A Generic Hybrid Encryption Construction in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
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1 A Generic Hybrid Encryption Construction in the Quantum Random Oracle Model Presented by: Angela Robinson Department of Mathematical Sciences, Florida Atlantic University April 4, 2018
2 Motivation Quantum-resistance Shor s Algorithm (1994) solves the following problems in quantum polynomial-time the integer factorization problem the discrete logarithm problem elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem Progress in the area of quantum information and computation has influenced the growth of quantum-resistant cryptography. Defeated cryptosystems: RSA, DSA, Elliptic Curve-based,... Potential survivors: Code-, lattice-, multivariate-, isogeny-, and hash-based
3 Motivation Hybrid Encryption Symmetric key encryption Usually faster runnning times Requires a shared secret in advance of the protocol Asymmetric encryption Does not require a shared secret between sender and recipient Can run slower for long messages Hybrid Encryption idea Encrypt message using symmetric component under random string k, then encrypt k under the asymmetric component
4 Hybrid Encryption Security Definitions IND-CCA An encryption scheme satisfies indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack if, given access to the decryption oracle, the advantage of an adversary A winning this game is negligible: A selects two messages m 0, m 1 and sends to a challenger C C selects b R {0, 1} and sends c b = Enc(m b ) to A A submits b {0, 1} to C and wins if b = b. Naive approach Combine IND-CCA secure symmetric component with IND-CCA secure asymmetric component to achieve IND-CCA secure hybrid encryption.
5 Fujisaki Okamoto transform Weaker security assumptions Fujisaki and Okamoto (1999) combined one-time symmetric encryption with one-way asymmetric encryption to achieve IND-CCA security. HY.Enc pk (m) = ASYM.Enc pk (r; H(r, m)) SYM.Enc G(r) (m) Observations: The asymmetric component encrypts randomness r The symmetric component encrypts message m under hash of randomness r There are, in a sense, two components.
6 Unruh s QROM-secure Fujisaki Okamoto Security in QROM Targhi and Unruh show how to modify FO transform to achieve security in the QROM. HY.Enc pk (m; r) = ASYM.Enc pk (r; H(r SYM.Enc G(r) (m))), SYM.Enc G(r) (m), H (r) Observations: The asymmetric component encrypts randomness r The symmetric component encrypts message m under hash of randomness r There is a third component that is simply the hash value of randomness r
7 Our contribution: QROM-secure Hybrid Encryption Let KEM.Enc(1 n, pk; r) = (k, c). Our QROM-secure hybrid construction is: Observations: HY.Enc pk (m; r) = c, SYM.Enc G(k) (m), H(k r). The asymmetric component is the ciphertext of an encapsulated key k The symmetric component encrypts message m under hash of encapsulated key k The third component is the hash value of encapsulated key k with random string r.
8 Hybrid Encryption Security Definitions One-way secure An asymmetric encryption scheme is said to be one-way if no polynomial-time adversary A can recover the whole plaintext from a given ciphertext. One-time secure A symmetric encryption scheme is one-time secure if no polynomial-time adversary A can distinguish between the encryption of two messages when a fresh key is used for encryption.
9 Preliminaries Quantum Random Oracle Model Classical Random Oracle Theoretical black box Responds to every unique query with a truly random response Disadvantage: cannot be implemented in polynomial space Advantage: enables security proofs, can be simulated in polynomial time and space A cryptosystem in the random oracle model is a cryptosystem where one or more hash functions are replaced by oracle queries to the random function.
10 Preliminaries Quantum Random Oracle Model Quantum information Described by qubits A single qubit can have a state of 0, 1, or any linear combination α α 1 1 satisfying α 0, α 1 C where α α 1 2 = 1 Observation permanently alters the state of a qubit Differences between QRO and RO There is no transcript of all queries to QRO Queries to the QRO in a superposition of all possible hash function inputs are allowed.
11 Generic Hybrid Encryption Scheme Tools KEM Let Π KEM = (KEM.Gen, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) be a key encapsulation mechanism with coinspace COIN KEM = {0, 1} n 1 key space K KEM = {0, 1} n 2 ciphertext space C KEM = {0, 1} n 3. The parameters n 1, n 2, n 3 depend on the security parameter n and should each be of size 2 ω(log n).
12 Generic Hybrid Encryption Scheme Tools Π KEM consists of the following three algorithms: KEM.Gen(1 n ) (pk, sk) KEM.Enc(1 n, pk; r) (k, c) KEM.Dec(c, sk) (k, r) or. δ-spread A key encapsulation mechanism is δ-spread if for every pk generated, max y {0,1} Pr[y = c (k, c) KEM.Enc(1 n, pk; r), $ r COIN KEM ] 1 2 δ. As defined, by Unruh, we say that the KEM Π KEM is well-spread if δ = ω(log(n)).
13 Generic Hybrid Encryption Scheme Tools Let Π SYM = (SYM.Enc, SYM.Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme with key space K SYM, and message space M SYM. Two hash functions H : {0, 1} n 2 K SYM G : {0, 1} n 1+n 3 {0, 1} l
14 Generic Hybrid Encryption Scheme Protocol The hybrid encryption scheme Enc, on input m and security parameter n runs as follows: 1 Gen runs KEM.Gen(1 n ) to produce (pk, sk) $ 2 Enc chooses r COIN KEM, then runs KEM.Enc(1 n, pk; r) = (k, c). Enc defines α := c β := SYM.Enc G(k) (m) γ := H(k r) 3 Enc returns ciphertext (α, β, γ)
15 Generic Hybrid Encryption Scheme The hybrid decryption scheme Dec, on input (α, β, γ), sk runs as follows: 1 Compute (k, r) := KEM.Dec(α, sk). If value is, return. 2 If γ H(k r), return. 3 Otherwise, m := SYM.Dec G(k) (β). Return m. Theorem The hybrid scheme Π HY is IND-CCA secure in the quantum random oracle model if Π KEM is one-way secure and well-spread, and if Π SYM is one-time secure.
16 Security Proof - Game 0 Generate: Challenge: Guess: Return b = b H $ Ω H, G $ Ω G (pk, sk) $ KEM.Gen(1 n ), r COIN KEM m 0, m 1 A G,H,Dec hy (pk) b $ {0, 1} $ (k, c ) $ KEM.Enc(1 n, pk; r) α c β SYM.Enc G(k )(m b ) γ H(k r) b A G,H,Dec hy (α, β, γ )
17 Generic Hybrid Encryption Scheme Proof techniques We must apply OW2H Lemma by Unruh. Lemma One Way to Hiding Lemma: Let H : {0, 1} l 1 {0, 1} l 2 be a random oracle. Consider an oracle algorithm A 1 that makes at most q queries to H. Let C 1 be an oracle algorithm that on input x does the following: 1 Pick i $ {1,..., q}, y $ {0, 1} l 2 2 Run A H 1 (x, y) until (just before) the i-th query. 3 Measure the argument of the query in the computational basis and return the measurement outcome. If A H 1 makes less than i queries to H, then return.
18 Generic Hybrid Encryption Scheme Proof techniques Let PA 1, P2 A, P C be defined as follows: PA 1 := Pr[b = 1 H $ Ω H, x $ {0, 1} l 1, b A H 1 (x, H(x))] PA 2 := Pr[b = 1 H $ Ω H, x $ {0, 1} l 1, b A H 1 (x, y)] P C := Pr[x = x H $ Ω H, x $ {0, 1} l 1, x C1 H (x, i)] Then PA 1 PA 2 2q P C.
19 Generic Hybrid Encryption Scheme Results Proof by sequence of security games. Combining probabilities, this yields an upper bound on the success probability in Game 0: Pr[1 Game0] < negl(n)kem + negl(n) SYM + 2q 2 ω(logn). This scheme contributes IND-CCA secure hybrid encryption scheme believed to be quantum-resistant.
20 Potential constructions BIKE-KEM + AES-GCM Frodo-KEM + AES-GCM Kyber-KEM + AES-GCM post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions
21 References Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes, Fujisaki, Eiichiro and Okamoto, Tatsuaki, CRYPTO 99, 1999 Post-Quantum Security of the Fujisaki-Okamoto and OAEP Transforms, Targhi, Ehsan Ebrahimi and Unruh, Dominique, 14th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, 2016 REACT: Rapid Enhanced-Security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform, Okamoto, Tatsuaki and Pointcheval, David, Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology, 2001 Quantum Computation and Quantum Information by Nielsen and Chuang, 2000
22 Additional slides
23 Formal Security Definitions One-way secure Definition A key encapsulation mechanism Π KEM = (KEM.Gen, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) is one-way secure if no quantum polynomial-time adversary A can win in the Game OW A,Π KEM (n) game, except with probability at most negl(n) KEM : KeyGen: The challenger C runs KEM.Gen(1 n ) to obtain a pair of keys (pk, sk) $ Query: C selects r COIN KEM and runs KEM.Enc(1 n, pk; r) to obtain a random key and ciphertext pair (k, c). C sends c to A. Guess: The adversary on input (pk, c) produces a bit string k and wins if k = k.
24 Formal Security Definitions One-time secure Definition A symmetric encryption scheme Π SYM = (SYM.Enc, SYM.Dec) is one-time secure if no quantum polynomial-time adversary A can win in game Game OT (n), except with probability at most A,Π SYM negl(n)sym : KeyGen: The challenger C picks a key k $ K SYM Query: On input 1 n, A chooses two messages m 0, m 1 of the same length and sends them to the challenger. C chooses b $ {0, 1} and responds with c $ SYM.Enc k (m b ) Guess: A produces a bit b and wins if b = b.
25 Formal Security Definitions IND-CCA in QROM Definition A hybrid encryption scheme Π HY is IND-CCA in the QROM if no efficient quantum adversary A can win in the Game CCA QRO (n), A,Π HY except with probability at most negl(n): KeyGen: The challenger runs Gen on input n, which runs KEM.Gen(1 n ) to produce (pk, sk). Query: The adversary A is given the public key pk along with classical access to the decryption oracle and quantum access to the random oracles G, H. A chooses two messages m 0, m 1 of the same length and sends them to the challenger C. C chooses b $ {0, 1} and responds with c Enc pk (m b ). Guess: A continues to send classical decryption queries to Dec, but may not query c. A also sends quantum queries to random oracles G, H.
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