Correlated Equilibria: Rationality and Dynamics
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1 Correlated Equilibria: Rationality and Dynamics Sergiu Hart June 2010 AUMANN 80 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 1
2 CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA: RATIONALITY AND DYNAMICS Sergiu Hart Center for the Study of Rationality Dept of Mathematics Dept of Economics The Hebrew University of Jerusalem SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 2
3 Correlated Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 3
4 Correlated Equilibrium CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM Aumann, JME 1974 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 3
5 Correlated Equilibrium CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM : Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant information before playing the game Aumann, JME 1974 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 3
6 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 4
7 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game Examples: SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 4
8 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game Examples: Independent signals SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 4
9 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game Examples: Independent signals Nash equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 4
10 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game Examples: Independent signals Nash equilibrium Public signals ( sunspots ) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 4
11 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game Examples: Independent signals Nash equilibrium Public signals ( sunspots ) convex combinations of Nash equilibria SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 4
12 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game Examples: Independent signals Nash equilibrium Public signals ( sunspots ) convex combinations of Nash equilibria Butterflies play the Chicken Game ( Speckled Wood Pararge aegeria) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 4
13 Correlated Equilibria "Chicken" game LEAVE STAY LEAVE 5, 5 3, 6 STAY 6, 3 0, 0 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 5
14 Correlated Equilibria "Chicken" game LEAVE STAY LEAVE 5, 5 3, 6 STAY 6, 3 0, 0 a Nash equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 5
15 Correlated Equilibria "Chicken" game LEAVE STAY LEAVE 5, 5 3, 6 STAY 6, 3 0, 0 another Nash equilibriumi SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 5
16 Correlated Equilibria "Chicken" game LEAVE STAY LEAVE 5, 5 3, 6 STAY 6, 3 0, 0 L 0 1/2 1/2 0 a (publicly) correlated equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 5
17 Correlated Equilibria "Chicken" game LEAVE STAY LEAVE 5, 5 3, 6 STAY 6, 3 0, 0 L S L 1/3 1/3 S 1/3 0 another correlated equilibrium after signal L play LEAVE after signal S play STAY SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 5
18 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when the players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game (Aumann 1974) Examples: Independent signals Nash equilibrium Public signals ( sunspots ) convex combinations of Nash equilibria Butterflies play the Chicken Game ( Speckled Wood Pararge aegeria) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 6
19 Correlated Equilibrium A Correlated Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium when the players receive payoff-irrelevant signals before playing the game (Aumann 1974) Examples: Independent signals Nash equilibrium Public signals ( sunspots ) convex combinations of Nash equilibria Butterflies play the Chicken Game ( Speckled Wood Pararge aegeria) Boston Celtics (NBA) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 6
20 Correlated Equilibrium Signals (public, correlated) are unavoidable SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 7
21 Correlated Equilibrium Signals (public, correlated) are unavoidable Common Knowledge of Rationality Correlated Equilibrium (Aumann 1987) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 7
22 Correlated Equilibrium Signals (public, correlated) are unavoidable Common Knowledge of Rationality Correlated Equilibrium (Aumann 1987) A joint distribution z is a correlated equilibrium u(j, s i )z(j, s i ) u(k, s i )z(j, s i ) s i s i for all i N and all j, k S i SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 7
23 Dynamics: Nash Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 8
24 Dynamics: Nash Equilibrium FACT SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 8
25 Dynamics: Nash Equilibrium FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 8
26 Dynamics: Nash Equilibrium FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "general" SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 8
27 Dynamics: Nash Equilibrium FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "general" : in all games SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 8
28 Dynamics: Nash Equilibrium FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "general" : in all games rather than: in specific classes of games SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 8
29 Dynamics: Nash Equilibrium FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "general" : in all games rather than: in specific classes of games: two-person zero-sum games two-person potential games supermodular games... SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 8
30 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 9
31 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "leading to Nash equilibrium" SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 9
32 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "leading to Nash equilibrium" : at a Nash equilibrium (or close to it) from some time on SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 9
33 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
34 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural" SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
35 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural" : SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
36 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural" : adaptive (reacting, improving,...) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
37 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural" : adaptive (reacting, improving,...) simple and efficient SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
38 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural" : adaptive (reacting, improving,...) simple and efficient: computation (performed at each step) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
39 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural" : adaptive (reacting, improving,...) simple and efficient: computation (performed at each step) time (how long to reach equilibrium) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
40 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural" : adaptive (reacting, improving,...) simple and efficient: computation (performed at each step) time (how long to reach equilibrium) information (of each player) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
41 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural" : adaptive (reacting, improving,...) simple and efficient: computation (performed at each step) time (how long to reach equilibrium) information (of each player) bounded rationality SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 10
42 Dynamics Dynamics that are NOT "natural" : SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 11
43 Dynamics Dynamics that are NOT "natural" : exhaustive search (deterministic or stochastic) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 11
44 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
45 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
46 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
47 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
48 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
49 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
50 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
51 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
52 Exhaustive Search SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 12
53 Dynamics Dynamics that are NOT "natural" : exhaustive search (deterministic or stochastic) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 13
54 Dynamics Dynamics that are NOT "natural" : exhaustive search (deterministic or stochastic) using a mediator SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 13
55 Dynamics Dynamics that are NOT "natural" : exhaustive search (deterministic or stochastic) using a mediator broadcasting the private information and then performing joint computation SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 13
56 Dynamics Dynamics that are NOT "natural" : exhaustive search (deterministic or stochastic) using a mediator broadcasting the private information and then performing joint computation fully rational learning (prior beliefs on the strategies of the opponents, Bayesian updating, optimization) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 13
57 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural": adaptive simple and efficient: computation (performed at each step) time (how long to reach equilibrium) information (of each player) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 14
58 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural": adaptive simple and efficient: computation (performed at each step) time (how long to reach equilibrium) information (of each player) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 14
59 Dynamics FACT There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium "natural": adaptive simple and efficient: computation (performed at each step) time (how long to reach equilibrium) information (of each player) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 14
60 Natural Dynamics: Information SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 15
61 Natural Dynamics: Information Each player knows only his own payoff (utility) function SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 15
62 Natural Dynamics: Information Each player knows only his own payoff (utility) function (does not know the payoff functions of the other players) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 15
63 Natural Dynamics: Information UNCOUPLED DYNAMICS : Each player knows only his own payoff (utility) function (does not know the payoff functions of the other players) Hart and Mas-Colell, AER 2003 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 15
64 Natural Dynamics: Information UNCOUPLED DYNAMICS : Each player knows only his own payoff (utility) function (does not know the payoff functions of the other players) (privacy-preserving, decentralized, distributed...) Hart and Mas-Colell, AER 2003 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 15
65 Games N-person game in strategic (normal) form: Players i = 1, 2,..., N SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 16
66 Games N-person game in strategic (normal) form: Players i = 1, 2,..., N For each player i: Actions a i in A i SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 16
67 Games N-person game in strategic (normal) form: Players i = 1, 2,..., N For each player i: Actions a i in A i For each player i: Payoffs (utilities) u i (a) u i (a 1, a 2,..., a N ) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 16
68 Dynamics Time t = 1, 2,... SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 17
69 Dynamics Time t = 1, 2,... At period t each player i chooses an action a i t in A i SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 17
70 Dynamics Time t = 1, 2,... At period t each player i chooses an action a i t in A i according to a probability distribution σ i t in (A i ) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 17
71 Dynamics Fix the set of players 1, 2,..., N and their action spaces A 1, A 2,..., A N SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 18
72 Dynamics Fix the set of players 1, 2,..., N and their action spaces A 1, A 2,..., A N A general dynamic: SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 18
73 Dynamics Fix the set of players 1, 2,..., N and their action spaces A 1, A 2,..., A N A general dynamic: σ i t σi t ( HISTORY ; GAME ) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 18
74 Dynamics Fix the set of players 1, 2,..., N and their action spaces A 1, A 2,..., A N A general dynamic: σ i t σi t ( HISTORY ; GAME ) σ i t ( HISTORY ; u1,..., u i,..., u N ) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 18
75 Uncoupled Dynamics Fix the set of players 1, 2,..., N and their action spaces A 1, A 2,..., A N A general dynamic: σ i t σi t ( HISTORY ; GAME ) σ i t ( HISTORY ; u1,..., u i,..., u N ) An UNCOUPLED dynamic: SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 18
76 Uncoupled Dynamics Fix the set of players 1, 2,..., N and their action spaces A 1, A 2,..., A N A general dynamic: σ i t σi t ( HISTORY ; GAME ) σ i t ( HISTORY ; u1,..., u i,..., u N ) An UNCOUPLED dynamic: σ i t σi t ( HISTORY ; ui ) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 18
77 Natural Dynamics: Time HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 19
78 Natural Dynamics: Time HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? Estimate the number of time periods it takes until a Nash equilibrium is reached SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 19
79 Natural Dynamics: Time HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? Estimate the number of time periods it takes until a Nash equilibrium is reached How? SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 19
80 Natural Dynamics: Time HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? Estimate the number of time periods it takes until a Nash equilibrium is reached How? An uncoupled dynamic A distributed computational procedure SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 19
81 Natural Dynamics: Time HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? Estimate the number of time periods it takes until a Nash equilibrium is reached How? An uncoupled dynamic A distributed computational procedure COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 19
82 How Long to Equilibrium An uncoupled dynamic leading to Nash equilibria is TIME-EFFICIENT if SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 20
83 How Long to Equilibrium An uncoupled dynamic leading to Nash equilibria is TIME-EFFICIENT if the TIME IT TAKES SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 20
84 How Long to Equilibrium An uncoupled dynamic leading to Nash equilibria is TIME-EFFICIENT if the TIME IT TAKES is POLYNOMIAL in the number of players SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 20
85 How Long to Equilibrium An uncoupled dynamic leading to Nash equilibria is TIME-EFFICIENT if the TIME IT TAKES is POLYNOMIAL in the number of players (rather than: exponential) SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 20
86 How Long to Equilibrium An uncoupled dynamic leading to Nash equilibria is TIME-EFFICIENT if the TIME IT TAKES is POLYNOMIAL in the number of players (rather than: exponential) Theorem. There are NO TIME-EFFICIENT uncoupled dynamics that reach a pure Nash equilibrium in all games where such equilibria exist. SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 20
87 How Long to Equilibrium An uncoupled dynamic leading to Nash equilibria is TIME-EFFICIENT if the TIME IT TAKES is POLYNOMIAL in the number of players (rather than: exponential) Theorem. There are NO TIME-EFFICIENT uncoupled dynamics that reach a pure Nash equilibrium in all games where such equilibria exist. Hart and Mansour, GEB 2010 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 20
88 How Long to Equilibrium An uncoupled dynamic leading to Nash equilibria is TIME-EFFICIENT if the TIME IT TAKES is POLYNOMIAL in the number of players (rather than: exponential) Theorem. There are NO TIME-EFFICIENT uncoupled dynamics that reach a pure Nash equilibrium in all games where such equilibria exist. In fact: exponential, like exhaustive search Hart and Mansour, GEB 2010 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 20
89 Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 21
90 Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium FACT There are NO general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 21
91 Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium FACT There are NO general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium RESULT There CANNOT BE general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 21
92 Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium RESULT There CANNOT BE general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 22
93 Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium RESULT There CANNOT BE general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium Perhaps we are asking too much? SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 22
94 Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium RESULT There CANNOT BE general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium Perhaps we are asking too much? For instance, the size of the data (the payoff functions) is exponential rather than polynomial in the number of players SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 22
95 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 23
96 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria RESULT THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 23
97 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria RESULT THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA Regret Matching Hart and Mas-Colell, Ec ca 2000 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 23
98 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria RESULT THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA Regret Matching General regret-based dynamics Hart and Mas-Colell, Ec ca 2000, JET 2001 SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 23
99 Regret Matching SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 24
100 Regret Matching "REGRET": the increase in past payoff, if any, if a different action would have been used SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 24
101 Regret Matching "REGRET": the increase in past payoff, if any, if a different action would have been used "MATCHING": switching to a different action with a probability that is proportional to the regret for that action SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 24
102 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 25
103 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA "general": in all games SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 25
104 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA "general": in all games "natural": SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 25
105 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA "general": in all games "natural": adaptive (also: close to "behavioral") SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 25
106 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA "general": in all games "natural": adaptive (also: close to "behavioral") simple and efficient: computation, time, information SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 25
107 Dynamics & Correlated Equilibria THERE EXIST general, natural dynamics leading to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA "general": in all games "natural": adaptive (also: close to "behavioral") simple and efficient: computation, time, information "leading to correlated equilibria": statistics of play become close to CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 25
108 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 26
109 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 26
110 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 27
111 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 28
112 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 29
113 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 30
114 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 31
115 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 32
116 Regret Matching and Beyond SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 33
117 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 34
118 Dynamics and Equilibrium NASH EQUILIBRIUM: a fixed-point of a non-linear map SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 34
119 Dynamics and Equilibrium NASH EQUILIBRIUM: a fixed-point of a non-linear map CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM: a solution of finitely many linear inequalities SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 34
120 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 35
121 Dynamics and Equilibrium "LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION": SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 35
122 Dynamics and Equilibrium "LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION": There must be some COORDINATION SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 35
123 Dynamics and Equilibrium "LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION": There must be some COORDINATION either in the EQUILIBRIUM notion, SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 35
124 Dynamics and Equilibrium "LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION": There must be some COORDINATION either in the EQUILIBRIUM notion, or in the DYNAMIC SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 35
125 The "Program" SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 36
126 The "Program" A. Demarcate the BORDER between SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 36
127 The "Program" A. Demarcate the BORDER between classes of dynamics where convergence to equilibria CAN be obtained SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 36
128 The "Program" A. Demarcate the BORDER between classes of dynamics where convergence to equilibria CAN be obtained, and classes of dynamics where convergence to equilibria CANNOT be obtained SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 36
129 The "Program" A. Demarcate the BORDER between classes of dynamics where convergence to equilibria CAN be obtained, and classes of dynamics where convergence to equilibria CANNOT be obtained B. Find NATURAL dynamics for the various equilibrium concepts SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 36
130 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
131 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
132 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
133 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
134 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
135 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
136 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
137 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
138 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
139 Dynamics and Equilibrium SERGIU HART c 2010 p. 37
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