [Agnetis, 008] min ( g - f ) ( g - f) How to chose g? What is the best alternative? ( g, g )

30 All Equitable Solutions Pareto-prune k best sum

31 In the worst case, there are exponentially many equitablyoptimal solutions p p p+ p+ Red jobs delayed by - but last green jobs adds to green agents' goal: Thus, this schedule favours red by: p+ ( p+ - ) + p+ -3 After switching order of two jobs (i <= p): i red: + i i- green: - i- sum: + i- Generalized Lorentz Dominance: (xi == if there was a switch) [C Σxi i ; C + Σxi i] ( C < C, both are constants) Pareto-independent; thus all possible switches equitably-independent

32 Pareto-prune: Find the complete Pareto-optimal set, then remove equitably dominated solutions. possible problem: too many Pareto-optimal solutions

33 Applied to multi-agent scheduling: dynamic programming for Pareto-opt schedules Pareto-opt schedules with n jobs: extend Pareto-opt schedules with n- jobs remove Pareto-dominated combinations order between jobs of the same owner: SPT thus schedule specifies owners of the first n jobs

34 k-best sum: deteriorating min sum, find equitably-optimal solutions [Perny et al, 006]

35 Finding equitable schedule for the same total score find chains of jobs of the same length starting from the chain of longest job, greedy reduce the difference of payoffs Why it works? after each chain, the difference of payoffs is decreased by starting from the longest jobs, we are able to reduce errors

36 Finding next degradation in current schedule, for each pair of jobs: (longer after shorter) l m switch such pair compute total score: ΣCi+=(m-l) add to not visited schedules (heap by ΣCi) take the smallest element from heap m l

37 Bounding the number of steps [A, B] x) equitably f ( f(x) eq worse + [B,A] A criteria minimization = pareto-better x) equitably better f ( equal no equitable solutions here eq worse f(x)

38 Equitable multi-agent optimization: conclusions multi-agent optimization becomes important (shared system, centralized control) true multicriteria approach to fair optimization (many solutions to chose from) single equitable solution: generalization of some known concepts all equitable solutions: can be intractable... (->approximation algorithms?)

39 Equitable Multi-Objective Optimization Krzysztof Rzadca, Polish-Japanese Institute of Information Technology based on joint work with Denis Trystram, Adam Wierzbicki Thank you!